

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
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
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


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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Volume X

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Number 1

THE SUPERNATURAL BIRTH OF JESUS

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I. CAN IT BE ESTABLISHED HISTORICALLY?

The question thus put by the editors of the *Journal* presupposes a negative answer to its complement: "Is the doctrine of the supernatural birth of Jesus essential to Christianity?" If the doctrine is essential to Christianity, only opponents of Christianity can argue against it. Present participants are surely assumed to be Christians. They may reasonably be assumed to hold at least that doctrine of incarnation which Paul declares to be the essence of the gospel, to wit; that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself." This then is our starting-point: an incarnation doctrine which conceives the Redeemer to have become partaker of flesh and blood "in like manner" with ourselves, involving exposure to "the same" conditions of temptation, weakness, suffering, and death. The belief that he was made literally "in all points like unto his brethren, yet without sin," has equal theological standing with the belief that the "body prepared for him" was miraculously framed. If to some it appears an advantage to the Redeemer that his earthly house of this tabernacle should be unique, to others it will seem the reverse, by

just so much as it obscures that identity of conditions as regards entrance into, continuance in, and exit from our human life, which forms the basis of the argument in Heb. 2:11-18; 4:15. It must therefore be in some other sense that we find the supernatural birth still referred to as "matter of faith" in the following extract from a recent discussion of the subject:¹

To sum up, the evidence appears clearly to indicate that the doctrine of virgin birth was not clearly revealed in the earlier part of the apostolic age. We have no proof that Paul was acquainted with it. The genealogies appear to us to have been drawn up by persons who did not hold the doctrine. Like many other doctrines, we believe it to have been kept back until conflict with heresy² brought it forward. . . . We regard it as a matter of faith, though we admit that it was introduced into church teaching at a date later than the earliest time.

Loisy justly criticises Protestant striving after the belief of "the earliest time," as if this alone were needful. Whether his opponent, the great champion of historical criticism, is imbued with this idea or not, Wright and Loisy both do well to reassert the rights of post-apostolic doctrine. The belief of the earliest time is not necessarily the best; it may not be even the most correct historically. So with the story of Jesus' supernatural birth. If Stephen and Paul can be supposed to have died in ignorance of it, it cannot indeed be "essential to Christianity;" but it may be both historical and, in some sense, "matter of faith," though matters of faith are not wont to be subject to the fluctuations of historical criticism.³

¹ Chap. xviii of A. Wright's *Synopsis of the Gospels in Greek*, 2d ed., 1903, on "The Virgin Birth."

² Professor Wright doubtless refers to the earliest and most general type of Greek and Gnostic heresy, viz., Docetism, which denied the "flesh" of Jesus and the "resurrection of the flesh" (1 John 4:2; 2 John, vs. 7). Irenæus tells us that those who made this distinction between the spiritual æon Christ and the passible Jesus preferred the gospel by Mark, wherein "the beginning of the gospel" was the descent of the Spirit into Jesus at the baptism. Marcion similarly cut off the opening chapters of Luke, beginning: "In the fifteenth year of Tiberius God came down to Capernaum, a city of Galilee." The Valentinian Gnostics preferred John because it also gave them an incarnation doctrine without the necessity of admitting that in his whole human nature from his very conception in the womb (Luke 1:35) Jesus was "the Son of God." The insistence on the virgin birth in the Apostles' Creed, as well as the dwelling on the details of the passion, and the phrase "the resurrection of the flesh" (*τῆς σαρκὸς*), are directed against this extreme anti-materialism. See McGiffert's *The Apostles' Creed*.

³ See the preceding note for the use made by the church of the second century of the virgin birth as "matter of faith." All moderns will sympathize with the framers

1. Were the question before us to be taken in the strict sense, it is self-evident that only a negative answer could be given. To ask that history, a science dealing only with secondary causation, should "establish" a "supernatural" occurrence, is to demand of it something beyond its powers. In fact, historical proof would make the subject no longer "matter of faith," but purely matter of knowledge, thereby depriving it of religious value. "Spiritual things must be spiritually discerned." The incredibly bad taste of the second century illustrates to us, in its attempt to manufacture documentary proof of the virgin birth, how worthless would be even the most ancient and authentic of documents as proof of the supernatural. Even in days when the *Protevangelium Jacobi* was supposed to be the actual testimony of the Lord's brother, its repulsive proofs of the virginity of Mary were no real aids to faith, nor could any conceivable discovery of ancient documents do more than corroborate, for example, the conjecture of Professor Sanday that the narrative of Luke 1:4—2:52 represents the story of Mary as related by herself some time after the formation of the Jerusalem church. Even this evidence would compel no one to believe the story; and, if it did, opponents would simply say: "It appears, then, that parthenogenesis is not confined to the lowest orders of the biological series." Historical proof can no more overtake "matter of faith" than a man can overtake his shadow.

2. The real question concerns simply the character of the birth stories of Matthew and Luke as historical sources. Exemption from the same criticism which would be applied to similar documents laid bare yesterday by the explorer's spade is confession of judgment. The asking of a verdict in this court implies equality of treatment.

But does not the use of the term "supernatural" preclude a favorable judgment? No; for the historical critic expects to find accounts of miracle in documents of this period, most of all in religious writings, even the most authentic. Documentary criticism may be said to have rendered its verdict with absolute unanimity regarding one of this creed rather than their idealistic opponents, whose incarnation doctrine was docetic, framed on the model of the mythologic avatar. It is obvious, however, that here the real "matter of faith" is the humanity of the birth, not its miraculousness. The latter stands for the principle of divinity which was admitted on both sides.

New Testament authority, and with almost complete unanimity regarding a second, the so-called "Diary" of Luke and the major epistles of Paul. Both of these involve accounts of, or at least allusions to, events as "supernatural" to the writers as the virgin birth. The verdict regarding both documents is emphatic in favor of their contemporary and authentic character. It is a later and independent question whether the writers mistake and misrepresent the nature of the occurrences they narrate. This may be true; or it may be that the scientists have drawn too close the limits of the credible. Acts 20:7-12 and 28:1-10 belong to the report of an eyewitness, who certainly believed he had seen Paul raise a man from the dead (Gal. 3:5; 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; 13:2; 14:8; 15:3-8; 2 Cor. 12:4, 12) are claims of Paul on his own behalf and on behalf of men personally known to him to have had supernatural experiences, and exercised supernatural powers. If the verdict of historical criticism upon the birth stories of Matthew and Luke be equally favorable, the involved references to the supernatural will have to be taken into the bargain. The answer of the skeptically disposed may be: There is still room for naïve self-deception to play a part, as in Acts 20:7-12, or for the confounding of the limits of subjective and objective, as in 1 Cor. 15:3-8 and 2 Cor. 12:4. The mystically disposed may insist upon a strictly supernatural explanation—if appeal to the supernatural can be called "explanation." The verdict of historical criticism on the age and character of the documents will be unaffected by such consequences, if it is to count toward the establishing or disestablishing of a given fact.⁴

3. From the quotation already made it is apparent that not even advocates of the virgin birth claim an origin for this belief in "the earliest times." We may add that the belief of the earliest times maintained itself for more than a century in Palestine in strenuous opposition to it. Even so orthodox a father as Justin Martyr (152 A. D.), who vehemently denies the name of Christian to those "god-

⁴ Date and credibility of documents are certainly affected by the degree and nature of the writer's appeal to the supernatural, as when the *Gospel of Thomas* or other late "infancy gospels" relate their puerilities about the boy Jesus' miraculous tricks with schoolmaster and playmates. But the quality and appropriateness of these as compared with the admitted "miracles" of Paul and the Diarist may determine our judgment of the writing which contains them, without raising the question of miracle *per se*.

less, impious heretics who are called Christians . . . who say there is no (fleshly) resurrection from the dead, but that their souls when they die are taken to heaven,"⁵ does not venture to withhold it from his Jewish fellow-believers, who, besides their clinging to circumcision and the Law, maintained "that He [Jesus] was born man of men and became Christ by election."⁶ In fact, it is much less surprising that ardent opponents of Docetism, like Ignatius and Justin, should hold strongly for themselves to the virgin birth, which Ignatius classes as one of "the three mysteries that were hid from the æons,"⁷ than that Justin should show such tolerance of Ebionite conservatism, and Ignatius connect his doctrine not so much with our Matthew as with an apocalyptic writing of very mythological type, more closely related to Rev. 12:1-6 and certain obscure Gnostic legends than to the canonical story.⁸

Of course, the fixing of an exact date when for the Greek-speaking church the doctrine of the virgin birth became "matter of faith," though by no means "essential to Christianity," would be impracticable. And yet it is at least interesting in conjunction with Ignatius' anti-docetic birth-doctrine of the Virgin and the Star to observe the curious tradition preserved in an ancient Syriac document entitled "As to the Star: showing how and by what means the Magi knew the Star, and that Joseph did not take Mary as his wife." This document, which dates the visit of the Magi to Bethlehem in the year 311

⁵ *Dialogue*, lxxx.

⁶ *Ibid.*, xlvii, xlviii; cf. Irenæus, *Her.*, i, 26: "He [Cerinthus] represented Jesus as having not been born of a virgin, but as being the son of Joseph and Mary according to the ordinary course of human generation . . . after his baptism Christ descended upon him in the form of a dove. . . . Those who are called Ebionites hold similar opinions with respect to the Lord."

⁷ *Ad Eph.*, xviii; cf. Justin Martyr, *Dial.*, xxxvi.

⁸ Cf. Harnack, *Chronologie*, p. 538, on the Gnostic legends of the Star. In Abulfaraj a virgin (Astarte?) is seen in the star. In the "Treasure-cave" (Berzold, Vol. I, p. 56) this is a prophecy of Nimrod. Ignatius connects the story of the cry, "Lift up your heads, O ye gates" (Ps. 24:7), which he, like Justin and later fathers, conceives as uttered at Christ's resurrection to the guardians of the gates of the seven heavens, with 1 Cor. 2:7 f. As in the *Visio Isaiae*, Christ's entrance into the world must be kept secret from the æons. Hence "the virginity of Mary, and her child-bearing (cf. Rev. 12:4-6), and likewise also the death of the Lord, were hidden from the prince of this world." Ignatius (*ibid.*, xviii) holds to Rom. 1:4 and the genealogies alike by his favorite method of antinomy.

(Sel. er. = 1 B. C.), "in the second year of our Redeemer," appeals for its own authentication to a council alleged to have assembled for the purpose in Rome, the scene of Ignatius' martyrdom in 110 or 117, "in the year 430 [= 119 A. D.], under the reign of Hadrianus Cæsar, in the consulship of Severus and Fulgus, and the episcopate of Xystus [Sixtus I], bishop of the city of Rome."⁹ The legend itself is late and worthless; but its dates are surprising for their agreement with fact rather than with current tradition; and even if mere guesswork, must be based on some second- or third-century chronography. But even if there be here no authentic trace, this date for the taking up of the doctrine at Rome, as "matter of faith," cannot be far wrong. Hermas of Rome in 125-40 uses only the gospel of Mark. His predecessor, Clement (95 A. D.), shows no knowledge of our Matthew, and his contemporary, Marcion (ca. 140), chooses Luke as the basis of his mutilated gospel, rejecting the birth story. If for Justin (ca. 152) Matthew is already the favorite gospel, it must have come rapidly into favor in Rome soon after 125 A. D., though doubtless it was earlier in circulation in Syria.

4. In Syria, therefore, not far from the year 100, is the first trace of the doctrine; for the gospel of Luke is credibly attributed to Antioch, whence Cerdo, the teacher of Marcion, would naturally bring it to Rome. The doctrine appears almost simultaneously in two widely different accounts. Our first gospel is generally recognized as deriving its name, "according to Matthew," from the fact that it frames in the five great groups of agglutinated *logoi*, or teachings of Jesus, which that apostle had "compiled in the Hebrew language" by means of a Greek narrative principally drawn from Mark, but somewhat enlarged by additions from other sources. To this added material from unknown, perhaps oral, sources, whereby the Hebrew *syntagma* of "sayings of the Lord" was expanded into a full narrative for the use of Greek-speaking Christians in southern Syria (or Egypt?), at a time when the gospel of Mark had already determined the main outline of gospel tradition, the story of the virgin birth as related in our first gospel must be assigned. The third gospel also expands the story of Mark by the addition of another narrative which contained

⁹ Text by W. Wright in *Journal of Sacred Literature*, October, 1866; discussion by Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1895.

the birth story. No amount of harmonistic ingenuity has ever adjusted Matthew's picture of Bethlehem as the home of Jesus' parents, whither they are prevented from returning after the flight into Egypt, to Luke's, where Nazareth is their home, and the census of Quirinius is the occasion of their visit to Bethlehem. There is absolutely no other point of contact than just the claim of the virgin birth in Bethlehem. As regards all the details of the narratives, their mutual incompatibilities exclude dependence on their details, to say nothing of the highly legendary character of the narratives themselves, especially Matthew's, in their individual contents.¹⁰

The mistaken exegesis of the Old Testament, the forced fulfillments of prophecy, the incompatibility with known events regarding the close of Herod's reign, the deposition of Archelaus and ensuing census of Quirinius—all these are difficulties of such admitted magnitude as make argument almost superfluous to prove their general untrustworthiness. There are but the two points of agreement that Jesus' birth was "in Bethlehem of Judea, for thus it is written by the prophet;" and that it was "by the Holy Ghost, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, 'Behold a virgin [Hebrew "a young woman"] shall conceive and bear a son.'" But it is just this central fact, coincidentally maintained by these widely divergent traditions, which cannot well be accounted for by devout legend. For even the LXX rendering of Isa. 7:14 could not of itself give rise to the claim of virgin birth, especially in the case of a writer like the author of Matt., chaps. 1 f., who certainly consults the Hebrew. The belief must have come first; the Scripture proof-text was an after-thought; otherwise it would appear in Luke also.¹¹

¹⁰ It does not imply *a priori* rejection of the supernatural to class the star which "goes before" the magi and "stands over" the place of the nativity with lights that never were on sea or land. The paraphernalia of visions and angels in both accounts (Luke 1:26, "the angel Gabriel") belong to the realm of religious fiction, abundantly illustrated in contemporary uncanonical literature, progressively diminishing as we approach contemporary records.

¹¹ We cannot say with the same certainty that the belief that Jesus was born in Bethlehem was anterior to the use of the Scripture, Mic. 5:2; because Luke 2:4 and John 7:42 imply the feeling that Bethlehem was to be the birthplace of the Christ. The idea that Christ should be revealed suddenly out of the unknown was current (John 7:27), or that he would come up like Oannes out of the sea (2 Esdr. 13:8), but not that of virgin birth.

5. Again, the fact that the older belief in Jesus as a descendant of David through his father Joseph still shimmers through from the background of the page in both Matthew and Luke, witnesses indeed, as Wright admits, that the idea of his supernatural birth has been later superimposed. But this very fact makes it the harder to account for the rise in unmistakably Jewish circles of a belief all too easily connected with repulsive heathen mythology. Nothing is easier than to prove that the stratum of our first and third gospels represented by the (mutually contradictory) genealogies is of earlier formation than that which makes Joseph's pedigree a puerility. Professor Wright even says: "In St. Luke the editorial manipulation [of 3:23] is so carelessly done that the natural meaning of the words is that Jesus 'really was, as he was commonly supposed to be, the son of Joseph.'" Later on Joseph and Mary are simply "the parents" of Jesus, and in Acts Peter's preaching after the resurrection always presents Jesus as sprung "from the seed of David," raised up like Moses "from among his brethren," without a hint of difference in earthly origin.

In Matthew even textual criticism has lately added its evidence to that of the higher criticism, in favor of a pre-canonical form wherein the genealogy was real. The reading of Matt. 1:16 in the recently discovered Sinaitic Syriac gospels, earliest of all known witnesses to the text, reads, "And Joseph, to whom was espoused Mary the Virgin, begat Jesus," in flagrant contradiction with the story itself. Other witnesses have since been adduced which evince traces of the same peculiarity. Professor Wright here sides with Rendell Harris in pronouncing the reading "an alteration of the Greek for dogmatic reasons;" but Schmiedel, in his scholarly and exhaustive discussion of this subject,¹² gives very strong reasons for treating this reading as a survival of the primitive genealogy smoothed away by later scribes. Nothing is easier, we repeat, than to prove an earlier stage of the gospel tradition in which the genealogies, one tracing Jesus' descent from David through the royal, the other through an obscure and humble line,¹³ were *bona fide* pedigrees of Joseph and Jesus. But no success whatever has attended the many efforts to eliminate the supernatural birth from the canonical Matthew and Luke as not

¹² *Encyclopædia Biblica*, s. v. "Mary," §14.

¹³ See my article, s. v. "Genealogy of Jesus," in *Hastings' Bible Dictionary*.

belonging to the canonical authors. These, on the contrary, show their point of view by coincidentally eliminating the inconsistent statement of Mark 3:21, 31. The virgin birth belongs in the canonical gospels; only these represent the second, not the first, stratum of gospel tradition. Concerning the first we may well accept in the general sense an ancient "tradition of the earliest elders," quoted by Clement of Alexandria (210 A. D.), that "the earliest gospels were those which contained the genealogies."

6. It is not, then, so easy a matter to account for the displacement of the earlier by the later beliefs in two widely divergent gospels, both of them bearing unmistakable marks of Syrian derivation. The recent attempts of Soltau and others to explain the story by the influence of Hellenistic, Buddhistic, or Egyptian mythology are simple failures. The story of the virgin birth is of secondary, post-apostolic origin, but not of heathen origin. Its authors have not the slightest idea of paralleling the stories of the amours of Jove. Neither do they in the least conceive themselves to be contradicting the Davidic descent of Jesus through Joseph. They are Jews who could speak of Isaac as "the God-begotten," without meaning to imply that Abraham was not his father, but only, as Paul says, that Isaac was born "by means of (*διὰ*) a word of promise," when the "deadness" of Abraham and Sarah, excluded all human causation in the matter (Rom. 4:17-25; 9:9). Paul draws the lesson from this "spiritual birth" of Isaac that believers are all born as Isaac was, "children of promise;" whereas the Israel according to the flesh are, like Ishmael, descendants of Abraham by mere natural generation (Gal. 4:21-31).

An infusion of Paulinism might well lead in our first and third gospels to a doctrine of Jesus' "spiritual," supernatural birth, as in the fourth it demonstrably leads over to that of the spiritual birth of all believers (John 1:1 f.; 8:31-42). The question to decide is whether historically the belated appearance of the idea in Matthew and Luke is better accounted for by such gradual infiltration of the Pauline idea, after the fall of Jerusalem, when even the Palestinian church became Greek-speaking and predominantly Pauline in sentiment; or whether we are to account for it with Sanday by some long-deferred confession of the virgin mother.

7. The difficulties which confront the latter explanation are cer-

tainly the greater, from the historian's point of view. The gospels are explicit in their representation that the attitude of Jesus' mother and brethren was at the outset hostile to his work (Mark 3:21, 31), and skeptical as to his messianic claims (John 7:5). Without the heavenly message to Mary a supernatural birth would be a meaningless prodigy of biology. With it, such hostility and skepticism are hard to conceive; and, even granting the possibility, what could account for her suppression of the facts at the period of awakening faith in the days when Peter was rallying the disciples with the word of resurrection?

The most unbiased judgment we can give the documents is unfavorable to their early origin or credibility. Their mutual contradictions and legendary features exclude the possibility of accuracy in detail; the bare point of agreement in respect to the supernatural birth in Bethlehem seems, indeed, to have been "brought forward by the conflict with heresy," but not out of memories of the Virgin. It is more credibly derived from the Pauline doctrine of a spiritual birth of believers as the collective Christ, the seed of Abraham, after the manner of Isaac, "by a word of promise." Logically, the idea of the virgin birth would seem to be a hybrid, if not a monstrosity. Historically, it reflects the spirit of the post-apostolic age, involving a compromise, or amalgamation, between the primitive doctrine, of messiahship by descent from David, and the Hellenistic, of messiahship by incarnation after pre-existence, represented in the Wisdom doctrine of Paul and the Logos doctrine of the fourth evangelist. The doctrine of the supernatural birth has the merits of neither, because it seeks to combine the claims of both.

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It would be easy to dismiss the question by saying: It depends altogether on what is meant by establishing historically? If to prove historically is to ground the thing to be proved on such evidence as can, for instance, be cited in attestation of the assassination of Julius Cæsar or the battle of Gettysburg, it is very plain, from the nature of the case, that the supernatural birth of Jesus cannot be proved from the data at hand. If, on the other hand, by historical demonstration

be meant simply the process that convinces the ordinary unsophisticated mind, then the fact has been proved beyond doubt. For upon the ground of some evidence it has been believed by a vast concourse of sane, honest, and good people for nearly two thousand years past. At any rate, the virgin birth has been asserted by all Christians in the most universal of all the creeds of Christendom.

But it is clear that the case is not so easily disposed of. Yet, in putting it to ourselves in this way we have gained something; we have been obliged to look at the matter of proof closely enough to see in it a number of factors worthy of special consideration. We have seen that the acceptance of a statement as true appears to have something to do with its proof; that the kind of testimony adduced for it has a little more to do with it; but that the special features and circumstances of it must determine how near the stage of demonstration it can reach.

Beginning with the first of these propositions, let us ask: How large a consent must the evidence compel before it can be declared absolutely conclusive? Is it necessary that everyone who has it presented to him should be persuaded by it? Evidently this is too rigid a condition to require. If it were insisted upon, no historical statement, or statement of any kind, faith in which depends upon proof, outside of itself, could be said to be capable of proof; for no such statement can be made that will command the assent of every human mind as soon as the alleged proof is given.

But is it, on the other hand, sufficient that a large or, let us say, overwhelming majority of those who have the evidence presented to them should be satisfied that it is adequate in order to declare it conclusive? Manifestly not. History is too full of the reversal of judgments made by majorities to admit of a different answer to this question. There are even instances where individuals have stood out against the universal consensus of great communities, and, though at great cost of painful labor and sacrifice, have gradually drawn their opponents to their own position. It may be alleged that in such cases the unsound conclusions reached by the majority had been arrived at without proof, and the sounder convictions of the minority, or of the single individual, in the case had been based upon the evidence. This, however, can be true only of the appearance, and not of the

reality, in such cases. Every belief held by men has had some support for it in what appeared to those who held it sufficient evidence. The amount and kind of the evidence may not have been such as to satisfy more rigid demands, but it will be found that, such as it was, it produced the conviction in question.

The first claim of Columbus to have discovered the western continent was soon disproved by those who followed him. They reduced his continent to islands by the process of circumnavigation. When on a subsequent voyage he reached Cuba, he sailed along its coast for what appeared to him to be a sufficient length of time, and then called his fellow-explorers together and asked them to testify that they had now discovered a continent. The fact appeared to be demonstrated, and their verdict was unanimous; but it was short-lived. The next adventurers in western waters exploded it by sailing around Cuba and showing that also to be an island.

Evidently, the multitude of those who accept a case as demonstrated has very little to do with its actually being put beyond question. Does the class or type of persons persuaded have a bearing on the question? Can an appeal, in other words, be made to the consensus of the more intelligent and critical part of the constituency which is to act the part of a jury? Such appeal is ordinarily made, and, it must be confessed, with a considerable show of plausibility. But there is something illusive and elusive in it. First of all, the process of setting apart a portion of the community, and characterizing it as the more intelligent and critical part, is of doubtful validity. Besides, the intelligent and critical attitude is also controlled by forces liable to produce unsatisfactory results. Here, too, history is full of the reversal of judgments. And if it be said that, after all, the best guide we have to sound convictions is the intelligent judgment of men fitted by training to discern tendencies toward aberration, and to warn us against them, we also say that this is so; but we add that even the best guide is not an infallible one, and our search now is for sure foundations.

If we now turn from the number and kind of persons that may be regarded as a safe jury on the question of the adequacy of proof, to the nature of the proof itself, we shall find the old and familiar distinctions of *a priori* and *a posteriori* quite useful. The *a priori* proof

for any position consists of such considerations as the antecedent likelihood, for instance, that the event to be proved would have happened, the verisimilitude of it as represented, the absence of any sufficient objection to taking it as an actuality, the harmony and consistency of it with the other parts of the transaction of which it forms a part, and the good results that may be or have been secured through the belief that it was an objective reality. The *a posteriori* kind of evidence consists, of course, of the testimony of competent witnesses. And by competent witnesses we mean such as have had the ability and the opportunity to know whereof they testify, and who at the same time would testify with absolute honesty and without prejudice. But though it is easy to lay down the general position in the abstract that where the *a priori* and *a posteriori* considerations converge toward a certain conclusion, that conclusion may be accepted as demonstrated, it is not easy to apply this abstract law to particular cases. For in each particular case the direction and vividness of the various lines of *a priori* and *a posteriori* proof present a different configuration.

That leads us back to the special case of the virgin birth of Jesus as currently accepted. The discussion of the case offers many temptations to introduce on the *a priori* side irrelevant considerations, and to give these a meretricious importance. One may plead, for instance, in behalf of the acceptance of the birth narratives in the gospels the church doctrine of the inspiration of these books, or of the whole New Testament collection in which they stand. It makes little or no difference what form of the doctrine of inspiration is called into the discussion; it may fairly be laid down as a sound prerequisite that it should be ruled out. It may very well be that these writings are inspired and normative. At any rate, for our own part, we heartily believe that they are. We recognize the gospels to be a part of the rule of faith provided by God for every man. It does not follow, however, from this that the particular chapters in which the birth narratives are given were originally integral parts of the gospels. It is conceivable that they were inserted by other hands than those of the evangelists. That this was occasionally done, the cases of John 7:53—8:11 and Mark 16:9—20 clearly show. There is no particle of external evidence, to be sure, that Matt.,

chaps. 1, 2, and Luke, chaps. 1, 2, belong to the same category. Nevertheless, it is barely possible that they may; and, if so, the connection between them and the remainder of these books in which they occur would be cut. While the books, as such, might be accepted as inspired, defining that term as rigidly as one may please to do, the stories of the birth of Jesus in such a case would not be covered by the inspiration of the books.

Or it may be that the narratives were incorporated into these books by the authors themselves, but without the intention of being palmed off as genuine history. Let us be careful to say that we are not asserting that this is the case. For our purposes it is not necessary to do this. It is enough to point out the bare possibility that the narratives in question were not originally meant to be taken as dry, statistical statements, but as poetic representations of the great spiritual fact of the incarnation. If this could be proved to be the case, it would naturally result in the necessity for a great change affecting many conceptions. The traditional views on many affiliated subjects would have to be modified or given up. But no earnest, truth-loving Christian would, we are confident, shrink from these logical consequences of the proposition, provided it were adequately supported. The very fact that the views to be modified or abandoned were merely traditional would predispose the independent thinker to confront the possibility firmly and courageously. For to him the word "traditional" has long ceased to carry the mysterious and magical persuasiveness that it once had.

In any case, upon this latter supposition, the question as to the intent and purport of the birth narratives as a whole would precede and be independent of their inspiration. They could be equally inspired whether they were found to contain as highly poetical drapery the great and distinctive Christian truth of the incarnation, or a bare account of the manner of the earthly birth of the Redeemer, literally understood. Which one of these two views of the design and form of these passages should be accepted as a fact belongs to the science of interpretation to determine in accordance with the soundest and sanest methods known to it. But no doctrine of inspiration can ever come in conflict with the true findings of sound exegesis, and therefore, upon the whole, the conclusion seems unavoidable

that to appeal to the inspiration of the New Testament in support of the exact historicity of the birth narratives in the gospels is not an altogether legitimate procedure, because it introduces an irrelevant consideration into the case.

So we may say also of the doctrine of the incarnation, that to introduce it into the discussion would be illicit. Minds of the infantile type, have indeed, found it easier to believe the mystery of the incarnation upon the basis of the virgin-birth idea than apart from it; but the doctrine does not depend for its validity on the historicity of the birth narratives in Matthew and Luke. It does not depend on the manner of the birth of Jesus Christ as a man. Paul and John in the apostolic circle, who of all in that circle teach the incarnation most explicitly and authoritatively, never allude to the birth of Christ or in any way connect his divine nature with a preternatural entrance into the world. The latter of these two had a splendid opportunity to clinch and confirm his declaration that "the Word was made flesh," by inserting a section in his gospel which, like the early chapters of Matthew and Luke, should have told of the birth from the virgin. But he fails to do so. If this fact signifies anything, it signifies that John did not see the connection between incarnation and a preternatural birth. In all the discussions of this great mystery in subsequent ages the birth has rarely been alluded to as one of the main supports of the doctrine.

But it is quite easy, on the other side, to introduce an altogether irrelevant factor from the field of philosophic or quasi-scientific pre-suppositions. One may appeal, for instance, to the antecedent improbability (there are those who would perhaps say, the impossibility) of a virgin birth. In such case the historian is in duty bound to face the evidence, and follow it faithfully to whatever conclusion it may lead. He has nothing to do with antecedent probability or improbability. The instances of apparent improbability turned into absolute certainty under adequate light are too many to excuse the historian, if he should fall into this insidious snare of "antecedent improbability."

Spontaneous generation is, in the present stage of scientific investigation, a scientific improbability; but scientists of good standing all over the world have not, on that account, ceased to experiment

with it. Parthenogenesis in the lower species of living beings is said to be a fact; in the higher form, it is an improbability; in the highest, of which the human species is the chief, its improbability seems to reach into impossibility. And yet there may be provisions in nature by the use of which a being of vast intelligence and power should bring it within his reach so to compose the forces and elements as to produce in the human species the phenomenon known as parthenogenesis. It does not become the cautious scientist to speak too rashly on a matter beset with so many unknown factors, and therefore possibilities.

F. C. Baur truly said: "Christianity is a historical phenomenon, and as such it must submit to be historically considered and investigated." But he went too far when he assumed that the historical method of treatment would reduce all that is supernatural and miraculous in Christianity to the vanishing-point. He committed the error of setting up an imaginary conception "of miracle in the absolute sense which dissolves the natural connection between cause and effect." Later scientific and critical historians have declined to follow him in this step. There is no necessary severing of the connection of cause and effect in miracle (we omit the qualifying clause "in the absolute sense" which exists only in Baur's mind). The calling in of unknown factors and forces by a supernatural agent does not violate the connections which the historian is set to discern and record. So far as he is not able to trace them, he should declare his inability to do so, but in no case should he deny what otherwise is well attested.

There is another line of consideration which stands partly on the ground of the irrelevant and partly on that of the relevant. It is that which views the subject as a matter of comparative religion and folklore. The logic of the case follows a course such as this: To great personages among many races supernatural birth has been ascribed. The influence of current belief among heathen people surrounding the early Christian church could not have failed on this point to affect Christian thought regarding the Founder of Christianity. There was, moreover, a predisposition, created by the great and remarkable features predicted of the Messiah in the Old Testament, toward the adoption of the idea of a divine parentage for him.

The total effect of these influences was to create the belief that Jesus must have been born supernaturally; and if he must have been, then he was; and the result of the process was the legend of Bethlehem.

We have characterized this line of reasoning as partly relevant and partly irrelevant. It is irrelevant so far as it involves an *a priori* element. That there are legends of the character alluded to in the case of many ancient great men, such as Pythagoras, Plato, Buddha, cannot be doubted. But that the currency of these legends must have affected thought in the first century of the Christian era, within Palestine, is a pure assumption. No trace of evidence for such influence can be pointed out. On the contrary, the whole historical development in the country and people was against the stream of such influences.

If, then, the path be hedged in by declaring as forbidden ground these extraneous adjacent territories of theology and philosophy, it will be found that no indisputable goal can be reached by traveling along this road, at least as at present known. What, then, is the gain? If the exclusion of what we claim should be ruled out yields no surer results than its admission into the investigation, why should we be careful to exclude it? The answer is that, though both methods yield unsatisfactory results, there is a difference between them. The one—that of the admission of these extraneous factors—certainly leads to error; that of their exclusion fails to lead to a positive end. In the latter case, we are sure of our ground as far as we can go, though we do not go as far as we should wish; in the former, we are sure of error from the beginning. In the latter case, we fall short of a conclusion; in the former, we are led astray. In the latter case, we may still hope to achieve the proof or disproof we are searching for, with possible additional light upon our question; in the former, such hope is excluded from the outset.

The last firm standing-point to which the path pointed out above leads is a certain tradition, embodied in documents declared to be credible. How it came to find a place there is the question that must be answered before further sure steps can be taken. If it was adopted as a legend that grew within the Palestinian church, whether under the influence of pagan thought or independently, and if as such a legend it represents the christological idea of the perfect moral and

spiritual purity of Jesus as the Son of God, it cannot be used as a step in the further prosecution of the inquiry. If, on the other hand, it was based upon facts which members of the early Jewish church had in their possession, and which they handed down as of interest, though not as of the essence and life of the gospel, then the case of the virgin birth would be pressed to a nearer approach to the level of a positively proved fact.

On these "ifs" the question must historically hang. Evidently, in this state, the case cannot be said to be capable of demonstration; but neither is it susceptible of disproof. Some minds will always find difficulty in giving their assent to the assertion of its reality. A vastly larger number will find, as they have found in the past, no more difficulty with it than with the miraculous element in the gospel history in general.

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II. IS IT ESSENTIAL TO CHRISTIANITY?

The negative answer to this question is clear if by Christianity we understand the apostolic teaching concerning Christ. Paul shows no trace of knowledge of miraculous circumstances connected with the birth of his Lord. For him the resurrection was the demonstration of the Lordship of Jesus (Rom. 1:4). Paul regarded Jesus simply as according to the flesh "of the seed of David" (Rom. 1:3; 9:5), and as found in "fashion as a man" (Phil. 2:8). When in Galatians (4:4) he says, "God sent forth his son, *made of a woman*, made under the law," there is no more reason to think he refers to a miraculous conception than that such a reference was in mind in Job 14:1, "man that is born of woman is of few days and full of trouble."

The Johannine writings show equally little consciousness of any miraculous circumstances connected with the birth of Jesus. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us" sets forth a most exalted conception of Jesus, but if the early chapters of Matthew and Luke had by accident been lost, as the last verses of Mark have been, John would afford no suggestion of a virgin birth. It is equally

true that, having those early chapters of Matthew and Luke, we have no ground for supposing that they had any influence in the development of Johannine doctrine. For the strongest statement of the incarnation is put forth as a truth demonstrated to the disciples by their daily experience with their Master, rather than by miracle exhibited in his birth: "The word became flesh and dwelt among us, and *we beheld his glory*—glory as of an only begotten from a father—full of grace and truth" (John 1:14; cf. 1 John 1:1 f.).

The epistle to the Hebrews dwells much on the doctrine of the incarnation, and argues therefrom the superiority of the new revelation to that which preceded it, but it is difficult to think that the writer of that epistle could have been influenced by any tradition concerning a virgin birth when he wrote: "For verily he took not on him the nature of angel's, but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behoved him to be made in all points like unto his brethren" (Heb. 2:16 f.).

It is noteworthy also that the author of the second gospel gave no hint of a virgin birth, and that the first and third gospels are equally free from any influence by that tradition after the first chapter of Matthew and the first chapter of Luke—excepting the reference to Mary as Joseph's "espoused wife" in Luke 2:5, and the phrase "as was supposed" at the beginning of the genealogy in Luke 3:23. So complete is this freedom from influence by the virgin-birth tradition that even in the story of the visit to the temple (Luke 2:48) Mary reproaches Jesus, saying, "Thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing;" while in Matthew, the Nazarenes, astonished at the renown which had come to their fellow-townsmen, asked, "Is not this the carpenter's son, and is not his mother called Mary?" (Matt. 13:55.)

These facts do not disprove the tradition of the virgin birth, but they do show clearly that that tradition exercised no influence over the thought and teaching of the writers of our New Testament—outside of the chapters in Matthew and Luke in which the tradition is preserved to us. Consequently it cannot be regarded as essential to apostolic thinking.

The question, "Is the virgin birth essential to Christianity?" must be answered in the negative also, if in this question we mean by Chris-

tianity the most exalted Christology. This consideration is real corollary of the preceding one, for in Paul and the Johannine writings we find as high a doctrine of the person of Christ as in later ecclesiastical speculation, even though the later speculative formulas are lacking. The pre-existence of Christ is clearly taught in Paul and John (1 Cor. 8:6; Phil. 2:6-10; Col. 1:15-19; John 1:1-14), who, as has been shown, betray no knowledge of a virgin birth. The sinlessness of Christ is also an apostolic doctrine (2 Cor. 5:21; John 3:13; 1 John 3:5; cf. 1 Pet. 2:22), but the apostolic writings which most clearly assert the sinlessness betray no knowledge of a virgin birth. Yet pre-existence and sinlessness are two attributes which are most frequently regarded as rendering essential to Christian thinking the doctrine of the virgin birth. The sinlessness of Jesus does not appear less marvelous if he had no human father, for human heredity passes as fully from the mother as from the father. A virgin birth would not, therefore, free Jesus from full and vital connection with the past of sinful humanity. If his sinlessness signifies that he was thus detached from the common inheritance, the detachment involved the supernatural quite as much if he had no human father, as if he were in fact "the carpenter's" son.

So also the mystery of pre-existence is not lightened by the doctrine of the virgin birth. The genesis of a human soul is in itself so deep a mystery that speculation concerning it is baffled in the case of each everyday birth among us. Pre-existence for Jesus can be inferred only from his own self-disclosures in life and teaching. A virgin birth would not of itself indicate such pre-existence, nor would a natural conception make such pre-existence less credible—as appears from the frequency with which the Platonic doctrine of general human pre-existence has been advocated.

The person of Christ is a subject filled with highest mystery and holiest significance. For many of us a virgin birth seems an altogether suitable introduction of such a personality into our human fellowship. But, however sacred the associations which cling for us to that tradition, in simple candor it must be confessed that it contains nothing essential to the most exalted Christology.

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I have promised the editors of the *American Journal of Theology* to indicate to their readers the answer I think must be given to the question, "Is the doctrine of the supernatural birth of Jesus essential to Christianity?" In addressing myself to fulfil this promise, however, I find myself laboring under a good deal of embarrassment. I am naturally embarrassed, for example, by the narrowness of the space at my disposal. Within the limits allowed me, I can hope to do nothing more than suggest a few of the considerations which weigh with me, and these only in the most cursory manner. I am much more embarrassed, however, by the infelicity of discussing the relation to Christianity, considered as a system of doctrine (that is to say, as a consistent body of truth), of a fact, the historicity of which I am to leave to others to discuss, who may perhaps reach conclusions to which I could by no means assent, whether in kind or merely in degree. I can only say that I have myself no doubt whatever of the fact of the supernatural birth of Jesus, as that fact is recorded in the opening chapters of the gospels of Matthew and Luke. I certainly make no question that additional evidence of tremendous weight is brought to this fact by its place in the system of Christianity, commended as this system as a whole is by the entire body of proof which we call the "Christian evidences." But I do not believe that it needs this additional evidence for its establishment. And I prefer my readers to understand that I proceed to the consideration of its place in the Christian system with it in my hands, not as a hypothesis of more or less probability (or improbability), but as a duly authenticated actual occurrence, recognized as such on its own direct evidence, and bringing as such its own quota of support to the Christian system of which it forms a part.

I am embarrassed most of all, however, by the ambiguity of the language in which the question I am to discuss is stated. What is "the doctrine of the supernatural birth of Jesus?" What exactly, indeed, is intended by the main term employed? What is a "supernatural birth"? Were the births of Isaac and of John the Baptist "supernatural births"? Or those of Sampson and of Samuel? Or those of Jeremiah and of Paul, whom, we are told, the Lord had selected for his own in or from the womb? Is not, indeed, the birth of every good man whom God prepares for some special work for him—cer-

tainly by influences beginning in the loins of his ancestors—in some sense supernatural? Nay, no one who believes in Providence can doubt that there is a supernatural element in the birth of every man that comes into the world. It may easily come about, therefore, that one may be found contending earnestly that the “supernatural birth” of Jesus is essential to Christianity, and yet sharply denying that that birth was “supernatural” in the only sense in which it is important to contend for its supernaturalness. What sense, further, we need to ask, is to be attached to the word “essential” here? Is the inquiry, perchance, whether the supernatural birth of Jesus constitutes the very essence of Christianity, so that in this doctrine Christianity is summed up? Or merely whether it enters so into the substance of Christianity that Christianity is not fully stated without it? The crowning ambiguity attaches, however, to the term “Christianity” itself. Is it to be taken subjectively or objectively? Are we asking whether it is possible for a man to commit his soul to Christ as his Savior without a clear knowledge and firm conviction of his Lord’s virgin birth? Or are we asking whether any statement of Christianity can be thought complete which omits or ignores this doctrine? Or if it be supposed that this question is already settled by the use of the word “doctrine,” we still have to ask what objective “Christianity” it is that we are to have in mind? The Christianity of the New Testament, or of some fragment of the New Testament, arbitrarily torn from its context and interpreted in isolation? The Christianity of the churches—the historical Christianity embodied in the authoritative creeds of Christendom; or the Christianity of a certain school of recent critical speculations—the Christianity of Auguste Sabatier, say, or of Paul Lobstein, or of Otto Pfleiderer, or of Adolf Harnack?

Were the inquiry a purely historical one, it might no doubt be soon settled. It admits of no doubt, for example, that, historically speaking, the “supernatural birth of Jesus” forms a substantial element in the Christianity as well of the New Testament, taken in its entirety, as of the creeds of the church. There it stands plainly written in both, and even he who runs may read it.¹ Of course, it

¹ “The church assigns the highest value to the doctrine of the virgin birth” (Schmiedel, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, 1964). It is “a constant and, we may truly say, universally recognized element in the doctrinal tradition of the post-apostolic period, for of any important or fruitful opposition to it the history of doctrine knows nothing” (Hering, *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, Vol. V, p. 67).

does not stand written on every page of the New Testament or of the creeds— why should it? And, of course, it may be thought a debatable question whether it has been logically or practically as important to historical Christianity as its prominent confession in the documents might seem to imply.* That it holds no essential place in much of the “Christianity” current at the opening of the twentieth century is certainly too obvious for discussion. To the late Auguste Sabatier, for example, “Christianity” had come to mean just the altruistic temper; and nobody will imagine the “supernatural birth of Jesus”—or any kind of birth of Jesus, for that matter, natural or supernatural or unnatural—essential to the altruistic temper. Must not much the same be said also of the “Christianity” of Otto Pfleiderer, or of any form of that at present very fashionable “Christianity” which supposes the parable of the Prodigal Son, say, to contain a complete statement of the Christian religion? As there is no atonement, and no expiation, and no satisfaction, so there is no mediator, no Jesus of any kind in the parable of the Prodigal Son. And the “Christianity” which refuses to know anything but the love of God which is there revealed to us, as it has no need of a Jesus, can have no need of a “supernatural birth” for the Jesus whom it totally ignores, or for whom it makes at best but an unessential place.

It is very evident, then, that if we are to ask whether “the doctrine of the supernatural birth of Jesus is essential to Christianity,” we must settle it in our minds very clearly at the outset what “Christianity” it is we are talking about. Our answer will be one thing if we are thinking of what many about us are vaguely and vainly calling “Christianity,” and perhaps quite another thing if we are thinking of the Christianity of Christ and his apostles, recorded in the New Testament, and drawn from the New Testament by the historical church through all ages. This latter is the only Christianity in which I can personally have more than a historical interest. I shall therefore confine myself to it. For the same reason I shall take “the supernatural birth of Jesus” in its highest sense—that of the truly miraculous birth of Jesus from a virgin-mother, without intervention of man. It is in this sense that the “supernatural birth of

* This is the gist of Hering’s assault on it; cf. as above, and p. 74: “The denial of the fact (of the virgin birth) has in all ages been adjudged heresy, but its positive utilization has been very slight.”

Jesus" was actual; and this is the only sense, therefore, in which discussion of it can have a real, as distinguished from a merely academic, interest. Defining thus my terms, the specific question which I shall seek to answer is whether the doctrine of the miraculous birth of Jesus from a virgin mother, taught in the opening chapters of the gospels of Matthew and Luke, forms an element in the Christianity of the New Testament, indispensable in the sense that without that Christianity would be incompletely stated and left in one important matter defective, and, therefore, liable to misconception, if not open to dangerous assault.

Were I asked to name the three pillars on which the structure of Christianity, as taught in the New Testament in its entirety, especially rests, I do not know that I could do better than point to these three things: the supernatural, the incarnation, redemption. In an important sense, these three things constitute the Christianity of the New Testament; proceeding from the more general to the more specific, they sum up in themselves its essence. What interests us particularly at the moment is that the virgin birth of Jesus takes its significant place and has its significant part to play with respect to each one of them. Without it each one of them would be sheared of some portion of its meaning and value, and would take on a different and weakened aspect.

No one can doubt that the Christianity of the New Testament is supernaturalistic through and through. Whether we have regard to the person of Jesus or to the salvation he brought to men, the primary note of this Christianity certainly is supernaturalism. He who walked the earth as its Lord, and whom the very winds and waves obeyed; who could not be holden of the grave, but burst the bonds of death and ascended into the heavens in the sight of man: he who now sits at the right hand of God and sheds down his gift of salvation through his Spirit upon the men of his choice—it were impossible that such a one should have entered the world undistinguished among common men. His supernatural birth is given already, in a word, in his supernatural life and his supernatural work, and forms an indispensable element in the supernatural religion which he founded.

It would no doubt be difficult—or impossible, if you will—to believe that a natural Jesus had a supernatural origin; or, going at

once to the root of the matter, that a natural "salvation" requires a supernatural Redeemer. Much of the Christianity about us today is distinctively, and even polemically, to use von Hartmann's term, "autosoteric;" and he who feels entirely competent to save himself finds a natural difficulty in believing that God must intervene to save him. I fully agree with the adherents of this "autosoteric" Christianity, that from their point of view a supernatural birth for Jesus would be devoid of significance, and therefore incredible. They should with similar frankness allow to me, I think, that to the Christianity of the New Testament, on the other hand, just because it stands as the opposite pole to their "autosoteric Christianity," the supernatural birth of Jesus is a necessity.

This, indeed, they in effect do when they argue that the virgin birth of Jesus is the invention of the Christianity of the New Testament on the basis of the extreme supernaturalism of its conception of Christianity. Thinking of Jesus as they did, we are told, the early Christians could not but postulate for him an origin consonant with what they conceived to be his nature, his powers, his career, the work he came to do, did do, is doing.³ Nothing could be more true. The supernatural Christ and the supernatural salvation carry with them by an inevitable consequence the supernatural birth. In other words, the supernatural birth of Jesus is an implication of the Christian consciousness—that is, of course, of the supernaturalistic Christian consciousness.⁴ And the Christian consciousness in this judgment receives the support of the universal human consciousness. Men have always and everywhere judged that a supernatural man, doing a supernatural work, must needs have sprung from a supernatural

³ "The conception that our Savior was a son of God born from a virgin was the involuntary, yea the inevitable, reflection of the divinity of Christ in the souls of converted Greeks" (Usener, *Das Weihnachtsfest*, p. 75; cf. p. 76: "There could not fail the birth as visible sign that something divine had entered the world"). Cf. Soltau. *The Birth of Jesus Christ*, p. 44.

⁴ Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth*, p. 33, argues that the consciousness of the gulf which separates the believer from "the One in whom he has found his Master," leads him instinctively to infer a difference in origin, and thus "the traditions of the miraculous birth of Jesus seem to anticipate the conviction of the believer, merely transferring into the realm of history a truth of which he finds in himself the most conclusive confirmation;" cf. p. 35. What is this but to say that in the logic of the heart the supernatural Redeemer demands for himself a supernatural origin?

source.⁵ If there had been nothing extraordinary in the coming of the Savior into the world, a discordant note would have been struck at this point in the "heterosoteric" Christianity of the New Testament, which would have thrown it in all its elements out of tune. To it, it would have been unnatural if the birth of the Savior had been natural, just because it itself in none of its elements is natural, but is everywhere and through all its structure, not, indeed, unnatural or contra-natural, but distinctively supernatural.

The cardinal point upon which the whole of this supernaturalistic Christianity, commended to us by the New Testament, turns, is formed by its doctrine of incarnation. The supernatural Savior, who has come into the world to work a supernatural salvation, could not possibly be conceived by it as of this world. If it would be to "annul Jesus," to imagine that he had not come in the flesh, or that he who had come in the flesh was not the Word of God who in the beginning was with God and was God—God only-begotten who was in the bosom of the Father—it would no less be to "annul him" to imagine that he could owe his coming to earthly causes or collocations. Born into our race he might be and was; but born of our race, never—whether really or only apparently.

There has been a very odd attempt made, to be sure, to set over against one another the doctrines of the pre-existence and of the supernatural birth of our Lord, as if they were mutually exclusive, or at least parallel rather than complementary conceptions. In speaking of such a thing as birth, however, it is obvious that when we say pre-existence we have already said supernatural, and as soon as we have said Deity we have said miraculous. So far as appears, it required the Socinians to teach us that one of these things could be taken and the other left—that any rational mind

⁵ "Stories of supernatural birth may be said to have a currency as wide as the world. Heroes of extraordinary achievement or extraordinary qualities were necessarily of extraordinary birth. The wonder or the veneration they inspired seemed to demand that their entrance upon life, and their departure from it, should correspond with the impression left by their total career" (Hartland, *The Legend of Perseus*, pp. 71, 72). So Origen (*Contra Celsum*, I, 29), speaking of the story of Plato's supernatural birth, says: "But this is really a myth, and the simple incitement to imagine this of Plato was that man believes that a man of wisdom and power greater than those of the multitude must have had a higher and more divine origin than they." The point of importance is whether the truly supernatural *life and work* are real.

could suppose a non-supernatural being to be the product of a supernatural birth; while surely only a pronounced pantheist could so confound things that differ as to imagine that for bringing a supernatural being into the world those causes may be thought to suffice by which commonly mere men are produced. Ordinary people may be trusted to continue to judge that, as incarnation means precisely the entrance into the human race of a being not in any sense the product of the forces working in that race, but introduced from without and above, it is in its very essence a supernatural occurrence, and will necessarily bear in its mode of occurrence its credentials as such. It is, indeed, obviously not enough to say that it behooved the Divine Person who became incarnate in Jesus Christ, in entering into a new phase of existence, not to seem then first to begin to be; although to say that is no doubt to say something to the point. Would we do justice to the case, we must go on and affirm that, when the Life itself (which is also the Truth itself) entered into the conditions of human existence, it could not but come, according to its nature, creatively—bringing its own self-existing Life with it, and not making a round-about way so as to appear only now to begin, by way of derivation, to exist. When the Word was made flesh and tabernacled among men, it could not be but that men should behold his glory—a glory as of an only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

In point of fact, accordingly, it is just in proportion as men lose their sense of the Divine personality of the messianic king who is Immanuel, God with us, that they are found to doubt the necessity of the virgin birth; while in proportion as the realization of this fundamental fact of the Christianity of the New Testament remains vivid and vital with them, do they instinctively feel that it is alone consonant with it that this Being should acknowledge none other father than that Father which is in heaven, from whom alone he came forth to save the world. Accordingly, the adherents of the modern kenosis doctrine of the person of Christ, seeing in Jesus Christ nothing but God (though God shrunk to man's estate), have become the especial defenders of the doctrine of the virgin birth, and at this point the especial opponents of the modern rationalists, with whom otherwise they have so much in common. In contradistinc-

tion to both, the Christianity of the New Testament, remembering the two natures—which nowadays nearly everybody forgets—offer us in our Lord's person, not a mere man (perhaps in some sense made God), nor a mere God (perhaps in some sense made man) but a true God-man, who, being all that God is and at the same time all that man is, has come into the world in a fashion suitable to his dual nature, conceived indeed in a virgin's womb, and born of a woman and under the law, but not by the will of the flesh, nor by the will of man, but solely by the will of the God who he is.⁶

Not even in the incarnation, however, is the Christianity of the New Testament summed up. Rather, the incarnation appears in it not for its own sake, but as a means to a farther end—redemption. And it is only in its relation to the New Testament doctrine of redemption that the necessity of the virgin birth of Jesus comes to its complete manifestation. For in this Christianity the redemption that is provided is distinctively redemption from sin; and that he might redeem men from sin it certainly was imperative that the Redeemer himself should not be involved in sin. He would be a bold man indeed, who would affirm that the incarnation of the Holy One in sinful flesh presents no difficulties to his thought. The sinlessness of Jesus, in the sense of freedom from subjective corruption as well as from overt acts of sin, seems to be involved in the incarnation itself, purely and simply; and, in point of fact, those who imagine it was in principle sinful flesh which was assumed by the Son of God are prone to represent this flesh as actually cleansed of its sinfulness, either by the act of incarnation itself or by the almighty operation of the Spirit of God as a condition precedent to incarnation. But something more than sinlessness in this subjective sense was requisite for the redemption up to which the incarnation leads. Assuredly no one, resting for himself under the curse of sin, could atone for the

⁶ Such criticisms as that of Réville, *Histoire du dogme de la divinité de Jésus Christ* (1869, p. 30; 1904, p. 27), miss the mark and would apply only to the kenotic perversion: "A pre-existent being who becomes man reduces himself, if you will, to the condition of a human embryo; but he is not conceived by virtue of an act external to himself in the womb of a woman, etc." In the New Testament view of the God-man, as there is no reduction of the Godhead to the level of a human embryo, so there is a true conception of a complete human embryo by an act external to itself. Only, the cause external to this embryo, by virtue of which it is conceived, is the power of the Most High, and not natural fertilization.

sin of others; no one owing the law its extreme penalty for himself could pay this penalty for others. And certainly in the Christianity of the New Testament every natural member of the race of Adam rests under the curse of Adam's sin, and is held under the penalty that hangs over it. If the Son of God came into the world therefore—as that Christianity asserts to be a “faithful saying”—specifically in order to save sinners, it was imperatively necessary that he should become incarnate after a fashion which would leave him standing, so far as his own responsibility is concerned, outside that fatal entail of sin in which the whole natural race of Adam is involved. And that is as much as to say that the redemptive work of the Son of God depends upon his supernatural birth.

I am, of course, well aware that this doctrine of redemption, and as well the doctrine of sin which underlies it, is nowadays scouted in wide circles. With that, however, I have no present concern. I cheerfully admit that to a “Christianity” which knows nothing of race-sin and atonement, the necessity of the supernatural birth of the “Redeemer,” if it be recognized at all, must rest on other, and perhaps on less stringent, grounds. But I have not undertaken to investigate the possible place of the supernatural birth of Jesus in the varied forms of so-called “Christianity” prevalent in the modern world, many of which stand in no other relation to the Christianity of the New Testament than that of contradiction. Nor am I to be deterred from recognizing the doctrines of “original sin” and of “satisfaction” as fundamental elements in the Christianity of the New Testament, by the habit which has grown up among those who do not like them, of speaking of them scornfully as “Augustinian” and “Anselmic.” What rather attracts my attention is that it seems to be universally allowed that, on these “Augustinian” and “Anselmic” presuppositions, the doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus is an absolutely essential element of Christianity. In so far, then, as it is admitted that the doctrines of “original sin” and of “satisfaction” are constituent elements of the Christianity of the New Testament, it may be taken as acknowledged that the virgin birth of our Lord is confessedly essential to it.⁷

If, then, it cannot be denied that the supernatural birth of Jesus enters constitutively into the substance of that system which is

⁷ Cf. Lobstein, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Cheyne, *Biblical Problems*, p. 95; etc.

taught in the New Testament as Christianity—that it is the expression of its supernaturalism, the safeguard of its doctrine of incarnation, the condition of its doctrine of redemption—are we to go on and say that no one can be saved who does not hold this faith whole and entire? The question is thoroughly impertinent. We are discussing, not the terms of salvation, but the essential content of the Christian system; not what we must do to be saved, but what it behooved Jesus Christ to be and to do that he might save us. Say that faith is the instrument by which salvation is laid hold upon; the instrument by which the prerequisites of the salvation laid hold of by faith are investigated is the intellect. As it is certain that the only Jesus, faith in whom can save, is the Jesus who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the virgin Mary, according to the Scriptures, it is equally certain that the act of faith by which he is savingly apprehended involves these presuppositions, were its implicates soundly developed. But our logical capacity can scarcely be made the condition of our salvation.⁸ The Scriptures do not encourage us to believe that only the wise are called. They even graciously assure us that blasphemy itself against the Son may be forgiven. It would surely be unfortunate if weakness of intellect were more fatal than wickedness of heart. On the whole, we may congratulate ourselves that it was more imperative that Jesus, by whom the salvation has been wrought, should know what it behooved him to be and to do that he might save us, than it is that we should fully understand it. But, on the other hand, it will scarcely do to represent ignorance or error as advantageous to salvation. It certainly is worth while to put our trust in Jesus as intelligently as it may be given to us to do so. And it certainly will over and over again be verified in experience that he who casts himself upon Jesus as his divine Redeemer, will find the fact of the virgin birth of this Savior not only consonant with his faith and an aid to it, but a postulate of it without which he would be puzzled and distressed.

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⁸ I have the unwonted felicity of being thoroughly at one in this with Professor Paul Schwartzkopff, who remarks: "The faith which lays hold of the living God in Christ is not necessarily conditioned by the thoroughness with which the intellect grasps its content" (*The Prophecies of Jesus Christ*, E. T., p. 3).

CHANGES IN THEOLOGY AMONG AMERICAN METHODISTS

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Since its foundation epoch American Methodism has not undertaken any formal creed revision, or even seriously discussed any proposition for revision. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of openly consummated and universally acknowledged changes in the theology of American Methodists. The best that can be done with our theme is to take note of such facts as evince distinct tendencies to changed doctrinal conceptions—tendencies sufficiently steadfast and widespread to warrant the conclusion, either that they are already in the ascendant, or that they are likely ere long to hold a dominant place. In a task of this kind there is doubtless a considerable chance for differing judgments, an accurate rating of tendencies within a complex and widely extended constituency being no easy matter. Two mistakes in particular will need to be carefully guarded against. On the one hand, it will not do to estimate the theological status of a communion by a mere show of hands, since a majority may, in the view of a clear-sighted observer, be certainly foredoomed to dwindle very decidedly, when once the influences are brought to bear upon it which have already changed the point of view of the opposing minority. On the other hand, it will not answer to take a vociferous advocacy of new opinions as an unequivocal sign of a deep-seated and victorious tendency to change, since the zealous and hustling advocate may be for the most part an eccentricity, representing no substantial dogmatic impulse or need of any large company. Avoiding these opposite errors, the judicial investigator will seek to ascertain the real trend of vital and scholarly conviction. When he sees that for an appreciable period changes in doctrinal conception within the ranks of men at once studious and practical in their mental habits are almost uniformly in a given direction, and appear to proceed

with cumulative force, he will feel authorized to infer that he has discovered reliable tokens of a doctrinal transition.

It is our judgment that a fair application of the standard just set forth to the investigation of American Methodism will reveal that many changes have occurred in relation to a few of the themes of theology, and that tentative efforts are being made for more or less revision of the traditional views in connection with some other themes. In sustaining this judgment against the challenge which is likely to be forthcoming, it will be necessary to cite as much of the historical evidence as our limits will admit. The themes to which we shall have occasion to refer are the conception of the Bible, original sin, the person and work of Christ, the conception of personal salvation, and eschatology.

I. *The conception of the Bible.*—For several decades Methodists, in common with other American Christians, have been aware of a conflict between two contrasted theories of the Bible. On the one hand is the high technical theory, which at the acme insists upon complete verbal inspiration of every part of Scripture, and in any case maintains the inerrancy or detailed infallibility of the Bible as originally written. On the other hand is the broader theory, which indeed cordially grants that the Bible contains the materials of a complete ethical and religious system, but renounces the notion of a detailed infallibility or inerrancy of every part, and places the stress upon the trend and outcome of the biblical teaching.

The evidence indicates that American Methodism began substantially upon the basis of the high technical theory, so far as that theory affirms inerrancy. There was a lack of explicit assertion on the subject. In almost any standard Methodist treatise one looks in vain for a proper parallel to the strong and unqualified declarations of the great dogmatists of the seventeenth century. The general assumption, however, up to the more recent decades, seems to have been that there was no need to admit any mistakes of any sort in the original Scriptures, and no propriety in so doing. This appears to have been the standpoint represented by Richard Watson in his *Theological Institutes*, which for a considerable period ranked as the unrivaled textbook of American Methodism. Later writers, whose works in systematic theology have been utilized in the education of

the preachers, have dealt with the Bible, for the most part, in the same manner. Miner Raymond contended rather for the truth of the Bible in general than treated specifically of the question of errancy. Here and there, however, one finds tokens that his mind was dominated by the high technical theory. He remarks, for instance:

Because, beyond reasonable question, miracles have been actually wrought for the specific purpose of attesting the Sacred Word, we deem it thereby demonstrated that what the Bible says God says.¹

Of course, this statement might mean less than that God is the author of every sentence in the Bible. But the way in which Raymond comments on the early narratives in Genesis conveys the impression that he designed his statement to be taken in its full breadth. W. B. Pope, an English Wesleyan, whose name is properly mentioned here on account of the use of his dogmatic work for a period in the conference course of study, gave some indications of a disposition to modify the stringent theory. He admitted differing degrees of inspiration, suggested that the limitations of witnesses may have come to manifestation in their reports, and frankly acknowledged that a considerable body of discrepancies appears on the face of the biblical narratives. Nevertheless, in the final issue he resorted to the assumption of inerrancy as characteristic of the original biblical documents. Having noted that many cases of discrepancy may plausibly be referred to the faulty work of transcribers, he added:

Each of these must be carefully sifted, and the result will generally be satisfactory. When it is not so, we are bound to believe that errors have crept in through the operation of causes that we cannot now trace.²

John Miley was noncommittal in this relation, and the most that can be said on the basis of his printed writings is that he took very little account of the possibility of errors in the Scriptures. In a much-honored textbook of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, a stalwart doctrine of inerrancy found expression from the pen of T. O. Summers. One of his sentences runs as follows:

Even in all subordinate and collateral matters of history, chronology, ethnography, topography, sociology, and the like, the Scriptures are perfectly con-

¹ *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 100.

² *Compendium of Theology*, Vol. I, p. 188.

sistent with themselves, with all other trustworthy records, and with all the phenomena and facts which are now patent to our observation.³

If we pass from theological treatises to articles in periodical literature, we find that the high technical theory, or the doctrine of complete inerrancy, has not lacked for advocates. Gilbert Haven, in a series of articles contributed to the *Methodist Review* for the years 1867 and 1868, contended with characteristic ardor for the conclusion that every word of the Bible was given forth under the inbreathing, or impulse of the Holy Ghost. Professor Hemenway, in an article which appeared in 1877, showed a pronounced unwillingness to admit that there are any errors in the Scriptures, and took the ground that the whole Bible is inspired and equally inspired. "God's authority," he said, "is absolute. It does not admit of degrees." S. L. Bowman, in a contribution printed as late as 1889, drew the conclusion that the proper view of the Bible is intolerant of the supposition of errors even in matters historical, as well as in those of a moral and religious import.

A measure of significance, though not so very much, may be attributed to the fact that the book of Gaussen, written in advocacy of strict verbal inspiration, obtained a place in the conference course for the years 1876-80. Its use in this manner shows that at least some of the bishops at that time were favorable to its standpoint.

The list of writers thus far cited may serve to indicate that the high technical theory had not spent its energy in the Methodist body by the middle of the nineteenth century, and, indeed, that it was not without self-assertive vigor up to the last quarter of the century. It is to be observed, however, that the rival theory began to make inroads on its territory soon after the middle of the century. In a contribution to the *Methodist Review* in 1858, Daniel Curry intimated his conviction that some retrenchment from absolute inerrancy may very well be admitted. He said:

While we claim and contend earnestly for the inspiration of the Bible, we delight also to recognize the human form, and to commune with its utterances as with the voice of a friend. Nor do we any the less reverence its lessons because we suspect that it is not wholly raised above all human infirmities. . . . In many instances the infallible certainty of a revealed doctrine does not require the absolute correctness of the statement of facts with which it is enunciated.

³ *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 436.

Twenty years later H. M. Harman gave expression to similar sentiments in his *Introduction to the Holy Scriptures*:

We are not required to make the absolute correctness of the evangelists in the most unimportant matters an article of faith, and to resort to far-fetched explanations to reconcile every apparent discrepancy.⁴

He recognized varied degrees of inspiration, and evidently thought that in exceptional instances there is indication of a very humble degree, saying, for example, of the Song of Solomon: "How far the song is inspired it is impossible to say."⁵

In the closing years of the century expressions of opinion on the side of the broader theory were far from being a novelty. We find them in quarters by no means distinguished for extravagant liberalism. Thus the *Methodist Review*, at a time when it was supposed to incarnate the very spirit of orthodoxy (July, 1890), remarked editorially, in quite unreserved terms, on the human errancy plainly visible in the biblical chronology and science. Again, a writer distinguished by an eminently sober and judicial temper, Nathaniel Burwash, president of Victoria College, took pains, in his *Manual of Christian Theology*, to disclaim the necessity of maintaining complete inerrancy for either Testament. He expressed, indeed, the conviction that the poetic license which appears in the ancient oracles was combined with a good degree of the historic spirit. But he added:

Beyond this general conviction of trustworthiness, we think it quite unnecessary to dogmatize in regard to the inerrancy of the Old Testament.

While awarding somewhat more stress to the historical details of the New Testament than to those of the Old, he still remarked:

But even this does not imply a miraculous verbal inerrancy, but such a truthful record, or faithful portrait, as an honest mind, quickened to its very best in memory by the deepest religious interest and sympathy, would furnish.⁶

With little, if any, exception, Methodist exegetes of any considerable experience and rank, who have written in recent years, have given evidence of their preference for the broader, as opposed to the high technical, theory of the Bible.

Concurring with the line of evidences just given, on the side of a growing acceptance of the broader theory of revelation, is the whole

⁴ P. 25.

⁵ First edition, p. 323.

⁶ Vol. I, p. 187.

body of indications of an enlarging appropriation of the modern critical views relative to the Pentateuch and some other portions of the Old Testament; for no Protestant would naturally be inclined to make room for these views who had not cordially accepted the broader theory. Now, it is undeniable that the critical views in question have been winning much territory in every prominent branch of Methodism. They have a standing in the principal theological schools. Thence they have been widely distributed through the pastorate. In large part they have found expression in volumes recently issued by the Methodist Book Concern.⁷ At the last Ecumenical Conference, held in London, they were referred to in a tone of tolerance, not to say of friendly recognition. And in this reference a conspicuous part was taken by the representatives of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. Especially significant were the words of J. J. Tigert, editor of the *Review for Southern Methodism*:

The main problems, such as those of the Hexateuch and of Isaiah, appear to have been satisfactorily solved, and, amid considerable difference on details, there is essential agreement among the greater critics as to methods, grounds, and results. So far as I can see, there is no reason to anticipate such a reaction from and repudiation of the historical criticism of the Old Testament as befell the Tübingen criticism of the New; for that criticism was essentially an attempt to rewrite history on the basis of the Hegelian *a priori* philosophy. There is nothing common to these two schools and epochs of criticism, and it is unsafe to the last degree to argue from the fate which overtook one to a kindred one which must speedily befall the other.

Finally, it is legitimate to mention on this point the friendly welcome which has been accorded in Methodist ranks to Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*; for no reader can fail to see that this work, with all its just reputation for caution and moderation, accepts the cardinal conclusions of the later criticism of the Old Testament, and in its whole tenor is distinctly adverse to the high technical theory of the Scriptures.

The evidence seems, therefore, to enforce the conclusion that an effective movement toward a modified conception of the Bible is in progress within the domain of American Methodism. The theory

⁷ See among others, C. M. Cobern, *Commentary on Ezekiel and Daniel*; Milton Terry, *Moses and the Prophets*.

of strict inerrancy is being displaced by the broader theory. Doubtless the former is still intrenched in many minds. But when we consider the hold which the latter theory has upon the scholarship of the Protestant world in general, and the great advances which it has made in a score of years within Methodist ranks, it must in all sobriety be regarded as the theory which is favored with the promise of the future.

In connection with this part of our theme, it is worth while to notice briefly a relative transference of stress from the external to the internal evidences for revelation. In the early part of the nineteenth century Richard Watson wrote:

The principal and most appropriate evidence of a revelation from God must be external to the revelation itself. . . . Miracles must be considered the leading and absolute evidence of a revelation from God.⁸

In the latter part of the century W. B. Pope wrote:

The dignity of eternal truth demands that it should not lay the main stress of its demonstration on miracles; certainly never on miracles alone. . . . The grandest miracles which are the credentials of a revelation are in the substance of the revelation itself. Christ, the author of Christianity, and its substance and end, is the supreme miracle.⁹

Probably Watson's standpoint is still approximated in the thought of some Methodists, but it cannot be doubted that for the newer Methodist scholarship, Pope, rather than Watson, is the spokesman on this subject. There is a growing conviction that the great credential of the Bible lies in its contents; that is, in the spiritual wealth and potency of the truths which it assumes to teach; and that even the reported miracle is efficient as a proof only as it furnishes a congenial contribution to the biblical contents, only as it serves to disclose the character of God, and to make manifest a power directed by wisdom and love. More and more widely it is being apprehended that, in respect of evidential value, nothing can be placed on a parity with the unique personality of Christ and the Christ-filled contents of the New Testament. This point of view, it is needless to say, implies no hostility to the supposition of miracles. It is simply the dictate of a just discrimination as to the conditions under which

⁸ *Theological Institutes*, Vol. I, p. 71.

⁹ *Compendium of Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 65, 73.

reports of miracles are adapted to be conducive to a rational faith in revelation. Universally Methodist scholars are cordially tolerant of the supposition of the historical verity of miracles, though some of them are ready to admit that the historical attestation for certain miracles reported in the Bible is much less cogent than for others.

II. *Original sin*.—In its first stadium Methodism was undoubtedly committed to the conclusion that guilt, as well as corruption of nature, is inherited by the whole posterity of Adam. It was commonly held, indeed, that this guilt is unconditionally remitted in case of those dying in infancy, on the ground of the meritorious work of Christ, and never is a real source of damage to one who accepts the saving offices of the Redeemer. Still, it was postulated as something attaching, in the order of natural conditions, to every child of the race, and as needing a special remedy. A remnant of this way of thinking survives in the articles of religion of Episcopal Methodism. Happily, the article which treats directly of original sin escaped all infusion of this venerable fiction; but in the article on the Son of God it was given a place incidentally in the statement that Christ became a sacrifice, "not only for original guilt, but also for the actual sins of men." As is perhaps indicated by this very subordinate reference to the element of guilt in the articles, Wesley laid the main stress upon the inherited corruption. Beyond doubt, however, he recognized the former element. In his treatise on original sin occurs the plain statement: "God does not look upon infants as innocent, but as involved in the guilt of Adam's sin."¹⁰ Richard Watson taught that Adam's transgression entailed upon his posterity a sentence not only of physical death, but also of spiritual and eternal death; and that, while this sentence is annulled for all who accept Christ, its repeal is conditional, so that it is quite possible that a penalty for Adam's sin should be included in the eternal punishment of any man who fails of salvation.¹¹ Wesley and Watson seem to have given very largely the standard on this subject for English Wesleyans. Later writers, such as James Rigg, W. B. Pope, and J. S. Banks, have repeated their teaching.

On the other hand, in the Methodist Episcopal Church the doctrine of hereditary guilt has long been in a moribund condition.

¹⁰ *Works*, Vol. XIV, p. 143.

¹¹ *Theological Institutes*, Vol. II, pp. 52-57.

Within the last half of the nineteenth century a few of her writers may have taken pains to pay it some respect, but they were powerless to rehabilitate it in the thought of the church. Miner Raymond distinctly repudiated it, and John Miley and R. S. Foster were also emphatic in its rejection. For well-nigh a generation it has had no considerable standing in the principal theological schools of this communion. We cannot believe that there is any sort of a chance for its resuscitation. Even the hold which it has through representation in the second article of religion will avail nothing; for the intelligent judgment of the church will concur with the following verdict of Miley:

This recognition of native guilt should have been eliminated from the second article in order to bring it into harmony with the seventh. The simplest explanation of its remaining is through mere oversight in the revision of the articles.¹² Thus a distinct change in doctrinal conception has been wrought in the largest branch of Methodism—a change in the interest of self-consistency, since the notion of hereditary guilt is distinctly an alien factor in a system which makes a virtue of repudiating arbitrary sovereignty.

In the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, the revision of the conception of original sin seems to have proceeded more slowly than in the sister-communion. T. O. Summers, in accordance with his English antecedents, gave a place in his theological system to hereditary guilt.¹³ But it is evident that his exposition has not remained in full control. The idea of hereditary guilt is distinctly repudiated by W. F. Tillett, dean of the biblical department of Vanderbilt University and professor of systematic theology. He says:

While voluntary sin and acquired depravity both involve moral guilt, and are culpable and justly punishable, inherited depravity, considered in itself alone, does not involve guilt and culpability. No man is responsible for what comes to him by birth apart from any act of his own free will—at least not until he arrives at an age of intelligent moral accountability, and finds that grace has provided and put at his command the means whereby he can change his sinful nature, and bring it into conformity to the law of God.¹⁴

III. *The person and work of Christ.*—On these topics it is not possible to specify any very definite doctrinal transition. The

¹² *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 525.

¹³ *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, pp. 34 ff.

¹⁴ *Personal Salvation*, p. 84.

movement here has issued rather in some measure of diversification of theory than in a wide acceptance of a revised dogmatic platform. The development relative to the person of Christ which probably has claimed the largest acceptance within Methodist bounds is the one which has been effected in the theological world at large in the last three quarters of a century; namely, a distinct enlargement of appreciation for the human perfection of the Son of man as a unique means of revealing at once God to man and man to himself.

With the more difficult problems of christological construction Methodist writers have not often attempted to grapple in earnest. Up to the seventh or eighth decade of the nineteenth century there was no considerable, if any, divergence from Richard Watson's quiet affirmation of the general terms of the Chalcedonian Creed. It was considered sufficient to maintain that in Christ two complete natures, the divine and the human, are united in one person. A serious wrestling with the data, rational and scriptural, which bear upon the exposition of this extraordinary personality was not undertaken. Thinking easily preserved an appearance of homogeneity because it followed the traditional channel and made no considerable effort to achieve insight or veritable explanation. In the later decades of the century more thought and research were expended, and the natural result has appeared in an initial diversification of scholarly conviction. Various thinkers have recognized, from a rational point of view, the great difficulty of predicating of Jesus a real childhood and a real youth, not to say a real manhood, on the supposition that there belonged to him, from the beginning of the incarnation, the perfectly unlimited vision of reality. Various students of the gospel narratives have recognized also the difficulty of reconciling certain scriptural facts and statements with the supposition that the habitual consciousness of the Christ of history was all-inclusive in its content.

In response to these difficulties, a number of Methodist scholars have concluded that there is no valid escape from admitting that the knowledge of Christ in the state of humiliation, however extraordinary it may have been, and however adequate to the fulfilment of a unique vocation, was not free from limitations. For an explanation of this fact of limitations a few have resorted to a radical doctrine of kenosis, the theory of a veritable depotentiation of the divine Logos in the

incarnation. Expression was given to this theory in the *Methodist Review* (March, 1897), in an article from the pen of J. M. Cramer, the particular form of kenotic doctrine which he advocated being that set forth by Ebrard; namely, the doctrine of the double life of the Logos, the original or normal and, supplementary to that, the depotentiated. More recently several Methodist scholars have expressed themselves in brief and general terms as favoring the kenotic theory;¹⁵ but the conditions under which they recorded their opinions leave it to be questioned whether they have any such independent interest in this theory that they would not be ready to surrender it, in case some other ground might be provided for explaining the apparent limitation of knowledge in the incarnate Christ. Possibly a solvent of difficulty may be found in the thought of a necessary mediation from the timeless sphere of the divine life to the forms of human conception and speech—a mediation taking place through the finite psychical nature of Christ, and being consequently subject to limitations. In any case, we surmise that the enormous metaphysical difficulties which pertain to the radical doctrine of the kenosis, and the scanty exegetical authority which it can claim, will restrict its progress among Methodist scholars. What has occurred in other theological domains serves to confirm this conviction.

Relative to the doctrine of Christ's work, or the nature of the atonement, the development has not been sufficiently pronounced to admit of being described in very precise terms. In the earlier part of the last century the established theory of Methodism was a moderate satisfaction theory—a theory which paid respect to the governmental bearing of Christ's work, but at the same time contended that in and through that work a tribute was rendered to the ethical nature of God, and not merely to the requirements of his governmental position. Within a portion of Methodist territory, especially in the Methodist Episcopal church, this theory has been compelled in part to give way to the pure governmental theory. The latter, as formulated by Miley, has been installed for a series of years in the conference course of study. Not a few people probably have come to think of it as *the* Methodist theory of the atonement. That is by no means the fact. In the majority both of treatises

¹⁵ Terry, *Moses and the Prophets*, Appendix.

and review articles by Methodist authors exception has been taken to the pure governmental theory. The general point of view of the older theory has survived in the minds of many theologians; and, so far as they have sought amendment, they have endeavored to get rid of obnoxious attachments—such as the assignment of a penal character to Christ's sufferings; such as the representation of an antithesis between the Father and the Son in respect to their attitude toward the sinning race; such also as the idea that atoning virtue was embraced in any mere physical transaction taken by itself, and not rather in the love, obedience, and self-devotement of a holy personality brought to manifestation in the visible transaction. With these developments another has had place. Instead of berating in severe terms the moral-influence theory, Methodist writers and preachers in not a few instances have come to recognize that this theory contains truth which ought never to be displaced or overshadowed by any rival theory. Comparatively few, doubtless, among Methodist pastors and teachers have announced their subscription to the moral-influence theory as an exclusive theory; but within a considerable range there has been of late a more appreciative estimate of it than was current a generation ago—an outcome quite in harmony with the widespread tendency in the theological world to render a larger emphasis to the paternal character of God as contrasted with the rectoral.

The circulation of Professor Denney's books on the atonement has emphasized in some degree the need of a closer consideration of the question whether the value of atonement is properly associated with the life of Christ as well as with his death. Only scanty tokens have yet been given of the tenor of Methodist thinking on this question. We judge that in this relation there is no complete consensus, some representatives of Methodism agreeing with Professor Denney's assignment of atoning value exclusively to the death of Christ, while others prefer to say, with the English Wesleyan, J. S. Lidgett: "The self-oblation which was consummated on the cross was begun at the incarnation."¹⁶ Those who hold the latter view claim that it is quite as catholic as the competing view, and that it has the advantage of superior congruity with the attribution of a distinctly ethical value

¹⁶ *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement*, p. 290.

to Christ's death, since the living Christ undoubtedly actualized the same ethical element, the same holy obedience and self-devotement, which found a culminating expression in his surrender to death upon the cross.

IV. *The conception of personal salvation.*—The most marked development which falls under this title concerns the interpretation of the advanced stage of salvation; in other words, the subject of Christian perfection or entire sanctification. On this subject John Wesley taught and bequeathed a fairly definite theory. It was manifestly his conviction that the work of grace which takes place in regeneration may be followed by a great consummating work worthy to be called entire sanctification; that entire sanctification, whatever intellectual and bodily defects it may fail to heal, not merely gives a normal direction to the will, but reaches back into the emotive nature, the sphere of impulses, desires, and affections, and profoundly renovates this background of the volitional life. Supposing the term "inbred sin" to cover all perverse tendencies of the emotive nature, we may say that Wesley taught that entire sanctification includes the elimination of inbred sin. From the scope which he assigned to this crowning experience, it logically follows that for its subject real grounds of temptation no longer remain in the heart or the spiritual nature, but are confined to intellectual limitations, to disordered states of the body, and to suggestions from without.

Doubtless, in one and another connection the definition of sin which Wesley set forth emphasized its voluntary nature. But this fact does not imply that he did not think of entire sanctification as extending into the background of what in strictness may be called volitional activity. For his psychology did not make the broad distinction between the emotive nature and the will which is current in our day; and, moreover, he might very well have thought of entire sanctification as reaching beyond sin proper to the standing occasions of sin in the tendencies or proclivities of the emotive nature. But, whatever explanation may be offered of the phraseology in question, it is quite certain that Wesley in his dominant way of thinking included in entire sanctification the elimination of inbred sin, as defined above.

This is indicated, in the first place, by the broad antithesis which he postulated between the regenerate state and the entirely sancti-

fied state. The proposition that in the regenerate believer there is no sin, no carnal mind, no bent to backsliding, he characterized as contrary both to the Word of God and the experience of Christians. In like manner, he rejected the proposition that if a man is holy at all, he is holy altogether. "That," he says, "does not follow: every babe in Christ is holy, and yet not altogether so. He is saved from sin; yet not entirely: it remains, though it does not reign." He noticed that the reborn man is apt to judge at first too highly of his condition, and to conclude that, because he feels no evil in his heart, none is left there; whereas universal experience shows that the full deliverance does not come at that point, and that the seed of sin is still remaining. On the other hand, he described entire sanctification as implying an entire renewal in the image of God, a total separation of sin from the soul, a total dying to sin, a condition in which the subject is freed from evil thoughts and evil tempers. He represented it as coming after profound conviction of inbred sin, and as being adequately attested only by the witness of the Holy Spirit, since one may feel all love and no sin for a time, while yet he is but partially sanctified. In short, it is manifest from the antithesis which Wesley made between regeneration and entire sanctification that he thought of the one as leaving behind a considerable deposit of inbred sin, and of the other as eliminating this deposit. Doubtless one can urge in rebuttal that Wesley once and again spoke of regeneration in very strong terms, as though it signified to his mind the complete renewal of the moral nature. But it is to be noticed that in a number of instances¹⁷ the connection shows that the emphatic terms were meant to be taken with a qualification. It is suggested, accordingly that a qualification is to be understood in the other instances, so that a decided balance remains on the side of the conclusion that Wesley's habitual thought affirmed a distinct antithesis between regeneration and entire sanctification, and gave to the latter term the broader and deeper sense naturally implied by this antithesis.

Again, Wesley's representation, that the complete cleansing—which the common thought of his Protestant contemporaries regarded as immediately antecedent to the entrance of the saved man into the

¹⁷ As in Sermons XIX, XL, and XLV.

other world—may be realized at varying intervals this side of death, argues that he made entire sanctification, as the phrase was ordinarily used by him, to cover all underlying tendencies in the soul which contend against the perfect dominion of love and righteousness.

Once more, repeated expressions in the hymns of his brother Charles, who at the time of writing in all likelihood shared his essential standpoint, are indicative of John Wesley's conviction that the extirpation of inbred sin falls within the scope of entire sanctification, viewed as an attainable experience in this life. Lines like the following are sufficiently unequivocal in their import:

Let me thy witness live,
When sin is all destroyed.

Speak the second time, Be clean!
Take away my inbred sin.

Fill me with thy glorious power,
Rooting out the seeds of sin.

Break the yoke of inbred sin,
And fully set my spirit free.

The seed of sin's disease
Spirit of health remove.

In face of all this, it avails little to point out that in two or three instances Wesley expressed a willingness to waive the question whether sin is only suspended in the subject of Christian perfection, so as to be practically inoperative, or is thoroughly destroyed. This was an irenic stroke prompted by his desire for the greatest possible degree of union with earnest-minded contemporaries who may have been disinclined to accept the more radical position. His characteristic standpoint was indubitably on the side of the conclusion that Christian perfection, or entire sanctification, as an attainable experience in this life, works the elimination of inbred sin as a fund of abnormality in the emotive nature.¹⁸

The original Wesleyan doctrine of entire sanctification, as defined above, has never ceased to have its advocates in American Methodism. For several generations it was the prevailing theory among

¹⁸ See Wesley's *Plain Account of Christian Perfection*, and Sermons XIII, XL, LXXXI; also Tyerman's *Life of Wesley*, Vol. I, pp. 444, 462, 498, 533; Vol. II, pp. 307, 346, 418-24, 431, 451-53, 465, 596; Vol. III, pp. 22, 175, 462, 625.

those who took pains to formulate and to propagate a doctrine of the higher Christian life. It appears in the books of the best-accredited writers on this theme for a large part of the nineteenth century. It was represented, if not always with entire lucidity, yet in sufficiently unmistakable terms, by George Peck, Nathan Bangs, R. S. Foster, Miner Raymond, Jesse T. Peck, Daniel Steele, and others. There is good warrant for saying that the dominant Methodist doctrine down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, so far as that teaching came to literary expression, made entire sanctification a great consummating experience, posterior to regeneration, and including in its scope the elimination of inbred sin. This is not saying that the doctrine of entire sanctification in the given form was made, up to that point, a vital issue throughout the whole area of American Methodism. So far as active, interested propagation was concerned, it was for very much of the period rather the specialty of a school in the church than the property of the church as a whole.¹⁹

In the latter part of the century a growing tendency to dissent from the original and the transmitted Wesleyan theory came to manifestation. One evidence of this tendency is contained in published writings. In a number of treatises the traditional doctrine was distinctly challenged. Among these were writings of the English theologian, J. A. Beet, which were circulated in this country through denominational instrumentalities. His theory amounts to a substitute for that of Wesley. In place of assuming an elimination of perverse inward tendencies, he postulates, as the summit of possible Christian attainment in the present life, such a maturity of will-power, and strength of righteous purpose as are competent to secure victory over every evil impulse as it rises into consciousness. The inward tendency to sin, he maintains, is not annihilated, but it may continuously be frustrated and made relatively less and less formidable.²⁰ Substantially the same theory of a progressive sanctification, to which no definite limit can be set, is advocated by

¹⁹ The facts of history seem to lend considerable countenance to Professor George A. Coe's contention, based on psychological grounds as well as on observation, that the practical appropriation and professed exemplification of such a tenet as the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection cannot pass beyond the bounds of a coterie or limited school in any large communion (*The Spiritual Life*, pp. 63, 64).

²⁰ *Holiness as understood by the Writers of the Bible; The New Life in Christ.*

James Mudge in a book entitled *Growth in Holiness toward Perfection*. Wayward impulses he teaches, taken in bulk, can at best be conquered, not eradicated. A remnant of depravity—that is, of tendencies falling below the level of the ideal—may be expected to abide till the end of earthly life. Cleansing from all sin is possible to the wayfarer only in the sense of deliverance from its guilt and power and practice, not in the sense of the complete extirpation of its subconscious grounds.

A view identical with the foregoing, in its stress upon attainable sanctification as belonging to the sphere of the conscious life, but differing somewhat in the tenor of its reference to inherent depravity, is contained in the volume of D. W. C. Huntington on *Sin and Holiness*. His contention is that entire sanctification is coincident with regeneration, and that among the subjects of the new birth the proper ground of distinction concerns the differing degrees of steadiness with which the regenerate character may be maintained and acted out. By character in his exposition is understood the dominant choice or attitude of the will; anything outside the sphere of conscious volitional activity falls outside the domain of character proper, and pertains to the sphere of conditions under which character is actualized.

Within the southern branch of Methodism a book advocating essentially the same view has been written by J. M. Boland. Other representatives of that branch have freely expressed their dissent from the traditional Wesleyan platform. Especially noteworthy is the position taken by Dean W. F. Tillett, of Vanderbilt University. In the volume already cited he criticises Wesley for assuming a distinct antithesis between the experience of regeneration and a second experience called entire sanctification. The converted man, he contends, must at the point of conversion or regeneration reckon himself to be entirely done with sin. He is not to look, or to be directed to look, to a second transformation, but simply to go on in absolute fidelity to the new character and relation attained by him. If at any subsequent point he finds evidence of sin in himself—faults of temper, pride, self-will, and the like—then he is to apply at once in all earnestness to the remedy; that is, to the power of God laid hold of by faith and consecration. If at a subsequent point

still there is a similar experience of a falling short of the standard, the same process is to be repeated. Thus, in place of a *second* blessing after conversion, which blessing is supposed to consummate entire sanctification, we have from the point of conversion a continuous striving after a thoroughly sanctified life, with such crises included in the religious career of the individual as conditions and exigencies special to him may entail.²¹

Obviously, on the ground of any one of these writers there is no place for the old-time conception of entire sanctification, as a distinct second blessing, evidenced by the testimony of the divine Spirit, and to be reckoned a matter of appropriate and even obligatory profession. There is room only for the notion of an indeterminate number of more or less notable reinforcements of the grace received in regeneration—reinforcements qualifying for a more or less constant victory over all evil incitements both from without and from within. The most that a Christian could say from the standpoint of the revised theories would be that, to the best of his knowledge, for such and such a time he had enjoyed so complete a victory over evil as to incur no occasion of condemnation.

Writings like those under consideration, composed by men of eminent standing in the church, circulated for the most part through official ecclesiastical channels, and meeting with tokens of extensive appreciation, constitute an evidence of no little weight. Manifestly they must be taken as symptomatic of a very considerable tendency to revise quite materially the traditional doctrine of entire sanctification.

Another evidence of defection from the older standpoint may be noticed in the implicit attitude toward it characteristic of a large section of the ministry. No one who has had large acquaintance with Methodist pastors will deny that a very decided majority of them, at least of those who have had considerable experience in church work, are disinclined to preach entire sanctification after the pattern of Wesley and his successors. They feel that it is well-nigh a matter of despair to secure satisfactory witnesses of the supreme grace. Occasionally a beautiful example of holy living among the professors of entire sanctification recalls to their minds the radiant

²¹ Pp. 510-34.

saintliness of a Fletcher; but the comforting spectacle is all too rare. They notice that a published claim to finished purity easily becomes a temptation to broaden, at the expense of a severe self-scrutiny, the distinction between mere natural infirmities and sins. They discover that very high professions on the part of those who have not gained an extraordinary self-knowledge through a profound, varied, and prolonged discipline, are not likely to forward the cause of religious zeal in the congregation at large, but tend rather to embarrass the zealous worker in the great task of making earnest religion appear sane, reasonable, wholesome, and attainable. In plain words, however little they may say upon the subject, they have evidently come to entertain a chilling suspicion, not to say a downright conviction, that the Wesleyan doctrine of Christian perfection is not in its proper terms a workable doctrine.

It would be taking a step beyond the evidence to say that this doctrine has lost its hold upon American Methodism. Statements in high official quarters, up to a very recent date, have been very largely in its favor.²² Positive and open exception to it has been confined thus far to a minority of Methodist scholars. But evidently when nine out of ten Methodist pastors esteem it a benign providence which relieves them of the occasion to deal with a group of sanctificationists of the ordinary type in their respective flocks, the prospect for the traditional doctrine is far from being bright. This fact, however, should not be taken as implying that a certain residuum will not be carried over from the doctrine and ever find among Methodists a warm appreciation. Wesley's teaching on this theme will remain as a protest against supineness in religion, as a rebuke to contentment with spiritual defeat, as a potent admonition to the follower of Christ to press forward to the complete enthronement of love and righteousness in the heart and the life. The Wesleyan theory may be modified; the practical demand which the theory enshrines will not be neglected except by a Methodism recreant to its history.

A few topics additional to that of entire sanctification might properly receive some consideration within the present division of our theme. Something might be said, for example, about a relative

²² Instances are given by J. R. Brooks, *Scriptural Sanctification*, pp. 155-67.

abatement of stress upon conversion as a distinct crisis in conscious experience. While it is a somewhat apocryphal notion that Methodism, as such, ever insisted that a valid religious experience must be in that form, it is true that the older type of Methodism placed large stress upon conversion expedients, as compared with the instrumentalities of early religious training. True to its record as an evangelistic power, American Methodism still holds that revival fire is a perfectly legitimate means for burning through the indifference characteristic of great multitudes, and that very many are likely to enter the kingdom of grace only through a powerful arrest and a distinct crisis in experience. At the same time, the feeling has been gaining ground that the church in the proper discharge of its vocation must, to a very large extent, safeguard the child from the start against the life of practical unbelief and alienation from the heavenly Father. Thus the gentler means of Christian nurture are receiving enlarged appreciation, and are made to share the field of interested attention with those strenuous forms of Christian effort which seek to rescue men through instant decisions and radical transformations.

It might be noticed also that on the theme of the witness to salvation, though a distinct change of standpoint on the part of the general body of Methodists cannot be asserted, the door has, nevertheless, been set ajar for the incoming of a modified view. Evidence has been given in some quarters of a disposition to make less account, than was at one time customary, of a distinct, extraordinary message to the individual, and to emphasize the standing ground of assurance which resides in a filial character and consciousness. A recent treatise by a Methodist author, waiving the question as to what may occur at some special crisis, and considering assurance as a continuous fact in a vital Christian life, sets forth this statement of its method:

Assurance is in and through the filial consciousness, which consciousness is at once an activity of man's spirit and a product of the Holy Spirit's agency.

V. *Eschatology*.—American Methodism has not made the theme of the last things a matter for very specific or extended discussion. There is, indeed, some ground for the suspicion that it has not taken pains in relation to this field to reach in all respects a clear consciousness as to the logical outcome of its own postulates. For instance, on the question of the possibility of moral transitions in the life to come,

it has been customary for Methodist theologians, so far as the rational argument is concerned, to stop short with the complacent affirmation that it is not necessary to provide any room for such transitions, since Methodist teaching authorizes the assumption of a fair chance of salvation for all men in this life. The fact has been well-nigh overlooked that a question may legitimately be raised as to whether a system which rejects irresistible grace and arbitrary reprobation, which strongly accentuates divine benevolence and human freedom, has logical means for excluding, all at once, at the end of earthly life, an element of contingency in the moral status of souls imperfectly developed in good or evil. Again, there has been an inadequate attempt to explain how an assertion of the inherent or essential immortality of the soul can be reconciled with the doctrine of the constant dependence of every finite entity upon the divine efficiency—a doctrine which Methodist theologians have held in common with those of every other name. The latter doctrine certainly would seem to imply that there is nothing in the nature of the soul itself which serves as an immediate guarantee of immortality, but rather that endless persistence in being must be dependent upon the divine purpose.

As respects positive developments, it can be said that Methodist scholars, with little, if any, exception, have come to repudiate the notion of literal hell fire as a piece of crude realism. It can also be stated that it is now a very common thing for Methodist writers to reject the thought of a necessary material identity of the resurrection body with the body of the present life. Twenty-five years ago indulgence in such teaching would have been liable to elicit protests; in the present it is quite certain not to evoke serious complaint from anyone above the rank of a fussy obscurantist. Other points of departure from the traditional eschatology might be mentioned, but most of them have received thus far too limited a suffrage to be accounted symptomatic of a general drift.

The conclusion seems to be warranted that, on the whole, American Methodism has preserved a fair balance between conservative and progressive tendencies. It has not been characterized by any spurts or rash adventures in the dogmatic domain. Innovating opinions have been compelled to give an account of themselves, and to prove

their ability to meet the tests of scholarship and piety. On the other hand, the door has not been closed against dogmatic amelioration. The advocate of improved points of view has met with a good degree of tolerance. Here and there, it is true, an intemperate dogmatist has raised an alarm-cry and called for the unsheathing of the sword of ecclesiastical discipline. But the responsible authorities have generally been cautious about giving heed to the intolerant demand. The genius of Methodism makes dogma subordinate to life, not indeed disparaging dogma, since in the long run it is likely to have a serious effect upon life, but yet holding it distinctly subordinate to the promotion of love and righteousness in the individual and the brotherhood. Unsparing rigor and excessive anxiety in upholding subordinate points in doctrine would accord neither with the spirit of the founder nor with the conception of the mission of Methodism as a great evangelistic agency devoted to the spread of scriptural holiness. That American Methodism has been to so great an extent true to its ideal, and has blended with its conservatism so much of tolerance and catholicity, must be gratifying to every lover of free scholarship.

A REVIEW OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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In the present stage of speculative thought the traditional *a priori* arguments for the existence of God stand in more or less suspicion. That, for the most part, they have brought their disrepute upon themselves there can be no question. The exigencies of controversy, and especially the onslaught of Deism in the eighteenth century, have called forth from the defenders of the faith a wealth of proofs whose chief virtue at present lies in the oblivion which has overtaken them. We shall not disturb their repose; they were born in strife; let them now enjoy their peace. It is desirable, rather, to review from a historical and somewhat critical point of view only that *a priori* argument *par excellence* to which, in the course of a long tradition, the term "ontological" has fastened itself. Arising in the thought of Anselm, it exerted a positive influence upon subsequent philosophy until it was seriously discredited by Kant. By this argument is understood the endeavor to reason immediately from God as concept to God as being. Rightly estimated, it belongs to a special province of that larger question of the relation of thought to being in general.

Someone may wonder why, since the argument is indeed at present discredited, there should be any interest in the investigation of its history. It has gone the way of earthborn things. What is the use of attempting to free it from the limbo of shades? Yet even a casual acquaintance with the history of philosophy suggests that no school of thought which long obtains among men is wholly in error. Truth, at best, is relative. There never was, nor can there be, absolute error. The superstructure of a thought may be unable to stand the test of time; it may have been shown even that the logical foundation upon which it stands has been defective and unsafe; but the builders of the thought nevertheless may have been swayed by motives that ought to endure despite the failure of their work. As the architect learns

from the ruins of the past, so we may glean some meaning from the relics of a bygone proof. Instead, then, of attempting the thankless task of establishing the validity of the ontological argument, ask yourself its meaning. Reasoning which swayed such men as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolff, Mendelssohn, to say nothing of minor minds, must at least have had some meaning. In the light of the history of the argument, it is well to ask what are the motives worthy of consideration which are conserved by it. Is the proof not merely invalid, but does it represent also an utter perversion of reason? To this query you must give some answer.

It has been questioned whether Anselm was in fact the originator of the argument with which his name is so closely interwoven. It is not necessary to show in detail that Plato had attained to his God in the realm of ideas in a not dissimilar way. Cleanthes, the Stoic, had reasoned from the mere ability to compare goods to the existence of a superlative good which could be described as an absolutely good and perfect being. Similar arguments were later employed by both Augustine and Boethius. For Augustine the knowledge of the existence of God is not in any sense dependent upon human reasoning. "Let it never seem to thee that God is known by reason, or that by reasoning he is to be brought into being."¹ The problem for Augustine was not *whether* God is, but *what* God is. Yet he urges that either truth is the highest good, and therefore God, or else there is a higher something which must be God. In any case, the concept of the highest good is one with the recognition of God's existence.* Boethius held practically the same view. God is either the most complete good presupposed by all incomplete goods, or else there is a good beyond God. Reason demands a less than infinite series. A good beyond God, however, is unthinkable; therefore God as the highest good exists.³ In these arguments God is the universal in certain categories, and by reason of that fact exists. The thought is evidently Platonistic. Yet, since the arguments are not put forward as special pleas, they are to be regarded merely as casual outcroppings of Platonic doctrine.

¹ *Omnia opera*, Vol. II, p. 852 B.

* *De libero arbitrio*, Book II, secs. 5-39.

³ *De consolazione philosophiae*, Book III, prose 10.

Anselm was influenced by the same general cast of thought. His world, too, is a Platonic world, embracing not merely the world of sense-objects, but also a realm of ideas—i. e., universals—certainly no less real than objects of sense, but known through thought alone. This being so, the *Monologium* presents essentially the same kind of argument that is found in Augustine and Boethius. God is, because he is the highest good.⁴ To our modern way of thinking this savors of assertion rather than logic, and we rightfully demand a more formal proof. This Anselm presents in the *Proslogium*.⁵ The argument is as follows: Declaring his belief that God is good, and that greater good than God cannot be thought, he proceeds to ask whether the fool's assertion that there is no God brings about his nonexistence. No, says Anselm, for the fool understands what he hears, and it exists in his understanding even though he does not understand that it actually exists. There is here in Anselm's mind a clear distinction between existence *in intellectu* and existence *in re*, between the artist's concept and the finished painting. At any rate, the fool understands what is meant by "a good greater than which cannot be thought;" *that* at least exists in his understanding. But such a good cannot exist merely in the understanding, for there is also a good existent in fact, and the latter is surely "greater" than the former. Hence, the good greater than which cannot be thought exists in fact. Such a good cannot be thought of as nonexistent, for existence is a mark of excellence, which turns out to be the kind of greatness that Anselm has in mind. Therefore, such a good exists, but by definition this is God. Therefore, God exists.

Estimates of the Anselmic argument sometimes assume that its author was naïve enough to confuse existence in thought with existence in fact. The question is not at this moment the true meaning of either term. In face, however, of Anselm's explicit distinction, it is not easy to see why such a critique should have become historic. The logical defect of the argument actually arises from the ambiguity of the word "greater." The historic objection was first given form by the monk Gaunilo in his *Liber pro insipiente*. He contended that there were conceptions of the imagination to which reality in no wise pertained; that experience made known certain

⁴ Chaps. 1-4.

⁵ Chaps. 2-4.

false conceptions which could not be said even to represent reality; that the existence of God is beyond our capacity to understand, so that our conception of him is never adequate. There was none of these things that Anselm could not have granted. Let the objection take the form that by such an argument could be proved the actual existence of an imaginary object, such as an island "more excellent than all others," then Anselm becomes interested. He points out that he is concerned, not with a "more excellent," but with "that than which a more excellent cannot be conceived." The former is one among particulars; the latter is the universal which embraces all particulars. For this reason, Gaunilo's idea of an island does not involve existence. Particulars are known through the senses. The idea of God does involve existence, because the universal is *per se* real. God being the *summum bonum*, he who thinks this universal must therefore know God's existence.⁶

The validity of Anselm's position rests upon the acceptance of his Platonic theory of knowledge. Granted that, he may easily say: "I believe that this argument cannot be invalidated by the validity of any objection." Even Ueberweg, though denying any necessary connection between realism and Anselm's argument, concedes that the defect which he discovers in the argument "was peculiarly natural in connection with the form of realism held by Anselm."⁸ The case may be stated more strongly. "When one makes it clear that this demonstration is a veritable sophistry, he will have jeopardized the entire system of the doctor."⁹ This by no means exempts Anselm's thought from criticism, but it does imply that Anselm had at least a justification for his method of attack upon the problem. If one can think of God, meaning by God the highest universal good, that thought must involve existence of its subject on the basis of the Anselmian realism. A change in the theory of knowledge would demand a restatement of the argument and involve the ultimate evaluation of its futility. This would hold true even for realism of the Aristotelian type.

* (1) *Liber apologeticus adversus respondentem pro insipiente.*

† *Ibid.*, chap. 10.

‡ *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 385, 386 (English translation.).

§ Huarenau, *Histoire de la philosophie scholastique*, Vol. I, p. 278.

As a matter of fact, the Anselmic proof did not obtain in its own age a broad reception. The Aristotelians Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, the critic Duns Scotus, and the nominalist William of Occam, are among those who naturally rejected the argument. Of them Thomas may be taken as a type. His objections¹⁰ follow in spirit those of Gaunilo. He recognizes as true that some propositions do involve the attribute, or predicate, as part of the nature of the subject, and are consequently known *per se* to all. Evidently this is characteristic of identical propositions. It is also true of such propositions as, "Man is an animal." Here both the terms are empirically known. Is this the case with the proposition, "God exists"? Does the notion "God" include "exists"? Only, Thomas says, on condition that we know what God is. This is never a matter of immediate knowledge, but a matter of demonstration from physical effects. As to the name "God," it is evident that it can be understood in various senses. Even were it understood in one sense, that understanding of it need not involve its existence. To say that one cannot think the nonexistence of God is untrue; the fool does think it. More specifically Thomas objects: (1) that it is not necessary to accept Anselm's definition of God; some make their God material and equivalent to the world; (2) that, granting the concept, one cannot reason to God's existence in the realm of reality; all that one can consistently affirm is that God exists in the understanding, which is no more than the atheist would grant; (3) that the proposition that that which cannot be thought not to be is greater than that which can be so thought, is invalid; for the latter may be thought not to be, not because of a deficiency in the being, but because of some defect in our faculties. Aquinas concludes that God may be reasoned to only on a *posteriori* grounds; he may not be known by cognition, but as the cause of cognition, the one "in whom all things are known."¹¹ The most telling of these objections is the first. Anselm did fail to show that God *must* be thought in his terms. Leibnitz urged the same objection against the Cartesian definition. Anselm would have replied, no doubt, that a merely mechanical God is no God,

¹⁰ *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, quæst. 2, art. 1.

¹¹ Cf. with the *Summa* his *Summae de veritate catholicae fidei contra gentiles*, Book I, chaps. 10, 11.

because he is not a moral being essentially; that the marks of his own definition were alone adequate to define the One in whom we ought to believe; that whoever had understanding could not fail to catch the import of such a definition, and that he asked no more to be granted to establish his position. It is worthy of passing note that Aquinas is not unwilling to regard the knowledge of God's existence as a first truth, if it be considered so merely in relation to ourselves.¹² This is in accord with his general contention for the lack of finality in our rational knowledge of God.

Meanwhile the argument did not lack defenders. There is some evidence to show that it was still taught in some of the Jesuit schools five centuries after Anselm. It was in this way, doubtless, that Descartes first became acquainted with it and was led to incorporate it into his own system.

Recall the completeness of the Cartesian doubt; everything was called into question except the doubt itself. Now, there never was a skeptic who had less actual desire to doubt than had Descartes. Above all, he was no moral hero; he had no desire to be enrolled among the martyrs. When his former teachers did not accept his doctrines, he was grieved. In 1624 Parliament forbade, under penalty of death, the declaration of any principles which clashed with the old and tried authors, or the institution of any disputation other than those sanctioned by the theological faculty. Descartes, a few years later, found a foreign climate more congenial than that of Paris. Even then he actually suppressed one of his manuscripts, *De mundo*, lest it might bring him into conflict with the church.¹³ Descartes, then, was anxious not to doubt. Of this anxiety was begotten his famous maxim: "Cogito, ergo sum." Now, apparently this bases his system upon the certitude of mere thought; but one need not read far into the system to find that this supposed basis was abandoned by him for another. This other basis was the certitude of the existence of God. Since, however, Descartes had already concluded that the only certitude he could have must be in thought, it was inevitable that he should come to regard the ontological argu-

¹² *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, quæst. 2, art. 1, *ad tertium*.

¹³ Letter to R. P. Mersenne, *Œuvres de Descartes*, Vol. VI, pp. 236 ff. (Cousin's edition.)

ment as of great worth. If God could be shown to be a proved fact, doubt would be dispelled more quickly than a morning mist. In this situation germinated the dogmatic tradition which culminated in Leibnitz and Wolff.

Descartes assumes that the test of reality in an idea is clarity and vividness. Modern psychological analysis would not fully admit this; witness the facts of dream-life. Yet, accepting this criterion, Descartes finds in himself as an "innate" idea a very clear and distinct notion of a being supremely perfect and infinite. Hence this being exists. Someone, he realizes, will object that existence and essence are distinct from each other. By "essence" Descartes here means practically what we understand by "concept." But, he continues, just as in a triangle you cannot separate the equality of the angles to two right angles from the concept of a triangle, so existence belongs to the concept of God. I cannot think a nonexistent God; it is the very existence of God that affords my idea of God.¹⁴ Of course, it is quite clear that Descartes has here shifted his ground. The question of the origin of the idea is not at all a part of the ontological argument.

Descartes denied the identity of his argument with that of Anselm. Anselm's proof, he said, turned merely upon the definition of the word "God," while his own rested upon the analysis of a clear and distinct idea.¹⁵ That analysis shows that existence necessarily belongs to the very nature of God as such, so that he is not dealing with a mere "essence"—i. e., a concept—or a mere "form"—i. e., an idea of the imagination. Into Descartes' reasoning the question of the validity of his idea of God does not enter. Yet behind his whole argument lies a theory of the causation of ideas.¹⁶ The mere presence of a clear and distinct idea is held to imply the existence of an objective cause. At bottom, Descartes' theory of the cognition of God does not differ from his theory of the cognition of any objective reality. His psychology has become antiquated, and, through its rejection, the whole argument has been impaired. The situation is akin to that which we discovered in the case of Anselm. If you accept their epistemologies, you cannot attack their conclusions.

¹⁴ *Meditations*, V; *Principles*, I, pp. Part 1, sec. 14 ff.

¹⁵ *Œuvres*, Vol. I, p. 389.

¹⁶ *Meditations*, III.

Spinoza accepts the Cartesian argument with such modifications as are necessitated by his monistic point of view. God is a "substance consisting of infinite attributes,"¹⁷ an attribute being "that which the intellect perceives of substance."¹⁸ A substance is "that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself;"¹⁹ and can, therefore, be immediately conceived without the aid of a syllogism. Hence, it pertains to the nature of substances to exist,²⁰ the criterion of existence, as with Descartes, being the clarity and vividness of the idea. To doubt existence in such a case is to say that one has a true idea of which he does not know whether it be true or false.²¹ Since attributes are proportioned to reality, God, being the substance consisting of infinite attributes each expressing eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.²² He bases this conclusion in part upon the inconceivability of God's nonexistence; otherwise there would be a nonexistent substance, a contradiction in terms. Inability to exist is impotence, but to suppose such impotence in God is to involve oneself in an absurdity which exalts the finite above God. Either nothing exists, or else God necessarily exists. Experience shows the former to be untrue; but, if anything exists, God must exist, for all existence must have its ground. God is the most real; hence he has the most power to exist and must exist *per se*. A connected statement of Spinoza's position is to be found in his *Korte Verhandeling van God*.²³ Everything of which we know clearly and distinctly that it belongs to the nature of a thing (by "nature" is meant that through which a thing is what it is), that can truly be maintained of the thing. Now, existence belongs to the nature of God, as we clearly and plainly recognize. Therefore, God exists. In this treatise Spinoza also insists that an idea and a thing are distinct, and that his argument does not confuse the two. The note in which he brings this out, however, is very obscure and in its details unintelligible.

There is one thing connected with Spinoza's argument that comes out more clearly than in either that of Anselm or that of Descartes. That is the important part played by definition. All three of these

¹⁷ *Ethics*, Pars I, Def. VI. ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Def. IV. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Def. III.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Prop. VII. ²¹ *Ibid.*, Prop. VIII. ²² *Ibid.*, Prop. XI.

²³ Sigwart's German translation, pp. 5, 6.

thinkers might well say that they care not who makes the arguments, if to them be given the making of definitions. Their general form of syllogism is:

If I have an idea of a God of which existence is a mark, then that God exists.
But I do have such an idea.
Therefore, God exists.

Spinoza does not seem absolutely sure of his grounds, for he fears that "many persons will, perhaps, not be able to see the force of this demonstration."²⁴ If, however, one accepts the canon that perfection establishes the existence of a thing, then, to quote Spinoza, it is true that "of no existence can we be more sure than of the existence of the being absolutely infinite or perfect, i. e., God." The question remains unanswered as to whether one *must* accept the presupposed definition. Spinoza does look toward it in his endeavor to cast his whole argument into mathematical form, vainly hoping to secure thereby mathematical validity and necessity.

To Leibnitz this lack of mathematical precision proved to be especially deplorable. He would admit the validity of the proof upon one condition; namely, that the *possibility* of the idea of God could be established.²⁵ Mathematical definitions, upon Leibnitz's theory, must be shown to correspond to reality. Hence, he urged that "we cannot safely use definitions before knowing that they are real," the test of reality being a particular kind of clearness, freedom from contradictions. He regarded the argument as incomplete, merely hypothetical in form. For its completion there was required a demonstration that God is possible, but granted that a necessary being is possible, it necessarily exists, and "if necessary being does not exist, there is no being possible."²⁶

Anselm had felt no obligation to prove the existence of God as possible, because by his theory of knowledge the denial of the possibility of a universal would be absurd. The mere fact of particulars existing made his universal a possibility. Neither did Descartes raise the question; for the idea of God being, in his view, innate, it would be idle to inquire as to its possibility. Leibnitz, it is true,

²⁴ *Ethics*, Part I, Prop. XI, schol.

²⁵ *Werke* (Gerhardt's edition), Vol. IV, p. 358.

²⁶ *Werke*, Vol. IV, p.p 405, 406.

also regarded the idea of God as innate, but he was confronted with the necessity of overcoming a cleft between his physics and his theology. A consistent monadology would have been materialistic, excluding God. Yet Leibnitz felt the press of theological need. Consequently, he made use of the tried arguments, and even invented a new and now abandoned argument for the existence of God. Since his physics seemingly tended toward a suspicion that there was no need for God, he was compelled to lay stress upon the category of possibility in order to establish his theology. Now, if the idea of God is not contradictory, God is possible.²⁷ If it is contradictory, it must be so because God's perfections are incompatible with each other; i. e., that the perfections *A* and *B* cannot be found in one subject. Leibnitz defines a perfection as incapable of analysis. *A* and *B* as perfections are ultimate and, being incapable of analysis, cannot be shown to be incompatible. But *A* and *B* are any perfections. Therefore, all perfections are compatible. God, having all perfections, consequently exists.²⁸

The above proof may be supplemented by a "proof of the existence of God from his essence."²⁹ Having defined possible existence as the possibility of a thing, he claims that this possibility is inseparable from the essence of a thing. It is true of God, as of all things, that if one can think him, it is possible that he exists. But, in the case of God, the essence and actual existence are inseparable. Therefore, if God may exist, he does exist. It remains only to show that God's essence is such that existence actually belongs to him. It is admitted, by definition, that the essence of God and the highest perfection are inseparable. But the highest perfection can exclude no perfection, and existence is certainly a perfection. Hence, God's essence does include actual existence. Leibnitz comes to the same goal in another way. If God be defined as a necessary being, then it is self-evident that his essence involves the necessity of existing. The idea of God, therefore, involves existence, if the idea contains no contradiction; i. e., if it is possible. But its possibility has already been shown.

The ordinary man has a just suspicion of all such arguments,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 614 ("Monadology," sec. 45).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, pp. 261, 262.

²⁹ Cf. Stein, *Leibnitz und Spinoza*, Beilage VII.

because, as Leibnitz urged against Descartes' proof, they cover the ground too quickly. In fact Leibnitz only buried the difficulty a little deeper under the ambiguity of "possibility." Yet the Leibnitzian-Wolfian school showed a keener appreciation of the part to be played by definitions. They uncovered the fact that their predecessors had treated existence as a perfection among the perfections of a most perfect being. If their notion of God be accepted, then analysis of that concept is bound to establish existence. This is the *nervus probandi*. Does analysis of any concept point to existence as a necessary element of the concept? If it does not do so in other cases, why should it do so in the given case, God? Are not the ideas of our dream-life of the same sort as those of our moments of conscious perception? What is the distinction between the realm of fancy and the realm of the real, between the true and the false? In some sense, "real" means a reference to an objective world. Hence, the reality of any concept seems to be attained by adding something to a concept rather than by mere dissection of the concept, by synthesis instead of by analysis.

This was the position taken by Kant in his famous critique of the ontological argument, a result that had been foreshadowed in his *Einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes*,³⁰ which had been published eighteen years before the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. He had then denied that the existence of a thing is to be regarded as a predicate of the thing. At that time, still dreaming his dogmatic dreams, he believed in the possibility of an *a priori* proof of the existence of God, but in his master-work he denied the possibility of any logical proof for God. The essence of this denial rests in the reduction of all proofs to some form of the ontological, and, then, denying *in toto* the validity of the latter. Now, if the final test of reality is to be absolute data of sensations, for the *idea* of God there can be no data; it is a construction in thought. This may not mean that God does not exist, but if he does exist, it can only be as out of relation to human intellect. You may have an idea of God, but you can have no *concept* of him, since concepts presuppose a sensualistic basis. Yet without concepts there is no knowledge. When, then, one speaks of the necessity of such an idea,

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, Part III, 2.

the necessity must be always a subjective necessity. In this idea, it is true, you cannot refuse to think the predicate without affecting the subject, but you are not at all obliged to think the subject; e. g., in the judgment, "God as a necessary being exists," you may refuse absolutely to entertain the thought. Even were this not possible, the argument is in no wise improved, for existence is a synthetic principle, to find which one must always go outside of his concept. Hence, even if one denies the existence of God, that does not affect the idea of God. "Logical" predicates are to be distinguished from "real" predicates, according to Kant's argument. Yet among these real predicates he does not include being. The only method he knows whereby one can learn of being is *a posteriori*, not *a priori*; through data of the senses, and not through the mere activities of thought. Hence, the idea of "absolute being" does not give us any knowledge of existence.³¹

Kant would grant that it is scientifically possible for God to exist, but it would be as a *Ding an sich*, of whose actual existence we neither know nor can know. For him, as for Leibnitz, possibility is evidenced by the lack of contradictory elements. Yet, unlike Leibnitz, this lack of contradiction must be found, not merely within the concept or notion, but within the sphere of experience as well. Nor does he regard the possibility of God's existence as establishing that existence. Nor can possibility be established by *a priori* arguments; somewhere there must be an appeal to experience. Kant, further, would deny the applicability of Spinoza's mathematical method for the discovery of transcendent truth; i. e., truth in an extra-empirical realm. Mathematics is *a priori* in method, while the question of existence is decided only through reference to empirical data. The Cartesian argument Kant would regard as lost labor. He compares the Cartesian logic to a merchant who thinks to enrich himself by adding ciphers to the left of the sum-totals of his accounts. As for Anselm, his argument was too obsolete in its form for Kant's notice. It may be added, too, that Kant's philosophical instinct did not sharpen his historic interest. His knowledge of the history of philosophy was, at best, restricted.

It could be shown that Kant's so-called moral argument for God, which enables the postulation of a God whose business it is to pro-

³¹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B, pp. 595-670.

portion reward to desert, in fact involves ontology just as much as does the cosmological or the teleological argument. On a Kantian basis consistency would afford no avenue of escape from the eternal treadmill of subjectivism. No *Ding an sich* can remain in any system, if by a *Ding an sich* we mean, as Kant often does mean, an extra-empirical something, or somewhat, within the field of experience. Evidently this is a contradiction in terms. Our sphere of discourse is never anything but the field of experience, so that in the Kantian doctrine contradiction is unavoidable. The outcome is clear: either no God, or else a rejection of the system in whole or in part, or else a contradiction in thought. The last stultifies reason; the first does not satisfy human experience; the possibility of modifying the system alone remains. We will not now follow the post-Kantian development, but it is of interest to recall that Hegel, rejecting the *Ding an sich*, found God, not outside of nature, but in nature; not transcendent, but immanent. Returning in spirit to Anselm, he once more makes God the highest universal—i. e., the Absolute—and on *a priori* grounds reaffirms the existence of God. Consciously he rejected Kant's criticism, and shrewdly observed that Kant had said nothing more than Gaunilo had said seven centuries before, nothing that Anselm had not fully anticipated. To Hegel, then, God is implied *a priori* in all existence as the reconciler of all contradictory elements in our thinking. He is not identical with the contradictions, because he is the Absolute. He is existent, for he is ever overcoming his subjectivity and realizing himself.³²

Thus, in a sense, the argument has completed its cycle. As modestly held by some of its present-day advocates, the washing of the grime of ages from its face has so far altered it as to make its connection with the past difficult of recognition. No one, at least, would be bold enough to present it in any pre-Kantian sense. Yet even today the argument abides with us as an alluring problem. Perhaps Kant's objections are influencing the wider circle, so that the very name "ontological" remains in disgrace.

What is to be our own estimate of the situation? Ought one to follow Kant, or Hegel, or shall he be independent of both? Cer-

³² Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. III, pp. 360 ff. (translated in the "Foreign Philosophical Library").

tainly we cannot accept Kant's *Ding an sich*; but with the rejection of it his critique of the ontological argument fails, because there is then left no reality *per se* to act as a touchstone of the existent. There are, however, many reasons why we should concur in his distrust of the argument.

The proof in question does lack a certain reference to sensuous data that in some wise ordinarily constitutes our criterion of existence. "Is this a dagger which I see before me?" cries the frenzied Macbeth. The sane man need not long seek a satisfying answer. This present experience would be referred to a whole of experience, and the problem would be solved under the guidance of the law of contradiction. It must be admitted that in the case of God we cannot see, we cannot hear, we cannot handle. He does not come into the field of sensuous experience. The problem seems complicated because there can be no appeal to the ordinary data of knowledge. But long experience has taught us the indefiniteness of merely subjective criteria. Logical error is always a possibility and complicates the ordinary illusions of the senses. Assuming a subjective criterion, it is true, as Descartes said, that we cannot prove that at this given moment we are awake and not dreaming. Our criterion must be found outside of the present experience, not in the mental content of the moment, but in a life-history.

Were the argument valid, the most it could prove would be a universal as existent being. Such a universal, whatever it might be, would not be the most perfect, but the most insignificant, of beings, possessing all qualities only because it possesses none of them. As we have widened the extension of the concept, we have tended to rob it of intension. Humanity is less significant than men.

Imagination is active in the most prosaic minds. Modern psychology is proving this in manifold ways. We perceive what we apperceive. Where does perception begin, and where does it end? The fact of apperception, call it what you will, is established; but who will define the meaning of the fact? There is lacking a clear and definite distinction between the real and the imaginary. How, then, shall we assure ourselves that a given concept, however plausible, really does exist? The case may be comparatively simple with mere figments of the imagination, but is it so simple as one approaches

the border-line between fact and fancy? Is God a fact, or a fancy? Who, upon the mere testimony of speculative thought, would venture to say? We know that there is always a tendency to hypostatize the unclear thought. Thus, "matter"—e. g., Locke's "I-know-not-what"—or "soul" as immaterial substance have, in the past, played an important rôle in philosophical thinking. Before keen criticism such concepts have been unmasked. May not the ontological argument be merely another example of this hypostatizing tendency? Even though the logic seem valid, the ground must be re-examined to make sure that at some unexpected point error has not found a weak place in reason's armor.

In general, it is only too apparent that the argument urges us to grant beforehand all that it is worth while to prove, and then we are expected to wonder at its dazzling success in proving the unexpected so easily. One is reminded of that automaton exhibited before wondering audiences. The audience is permitted to examine it; behold, its skin is waxen, and the figure bears every mark of a mechanical construction. Yet its movements are wondrously lifelike for an automaton. The audience marvels until, at the proper point in the program, it is discovered that the automaton is a living person skillfully disguised; it never was an automaton. More than this, the futility of so-called theistic arguments is being borne in upon us with increasing force. We are ready to confess that speculation can never tell us what God *per se* is. Nor does the confession disturb us. To borrow Clifford's simile, there may be a wonderful peacock on the other side of the moon, but of what interest is that to me? In a word, we are coming more and more to ask, not what God *per se* is, but what does he *mean* for us. How shall we estimate him in our lives? That is, the practical interest is overshadowing the merely speculative.

Shall we then say that the argument has no interest for us? *Per se* it may have none; but may there not be motives involved in it that are worthy of conservation? In the first place, the argument suggests that if there be a God, he must be definable. One may borrow Kant's own thought and say that reason must be able to answer the questions that it propounds. God is a problem for which there must be some answer, even though that answer be found to involve an

imaginary quantity. One is tempted immediately to object to the possibility of knowing the infinite. In a given experience, or in a finite series of experiences, it is true that knowledge can never transgress limitations; but with that we are not now concerned. To say *that* God is, when we do not know *what* God is, can mean nothing for human life. By no just logic can we assume *that* God is, and then reason to *what* God is. The process must be reversed. In the last analysis, our existential judgments will prove to be value-judgments. If God has no meaning for us, then for us God does not exist and must be excluded from our universe of discourse. But if God does mean something to us, then he is definable, and, being definable, he exists. In what sense this is true remains to be shown.

By "definition" we do not mean a mere formula of words divorced from experience. Definition is possible only in terms of experience, and, strictly speaking, is applicable only to things in experience. But that which in this sense is definable must exist. Gaunilo touched the nerve of the whole issue when, distinguishing the conceivable from the intelligible, he declared that "unreal objects are unintelligible."³³ Other test of existence we have none; if God exists, even he cannot escape it. Positively, then, what is meant by "definition"? A definition marks out the limits of a concept; but to mark out the limits of a concept is to relate it to other and known concepts. In other words, a definition gives to a concept its *locus* in the field of experience. The formula of words is the accident and not the essence of definition. When we speak of defining God, we simply mean that to our notion of God we are able to assign a place in experience. This is the corollary to the demand that our God must have a meaning for us. Unless God can be given such a *locus* in experience, there is no God.

If God must be definable, and if definition is to mean, not a formula of words, but the locating of a concept in experience, it is evident that much will depend upon the point of view from which experience is oriented. It is not possible that this point of view should be absolute. It is, in fact, relative to ourselves; God is to have meaning for us. We are the judges of significance. That is to say that we alone are competent to say what that point of view shall be. The exact point

³³*Liber pro insipiente*, chap. 7.

of view will be a matter of personal choice, but the choice, once made, will be determinant of the entire structure of one's thinking. Just as one may arbitrarily make his geometrical world Euclidian or non-Euclidian, so one is at liberty to orient his thinking as he will, provided that he does not seek his point of orientation outside of the general field of experience. To do that he must grant the validity of the extra-empirical. We conclude that definition is not something forced upon us from without, but is the product of our own activities. The place of God in the field of experience, therefore, is to be determined *by* us and not *for* us. In this sense, every definition of God must be *a priori* and not *a posteriori*.

If, then, God be definable, and if this definition is *a priori*, again we are face to face with the question of the relation of this definition to existence. Already you are saying that a definition, even in the present sense of it, cannot be divorced from experience. This must be granted. Experience, however, is used in a twofold sense. It may mean the sum-total of the ever-changing phenomena of consciousness as they are being worked out into an organic whole, or it may mean some sensuous element of this broad experience. Now, it is clear to everyone that God cannot be an object of experience in this latter sense. Hence he is not real as such objects are real. Yet no one would pretend that that broader sense of experience is identical with the sum-total of cognitions. Volitions, emotions, are also factors in experience. Viewed genetically, this field of experience is inchoate, undefined, and lacking organization. All of that is a logically later accretion. Closer psychological analysis leads to the recognition that we are the organizers of our own experience. Our psychological processes are forever classifying the data which they discover at hand. In the method of classifying we are bound by no law save our own choice. Two persons developing, seemingly, in the same environment do not live in the same *world*. Each one, classifying his data, constructs his own world, and determines by his choice the kind of a world it is to be. From a speculative point of view, one classification is as good as another, the Ptolemaic world as good as the Copernican; it is only practical interests that can decide.

Whether, then, our classification of data—that is to say, our world

—be true—i. e., real—can be ascertained only by a reference to how this world of experience behaves toward us, and how we may behave toward it. Meaning, the value for us, in the case of any content of experience, or even of the whole of experience, is accordingly to be understood as practical rather than as theoretical. Our world can have no other sort of significance, but it is precisely this meaning that gives us warrant in reasoning to an existent.

With respect to the problem of God, it has been pointed out that if God be a reality, he must have some *locus* in experience; otherwise he has no meaning. The fact that God is in no wise a datum of sensuous experience seemed to widen the breach between any notion of God that we may have and his reality. It would seem that there are only two avenues open. Either, so far as we know, there is no God, or, at best, he is merely an hypothetical being. Neither horn of the dilemma affords the theist consolation. God's existence cannot be demonstrated. Yet this truth needs supplementation. Existence is not to be established theoretically, but practically. From a theoretical point of view, we are justified in constructing for ourselves either of two types of a universe. In our world there may be a God, or that world may be completely atheistic. Either theory can explain the facts. If in our own world there is a God, it is because we have put him in it, and the kind of God he will be depends upon the kind of men we are. Inevitably our conception of him will be, in some wise, anthropomorphic. It is partly true that such a God is a God in our thought, but an extra-mental God can have no place in the field of discourse universal. The criterion of the existence of such a God will be found in the sphere of practice: how may we behave toward our theistic universe and how will it behave toward us? Practicality is, consequently, the final test of our theory. Apart from empirical confirmation our *a priori* reasoning is of no value.

Suppose, however, that we do so assure ourselves of the actual existence of the world we have constructed. By the same reasoning, you say, the materialist becomes satisfied of the existence of his godless world. To him it has meaning; he may look upon its behavior with complacency and behave toward it benignly. More no man can desire. This is an illustration merely of how each man's

world reflects his own character. Between these apparently equally true and real worlds, between an existent and a nonexistent God, who shall decide? There is no final arbiter but experience. True, the individual may err in his interpretation of experiences; yet we do not move in an egoistic realm. A man may claim the right to maintain that the ego is the All, but he who acts upon that premise commits not merely intellectual but practical suicide. Man is a social being, and not only may but must call upon the experience of his neighbors, of the race, of humanity. In the collective force of human choices, expressing themselves as the experience of humanity, experience approaches apodicticity. Yet until humanity shall have lived through the last of infinite generations, no one dare say that beyond a peradventure God must exist, nor will he be able to silence the voice of the atheist. When, however, one turns to his own individual experiences, and notes what God means to *him*, not in his mere life-fancies, but in his everyday practice, he finds nothing in the field of experience more real than him.

The true value, therefore, of the ontological argument rests in the attention that it invites to the *a priori*, definitive element in our knowledge of God; but the argument fails of validity in so far as it wholly divorces reason from experience. There is no need to regard the *a priori* element just mentioned as something antecedent to experience. Both it and the sensuous, *a posteriori* element in our knowledge of God are abstractions from the whole of experience. While, therefore, we reject the ontological argument, we answer our original query by affirming that the reasoning has in it some motives worthy of appreciation.

DOCUMENT

THE SCORN OF THE WORLD: A POEM IN THREE BOOKS

TRANSLATED BY HENRY PREBLE FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN OF BERNARD, A MONK OF THE BENEDICTINE MONASTERY OF CLUNY, IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY. WITH A PREFATORY NOTE BY SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON, D.D., LL.D., PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY IN NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

PREFATORY NOTE

The author of this poem was Bernard, a monk in the Benedictine monastery of Cluny, a town some ten miles northwest of Mâcon, in extreme east-central France. Nothing is known of him personally, except what may be inferred from the geographic term "Morlanensis" appended to his name in its Latin form, Bernardus Morlanensis, which seems to indicate that he hailed from Morlas, the capital of the old province of Béarn, five miles northeast of Pau, in extreme southwestern France, and from the fact that he dedicated his poem to his abbot, Peter the Venerable, who was abbot from 1122 to 1156.

The general theme of the poem is the corruption of the age both in state and church. The treatment is in the style of satire, with its legitimate exaggeration. The poem was very popular, and manuscript copies of it are still extant at several places. The famous Lutheran scholar, Matthias Flacius Illyricus, inserted it in his collection of attacks on the Church of Rome written in verse by mediæval authors, which he published at Basel in 1557 (not 1556, as commonly stated). It is by far the longest poem in the collection. The collection was reprinted in 1754, probably at Frankfort-on-the-Main—there is no place of publication mentioned on the title-page. In 1597, at Bremen, Nathan Chytræus brought out an edition of the poem separately, in apparent ignorance of the fact that Flacius had already printed it; and this edition was reprinted by Eilhard Lubin

at Rostock in 1610, by Petrus Lucius at Rinteln in 1626, and finally by the brothers Stern at Lüneburg in 1640. The only modern edition is by Thomas Wright in the Rolls series, published at London in 1872 in his *Anglo-Latin Satirical Poets and Epigrammatists of the Twelfth Century*.

The poem was first brought to the attention of English students of mediæval hymnology by the late Archbishop Trench, who inserted ninety-six lines from its first book in his *Sacred Latin Poetry* (London, 1849; second edition, 1864). These lines are upon a high spiritual plane, and were translated by the late John Mason Neale and published in his *Mediæval Hymns and Sequences* (London, 1851; second edition, 1863) and the translation leaped into such popularity, because of its glowing description of heaven, that he brought it out separately under the title, *The Rhythm of Bernard de Morlaix, a Monk of Cluny, on the Celestial Country* (London, 1859; eighth edition, 1866; numerous reprints). Neale fell into strange blunders, which have been perpetuated by his faithful copyists, respecting the translation of the geographic term "Morlanensis," and other matters mentioned in his preface. He also misled his readers to suppose that Bernard's poem was upon heaven, whereas it is mostly taken up with the other place, and some parts of it are not adapted for family reading.

The cento of Trench has been rendered in part or wholly by other poets, as Mrs. Elizabeth Charles in her *Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family* (1862), Gerard Moultrie (1865), Abraham Coles (1867), Samuel W. Duffield (1867), David T. Morgan (1871), Jackson Mason (1880), and Charles Lawrence Ford (1898).

As far as I know, this is the first time the poem has been translated in its entirety.

DEDICATION

To his lord and father, Peter, honored abbot of the Brethren of Cluny, his son, their brother, would whisper a word of reminder. What is put forth for the ears of the public or the tongues of the many should be polished according to the criticism and made acceptable to the judgment of an expert; for touching and retouching one's work brings glory; putting it out carelessly and hurriedly brings disgrace. Hence every writer takes to one course or the other; and if he corrects his writing according to the verdict of the wise, he wins for himself, even though he does not seek it, the name

and title of wise man. If, on the other hand, he be arrogant and to present his hand to the rod of correction, he lays himself open to charge of silliness as well as arrogance. Neither he nor his discourse, therefore, is accepted even by the unskilled; and I am a liar if Horace Flaccus,¹ in instructing the Pisos and restraining us who, according to the poet's words, "are forever scribbling verse, whether taught or untaught" (*scribimus indocti doctique poemata passim*)—"I am a liar, I say, if Horace in his "Ars Poetica"² is not of my opinion, since he there directs that a work which has not been corrected by length of time and many erasures be chastened to a finished production with painstaking care again and again, and be kept from seeing the light for eight years. But the indiscreet, or rather insolent, all keep bringing out and bringing in their own productions, casual scribbings, and, while ever learning, though never arriving at knowledge, flout the judgment of others, and complacently fancy that wisdom is theirs. Being their own teachers and their own pupils, and having a lordly confidence in their own little talents, they make other people's utterances of little or no account, their own of great. On the other hand it is the mark of a wise and learned man to compare one's own work with those of the learned, and to study form and style in them and to learn from them and from them, and try to follow their methods in the arrangement of the ideas and the words themselves. It is certainly customary, if one's works need more careful pruning, to prune them; if adornment, to polish them; if correction, to improve them, in accordance with the learned judgment of our elders; and only when they need none of these things to put them forth to be read. Considering this, I have not neglected to offer for your criticism, most learned father, the subjoined work under the Scorn of the World, which I have prepared and completed in due measure. I have not neglected, I say, to thus offer it, for I judged that it should not be published in independent confidence or confident independence, without having been first approved by the mouth of Peter, the venerable rock, fortified by his acceptance, corrected according to his opinion, strengthened by his good word. And I ask that no one will blame me or impute it to flattery that I address you by the simple name Peter, and emphasize the compliment by coupling the name with its etymological meaning. For I know that, as with unrestrained minds glory or pride is the destruction of merit, so with the excellent is it an incentive, and

¹ Not, as the reader might suppose, from the "Ars Poetica," but from Horace's "Epistle to Augustus" (Ep., II, 1, l. 109).

² This reference is to the "Ars Poetica" (ll. 386 ff.), and the quotation rests thus, using only the pertinent parts and discarding the verse form: "Si quid tanquam olim scripteris . . . nonumque prematur in annum, membranisque intus positus."

words of the poet are true, "*gloria calcar habet*, glory is a spur."³ For a generous soul, whenever anything is said in praise of it, ever strives, even if it is not true, to make it true because it is said. One never speaks to deaf ears, therefore, in praising a good and honored man, when the very praise of virtue is his subject. But enough of this. Now I come back to the point of digression. To your criticism, therefore, most learned father and lord, I have determined to intrust the little work on Scorn of the World. I have written and divided it, but not yet put the finishing touches to it. If anyone or you yourself should want to know why I preferred to bind myself to verse rather than to write in prose, I will say, quoting the words of the poet,⁴

*"Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae
Aut utrumque et honesta et idonea dicere vitae,"*
("A poet seeks to profit or to please or both,
And to say things worthy and fit to live.")

because what is put forth in metre is more eagerly read, and more easily sinks deep into the memory. Hence, while the reader is charmed by the beauty of the lines and the music of the words, he is fired to show forth the virtues of which he hears or reads, and girds himself up to practice them while he contemplates the graces of the language. Therefore, as in verse there is most beauty, so in beauty there is most profit, and each of these hangs together with the other. And this is easy to see; for if the reader take pleasure in the one, he certainly will in the other. For he who gazes with eagerness upon the beauty of the words often grasps more eagerly the fruit of the thought. Hence it happens that all, or nearly all, that poets have written, they have put forth with a metrical safeguard, so to speak, expecting to make attractive, when painted in verse, what they could not make so in prose. Therefore also the Psalter itself, as they call it, is composed in lyric feet. I pass over the point that very many pages of the Testament, which I omit to enumerate, for the reason given were written in metre, not turned into metre. For in the time of revealed grace, when faith and the gospel and our crucified Jesus reigned everywhere, the art of versification came so far into favor that some of the orthodox ventured to turn even the majestic dignity of the gospel's pages into

³ The poet here referred to is not Horace, but Ovid, and the quotation comes from "*Ex Ponto*," IV, 2 (Severo), l. 36, and reads, discarding the verse form: "*Excitat auditor studium, laudataque virtus crescit, et immensum gloria calcar habet.*"

⁴ From the "*Ars Poetica*," with the second line from a different text or defective memory. The quotation as given in A. J. Macleane's text is: "*Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae, aut simul et jucunda et idonea dicere vitae.*"

spondees and dactyls. Thus, therefore, I, imitating the style of those whom I emulated in devotion to God, though not able to reach their skill in this or in other branches, yet was both desirous and able to pursue their end, and pursued it. For inasmuch as in the minds of my fellows a reputation for writing good verses hovered about me, though undeservedly, and hardly anyone spoke, much less wrote, in criticism of faults, my heart warmed within me; and when the fire of zeal had burned brightly in my meditations many days and nights, I finally girded myself up, and spoke with my tongue what I had long kept hidden in my mind. For I had often heard the Bridegroom say, "Let thy voice sound in my ears," but had not obeyed, and again the Beloved cried to me, "Open unto me, my sister."⁵ So then I arose to open unto my Beloved, and said: "Lord, that my heart may meditate, my pen write, my tongue proclaim thy praise, pour thy grace into my heart and my pen and my tongue." And he said unto me: "Open thy mouth, and I will fill it." So I opened my mouth, and the Lord filled it with the spirit of wisdom and understanding, that through the one I might speak truly, through the other, clearly. This I say not in pride, but altogether in humility, and only for this reason boldly that, unless the spirit of wisdom and understanding had flowed in upon me, I could not have put together so long a work in so difficult a metre. For this kind of metre, preserving as it does an unbroken line of dactyls, except for the last foot, and the leonine sonority, has, in consequence of its difficulty, fallen almost, not to say quite, into disuse. Finally, it is well known how little was composed in it by those most excellent verse-writers, Hildebert de Lavardin,⁶ made first bishop and afterward metropolitan for his preeminent attainments, and Wichard, canon of Lyons.⁷ Hildebert, in

⁵ Reference to Cant. 5:2.

⁶ Hildebert, born 1056, became bishop of LeMans 1096, and archbishop of Tours 1125, where he died December 18, 1133. The cathedral of LeMans is his monument. His moral character was publicly exposed by the famous revival preacher Henry of Lausanne, a monk of Cluny. His literary remains, both in prose and verse, are in Migne, *Pat. Lat.*, CLXXI. The poem on Mary of Egypt is in cols. 1321-40. There is a brief quotation from him in the collection of Flacius, *Varia doctorum piorumque virorum, de corrupto ecclesiæ statu, poemata* (Basel, 1557; p. 417), in which Bernard's poem first saw the types.

⁷ The name is spelled variously, Guichard, Vuichard, Wichard. The last is the form preferred by the authors of the monumental *Histoire littéraire de la France*, who on p. 444 of Vol. XII give a brief notice of him. The satire mentioned by Bernard is the only piece of his which has survived, and we owe this, curiously enough, to Flacius, who inserted it on pp. 489-91 of the collection mentioned above. It is only thirty-three verses long, and is headed "Satyricum carmen in monachos." Nothing appears to be known of his personal history, save that he wrote in the twelfth century and was a canon of Lyons.

writing in hexameters of the blessed sinner, Mary of Egypt, gave but four lines the shading of this metre, and Wichard used it in thirty lines, more or less, of his Satire. But why do I mention this? That men may understand that it is not without God's help and inspiration that I have written three books in a metre in which these writers wrote so few, so very few lines, begging their pardon for saying so. And now I offer my meditations to the criticism of your judgment, most learned father, and would whisper a reminder of my obedience in so doing. For when you were at Nogent⁸ a while ago, and had deigned to receive some little works of mine, you bade me also bring you this of which I had happened to speak; and since I could not do it then, not having the work with me, I now offer it to you divided into three books, and beg for your correction here, if it shall be necessary. It is not irrelevant to mention briefly beforehand what subject I have treated in each book. In the first I have discussed Scorn of the World. In the two subsequent books both the subject and the purpose are the same, the subject being the castigation of sin, the purpose to recall from sin, and everyone is aware of the value of such writing and the good it does. To be brief, I have dedicated this work, such as it is, to you, father, writing it with God's favor, and will send it if I cannot be at hand to present it in person. May, therefore, the gracious father graciously receive his son's work, the master his pupil's, the lord his servant's! For with approving conscience I dare to say confidently, and I do say, that you have in me a true son, a devoted pupil, a servant without servility. What are you to be to me, or rather what I to you? Surely you will be a father to me, and I shall be a son to you. For the rest, may the God of peace and love preserve you and yours in peace, reverend father. Amen.

BOOK I

The hour of doom is at hand; the times are out of joint. Let us awake! Behold, the Supreme Judge stands threateningly over us, to end the evil, crown the right, reward the good, free the troubled, and give us the realms of light. He will take away the hard and heavy load of the burdened soul, will strengthen the worthy, and punish the wicked, with justice to both. Behold, the King of Piety and Majesty is come; the man accused, God in man's name, shall arise as Judge and not as Father.

Arise, and walk the narrow path, all ye who can. The King comes quickly, knowing the facts, and himself the witness against us. Let all

⁸ There are no less than eight Nogents in France! Probably the one here meant is Nogent-sur-Seine, sixty miles southeast of Paris. Near to it Abelard built his humble oratory which bore the name of The Parclete and was superceded by Heloise's abbey of the same name. The ruins of the latter building are still visible.

the guilt and all the dross be washed away while there is yet time and opportunity. Give to the needy. Make ready a lowly place for him that aspires too high. The Judge stands over us, and will tell exactly what he means to give us and what he has given. He comes back a light unto the good and a terror to the bad.

He that is now slighted will appear in lordly power, inexorable, terrible in his wrath, and not to be withstood. In his right hand he will hold the worthy hosts and the wicked hosts. On one side the accepted will have their place, on the other the rejected. The wicked on one side, the worthy on the other, will hear the words: "Go, go, ye guilty troop. Come into my kingdom, my flock." The concourse on the right hand shall go to heaven with Christ at their head. The crowd lost in sin shall wail in their ranks on the left.

The crowd lost in sin, condemned by sin to hell, stands fast now, but shall fall then; stands fast here, but shall there forever atone for its deeds. Then shall ye who weep now receive eternal joy, believe me, ye holy concourse, new-born in holiness. The flock shall be restored, and the thief shall be removed from the flock, the new from the old, the accepted from the rejected, the white from the black, the foe from his bold schemes, the lamb from his foes, the goat from the lambs. The humble shall mount to the stars, the lofty go down to the lowest place. He that weeps shall flit to heaven, and he that delights in sin shall depart to regions below. The drunken soul shall atone for carnal pleasures; the sober and worthy rejoice. Finally, the last fire shall rise higher than any mountains, while the slothful occupy places below, and the blessed the stars; and the flame shall rise free into the air, shall rise to the stars, and destroy palaces and kingdoms, villas and cities and castles. It shall boil away all the elements that now reek with filth, and shall make all things shine with light, removing the impurities.

The world shall be occupied and renewed, itself yet different—different in aspect, though not in source; and no man shall be poor there or feeble or sad. There shall be no raging madness or strife, no food or cooks, no passion, no jeers or swelling pride or violence. The earth shall be moved, and the form of its circle made over which is now seized, defiled, destroyed in one whirling chaos.

The earth bears our fathers' bones; hereafter it shall be like the Garden of Eden. No more shall the husbandman till it as now, leaning on the help of the ox. The atmosphere shall no longer have the same complexion, but be free from snow and clouds, lightning, thunder, and rain. The orbit of the sun and the quick-fleeting moon shall stand still; the stars, the

pole, the sea shall cease to revolve. All the constellations shall be bright, with the glory of the Right Hand of God, the constellations shall have twofold light, and the sun shall illumine thy courts.

The pious people that weep now shall then shine as the sun, and all have learned minds and beautiful bodies—beautiful and swift and strong, free, charming, sound, and vigorous, exempt from hateful death. The comeliness of Absalom were uncomeliness there, the hair of Sampson stubble, and slow the foot of Asahel, the hind of Israel. Naught there the power of Cæsar that knew no peer, the might and pleasures of Solomon naught. There would not Moses give himself sound eyes and teeth, and brief were the life of Methuselah. Seek these things well, ye souls—seek, seek, arise to seek pure joys, enduring joys that perish not nor ever shall.

Does not the robber, snatched from the cross of woe, to rule rich realms and hold a scepter high, know patent joys? His joy is gloom and nil beside the joys above. Compare them, and thou seest that earthly joy is naught.

We shall see and share and know those heavenly joys, we who weep for slippery joys now. All things closed or open shall be for us all. Our individual members shall be fashioned as eyes. The worthy eye shall look through all things closed as through things open, for God is its sure vision there. We shall look upon the face, and our gaze shall pierce through to what is hidden within; nor shalt thou fear to have thy sins exposed to view, laid away in tears. Thy neighbor shall know thy wrongdoings, thou his, and feel no shame. More gracious grace, a higher hand shall there be shown to thee. The fiercer thy wounds now borne without complaint, the plainer and surer shall be the healing there. All closed paths shall open before thee and nothing obstruct thy way. Dost know how to imagine good things? The more shalt thou gain, my steadfast voice. Thou shalt march mightier than the world, swifter than winged sight. Thou shalt be found mighty to roll the ages without an effort. Thou shalt be equal to them above, shalt imitate their deeds and follow with skill; thou shalt see the Father's face, O thou of pious speech here. Standing above the clouds, thou shalt safely see black Tartarus below, and have no fear of its gloom and woes, its terrors and its tears.

The troop of the guilty and lost sees the joys afar off now, sees judgment, hence weeps, and, wicked, envies the holy. It weeps because many a tear is in store for it, while joys await the holy. It weeps because it falls and shall not see the face of the Thunderer. As the upright then sees the reprobate troop, so now the reprobate sees the blest, and looks down with scorn upon it below itself.

More beautiful is a swan after a blackbird, white after black, music after groaning, snow after pitch, the good after the reprobate.

Neither the good daughter becomes troubled about her mother nor the son about his father, though the daughter stand while the mother falls, the son is blessed while the father atones for his sins. As you now delight to see the fishes sport in the sea, so you shall not groan with pain to see your flesh in hell.

Run, good man, avoid the slippery, and choose the virtuous. Be wrung with tears, and by your tears you shall win the delights of heaven. You shall be filled with light without a moon or evening star. There shall be a new light, a golden light, one only light. When wisdom or power delivers over its ancestral kingdoms to the Father, then shall thy path go to him. Then shall new glory illumine the worthy heart, and make all that puzzled plain. The true and lasting sabbath shall appear.

The Hebrew shall walk free from his foes and them that lord it over him. He shall be held free and celebrate the Year of Jubilee. Their land of light, unknowing storm and strife, shall be peopled with new citizens and filled with the sons of Israel. The gleaming land, the blooming earth, shall be freed from thorns, and given to the faithful citizens there which here is held by strangers. Then shall all the holy look upon the face of the Thunderer in full power and knowledge and peace that faileth not. All the faithful shall have that peace, that blessed peace, inviolable, unchangeable, and unalloyed; peace without sin, peace without storm, peace without strife, the end of toil and uproar, an anchor sure. One peace shall be for all—but whom? The spotless, the gentle of heart, standing firm in their place, and holy of speech. That peace, unailing peace, has been given to them above, and is to be given to the humble, and the courts shall be filled with their festal voices and songs.

This Garden of Eden shall abound in all sweet perfumes, and there shall be full grace, full joy, song, and rippling laughter—full redemption, full renewal, full glory; while violence and misery and grief are fled, and suffering banished. No weakness is there, no sadness, no tearing asunder; there is one common weal, one only peace, peace without a flaw. Here are mad passions, evil schisms, scandals, peace without peace; on Zion's heights is peace without strife and without grief.

O sacred draught, sacred refreshment, vision of peace, anointment of the soul, not refreshment of the greedy belly! On this man leans, by this he walks, this uses, and shall enjoy. The peace unailing, now but a hope, shall hereafter be found a fact. Good Jesus and his comeliness shall be the food of the blessed, feeding their souls that thirst for him and are filled.

And thou shalt thirst, and shalt be filled with this feast of life, no toil for either, one rest, one love for both. Thou, a stranger, shalt be united with the citizens of heaven, thyself a citizen. Here is the trumpet of battle; there peace and life await thee that livest well. All the faithful shall have this one Last Supper. Then shall the net be heaped up and filled to overflowing. Then at last, unharmed by the vast numbers of great fish, it shall be glorified, and the serpent shall be driven from the lambs.

The forces of them that fall shall be sundered, of them that stand shall be saved, and thou shalt burn the one and stablish the other, O God. A new people, a new flock, this goodly number of the good, shall seek Jerusalem—the pious sow here and shall reap there. It shall be a glorious flock, in him rejoicing as Father, on him leaning as Leader, who took away all guilt by his blood—the Crucified King. This flock in holy order, in gleaming lines, and filled with light, shall live under his leadership who suffered on the cross—the King of Nazareth. Nourished by the savor of the spirit and the nectar of heaven, it shall live in sweet repose amid perpetual spring. Among sacred lilies and springing buds of flowers the ranks of the pious shall stroll and practice melody, preparing their hearts for praise and their lips for song, as they stand recounting their old-time slips and sins. The greater their wrong-doing was, the wickeder their hearts, the greater shall their praise be and the loftier their hymns to him who set them free. Then there will be one song, full of the mercy of the Thunderer, one hymn of praise of him who gives heavenly rewards for husks—rewards for husks, joys for woe, life for death—life wherewith the Israelite shall be filled again.

Here we live a little while, and wail a little while, and weep a little while; the recompense shall be a life not brief nor e'en brief tears. Oh, recompense! Our brief course here eternal life awaits. O recompense! A heavenly mansion waits for them of misery full.

What is it that is given, and to whom? Heaven to needy creatures who merit the cross, the starry skies to worms, good gifts to guilty souls, the stars to sinners. Heavenly grace not only gives us all the gifts of light, but crowns our flesh above the stars. All shall receive one recompense of heavenly grace—all, all who weep for woe. Then shall the rose flash red as blood, the lily virgin white, and joy surpassing make thee good, O pious tear. Now is thy portion sadness, but then joy—joy greater than tongue can tell or eye can see or touch can grasp. After the dark, fierce, wicked scandals of the flesh, light without darkness, peace without disturbance, await thee. Now we have battle, but hereafter rewards, and of what sort? Complete; complete renewal, free from all suffering and trouble. Now

we live on hope only, and Zion is vexed of Babylon; now is our portion tribulation, but then new birth, a scepter and a crown. Therefore shall Rachel yield to Leah, journeying home, Martha to Mary, the wrath of Saul to David, of Holofernes to Judith, of Ahab to Elijah, and all things obey the meek, while hope becomes reality, the seed fruit, the word deed, the darkness day. He who is now but believed on shall himself be seen and known, and shall be theirs who see and know him. Complete renewal, then the pious vision, vision of Jesus. Him shall Israel behold, and be filled with feeding on him, shall be filled with him and dwell with him on the heights of Zion.

O good King, none needs there to say to thee, "Spare." There shall be no wretched heart any more, nor wasted time, no corpses, funerals, or tombs; and, what is still more blessed, all evil shall be far away. Thine eyes shall no more be wet for thy sins, and the mournful joys and soft-tongued attacks of the flesh shall be gone. Deceit and wrong and wrangling—in short, all evils—shall perish. Thou shalt have no trials, no torments to fear, no wrongs, no injuries, no troubles to bemoan. The cross on which this flesh, these ashes, wear themselves away shall be a blooming flower, and there shall be nothing more to make it afraid. None shall need to feed on husks or to try to turn any man's heart by entreaty, nor shall anyone weep, lost in misery or fear of death or torture. By thy tears shalt thou win the right to joy and life—life not defiled by husks or prayers, or misery and death and torture. Heavenly plenty and heavenly grace shall be spread broadcast, and the soul shall see new light, while God becomes all things to all. An enviable race and blooming life, the welling fount of David there. The light will golden be, the land with milk and honey flow. That light will have no evening, that race no woe, that life no death. Jesus will be there, holding all and held of all. His light will feed the blessed, his light alone, food without food to them adapted whose hearts are as fire. Him we shall behold, and shall be satisfied beholding him, while our chorus of earth shall fill the star with its holy bands.

We lean on hope now, and here are fed on milk, but there shall eat the bread of life. The night brings many ills, the morn will bring deep joy. The passion brings joys, redemption kingdoms, the sacred cross a haven, tears rejoicing, suffering rest, the end new birth. Jesus will bring high trophies to all them that love him; Jesus will be loved and will appear in Galilee. The morning will appear, darkness flee away, and order reign. The morning will be bright, and he who brings good gifts will shine brightly. Then shall the pious ear take note and hear the words, "Behold thy King." Behold thy God, thy Glory is here, and the Law is done away; my portion,

my King, God in his own glory shall be seen and loved; the Creator shall be seen face to face. Then Jacob shall be made Israel and Leah Rachel. Then shall the courts of Zion and the beautiful country be perfected.

O fair country, the worthy eye beholds thee, at thy name tears gather in the worthy eye. The mention of thee is as ointment to the soul, the healer of pain, the fire of love to the soul that takes in heaven. Thou art the one and only peace, the heavenly paradise. No tears hast thou, but peaceful joy and smiles. There is the hay planted and the tall cedar and hyssop; the walls gleam with jasper and are brilliant with golden bronze. Sardius is thine, and topaz and amethyst. Thou art wrought of the heavenly congregation, and Christ is thy crowning gem, thy light the death on the cross and the flesh of the crucified Leader. Praise, benediction, hallelujahs resound for him. A blooming dower and brilliant gems are thine, the King of Nazareth, Jesus, man and God, the Golden Ring, the Garden of Delight—the Door and Doorkeeper, at once the Ferryman and the Haven. He is thy salvation-bringing Day-Star, thine Ark, Champion, and Garden. Thou art the fount and stream without bounds of space or time; sweet of taste art thou to the good, and thou hast the living rock all about thy brink. God himself is thy golden stone, thy wall, indestructible, insuperable, and never doomed to fall.

The bay is thine, a golden dower is given thee, lovely Bride, and thou receivest the first kisses of the Prince, and lookest upon his face. White, living lilies are thy necklace, O Bride! Thy Bridegroom, the Lamb, is beside thee; thou standest in beauty beside him. Peace, thy rewards, the Founder, the halls, the holy cross upon the gate, thy skill to praise, thy function to live undying, thine only work to make sweet music, and jubilant sing thy ills deserved and blessings given. Thy lot is joy without end, without alloy; thy law to shout and sing, "Glory be to Thee, O Christ."

City of Zion, city fair, country of harmony and light, to thy joys art thou ever drawing the pious heart. Blessed Jerusalem, our home, not place of passage, street beautiful, Pythagoras' hand points the way to thy good gifts. Golden city of Zion, country of milk, beautiful in thy people, thou overwhelmest every heart, thou dazzlest the eye and heart of all. I cannot, cannot tell thy happiness and light, thy glad companionships, and thy wonderful glory. Trying to extol them, my heart is overcome and faints. O fair glory, I am conquered, thy praise conquers me utterly. The courts of Zion, filled with the martyrs, ring with hallelujahs, amid the gleaming crowd of citizens, secure in her Prince, in the peaceful light. Abundant pasturage for the soul is there, assured to the holy; the throne of the King is there, and the sound of a feasting throng. A race glorious

in its Leader, a company shining in white raiment, dwells happy in Zion's halls, those kindly halls. Without sin, or trouble, or strife, the Israelites dwell on the lofty heights of Zion. Blooming peace is there, green pastures, life's very marrow, with naught to vex, no tragedy or tears.

O sacred draught, refreshment sacred, peace of souls! How pious, how good and pleasant, the sound of their hymns!

God is himself sufficient food unto all the redeemed—full refreshment, the actual vision of the Almighty. They are satisfied, and yet they have a panting thirst for him, without fiery heat, without distress, without complaint. To one more, one less, that mighty bounty of the Godhead—many are the mansions, many the recompenses, of the Father. The moon is before the lesser fires, the sun before her. She presides over the night, they over them that sail the sea, he over the day. Thou seest that one star shines more brightly in the sky than another star; so shall the faithful believe there are supreme rewards and rewards more moderate.

O famous Zion, glory due to those who shall be glorified, thou displayest intensest blessings to the inner eye. The eye within, the keen vision of the mind, beholds thee. Our hearts on fire reap hope now, hereafter the reality. O only Zion, mystic dwelling in the skies, I rejoice for thee now; for myself I grieve now, and mourn, and pant. Because I cannot with the body, I often make my way to thee in spirit; but flesh is earth, and earth is flesh, and now I fall back. None can disclose, and none describe in speech the splendor that fills thy walls and thy capitol. I can as little tell it as I could touch the heavens with my finger, or walk upon the sea, or plant a javelin in the sky. Thy beauty overwhelms all hearts, O Zion, O peace; city without time, no praise of thee can go beyond the truth. O dwelling new, the pious company, the pious race, lays thy foundations, carries on the building of thy walls, and brings them to a complete and perfect whole. God cherishes thee, and the ranks of the angels dwell in thee, feasting and playing upon the ten-stringed lyre. Thou bloomest with the prophets, art golden with the twelve patriarchs, and bright with the faithful who are ahungered here, but filled there. There are the pure lilies of the virgin couch, the blood-red rose, the purple badge of dignity and worth. The company of the patriarchs adorns thee, a spotless couch is thine, a holy victim and holy tears the penalty for guilt. The Great King presides there and occupies thy courts, the only-begotten of the Father, mystic lion at once and lamb. The King is there, the only Son of Mary, Offspring of the Holy Virgin, Author of Creation, Mouthpiece of Wisdom. Here the Father's Word and Wisdom, the Father's Right Hand; as Final Judge he holds all things below, above, within, without. God rules the

stars, my clay dares aspire to the stars in him who holds all things created in his hand as his own. With the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost equally hold all things, tower above all things, are all and everywhere. We seek him well, and so shall see him; nay, do see him. We shall gaze upon him and shall thirst for him, and be satisfied. To look continually and forever upon the face of the Thunderer brings lasting gain, unceasing gain to the holy.

O courts of splendor, blooming land, O land of life without a wrench, without a grief and without strife, 'tis thee I seek, thee I adore, for thee I burn; 'tis thee I wish, and hail and sing. Nor do I seek thee through merit, for as to merit I reap death. In merit I am a son of wrath, nor reign in silence. My life, indeed is very guilty life, is death in life, o'erwhelmed and trampled under deadly sin. And yet I walk in hope, in hope and faith I ask for my reward, the everlasting reward I ask for night and day. The Father of goodness and piety created me, supported me amid filth of the world, raised me out of the filth and from the filth washed me clean. Thy greatest hope, thy strongest hope, is fixed and shall be fixed on Him who after thy⁹ sins let his light shine into their abyss. When I take strength from him, I rejoice; when from myself I mourn. In him I rejoice, in myself I grieve and toil in tears. While I meditate upon his flesh, quick joy is in my heart; but when I view my own mean flesh, my soul congeals, conscious of its meanness. Let great power and supreme grace relax the great punishment, unloose the tremendous chains of the wicked, overcoming the devil. Celestial grace alone has power to spare the inward rottenness of the whole world, a healing salve to its ills. Celestial grace, the welling fount of David, washes all things clean; all things doth wash, and floweth over all, cleansing all.

O pious grace, make me to see the palaces on high; let me behold the blessings and the celestial festivals of harmony. Let me not be tortured in soul or follow or say anything unholy; let me join the denizens of heaven and follow the Lamb. Let me be free from dross within, from foes and trouble, cold and hail, flesh, lust, death, fear without. O country of heaven, without sin or storm, I, sinner, burn for thee—I will say more, with faithful heart I dare aspire to thee. Thou art all my hope, O Zion golden, more brilliant than gold, glorious in thy ranks, secure in thy Leader, blooming with perpetual bay. O fair land, shall I obtain thy full rewards? O fair land, shall I behold thy joys and thee? Tell me, I beg, and answer give,

⁹ The obscurity of this couplet can be better illumined with the *tua* of P [one of the various readings of Wright's edition, to which these notes signed H. P. refer] than with the *sua* of the text, so I adopt it.—H. P.

O say, "Thou shalt behold." I have a well-fixed hope; shall I attain the thing? O say, "Thou shalt attain."

Rejoice, my ashes, God is thy portion, thou art his; see that thou remainest so. Thy King thy portion is, thou his; see that thou fail'st him not. My heart, my sinful heart, that portion shall not be torn from thee. Tears are thine, but thou shalt have the better part; ask, and thou shalt receive—the better portion, full refreshment, unfailing peace of soul, the vision of the Deity, the face of Omnipotent Light. Hence the deep thirst, the sacred tear, the panting sigh. Through tears the spirit becomes an offering, weeps for its wrong and covers it with a veil of tears, crushes down the flesh, washes and lightens the deed, the heart, the tongue. It scorns the external, and knocks at the door of the inward night and day. It bemoans and upbraids itself, wrings, drives, tries itself, is a furnace to itself, rouses the heart with wailing and repeats the cry, "O Zion, O peace!"

To the tearful, the hungry, the tired is the vision of the Father breath and refreshment and new life. O holy, pious, thrice and more times blest is he whose portion is God! O wretched, sinful, he who hath that portion not! The one and only glory of the heavens, the one Creator is himself the Giver of the Gift, the Maker of the sky, and the Gift itself. It warms the heart to look upon his face, to see the bands, to take the rewards and share his light.

^ Race pious of tongue, but impious in walk, jealous of good morals, why live ye ill and lose those blessings of the good? Race of adamant, with hearts as hard as stone, why scorn ye the good, to seek the perishable? Reckless race, crowd whirling in the vortex of death, race bereft of deeds without, and hearts turned within, why draw ye back and scorn those inward gifts? Why leave ye the manna and go back to Pharaoh? Why seek ye the things that make ye fall and die? Why cleave ye to that which falls in death and dies at last? O spurious crowd, delirious crowd, whither do ye haste? Whither are ye hurling your guilty bodies, your guilty hearts? Why, I ask, do ye scorn to go before and seek to turn backward? O race condemned, ye turn your face to sin, your back to good. Man, why dost thou prefer the fleeting to the permanent, the fallen to that which stands, the last to the first of things, and spurn the high, all bent upon the low? Rise, turn back, strive to rise, strive to turn back. Make known the sinner, sinner; God is at hand to avenge, to avenge the hidden wrong. Uncover the wounds, uncover the corpses four days old; uncover the wounds, and cover them with tears, smite the sound parts. Race of Babylon, rise, weep for your harmful joys, drive them away with your tears, wipe the place and guard it well.

The hour of doom, the last day, is near with its sin-destroying fire, grateful but terrible, mild and yet harsh, bright but appalling. Vengeance is at hand, death, tribulation—of what character? Bitter. A bright day to them that sleep, terrible to those awake. Though so long-suffering, our Judge stands threatening, as proclaimed by the bards and disclosed by the mouth of the prophets.

O awful crash, as all things fall in flame, aye, even the heavens! The King comes quickly, the sinner and the faithful man tremble at his coming. From this Leader shall we receive our rewards, from this Judge obtain glory. Before this Judge shall fraud fail; through his testimony shall guilt be known. Gentle yet terrible, a lamb yet fierce, other and yet the same, shall he appear, and the heavens obey him. The bands of heaven and the topmost heights shall be shaken; the heavens, the earth, the sea; shall be heard to give forth a sound. The high summits and the high bands shall fall together; the heights and the depths, the sun, the sea, the stars, shall be shaken. Now silent to form a good judgment, he shall thunder forth, roaring and raging and striking against that which is evil. Mild to them that love him, but terrible to his foes, will he be found; merciful to the one, inexorable to the other. His one countenance shall frown upon the one and smile, oh wonder vast, beneficently upon the other. He shall have pity upon the one and crush the other. Long-suffering, kind, bearing the burden of the wicked here, he shall then punish the evil and fortify the acts of the good. One shall be rendered beautiful by merit, another raised aloft by the grace of the Father alone—grace not deserved by him, but freely given.

When the way is hard and the course of two feeble, one shall be rejected, the other win the heights of heaven. When the way is slippery and the case of two is the same, one shall be loved, the other regarded as an enemy and outcast. Many a pitfall unto many, nay unto all, is this matter of the acceptance of some and the casting out of others in despair. An insoluble, inexplicable enigma, this. We see external goods from the outside only; their Author from within also. God knows the pious heart, denies the impious, just to them both.

Let every man tremble for himself, and let every man rejoice in thy grace. Let every man bemoan his sins, and walk in fear and trembling. He falls from the ranks tomorrow who today stands in line apparently pure. The almighty King who rules all things crushes some and chooses others. The way of man is today wicked, tomorrow pious; today roses, tomorrow dust. Soon the rose becomes a thorn, and the wolf lurks about the sheepfold tomorrow. Man sees the face, but God the heart; God finds him a

sinner who to man seems good. Let each man tremble for his deeds, let God make thy flesh faithful, make it faithful and blot out vile and impious joys with tears.

Sport, oh sport, ye people of Babylon, while your bodies live. Sport, ye of hearts slow to good and prone to evil. The last day is at hand which shall put all your doings to flight, burning your palaces and your treasure-houses. The King of Piety will come, with his rage not like our rage—O inward trembling—stern to some, to others kindly of speech. The King will come, a scourge unto them that fall out of line, a mild unjudging judge to them that keep in line. He has suffered judgment and endured to stand before Pilate. In righteousness will he show it forth, but he has borne it and will make it bearable. The King born of a virgin, himself Giver and Gift, shall be plainly visible. Why weave delays? All flesh shall see the Son of man. The unutterable, wicked crowd shall gaze on him they crucified, him whom they cursed, alas, depraved in tongue and heart. The grain shall be gathered into barns and threshed upon the floor, and he that weepeth now shall receive joy forevermore. The impious race of Babylon, born to die, shall fall, the son of peace shall mount to heaven, the son of wrath go down to hell. Then shall Gehenna be heaped up and overflow with the ranks of sin and lust.

One shall find it mild there, another harsh, another without escape; afterward there shall be no remission or redemption. Bewail your evil here, seek the stars, ye children of Eve. Here pain is profitable, here is it possible to win your place, but there alas, alas! Fraud is scourged there and pride howls, but in vain. Wantonness weeps, sluggishness grieves with unceasing grief. The fickle heart mourns for what is worthless and weeps for its bitter lot; the race of darkness is lost to self and hope and name. They that burn with Venus' flame now shall be roasted by the fiercest fire of Gehenna; vengeance shall pursue and smite them with fury to their destruction. It roasts the hearts on fire with sin, the limbs on fire with lust, crushes the false witness, rages against the arrogant, lowers over all. It renews and slays, makes whole and cuts, that undying bodies still may die; the standing be laid low, that cold may glow and fire congeal, and they that seek to escape either may fail to find the other. Full many a death is there, flame black as night, and light that is darkness. I cannot touch on all details in my poor verse or in prose. As human voice cannot proclaim the joys of the good, so human voice cannot proclaim the woes of the bad. He that is crafty now shall hereafter find the baseness of his heart and the wickedness of his life punished by dire torture and pain. Verily vengeance like a lash shall be doubled for my deeds, devour the heart and

pierce the frame through and through. Let the pious man hear this, that he may stand firm; the impious, that he may rise up quickly. Fear begets firm standing, blesses him that standeth, and cleanses him that is sunk in guilt. Uttermost punishment shall bring hearing to the inattentive ear, and real tears shall be shed at last by the heart caught in sin. Those that wrong-doing binds together here, smiting vengeance shall unite there, bringing the feeble together with the feeble, the depraved with the yet more depraved. Their frivolous life now, punishment then, binds the low to the low, the depraved to the depraved. The ranks of sin are tied up and bound together like a great bundle, and, having no fruition in them, are burned like fagots. They are withered fig trees without fruit within, worthless branches and dry for the burning. Earthy flesh and fleshly earth is the horde of the wicked, a crooked generation, a miscellaneous bundle of kindling wood. Hereafter shall their laughter be changed to weeping, and in the fires and pangs of death they yet die not. The torments of the wicked are as many and great as their sins, but of the many two are the worst, cold and fire. Nor are these relieved by each other; both torture the body and soul according to Christ's judgment. Our temporal fire is a jest and cooling shade beside the fire there. The fire we call so great that not all the billows of the sea could quench it is gentle and a sort of painted picture before those enduring flames. That cold is such that it would freeze the fiery mass of a molten mountain. Such woes shall the course of the guilty meet. The eyes, the temples, brow, lips, chest, bowels, breasts, mouth, throat, member, legs there feed the flames. There do the eyes weep, weep for their sins long past, become a horrid foulness and foul horror now. The sight of the Demon and face of the Gorgon bristle there, and all shocking and impious things are exposed before all. The race of the wicked is stung by serpents that die not, and tortured by dragons that breathe forth flame. The serpent lives in that actual fire as the fish lives in the sea, and I read that these things shall be as I write them. There are the cross, the scourge, the hammer, the fire, and fiery flood.

O flesh, thick night awaits thee there, a night that knows no light. All the dwellers in the regions of death are in night together. Groan, wail, O man, grieve, tremble, lay aside earthly things. Fiery bonds at last enchain the individual limbs, bonds restrain elusive bodies and fictitious limbs. The sinful race is fixed head downward on a threefold cross, with face and back completely turned around. Unutterably horrible are they with their legs and feet reeking with decay and their heads downward. Such are the woes of hell for sure.

Wail, guilty race. Believe me, these things are not inventions of mine.

I note a few details here, some individual ones I know not, and some I omit. My words are true. God is building a fiery furnace of the wicked, David indicating the friends of this world. Reflect, my soul, how fierce is the fury of that fire. This furnace is heating with a heat such as furnace seldom knows. Consider in thy heart why it is called a furnace of fire. Dull soul, wandering soul, learn and fear the scourges prepared for the wicked. If thou heapest up evil here, thou shalt there become the torch that burns thyself, thine own fire and burning fiery furnace. Alas, oh theme for tears, my soul, cry out, oh pitiable, woe! Not bright and shining there the flame, but black and awful, yet it flashes out and doubles woe with darting fire. For thy pain is visible to thy neighbor, his to thee, in the darkening light. Vengeance burns the heart with cold, the body with fire. Both rush into sin, both deservedly atone for it. That the greater sinner meets such torture the God-man says, and Job the well tried. He that stands out and endures the inner woe, as God ordains, falls into outer darkness. Unless thou weepest here, thy portion there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Smoke rising from the fires burns one, fierce cold another. There is solid proof that the torture of cold and fire awaits the wicked when they die and begin to atone for their deeds. Job's page, too, if you mark well Job's sacred songs, says quick passage drives them from snow to fire. And he is a trustworthy witness; therefore is the flank of my pen protected, being hedged about by King, lieutenant, prince, and soldiery. As the rewards, so¹⁰ are the stripes perpetual—kingdoms, kingdoms everlasting for the blest, stripes unceasing for the bad. For the one is honor ever larger, for the other pain ever greater, without end.^{a)} The one possesses heaven, the other is cast down to destruction. Their slippery bodies and tyrant hearts are torn with torture, and parched with the coldness of hail or the torch of the lightning. They are squeezed, furrowed, ground, wrung, smitten, and pestered in Gehenna with violence and torture, weight and cold, with scourging and suffering unceasing. There, believe me, you find the cross without the tree, death without death, voice without song, light without light, night without night. Not there do you see Aracus state judge nor Rhadamanthus, nor Cerberus there, but the fury and vengeance and wailing of hell. Not there the boatman and the skiff by voice of Vergil sung, but what? Burning, torture, night, the death of Babylon. Orpheus is not bound there by conditions made, nor Typhœus by stout thongs, nor is that heavy stone there and the bird that tears at the inwards. Blackest punishment is there, heaviest punishment, the punishment of the wicked—

¹⁰ The *sic* of B makes sense of what seems nonsense with the *in* of the text, so I adopt it from the footnotes.—H. P.

their evil conscience and their guilty heart are the serpents that know them. Their envious hearts, their sordid flesh and limbs a prey to lust are torn by eternal vultures and burned with eternal sulphur in punishment eternal. Assyria's race, made food of dragons, trembles there and groans, the daughter of Babylon weeps, her lilies lost. The more blooming and brilliant and mighty she was, the more ugly she lies there shattered in foul decay. That harlot thought herself a goddess, poison filled her heart. She was given up to all things vile, and now is exposed to all punishments. Her sweet honey, or rather gall, have they drunk who now pursue slippery and fleeting joys, who prefer perishable gains and kingdoms that fall to that which lasts, and are filled with salt that has lost its savor. Her wines of passion and lust has the accursed crowd drained to whom Babylon has shut the starry realms. Their lot is changed; the greater their delights before, the more terrible the tortures into which they are now thrown. What now is left to see and know of her? She has withered and turned to ashes, collapsed and fallen. The thunder of Babel and the rebel tongue of Jezebel are sunk to hell; applaud, ye stars, ye heavens, applaud! She who had grown to ill-starred power and in her might had said, "The world is mine," has destroyed herself with the rest and plunged into the regions of death. That land is deeper and darker than the earth; the race of sinners weeps there, but the tears are too late. The land is overspread with darkness and with the whirl of death. Manifold death is there, sure tears and suffering sure. That woe endures throughout all the ages, while pain consumes the breast, and torture wrings the flesh, and fire burns the heart. Sound is stilled there, horror lies brooding there and the shadow of death. The strong man bears his sins there and strength of torture. The mighty heart endures the scourge mightily. The greedy throat is on fire, the babbling tongue of drunkenness, the gluttonous belly. Manifold torture is there and inmost punishment for the wicked, manifold torture, manifold suffering, manifold fire. The fire surges there black and mighty to torture, to burn the wicked heart and luxuriant members. Night doubles the woes, and the steaming caldron of the Styx darts forth; black and penetrating is the scorching flame, and no water is anywhere there. The furnace roars with billows of fire, and the wailing fills the air; the gloom and lamentation have no ending. Its fiery flood, its billows black the flame rolls up, and roasting cold, with freezing fire racks the soul. The devouring worm teemeth, and the deep pool of the abyss lies hidden there. All there faint in soul and body.

Sport, live, ye stranger race of rich revenues. The flesh deceives you here, and Gehenna receives you there. There is no vision, no mansion filled with light, no place of order, no courts of light and happy fields.

O Vergil, thou art deceived when thou tellest of the fields of the blessed. Thou who writest of them, dost not find Elysian fields awaiting thee there. Poetic Muse, scholastic tongue, dramatic voice, in treating of these things thou art deceived and deceivest others to their hurt. This Gehenna gleams with fires that radiate no light, is full of blackness, full of whirling confusion, full of suffering. It is full of the handmaidens of lust and vice who came thence and return thither. It swallows up them that it spits forth, pierces them through and through, and plagues them utterly, while life alone survives for the coming deaths. The fire of loin and lust burns, burns in fire, and punishment is duly meted out to it.

He that is unworthily raised up here is driven to the bottom there. He has then the worst and lowest place who now has the first. He that seizes and ravishes and mangles and tortures, shall be seized and ravished and utterly mangled and tortured himself. They that are now a prey to falsehood, wrong, passion, gluttony, and greed shall become the prey of vengeance, gloom and fire, of torment and alarms. Hear this with attentive ears while yet ye may, ye who hoard up lucre, run after lucre, and sell yourselves for lucre; race quick to feed the sordid flesh with flesh, and give to them that have, but to the poor, alas! spare not a bit of bread. Here ye have Lazarus, there Tartarus, and the throat once drunk with drink and food shall there be parched and dry. The rich man dies without a hope, without a name, poor in his riches, but Lazarus hereafter shall be filled with all he weeps for now. The rich man asks for water, the hungry man reaps full plenty. Glory is given to tears, suffering to riotous abundance. After death the rich man goes below, the poor man to the stars. He that weeps amid his sores, rejoices in heaven, while the well-fed stomach grieves. A drop of water is begged, the throat is tortured and the mouth parched. No drop is given. Why? Because he would not give a crust. He that did not give a little is reduced to the least. He stands with hands outstretched to the fount and begs for the water that is not for him. Returning wine with honey, feasts with feasts, raiment with raiment, he bears his sins now, bears plague and torments. His glory and bloom have gone down into the cave of the Styx, the black cave. His bloom was but a show of bloom, and has withered and turned to pain. He that had little has now Abraham's bosom and paradise; he that had much has burning, tears, torment, suffering, and jeers.

Where now is the fine raiment? Where now are the dinners and suppers? Raiment and dinners are fleeting things, but their penalty endures. Purple passes away, and eating comes to an end, but vengeance endures—endures and worries sharply, aye, unceasingly. Fire and hunger and

thirst are the punishment of the rich man in his need, in place of the quail and the little pig, of the feast, the debauchery, the fire of the belly. The quail, the wolf, the oyster, the flesh of the sow or the steer, the fire of passion, the sinful dice, the ribald jest, the dinner by day and the supper of midnight, are passed and gone; the deed tyrannical by day, the slippery deed of night, are now no more. The man of wealth and luxury is buried and dwells in numbers in the regions below, so saith the Holy Scripture.

Hear with your ears and store in your hearts these things, ye rich. Lift up the wounded, carry the prostrate, feed the humble. Feed those with meat who shall feed you well with rich prayers, that their needy and thirsty limbs faint not. Store this precept in your hearts, and show it forth in your character and deeds, and all that pious faith acclaims and the way of soberness approves. Store it in your hearts, show it forth with your tongues, do what is right; the food unto the needy, house and shelter to the pilgrim. Give yourselves and yours; God wishes both, delights in both. Let every man give himself to the Lord, his goods to the poor. Why weave I many words? I am teaching you and myself. Let us give our trifle to the needy, who have the best with them. Christ who gave all is moaning at our gates. He is in want and cries aloud, asking for the last bit and saying, "Oh give." None gives, he is in want. What then? He will himself exact the thing refused. We, drunken race, get joys here, but torture hereafter. Lo, thou layest up vast pelf and gain in thine avarice, and keepest no account, for to keep account is the mark of the poor man. Impure beast, thou seest Christ wailing at the door, mingling here with the hungry and thirsty. On one side thou hast Lazarus, on the other Tartarus, and thou escapest one only by means of the other. Feed, help, regard, nor sinfully cast the humble from thy heart. Thou preparest but earthly goods for thyself, the poor man guarantees the heavenly goods. He will give thee God for bread; he dies and goes away, but God remains thine. Earthly glory and earthly riches are full of ashes. The glory fades and their splendor withers away. Let the world hear, hear with its inner ear. The world rolls like a wheel driven in the whirl of death. The pleasantness of the world passes and dies and leaves but a cloud. Quickly does the world vanish with its glad being. The honors of the world are frail, their moment brief, and brief the feast. It gives nothing lovely, loves nothing profitable, and jeers at virtue. With foes of soul and foes of body it bristles and withers within and without, itself and its pleasures. The love of the world perishes and destroys its own, the lovers of the world that fancy its joys, its gloomy joys are real. Shall we awake, or shall we stay sunk in the mire of the world, so plainly given over to destruction by fire

and flood and foe? Why does the wandering, guilty heart cherish the things that have no real value, that give some brief pleasure and after a little while long pain? Why do we love the flesh so near the burning and the foe within? The love of the flesh perisheth. It is a rose, but shall be dregs; therefore let it be cast out. O fair flesh, so soon foul and full of dregs, a flower now, but presently slime, aye very slime, why dost thou swell with pride? O fleshly flesh, presently clay and then worms, a man today, tomorrow dust—for that is what we are—why art thou arrogant? O feeble flesh, quick falling, soft and weak, why dost thou aim so high, and rear thy front so bravely? What mean thy drunkenness, thy thousand dainties? Thy wealth reeks with decay, thy wines are death; whence comes thy haughtiness? Whence is thy pride? Thy glory is dross, destroyed by death, and dross thy dinners and thy joys, aye, dross thyself. What are thy baths, thy golden raiment? What means thy gluttony? However groomed, thou still shalt ever be flesh, and yet not ever flesh. After being man, thou becomest ashes and ceasest to be flesh, turning to rottenness. How trifling is thy strength, the urn with its little heap of dregs teaches thee. O milky flesh, a rose now, hereafter a worthless lump, thy bloom shall fade, thy rose decay, and still in youth. The flesh, so blooming now, tomorrow shall be horrible, nay more, a very horror, a horror to friends, a horror to foes, a horror to all. Tomorrow shalt thou be horrible, withered, worthless, a bitterness, thou so fair, so blooming, so dear, today. 'Tis sad this that I am telling, the beauty of thy grace shall straightway pass, this brilliancy of face shall straightway pass and fail. Why talk at length? This flesh, this grace shall perish, this charm, this warmth, this skill or power shall pass away and die. What is perishable flesh? What useless man? But clay. What is the glory of the flesh, I ask. 'Tis earth. Its roses? Grass. Fleshly glory and all the things of flesh, while the flesh flourishes, seem stable, but they fail when it fails.

Why is man born or boy brought forth? To die? He comes forth into the air, goes through hard things, moves hence, and is buried. Shifting sand, a fleeting breath, is man. In the morning he stands upon the earth, in the evening is carried out for burial. That which but now was a blooming flower falls in the space of an hour, and is presently snatched away, though it flash with beauty of body and soul. A bit of ashes becomes the man of integrity and value, full of activity as he was, and is not to be replaced or recalled. He is hidden in the sod and shut within the hospitable tomb. The glory of a statue remains for him and the shadow of a name, nay, not even a shadow. The man goes to heaven if he has done well, to hell if ill. His body lies in the ground, his skill is dead, his tongue is still,

his breath is fled. That which was a man is become dregs; he that loved him casts him off, and he that he loved shudders and will not know him, hurries quickly to cover up his limbs, hurries to bury him, weeps and gives the orders and makes ready the urn. He groans nor wipes away his tears all day. Presently he bears the bier or goes before or after in prayer. Finally he goes to the funeral lamentations with a sort of imploring wail. He goes in tears, returns rejoicing when he has consigned the bones to the tomb and come away. The loyal love disappears when the wealthy hand has disappeared. It is dead, is dead, when he has lost his friend and his wealth. He who had smiled upon him was in love with his wealth, the wicked heart.

This man of integrity, this paragon, this real man, what is he, pray? What his brave show? An urn of ashes. Handsome, lovable, irreplaceable, this rare man who filled his post so well, has flowed away like water and been straightway snatched from our sight. He has died like the cattle, and all his charm and grace are suddenly gone. Both the heat and hue are extinguished; henceforward the passion of youth is gone. Why tarry on the subject? Thou art laid low, dear flesh, art become dregs and dust. Thou ceasest to be what thou art, and shrinkest to ashes. Why does the food flow down, and the throat dilate with drinking and eating? Fed on food, thou art, O flesh, food thyself for worms, and turnest to decay. We can see thy limbs and face pale in death, pale in death, cold to the touch and shrunken together. The auburn or golden hair that waved o'er thy ivory neck lies dead, the heart and the lips with which thou gavest forth thunder tones are still. The eyes have no sight, the ears no hearing, the mouth no speech, the nose no scent, the heart no passion, the frame no warmth. The foot so swift to evil, the eye fixed on woman's charms, the milky neck, the waxen arms have fallen to decay. The waxen arms, as wonderful as beautiful, the shining limbs, one little ditch contains. The teeth before so white, the fiery lips, the blooming face, the gleaming cheek are now decayed and mere dead matter. Where now the cups, the dainties where—the thousand dainties now? Where is the bloom of youth and where the roseate glow of face? Where is the unsteady voice, the all too frequent laughter where, the ribald speech, the frenzied, wanton glance? Where are the belt, the golden ring, the fillet golden? Where the renown and high position inherited from the long line of ancestors? The flesh that sprang from kings is given to worms, is become worms. The flesh reared in palaces and hedged round with royal splendor is defenseless now. Lovely body, thou art now a black and worthless body, thou art dissolved in death and become the image of a corpse.

Earthly glory, like lilies now, tomorrow is as the wind. Fair youth flees away with time first and then in death. The noble chest, the noble body are but body, and the funeral pyre of youth and old age are one. Presently the boy dies, as the rose perishes that blooms in the spring. The strength is snatched away from the strong man, the gleaming beauty from the woman. If one had mental vision keen as the eye of the lynx, I believe he would see that sweet is bitter as gall and beauty ugliness. Think what fair bodies, breasts full of life and limbs of charm, what royal frames, are in the tomb. The tomb speaks loudly and threateningly: "Here are received the first and the last, the high and the low."

Man is a feeble thing, man is a short-lived flower, man is a thing without being, man is clay and earth, and stores up earthly things in his soul. Man is a little flower, a figurine endowed with life. Breath makes him grow, nourishes him, fills and moves him for a little while. When he leaves his bones here, the man dies and becomes mere mean flesh, flesh more horrid than all other flesh. Our flesh is more worthless when dead, more feeble when ill, than any other flesh, and so no other corpses are laid away. It quickly teems with worms, and, as is plain enough, gapes open when hurt, and soon breaks under any rough treatment and hard blow. I will not tell how quickly it becomes ill, how quickly it becomes mean; nor will I say how quickly it becomes decayed, how quickly festering rottenness. Moreover, it is more horrid, more rough and wild in death, and makes a worse stench—suffers more pain in illness and quickly falls away. You have no fear from corpse or dead body of beast, but poisonous sickness attacks you from that of your kind.

When slain they go their separate ways, the man and brute; is his or its the greater fear? Why, plainly his. A dead animal in a field causes you no alarm; the corpse of a buried brother is far more terrible to you. You are afraid to go and look upon his bones at night, though you have no fear to approach a dead animal. It is left that our corpses and dead bodies are more horrid and more fetid, and they are known to be so.

Man is a fleeting breath, a short-lived vapor that appeareth for a little while. He appears and shines forth, straightway withers and becomes dry grass. Man is born in tears, and quickly taken away, expires and is buried. He stands a little while, soon falls, is here today, tomorrow gone, set here a little while. The slightest stirring of the air, and most short-lived breath, is man. (He is born unto trouble and pain.) He raises his head, leaps forth, dies, is like a bubble. No bubble vanishes more quickly, no breath of air more fleetingly. He is earthly flesh and fleshly earth, an image, smoke, a heap of rottenness, the wave of a whirlpool, nay, a very

whirlpool. While breathed upon from heaven he blooms like a rose. He is a vapor, straightway collapses and disappears, becomes horrid slime. Man is made of clay here, born of a woman; the new-made man is given over to tears to weep here for himself. He bawls at the breast, lives in troubles, death calls, he goes. He that just now flourished straightway falls and is buried. He straightway falls, straightway passes and is taken away. He passes, goes away, falls, was here a moment, stayed but a little while. He came forth quickly, quickly passed hence, dies as though he had not been, sows weeds and thistles here. He pursues thistles, reaps thistles, suffers tribulation here. He seeks joy and weeps, he loves and fears, and is crushed down. While man has life, he abounds or needs, rolls like a wheel, gives, takes, goes, groans, is crushed or crushes, burns or is burned—burns and is burned, hurts and is hurt, grows up for ills. He delights in honors and in their labors sinks to rest. His is the heaviest cross who aiming at the top comes out at the bottom. Hence he boils and rages and struggles, busying himself thus. He rolls like a wheel, looks like a rose, and has a sort of brilliancy.

The rich man trembles when ill, the man of high position groans in the midst of his joy, the wealthy man withers. Finally the mad urn gets him, overwhelms him and carries him off, O hard fate, tormented by many deaths on all sides. He is thought rich in his rich name and surviving glory; his urn is filled with rottenness, and the whole land with his name. He becomes a mirror, a sound, this upright, this good man; this was he so famous of birth, so strong in ancestry, filled with the spirit of Achilles. Fame called him a man; presently the fame fades and withers away itself, flourishing a little while, then battered and torn and enfeebled. Presently, when it has passed away, the man has ceased to be or to be named; therefore it is proved that life has no warmth and living thing no strength. The dull trunk lies there; the man is still who before spoke in thunder tones. The rose that blooming stood erect upon its stalk lies hideous as withered leaves.

Life is as fleeting, nay, as evanescent, as the points which outline a geometrical figure so quickly done away. Death is the great highway; death is the ultimate edge of things. Death tramples gold and clay alike, and nothing is too late for it. It hangs over all, whether hind or noble, rushes on quickly, is the one way of all flesh.

The man more learned than Socrates, stronger than Hercules is laid low by tertian fever, and so we see that all things are vain. Understand that all that lives and moves beneath the sun is vain; you may know it finally from the teaching of books.

Lo, thou of vision so open to evil, so blind to good, the fever is thy funeral fire; whence dost thou swell with pride? What is thy strength? The frame of great Hector is shrunken and contained in a single narrow ditch. What is thy learning? The bones of Socrates are dry dust; Plato, the mouthpiece of the soul, Cato, of justice, are but dust. What is thine eloquence? Or Demosthenes' and Cicero's? Their tongues are stiff, the breath of those clever lips is fled. What are thy blood and birth? The high race of the Fabii has fallen and their crowd melted away in death.

Thy beauty raised thee up, Absalom, and double vengeance brought thine end; thy milky flesh and golden locks are become mere dregs of things. What is thine eminence? What thy name? Thy praise what? Eminence, name, praise of yore, thou seest how they fall away. What is thy glory? What thy favor? What thy gifts? Nor glory nor favor hast thou like Solomon's. Though thou hast royal magnificence, thou shalt not be higher than the son of Philip, but shalt be written less of achievement than he. He had modesty, repose, a royal pose and air, sport, battles, and all towns opened their gates to him themselves. He saw the farthest and uttermost ends of the world, born to be a man, and ruled over nations and cities and rulers. He had conquered all things, and is conquered himself in course. From man he becomes ashes, scattered as it were by the breath of the breeze. He was a flower and now is slime, that paragon, that man of strength; scarcely would he fill a basket or a little urn who before filled the world.

Where is the glory of Babylon now? Where now dread Nebuchadnezzar? Where the vigor of Darius? Famous Cyrus where? They have passed away and left no trace.¹¹ Their fame remains and is fixed while they have sunk into decay. What are the halls and the splendor of Julius? Thou art gone, Cæsar, thou wast more cruel than thyself, more mighty than the world. Thy arm, thy wars, thy forces were driven in fury that thou mightest fill the surface of the world with blood, and scale the stars with thy glory. Thou didst wrongfully try thy strength with thine elderly son-in-law, and wast no loyal father-in-law or ally to him. Thou who art ashes now wast as man great as the world. Or was thy ambition to subdue the city and the world a sham? Behold, thou art resolved into a heap of dust, an urn of ashes. Fierce Cæsar, thou art stripped bare and become next to nothing.

Where now are Marius and Fabricius who knew not gold? Where the noble death and memorable course of Paulus? Where now the divine Philippi, and the heavenly voice of Cicero? Where Cato's peacefulness

¹¹This line is hopelessly corrupt.—H. P.

to his countrymen and wrath against the rebellious foe? Where now is Regulus?¹² Or Romulus? Or Remus? The rose of yore exists in name alone; mere names we hold. Quickly as the swift-fleeting path of a ball, these passing hearts and bodies strong have gone. A little while the tide of the ancients maintained its height and quickly fell; there glory ended; all their life passed by. We, too, are taken off and go away like them, go to the regions below, losing the sky, fainting in soul.

Death overhangs all living things; we all shall go. Death calls, we shall go, and not retain the glories of this world. We shall go, shall go, and shall return, to what? Way down to the lowest. Our bodies proclaim their origin in clay by their low aims.

The path of the soul is free to the heavens, of the flesh to things below. They take up the one and scorn the other, tending each to its origin. The flesh resists, the soul groans, Eve urges the man, and hence sin. The soul raises and washes, but the flesh weighs down the heart and defiles our deeds. Sweet wranglings while the crescent moon presents her horns—the one urges and the other, till both cease made as one. Why, flesh and earth, why dost thou struggle with the burden of the flesh and earth? The things of flesh and earth the die of time changes from hour to hour. Time and all the things of time roll on and know not how to stay. All individual things are proved to pass and naught to return in the general flow. See the best things of the body pass away like the wind. Remember that the separate things and blind ages pass away. The world melts away and vanishes like all the things of the world falling to destruction and wasting decay. Its light shines brightly, and lo, its charm fades utterly away. Its light flourishes and quickly fails and is as mud. See the rolling course of things running by like a stream. The glory of the earth fails and flees and vanishes in the circle of the days. The world rolls like a wheel and so is depicted as a wheel, as prone to roll, and change, and tumble down. Uncertain is its fixity, unstable its stability. It goes and comes, like the sea, bad now, tomorrow worse.

The glory of the earth, how it stands tottering! It flies like sand carried along by a stream or driven in a whirlwind. All the good things of the world flow by and none remains. } It smiles with an outward appearance of splendor, but is hollow as a reed within. } The glory of the earth is as glass, yea, as very glass. It is straightway snatched away and disappears in its emptiness. I see it well, each day brings change of things; if I see well, there is constant change and vanishing of things. The world and all things are vanishing like empty dreams, and many signs proclaim

¹² Surely this reading of P is better than the "Remulus" of the text.—H. P.

the nearness of the Day of Judgment. Stars on fire and iron-like moon are reported to have been seen, the sun without light, and the earth plunged in a whirlpool. The frail earth quakes, the wanton shades of Furies murmur, their warlike horde is said to have been seen rushing through the air. The bands of the dead are said to have been seen rushing together. Weightiest signs and many portents are coming to view. Grace fails, order is dead, wickedness rages, every one pursues guile, and is ashamed to be honest and modest. Justice is crushed under torture, the crowd by the crowd, the leader by the leader, the king by the ruler, the band by the band, the high by the high, the crowd by the crowd. All slippery deeds come out to public view, and nothing is hidden; mad, unnatural wrong is worshiped, and wantonness riots drunken by night and by day. The sacred law is out of favor, the unlawful permitted and delighted in. He that would be good is wretched, is a burden, is oppressive; he that seeks evil walks in lordly ease. No way of justice remains, for the maiden has withdrawn, and gone off to the skies with her sisters. Right is down and is a hindrance; evil practices are a help and profit. Fraud stands erect, love lies prostrate, order weeps, craft pleases, the greedy throat is here, the manly brow is lacking. Believe me, these things are forerunners and sure messengers of the end. The end is coming, and the glory of the world is perishing through foe and downfalls, rebellion, blood and fire and storm, through strife and lust and fraud, oppression, bloodshed and war.

Arise, arise, take up new hope, ye whose hope is wavering so. See the kingdoms rushing to destruction and the high places of the earth tottering to their fall. The last days are at hand, if the Holy Scriptures do not deceive us. The sayings of the prophets and the words of heaven are nearing fulfilment.

Fleshly glory is like a throw of dice and filled with ashes. The Judge stands threatening. God is at hand to judge, let the sinner awake, for Christ is near. Who now delays? Lo, fierce Antichrist is upon us. The offspring of impiety and evil, the beast of perdition, comes; under his direction the tail of the Dragon shall drive the stars below. The impious one is upon us, the son of impiety is near. He is upon us, and raises his head among those that he has laid low. Under his sway shall multiply and hold sway death, tribulation, and suffering such as never was. The seventh trump is at hand, the last stroke. Behold, the world recedes as thy words, Paul, foreshadow. Rome seems to be losing her kingdom and to be drawing back, neither her throne nor state any more high as before. Slippery deeds become open, are done in public. Rome, thy former glory is dead, thy king fails thee. With such signs going before,

nay, following in sequence, the impious comes upon us in his terrors and fire. And there are evident signs of threatening, signs of wrath, that you may absolutely know the last days are very near. A black, bristling, winged dragon, spitting fire, has recently been seen in the sky—this is no theme for mirth, I tell—the thing was clearly visible to all, both travelers and inhabitants. It fled, bristling, and this flight of the dragon spread terror. The horrible monster passed over towns, flew by and visited very many places, so the report goes.

A woman has been born in the country in England with two heads, and she had two legs. Two legs only she had, but twice two arms; two bosoms and four breasts added to the wonder. I want you to believe that I say what is so, and write the truth. Her actions, walk, and sitting down were like other women's. Of these women, these sisters, marvelous to tell, one died, the other survived in grief. After a little while both sank in death, the survivor following the other.¹³

A man of great career exists in the regions of Spain. I note him in my verse and swear to these things by true witnesses. He gave out, ye gods, that he was born of a simple virgin without male seed, and the company of his brethren believed him. Finally the viper said he was Christ. He practically proclaims thus or signifies that he is Antichrist. One of no less strange practices has appeared in the regions of the East, and is disordered in mind. This impious fellow said he was great Elijah. Thus you may be sure the last days are near.

Reckless race, let us bemoan our impious deeds while yet we may. The Judge comes threatening; let us tremble. Let no man cease to hold to the right and bewail the evil. Joy is drawing near for them that weep, and wrath for the ungodly. The seventh trump, the last stroke, the dreadful day are here. Wrath comes rushing upon us in thunder and lightning. Thoughtless race, let us flee from things that flee so quickly. Thoughtless race, let us cover our slippery joys with tears. We have refused to stand, and have drifted into evil; let us stand by the good. The hour of doom is at hand, the times are out of joint; let us awake.

END OF BOOK I

[*To be continued*]

¹³ This is a reference to the Biddenden Maids in Kent; cf. Hone's *Every Day Book*, under March 26. [Note of Rev. Dr. Howard Osgood.]

CRITICAL NOTE

A NEW GLIMPSE OF GREEK TENSE-MOVEMENTS IN NEW TESTAMENT TIMES

The limit of function between the aorist and perfect in Greek has been with New Testament, as with other, grammarians a matter of no little interest. Especially for New Testament times there has seemed to be evidence of a tendency on the part of these tenses, if not toward amalgamation, at least toward a partial interchange of function. Thus an occasional aoristic perfect is recognized; while many aorists, translated by English present perfects, seem to have taken on a sense of completion quite foreign to the genius of the tense. Latin influence may have borne a part in this incipient breaking down of barriers between the two tenses. At all events, such a tendency in Hellenistic Greek must be acknowledged.

Recent publications of Greek papyri and ostraca have supplied new materials of an important sort for the study of those deeper and more elusive linguistic movements that work in the everyday speech of the common people. Thus Professor Wilcken, in his *Griechische Ostraka*, has printed the texts of over sixteen hundred of the inscribed potsherds on which the commonest receipts and orders of Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt were written. These texts, brief as they are, possess the peculiar advantage of being usually dated, and assignable, on internal or other grounds, to a particular locality.

In examining one class of Professor Wilcken's texts, one is struck by the change in the later years of the first century, from perfect to aorist. Many of the ostraca are tax receipts, for poll tax, river-police tax, etc. The verb for paying or discharging the tax is *διαγράφειν*. In the Ptolemaic period and under the early emperors it appears in the perfect. More particularly, in the Ptolemaic time the second perfect *διαγέγραφεν* is used; and under the early emperors the first perfect, *διαγεγράφηκεν*. The form is generally that of the following ostrakon, a document of April 22, 18 A. D.:

Διαγεγράφ(ηκεν)

Ζμηθίως Παχνούβιος

ὑπ(ὲρ) λαογραφ(ίας) τοῦ πέμπτου (ἔτους)

Τιβερίου Καίσαρος Ἐβαστοῦ

Φαρμάβι κ̅ξ ἀργυ(ρίου) δραχ(μὰς) οὐκτὼ/ςη

(Second hand) Ἀπολ(ώνιος) ἐπηκολ(ούθηκα).¹

¹ Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka*, Vol. II, No. 3.

Receipts of this type, with the first perfect of *διαγράφειν*, are found dated as early as 22 B. C. While the aorist appears in one ostrakon as early as 40 A. D., the perfect prevails in these documents to the almost complete exclusion of the aorist well into the seventh decade of the first century. In that decade the aorist appears with greater and greater frequency, and in the course of a dozen years almost completely supersedes the perfect, thereafter, so far as my observation goes, maintaining the ground gained. The last appearance of the perfect in these documents is in an ostrakon of 96 A. D., so that, as far as the evidence goes, in less than sixty years the displacement was complete. This singular movement may be traced in the receipts from Elephantine, and independently in those from the neighborhood of Thebes, the decade of transition being in both the same. Yet side by side with this newly accepted aorist stand such perfects as *μεμέτρημαι* and *μεμέτρηκεν*, over which, it will be noted, the corresponding aorist forms would have had no advantage in brevity. Ease in writing the shorter word, indeed, was probably without influence in the change, for the word, whether aorist or perfect, is usually abbreviated to its first four or five letters. The aorist's advantage in ease of utterance, however, may have helped its introduction into these documents. And it is always possible that the caprice of some new official, perhaps directly or indirectly under Latin influence, may have been in part responsible for the new fashion.

Whatever the causes that operated to produce this sudden change—among which Latin influence may have been one, and convenience of expression another—we may recognize in it an illustration of the rapid developments of tense-function to which Hellenistic Greek was liable, and of which the literary language was bound sooner or later to show the influence. For New Testament syntax this glimpse of first-century tense-movements in the common speech is particularly suggestive, not only in view of the coincidence in time, but especially because New Testament Greek lay nearer to the vernacular than to the literary language—a fact of which every day is bringing fresh evidence.

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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

DID PAUL USE THE LOGIA?

The general idea of this large book¹ is to test the truth of a special theory by applying it to two cognate questions, and showing that it affords a probable solution of both. Resch's special theory is, that an original Hebrew *Logia Jesu* lies behind our gospels, and the two questions to which he applies it are the synoptic problem, and that which is generally known as *Jesus und Paulus*, i. e., the relation which the teaching of Paul bears to that of the Lord, and especially to the presentment of the latter which we find in the synoptic gospels.

The working out of the theory in relation to the synoptic problem is to be found in Resch's five volumes on the *Aussercanonische Paralleltexthe* (1893-97), in his *Die Logia Jesu*, a reconstruction of the text of the source of the gospels in Greek and Hebrew (1898), partly in his perhaps better known *Agrapha* (1889), and in the present volume.

His position may be roughly stated thus: He accepts the generally received view of the "priority of Mark," in so far as he thinks that it was known to and used by the compilers of the other gospels; but he also accepts and enlarges the view of B. Weiss, that Mark, besides his knowledge of the preaching of Peter, used the document which lies behind many of the non-Markan parts of Matthew and Luke. Weiss, who called this document the "Apostolic source," thought that it was used merely in a few places by Mark, and thus explained the so-called "secondary features in Mark;" but Resch maintains that it originally contained all that is now found in the second gospel, which is really only a selection from it, and that the other writers used it throughout as well as the Markan selection. Moreover, he thinks that it was written in Hebrew, and he incidentally offers a solution of the textual problem by treating the early variants in Codex Bezae and other authorities as independent translations of this Hebrew original, which he dates almost immediately after the ascension.

The bearing of this on Paulinism is as follows: As Resch says, the

¹ *Der Paulinismus und die Logia Jesu in ihrem gegenzeitigen Verhältnis untersucht.* Von Alfred Resch. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1904. viii+656 pages. M. 20. [= "Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur," Neue Folge, XII. Band, herausgegeben von O. v. Gebhardt und A. Harnack.]

main problem of Paul's life for us is the relation between his teaching and that of Jesus. Is the one mainly dependent on the other, or is its source to be found elsewhere—in the belief, for instance, of contemporary Judaism, or in the speculations of Alexandrian thought? Again, if the former alternative be accepted, in what manner is the dependency to be explained? To these questions Resch's answer is that Paulinism is definitely derived from the teaching of Jesus, and mainly through a study of the Hebrew Logia. The attempt to establish this point is the main subject of *Der Paulinismus und die Logia Jesu*, and, whether we regard it as successful or not, we must all be grateful for the gigantic labor which has provided us with so great a mass of valuable material.

To a considerable extent Resch has arranged his work in a form which is more logical in plan and convenient for further research than at once conducive to an appreciation of his argument. In Part I (pp. 33-154) he goes through the epistles verse by verse, adding the suggested parallels from the Logia, without any attempt at classifying the probability of each suggestion. As the smallest resemblance in language or thought is sufficient reason for Resch to note a parallelism, the result is that a few really striking passages are lost in a crowd of instances which most of us will regard as valueless. For example one is inevitably prejudiced when one finds that the first three passages are the following:

1 Thess.

Logia

- (1) 1, 2. εὐχαριστοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ εὐχαριστῶ σοι πάτερ (Matt. 11:25).
 (2) — ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν ἡμῶν ἐν παντί καιρῷ δεόμενοι (Luke 21:36).
 ἀδιαλείπτως
 (3) 1, 4. εἰδότες τὴν ἐκλογὴν ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοί (Matt. 20:16).
 ὑμῶν

It is possible that, if the dependency on the Logia were firmly established, we could go back and see in such passages as the above reminiscences of a book which was known to be familiar to Paul (though, even then, I think that the first two would be with far more probability ascribed to epistolary usage), but, as at present arranged and for the present purpose, they merely tend to confuse and annoy the reader. Perhaps more than 50 per cent. of the examples given are of this nature, and should have been relegated to an appendix.

Part II (pp. 155-464) deals with the subject in hand from a different point of view. The writer now takes separate passages or groups of passages from the Logia, and traces and explains their use in the Pauline epistles. Many of these notes (there are altogether 203) are extremely interesting, but hardly any are free from that peculiar form of hyper-

criticism which sees allusions everywhere. It is, of course, impossible to discuss these notes at length in a review, but some idea of their character may be gathered from the fact that among the passages which Resch thinks that it is possible to trace in the Pauline epistles is the baptismal formula in Matt. 28:19. His argument is that Paul's method of thought about God is definitely trinitarian—which I suppose none would deny in a certain limited sense—and that he sometimes speaks of baptism in connection with the Spirit, sometimes in connection with Christ. The most reasonable explanation, says Resch, is that Paul knew of the command to baptize, contained in the Logia, and so confident is he that this is so that I think he would be prepared to claim the authority of Paul as evidence for the text of Matt. 28:19, as against the so-called Eusebian reading which omits the command to baptize.

In Part III (pp. 433–639) Resch brings together the general conclusions which he derives from the previous sections, and shows their bearing on various problems connected with the epistles and gospels. The first point is, of course, the attempt to prove that Paul shows acquaintance with the Logia from the baptism of John to the ascension. He used it, Resch thinks, in the Hebrew and not in a Greek translation, the latter being excluded by a study of Pauline phraseology as compared with the corresponding words in the gospels. Turning to the latter, it is next shown that no one of them is especially Pauline, though it is startling to find that, according to Resch, there are more points of connection between Paul and Matthew than between Paul and Luke. Finally the question is reached to which the rest is preparatory: "Was the Logia the main source of Paulinism?" Resch believes that it was, and to clinch his argument considers the possibly alternative sources—the Old Testament, Jewish apocryphal literature, Philo, etc.—but dismisses them all as insufficient to account for the facts. This part of the book is, I think, much more convincingly written than any of the others; but one cannot repress the feeling that neither the scale nor the method is the same as that which has proved the use of the Logia, and one wonders whether Reschian criticism applied, for instance, to the connection between Philo and the epistles of the captivity would not produce at least as good a case for the dependence of Pauline doctrine on Philo as the present work establishes for the use of the Logia; or, on the other hand, whether the means by which Resch disposes of the use of the Jewish literature would not make quite as short work of the Logia.

The main questions, therefore, which the reader of *Paulinismus und die Logia* is bound to ask are, first, whether Resch has established a con-

nection between the teaching of Paul and the sources of the synoptic gospels, and, secondly, supposing that this point be answered in the affirmative, whether he has shown the identity of the source used by Paul with the Logia.

I fear that the general judgment on both points will be definitely adverse, and that on the former it will be perhaps adverse to an unjustifiable extent, owing, as I have hinted, to the enormous mass of parallelisms and allusions that to most minds will seem somewhat irrelevant. This is a pity, for concealed among the mass are really striking passages. Let me give as examples two which I am sure are worthy of very serious attention—one from First Corinthians and the other from First Thessalonians.

1. Perhaps the stronger instance of the two is in First Corinthians, in connection with divorce. The parallels are 1 Cor. 7:10, 11 (γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι; . . . καὶ ἄνδρα γυναῖκα μὴ ἀφίεναι) and Mark 10:11, 12 (ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, μοιχᾶται ἐπ' αὐτήν, καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς ἄλλον γαμήσῃ μοιχᾶται). It is noticeable that Paul introduces these verses with the direct statement that they are the Lord's own teaching (παραγγέλλω οὐκ ἐγὼ ἀλλὰ ὁ κύριος), and that they differ in this respect from what follows (cf. especially vss. 6 and 25). One explanation of this is that Paul claims a special revelation in the first case, but not in the second; yet it may be submitted that the more prosaic explanation that he was referring to a known collection of precepts of the Lord is quite as probable. That this collection of precepts is best preserved (so far as this passage is concerned) by Mark 10:11, 12 (or its source) is rendered probable by the fact that only this gospel deals with the question of divorce or desertion of a husband by a wife. It is true that many critics have regarded vs. 12 as a late addition, on the ground that it refers to a possibility which the Jews never contemplated, but Resch's views condemn this theory, and for a probably better translation of the original Hebrew he points to the variant reading of Codex Bezae—ἐὰν γυνὴ ἐξέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλον μοιχᾶται—which is certainly nearer to the Pauline γυναῖκα ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς μὴ χωρισθῆναι. One may perhaps go a little farther, for this is not the only variant which is noticeable here, as *Syr. Sin.* and *Fam.* 1 place the case of the wife before that of the husband, just as Paul does. This is important, because this otherwise unnatural order finds, if it be the true text of the gospel passage, its historical justification in its relation to the case of Herodias, which, as has been pointed out by Professor Burkitt,² was probably the cause of the discourse. But why should Paul have also adopted

² *Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. V, pp. 628–30; *Evangelion da Meppharreshe*, Vol. II, p. 250.

this unnatural order? The suggestion is obvious that he did so because it was familiar to him through his source, and the only alternative which I can see is that possibly the Christian wife with a pagan husband would find more domestic difficulty than the Christian husband with the pagan wife, though I am not sure that this is correct psychology. The coincidence must, of course, not be pressed too far, but it is certainly remarkable, and it is surprising that the evidence of *Syr. Sin.* seems to have escaped Resch's observation.

Here, then, we have a possible, perhaps even probable, allusion to some document containing the teaching of the Lord, which was used by Paul and by the editor of the second gospel.

2. In 1 Thess. 4:15 f. Paul introduces a short statement³ as to the parousia by saying that he gives it *ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου*, and concludes in vs. 18 by telling the Thessalonians to comfort one another with *τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις*. It is possible that he merely means in the former verse to claim some special solemnity, or perhaps inspiration, for what follows, and that in the latter "these words" merely means the preceding passage. But it is, I think, slightly more probable that he is referring to a collection of *logoi* of the Lord. Resch finds the parallel to this passage in the gospels in Mark 13:26, 27,⁴ and the criticism which one naturally makes is that, in spite of a certain degree of verbal similarity, the characteristic features of both are different. The gospel is concerned with the question of the parousia in itself. The resurrection of the dead is, perhaps, implied, but it is not a main feature, and I do not think that the taking up of the faithful into the air is even implied. In fact, the whole question as to the possibly different treatment of those who were alive and those who were dead at the time of the parousia is not before the writer's mind. On the other hand, it is just these points which are characteristic of the epistle, and, therefore, at first sight one is inclined to reject Resch's view that Paul is dependent on the source of Mark for his teaching.

But perhaps this is too hasty. Paul was not quoting; he was explaining; and the difference of statement and emphasis is due to the difference in

3 τοῦτο γὰρ ὑμῖν λέγομεν ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου ὅτι ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόμενοι εἰς τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ κυρίου οὐ μὴ φθάσωμεν τοὺς κοιμηθέντας, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ὁ κύριος ἐν κελεύσματι ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου καὶ ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ καταβήσεται ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόμενοι ἅμα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀρπαγσόμεθα ἐν νεφέλαις εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ κυρίου εἰς ἀέρα· καὶ οὕτως πάντοτε σὺν κυρίῳ ἐσόμεθα.

4 καὶ τότε ὁφονται τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐρχόμενον ἐν νεφέλαις μετὰ δυνάμεως πολλῆς καὶ δόξης καὶ τότε ἀποστελεῖ τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἀνέμων ἀπ' ἀκροῦ τῆς ἕως ἀκροῦ οὐρανοῦ.

the point of view. I can easily imagine that the Thessalonians had heard teaching from Paul based on a collection of *logoi*, and that this belonged to the same stage of development as the discourse in Mark: the speaker and his listeners were concerned in establishing the certainty of the parousia—the main problem for the earliest disciples. But as soon as the first generation began to die out, the question at once arose as to the possibility that the dead would not share in all the benefits which the living would enjoy at the parousia. The *logoi* were ambiguous on this point, and the necessity of an exegesis naturally arose. The question is legitimate whether 1 Thess. 4:15 ff. is not an example of this exegesis, the taking up of the saints into the air being deduced from a comparison of the gathering together of the elect, and the coming of the Lord in the clouds. This seems not untenable; personally, however, I think it more likely that Mark 14:26 ff. is in itself an early attempt to expound some genuine saying, perhaps the same as that implied in 1 Thess. 4:15, by an exegesis, inspired by Jewish apocalyptic literature, parts of which are imbedded in the present text. I am more inclined to take this view, partly because in 2 Thess. 2:2 we have, probably, traces of other mistaken attempts at exegesis which were current (in which *δὲ λόγον* may mean “Logos of the Lord”), but chiefly because it seems to be almost certain that by the time he wrote Second Corinthians Paul had abandoned the eschatological teaching given in First Thessalonians. This is intelligible if he had in the meantime given up the use of Jewish apocalyptic literature as a means of arriving at the exegesis of the *logoi* of the Lord.

These two passages, and some others of but little less weight, seem to present a fair case for the theory that Paul was acquainted with a collection of *logoi* which in some points resembled our second gospel, but I fail to see that they sufficiently support the Reschian view of the existence of a primitive document of enormous size. To make this good, Resch must produce some stronger evidence, and I do not think that such exists. If I am right, then it is inevitable that Resch's theory that *die Logia Jesu* are the main source of the gospels, and were known to Paul, will be condemned. For unless the evidence in support be really strong, there is a presumption against any theory which builds up a lost source by putting together documents which are supposed to have been derived from it—a presumption which it is wrong to neglect, because it is based, not on any *a priori* reasoning, but on our knowledge of the methods of antiquity. Nothing is more certain than that, as a rule, the ancients compiled their writings by a process of conflation. Our first gospel represents the conflation of Mark with another document—even Resch admits this to be undeniable—

and Tatian carried the process still farther in producing the *Diatessaron*. If we wish to reconstruct the original, it would, therefore, seem unwise to continue the conflation. This, however, is just what Resch has done, for in trying to reconstruct the sources used by the early church in manufacturing the gospels, he has copied instead of reversing the process which that church employed.

In conclusion, it may not be amiss to ask whether, supposing after all, Resch is right, and that the *Logia* really did exist, and that Paul used them, or even merely supposing that Paul knew some smaller collection of *logoi*, is it probable that they were the main source of Paulinism? Resch's suggestion is that, immediately after the conversion of the apostle, he went away to the deserts of Arabia and studied the *Logia* for three years, then came out his doctrines on this basis, and learning to see the true meaning of Christianity in relation to Jew and gentile. I cannot think that this is probable, although the view that the visit to Arabia was one of meditation has the support of Bishop Lightfoot's authority. What is the real meaning of Gal. 1:17? Surely it is that the apostle's first act was to preach the gospel to the Arabians. His argument, if I follow it correctly, is that the accusation that he is in any way dependent on the apostles of Jerusalem is shown by history to be untrue: "When it pleased God to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the gentiles, immediately I went into Arabia . . . afterwards, after three years, I went up to Jerusalem to speak with Peter." That is to say, as soon as he received the call to be an apostle of Jesus Christ, he obeyed and immediately did his work, without consulting the other apostles. The whole point of the passage is to show that his work as an evangelist and apostle was independent of flesh and blood, and of the other apostles. The suggestion that there was a period of three years' inactivity in Arabia, followed by an interview with Peter, however brief it may have been, before he began his preaching, immeasurably weakens the force of the argument. Probably it would never have been made, had it not been for the feeling which Resch shares, that Paul would not have been in a position to begin work at once but would have required time to grasp what the teaching of Christ really meant. Such a view implies that Paul had been persecuting the Christians without understanding their doctrines, and I would submit that it is far more probable that he really understood them quite as well as the Christians did themselves, and in some ways far better. He had persecuted them vigorously as we can see from Acts 6:11 ff., because he regarded their teaching as subversive of Judaism—as, indeed, it was. The apostles at Jerusalem could not understand that this must be the logical conclusion of their argument.

out Saul of Tarsus did, and the more closely he followed them, the more clearly he saw that it was so, and the more firmly he persecuted, because he believed that they erred in their fundamental argument or rather presupposition, that Jesus was Christ. The only change, therefore, made in his position by his conversion was that he was convinced that this fundamental presupposition was correct. All his own arguments as to the logical result of the Christian positions remained; he altered none of them; he preached them now as facts which had to be faced in consequence of the revelation which had been made to him, instead of holding them up as terrible examples of the results of the false doctrine of the Nazarenes. There is always a danger of underestimating the importance of Paul's knowledge of Christianity, derived from keen hostile attention to the preaching of the disciples in Jerusalem, and I think that this is far more likely to have been the *Hauptquelle des Paulinismus* than the Logia.

I am really sorry to find so little in this book with which to agree, for Resch's works have always been a source of great instruction and stimulation to my own studies; and, in spite of my failure to be convinced by his arguments, I am sincerely grateful to the writer for this as for his earlier books.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

LEIDEN, HOLLAND.

THE MESSIANIC HOPE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

Professor Mathews' volume¹ is an able treatment of a subject of vital concern to the theologian of today. The view is widely current among New Testament scholars that eschatology was of fundamental significance in the thought of Jesus, of Paul, and of early Christians generally; and that this was a Jewish eschatology in source and character, which has been contradicted by events and has become impossible to us in the light of our present knowledge of the world. If this is so, if, according to the final decision of New Testament theology, the central and fundamental thing in the thought and teaching of Jesus and in that of Paul is a thing which we cannot accept, then is not every effort to construct a Christian doctrine for today on the basis of the New Testament precluded? Indeed, is not Christian faith undermined? Can we still worship as Master and Lord one whose fundamental conceptions of the kingdom of God and of his own calling as Messiah were mistaken? Those who still think that a Christian doctrine can be derived from the New Testament and based in good part

¹ *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*. By Shailer Mathews. [= "The Decennial Publications," second Series, Vol. XII.] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905. xx+338 pages. \$2.50 net.

upon it, and who still believe the words of the Master to be truth and life, may use either of two means of escape from the critical situation thus created. They may question, on historical grounds, the fundamental place of messianic eschatology in the mind of Jesus and of Paul, or at least in the mind of Jesus; or, admitting its fundamental and central place, they may seek to show that there is a foundation beneath this foundation, a center within this center, a substance of which this is the form. Various combinations of these two means of escape are of course possible. Professor Mathews chooses chiefly the second means. Acknowledging in the fullest measure the importance of the messianic hope to Jesus and to the New Testament writers, he seeks to show that the eternal Christian verities remain secure, though we reject the form in which they were chiefly expressed, a form inevitable in New Testament times, and to the founders of Christianity inseparable from the truth itself. Professor Mathews adopts the view, which has now many advocates, especially in Germany, that the kingdom of God was to Jesus primarily eschatological. It belongs, properly speaking, to the coming new age. He also holds with a smaller, but not inconsiderable, number of scholars that the messianic confession of Jesus' disciples, and even the messianic consciousness of Jesus himself, consisted in the conviction, not that he was already the Messiah, but that he was hereafter to come as such and establish the kingdom. This "eschatological messianism" is the center also of primitive Christianity and of Paulinism. Jesus is to Paul the eschatological Christ. Faith is primarily the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ of the eschatological hopes.

Perhaps it adds to the effectiveness of Professor Mathews' main argument that he is so staunch an "eschatologist." For his argument is that what is essential in Jesus and in the New Testament remains when the eschatological element is removed; that after we have done full historical justice to that element, it becomes evident that it is after all only of "interpretative" value. What then is the true foundation beneath this mistaken fundamental conception of Jesus and the apostles? It is to be found in part in the truths which the eschatology itself contained, faith in the rule of God, and in his future dominion over all, and in the life eternal; and, in part, in the fact that the appropriation of the messianic title to Jesus was the only way then available of expressing the reality and degree of his uniqueness, the supremacy of his personality, the finality of his knowledge of God, so that the justification of eschatological language is found less in itself than in him. In Paul also, the author maintains, eschatology, though fundamental, has in reality only interpretative value. He adopts "pharisaic messianism," but it becomes to him a medium of expression

the new life in Christ. To expound this new life and its ethical and social implications is to set forth essential Paulinism. This is true also of the other New Testament writers. Partly in Jewish messianic terms, partly in the new Greek philosophical formulas—hardly more acceptable than the others to the modern mind—these writers brought to expression their faith in the supremacy of Jesus and in the reality of the eternal life which they experienced in him.

The reviewer would express his complete sympathy with the aim of the book as thus suggested, and in the main with the method in which it pursues that aim; he is, however, inclined to make a larger use of the first means of escape from the difficult situation created by an eschatological interpretation of the thought of Jesus, and to think that the "eschatologists" in their zeal have been carried too far. Professor Mathews himself limits the significance of this element in the mind of Jesus, but it may be doubted whether a clear picture results. The kingdom of God was, he says, to Jesus in its primary and literal sense eschatological, but he used the term also figuratively of the people who were hereafter to belong to the kingdom. In this figurative sense it was already present, though in the literal sense, only future. It was present also in the victory of Jesus over Satan and demons. Again the so-called "future messiahship" theory, which Professor Mathews advocates, does not become clearer and more credible by his modifications of it. The phrase, "Son of man," on which this view of the self-consciousness of Jesus hinges, had, we are told, for him a symbolical meaning, such as its use in Daniel suggests. Its use by Jesus meant that he thought of himself as a type of those who were preparing for the kingdom. In that figurative sense he was already Messiah. He accepted Peter's confession in the eschatological sense in which Peter meant it; but he differed from his disciples in believing that he was already doing messianic work (pp. 96, 115). Nevertheless, the essential and literal element in his messianic consciousness was still the conviction that he was destined to come in the future as Messiah. The reviewer confesses that neither in this nor in any other exposition that he has met does this "future messiahship" become to him a natural or even conceivable interpretation of the consciousness of Jesus. This is a question of historical evidence and psychological interpretation, and is distinct from the further question whether, if this eschatological messiahship is accepted as Jesus' thought about himself, it will be possible for most of us to think, as Professor Mathews does, that it is due to the greatness of the personality of Jesus, and does not impair that greatness (pp. 128, 129).

The book before us is comprehensive in its scheme, including a study

of the messianic element in Judaism, in the teaching of Jesus, in primitive Christianity, in Paul, in later New Testament writers, and in early Christian history. In a book covering so wide a range there are naturally sentences at which the reader puts question marks. One may doubt the influence of a Hellenistic art-impulse upon the production of apocalypses (p. 22). The discussion of the eschatology of Enoch 36-71 hardly does justice to this significant effort to lift the figure of the Messiah up to the level of a transcendent hope (pp. 38-40). It is hard to assent to the judgment that even in the fourth gospel the messianic faith in Jesus is nothing more than an expectation that he would do messianic work in the future (p. 87). There are some inaccuracies in references, as on page 48, note 3, and page 28, note 6, where the correction must be supplied by reference to Bousset, who is again not rightly quoted on page 90, note 2. Wrede's *Messiasgeheimniss* should be seriously dealt with by one who gives messiahship so large a place in the life of Jesus. The summary of his view, on page 84, is misleading.

There is a minor matter of which it may not be amiss to speak. The word "messianism," which is used throughout the book, is one from which the present writer shrinks. If theologians decide to use it, the makers of dictionaries will be obliged to recognize it; but is it a word so needed and so good that this obligation must be imposed upon them?

We close with a reaffirmation of our thorough agreement with the main contents of the book and of its outcome. The messianic apocalyptic element was beyond doubt of great significance in the beginnings of Christianity, and has a large place in the New Testament. We must, unquestionably, clear it away in order to adapt New Testament teachings to our own times, and the clearing must be done by such thorough-going distinctions between form and substance as are here attempted. Setting aside the eschatology, as we have already more freely set aside the cosmology, of the New Testament, we have left, as Professor Mathews points out, the two great essentials of the Christian gospel, the personality of Jesus with its revelation of God and of eternal life, and the new life in and through him. These are the facts of which the messianic eschatology is one embodiment and interpretation. We must substitute forms of expression and interpretation in accordance with our own views of the world and modes of thought and speech, but the facts remain and constitute the abiding truth of the New Testament. It is by no means easy to find new language to take the place of the old, language that shall have the religious value of the old and yet avoid conflict with the rest of our knowledge. No one man will solve all the problems involved in such a restatement, and

no one solution will meet all needs; but we welcome this clear and frank discussion of the problem, and shall look forward to the author's further, more constructive efforts in the book he announces on *The Gospel and the Modern Man*.

FRANK C. PORTER.

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RECENT BOOKS ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The problem of the gospel of John, like the problem of Jesus himself, will not down. Interest in it fluctuates, or at least the manifestation of interest shown in published books and articles varies, and the line of battle advances and recedes; but the sun never sets upon an ended contest. Recent months have, as Sanday in his opening lecture remarks, produced a remarkable series of discussions on the subject, articles or books having appeared from Schmiedel, Loisy, Jülicher, Réville, Bacon, Stanton, Drummond. To these Sanday's own volume adds another of first-rate importance, to which there has still later been added the article by Professor Carl Clemen in the October number of the *American Journal of Theology*. These discussions make it evident that, for the moment at least, the tendency to narrow the space between opposing opinions has been checked and reversed; the apostolic influence upon the gospel and the degree of historicity are again being minimized, and the gap between diverse opinions widened. The discussion of the problem is therefore no threshing over of old straw, but eminently opportune.

The present volume¹ bears the familiar marks that are characteristic of all Canon Sanday's work: learning, clearness, fairness to opponents, judiciousness in judgment, conservatism. Yet Sanday's conservatism consists, not in a strenuous adherence to traditional views, but rather in a frankly expressed preference for those views which on the one hand are consistent with the evidence as he interprets it, and on the other involve no serious departure from those conceptions for which the historic church has for centuries stood.

The book has its limitations, mainly such as are imposed by the occasion which gave rise to it. It consists of eight lectures delivered before Union Seminary, New York, in October and November, 1904. In the nature of the case, such lectures could not enter into minute discussion of detailed evidence. In some matters, accordingly, notably in respect to

¹ *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*. Eight Lectures on the Morse Foundation, delivered in the Union Seminary, New York, in October and November, 1904. By William Sanday. New York: Scribner, 1905. xiv + 268 pages. \$1.75 net.

the external evidence, the book, in marked contrast to the recent essays of Professor Bacon and Professor Clemen, does not so much recite and weigh the evidence, as give us Sanday's verdict respecting the value of it. But even at these points the reader is persuaded that he is listening to the verdict, not of a partisan, but of a judge.

The book as a whole is an able defense of the view that the gospel is from an eyewitness of the events, a companion and disciple of Jesus, probably John the son of Zebedee, though Sanday does not wholly exclude, but even shows some leaning toward, the possibility that the author was a younger John, not of the Twelve, but a follower and beloved friend of Jesus. He strongly insists that the book is not a biography, but a gospel, and admits that the material has undergone a considerable degree of transformation in the mind of the writer since he witnessed the deeds and heard the words of Jesus. He finds, however, no room for redactor and editor save in 21:24, 25, and no occasion to admit intentional, or serious unintentional, misrepresentation of the history. He denies that the book shows any large influence of Paul upon the theology of its author, and holds that the essential elements of the Christology and the germinal trinitarianism of the book were derived from Jesus himself.

Granting, what the present reviewer at least is disposed to grant, that the author's judgment respecting the external evidence, which he states rather than substantiates, is sound, Sanday's discussion as a whole may fairly be said to show that he who is able to believe that Jesus wrought miracles such as this gospel records, or that he did things which a personal companion of Jesus would have described as these things are described, and that Jesus could have said such things respecting his own relation to God as the gospel reports him as saying, or that he could have said those which in the process of sixty years of reflection could have become transformed in the mind of his disciple into the sayings as here reported, should have no difficulty in accepting this gospel as coming, in substantially its present form, from the hand of a personal companion of Jesus. Whether this companion of Jesus was John the apostle, or another younger John outside the apostolic circle, but not outside that of Jesus' personal disciples, is relatively unimportant. The decision of the main question really turns upon the amount and kind of evidence demanded to sustain such a proposition. Shall we, as Sanday indicates on p. 183, reason from the historical evidence to the authorship, undeterred by the difficulty of regarding these events and teachings as historically belonging to Jesus, and then, on the basis of authorship, accept them as historical? Or shall we, on the basis of the difficulty of believing them to be historical, set our standard for the

kind and amount of evidence necessary to prove eyewitness-authorship, and then, if the evidence fails to meet the demands of this standard, declare the eyewitness-authorship disproved? In fact, nobody does the former consistently; we all do—Sanday by no means least—determine more or less definitely the kind and character of evidence necessary to establish a certain conclusion, and then determine our verdict according as the obtainable evidence meets or fails to meet this demand. One's verdict on the authorship of the fourth gospel will be in no small measure fixed in advance by the canons of evidence that are adopted.

Thus once more we are forced to recognize that criticism and philosophy, however often divorced in courts of church or of reason, refuse to live apart, and that in this alliance criticism eventually bends the knee to philosophy. The ideal of a criticism unbiased by philosophy is an ideal, not to be relinquished, but, in the last analysis, impossible of perfect achievement. When we press our critical question to a final answer, we cannot escape weighing our evidence in scales that our philosophy constructs.

In the meantime Sanday's book is instructive and helpful. Its criticism of the recent literature is informing and discriminating. Its arguments are almost without exception fair and reasonable. If it does not enter fully enough into some matters—such, for example, as the external testimony and the evidences of editorial work—to enable one from this work alone to judge of the case on its merits, the author has at least clearly defined his own point of view, and enabled us to see how from that point of view the matters appear to a sober and fair-minded man.

ERNEST D. BURTON.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

This book² is the first part of a work covering the Johannine vocabulary and the Johannine grammar. The grammar is soon to be published. The two volumes are introductory to a third on *The Fourfold Gospel*. But they are also a continuation of *Diatessarica*, under which name four volumes have been published, viz.: *Clue: A Guide Through Greek to Hebrew*, *The Corrections of Mark*, *From Letter to Spirit*, and *Paradosis*. It appears, then, that the present volume on *Johannine Vocabulary* is the fifth of a work which will ultimately consist of seven volumes, unless indeed *The Fourfold Gospel* shall be found to have one or more successors.

The volume before us treats, first, of Johannine "Key-Words" (146 pages); second, of "Johannine and Synoptic Disagreement" (91 pages);

² *Johannine Vocabulary: A Comparison of the Words of the Fourth Gospel with Those of the Three*. By Edwin A. Abbott. London: Black, 1905. xviii + 364 pages. 13s. 6d.

and, finally, of "Johannine and Synoptic Agreement" (112 pages). In addition to these main divisions, we have an "Introduction" (15 pages) and an appendix on "Prepositions in the Four Gospels" (5 pages). The motto of the book is *oratio imago animi*, and it is dedicated to the author's daughter, "by whom the main materials for the work were collected and classified, and the results corrected and revised." It may not be incorrect, therefore, to regard the *Johannine Vocabulary* as the first critical contribution by a woman to the problem of the origin of the gospels. But we infer from the dedication that all the interpretative matter of the volume, including a multitude of footnotes, is to be credited to Dr. Abbott himself.

The purpose of the *Johannine Vocabulary*, if we may deduce a statement of this from sec. 1442 of the Introduction, is to illustrate the Johannine use of synonymous words, also of characteristic iterations and variations; to illustrate the Johannine use of different forms of the same word; to illustrate the subtle shade of meaning denoted by slight variations of a clause; and finally—though this belongs, at least in part, to *Johannine Grammar*—to illustrate one of John's most striking characteristics, his frequent obscurity or ambiguity.

The first of the three main divisions of the book, that on "Key-Words," has a chapter on "Believing," a chapter on "Authority," and a chapter on "Synonyms." The first of these, from the nature of the case, is the most extensive. "Few of the leading characters," as the author says, "are not placed at some time in such circumstances as to show us—or make us ask—what, or whom, and how, and why, they 'believed'; or why, and what, and whom, they were exhorted to believe." In this chapter on "Believing" the author discusses the usage of the Old Testament, of Philo, and of the New Testament exclusive of John; then, the antecedent probability that a Christian at the close of the first century might be expected to restate the doctrine of believing; and finally takes up in order all the passages of the gospel of John in which any form of the word occurs. His conclusion is that "believing is to be regarded, according to John, in different aspects, not as a consummation, or a goal, but as a number of different stages, by which different individuals pass, in accord with their several individualities, toward the one center, Jesus, the Christ, the Son of God, in whom they are to have life."

We may illustrate the character of the discussion by the author's treatment of the expressions "trusting to the name of," and "trusting to," the Lord, though this is one of the relatively few instances in which we cannot wholly agree with his views. Dr. Abbott approves of Origen's distinction, and holds that "trusting in the name of Jesus implies a lower kind of trust,

a profession of belief in baptism, which professed belief, if not followed up by spiritual action, might come to nothing" (sec. 1487). Again, referring to John 2:23, "Now when he was in Jerusalem at the passover, during the feast, many believed on his name, beholding his signs which he did," the author says: "This probably implies that they were baptized in Christ's name" (sec. 1493). He thinks the statement of John 3:22 antecedently probable, that Jesus, or rather his disciples, continued the work of baptizing. But does it follow that, because Jesus allowed his disciples to baptize in the land of Judea, after he had virtually been rejected in Jerusalem, therefore he had baptized previously? And does it follow that, if he allowed his disciples to baptize, the baptism was "in Christ's name"? What could it possibly have meant at that time, either to Jesus or to the public, that disciples were baptized in his name? But the chief objections to this distinction between trusting to the name of Jesus, and trusting to him, are (1) the significant use of the word "name" in John (see, e. g., John 14:13; 17:6, 11, 12; 20:31), and (2) the context of the passage in which "believing in the name" first occurs (John 1:12). Those who believe on Christ's name are spoken of as those who "received him," who also were born "of God." This latter qualification seems to imply that John, in this instance at least, meant by believing in the name of Christ a sincere trust. And we are not to abandon this position because of the expression "to them gave he the right to become children of God," as though they were not yet his children. If "born" of him, they are his spiritual children; and by the right to become children of God (*γενέσθαι*) John can have meant only the authority to claim all the privileges pertaining to this new relationship to God. Nor ought we to admit that John 2:23 obliges us to alter our interpretation of John 1:12, 13. The many to whom Jesus did not trust himself, though they professed to believe in his name, certainly had no true and deep faith; but we cannot believe that the author wished to indicate this by saying that they "believed on his name." In John 8:31 it is said that certain Jews "believed him" (*πιστεύουσιν αὐτῷ*), and yet, a little later, the same people took up stones to stone him (John 8:59). They evidently had no true faith in him, though it is said that they "believed him."

In the chapter on "Authority" in the fourth gospel our author's view may be indicated in a sentence or two. "According to John, human authority at its highest implies perpetual and voluntary dependence upon divine will" (sec. 1580); "If life is to be laid down with authority, it must be laid down out of love for others" (sec. 1588); and, "The false ruler says to the true, 'I have authority to take thy life'; the true ruler replies, 'I have authority to lay it down'" (sec. 1594).

The chapter on "Johannine Synonyms" treats of "seeing," "hearing," "knowing," "coming," "worshipping," and "going away," and contains many valuable suggestions. An interesting argument is presented for taking the words of John 4:22 away from Jesus, and giving them to the Samaritan woman, who here "mimics the dogmatism of the Jewish rabbis" (secs. 1647, 1648). In sec. 1629a, which refers to John 17:25, "O righteous Father, the world knew thee not, but I knew thee," the author asks: "Does this mean (1) that the pre-incarnate Son recognized the Father from the beginning, or (2) that the incarnate Son recognized the Spirit of the Father when he was baptized and sent forth to preach the gospel?" But, we ask, *must* it mean one or the other of these views? Is there not even a third explanation possible, not to go farther than that? May we not better understand the passage in this way: Jesus was looking back over his ministry as a completed whole (aorist). During that ministry he, in contrast to the world, had known the Father. The aorist doubtless *might* refer to an act of the pre-incarnate Son, but such a reference would require some clear evidence not furnished by this passage. The other alternative—viz., that the words refer to Christ's recognition of the Spirit of the Father at his baptism—hardly does justice to the manifest fact of his constant abiding in the Father. Moreover, the knowledge which came to Jesus in the hour of his baptism was knowledge of his own mission rather than knowledge of the character of God.

The six word-lists which are designed to illustrate the Johannine vocabulary by comparison of its words with one or more of the synoptists are more than mere lists of words. Introductions and footnotes give so much of the context and use of a word that the statistics have real significance. Many interesting facts are pointed out which illustrate the allusiveness of John; nor does the author limit his allusions to the synoptists or even to the New Testament writings. Thus, e. g., in the stress which John lays on the fact that the Son does all things "for the sake of the Father," or "for the sake of the disciples," the author sees an allusion to the doctrine of Epictetus: "Whatever lives has been so framed as to do all things *for its own sake*."

As specimens of Johannine allusion to passages in the synoptists we may note John 8:12: "I am the light of the world," which is thought to allude to Matthew's "corruption" of the doctrine of Christ when he represents him as saying, "Ye are the light of the world" (Matt. 5:14); and John 20:17: "Jesus saith unto her, 'Touch me not,'" which is thought to be a correction of Matthew's statement that certain women took hold of the feet of the risen one (Matt. 28:9).

In concluding this brief review of *Johannine Vocabulary*, I will quote from the Introduction two sections which seem to indicate in an admirable manner the most striking qualities of the volume. They concern the famous dialogue in the appendix of John's gospel, which has caused all translators a good deal of trouble. The rendering and comment of Dr. Abbott are as follows:

Jesus. Simon, son of John, *lovest* thou me more than these?

Peter. Yea, Lord, thou knowest that I *still love* these.

Jesus. Feed my lambs.

The Master now repeats his question on a lower level, dropping the clause "more than these."

Jesus. Simon, son of John, *lovest* thou me?

Peter. Yea, Lord, thou knowest that I *still love* thee.

Jesus. Tend my young sheep.

On the third occasion, Jesus comes down to a yet lower level, to the standard that the humiliated disciple has himself adopted.

Jesus. Simon, son of John, *lovest* thou me *still*?

Peter. Lord, thou knowest all things, thou *feelest* that I *love* thee *still*.

Jesus. Feed my young sheep.

Thus, the dialogue resolves itself into a short dramatic poem with a triple refrain, apparently alluding to traditions mentioned in other gospels, but not in this one. Most simple, yet most beautiful, artless yet in harmony with the deepest laws of art, it combines a passionate affection with subtle play on words and a most gentle yet powerful suggestion of loving reproach and helpful precept.

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In his essay³ on the death of the sons of Zebedee, E. Schwartz starts with an assumption which, while learnedly fortified by plausible reasonings, is so palpably a mere assumption as to vitiate the entire argument. To the request of the sons of Zebedee for seats one on the right hand and the other on the left of Jesus in his glory, and to their assurance that they could drink of the cup of which he drank and could be baptized with the baptism with which he was baptized, Jesus had replied: "The cup that I drink of ye shall drink; and with the baptism that I am baptized withal shall ye be baptized" (Mark 10:39). This utterance, ascribed to Jesus, Schwartz understands as a *valetudinium ex eventu*; the cup and baptism mean the martyr's death which both James and John suffered; the prophecy was written and laid in the mouth of Jesus after the occurrence; and since James was put to death by Herod Agrippa in 43 A. D., John also must

³ *Ueber den Tod der Söhne Zebedaei: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Johannes-evangeliums.* Von E. Schwartz. Berlin: Weidmann, 1904. 53 pages. M. 3.50.

have met death at the same time (Acts 12:2). John's name was suppressed because of a legend that he still lived in Ephesus. According to this theory, the John mentioned by Papias cannot be the son of Zebedee, but was John Mark, who had become one of the "pillars" of the church at Jerusalem (Gal. 2:9), but did not accompany Paul and Barnabas on the first missionary journey, as erroneously reported in the book of Acts. The gospel, the epistles, and the Apocalypse were not written by the son of Zebedee, but a hundred years after his death, by some unknown person, who, though elsewhere skilfully disguising it, once disclosed his hand, in the last chapter of the fourth gospel, and there, in correcting the false interpretation that the son of Zebedee should not die, really indicates that John is already dead and enjoys only the life which an immortal spirit has. Of this whole essay one may say that it is interesting and evinces learning, but is not convincing.

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SOME OTHER BOOKS ON JESUS AND THE GOSPELS

M. Jacquier's history of the synoptic gospels,¹ while offering no new theory and working out no new solution of the problems which are perplexing scholars, is an admirable review of the gospels themselves from the modern literary point of view, and of the criticism to which they have been subjected. After giving the meaning and use of the term "gospel," and the testimony of antiquity to the existence and relation of our present synoptics, M. Jacquier discusses the contents and characteristics of the oral gospel, analyzes critically and comparatively the three written gospels as we now have them, then describes the theories of their origin which have been advanced, and finally deals with each gospel in detail, its language, date, place of composition, author, readers, teachings, and history. For his own conclusions he maintains that at the basis of the synoptics is an oral gospel, or catechism, in Aramaic, which became written in many forms, more or less complete; that Matthew's logia and Mark's fuller narrative were the main sources of both Matthew's and Luke's gospels, as we now have them, but were supplemented by other apostolic narratives, oral as well as written. Our Greek Matthew he would date before 70 A. D., Mark between 64 and 67 A. D., and Luke in the decade 60 to 70 A. D.

¹ *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament*. Tome second: *Les évangiles synoptiques*. Par E. Jacquier. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. xii+511 pages. Fr. 3.50.

In his life of Jesus² Dr. Furrer allows no miracle; God is revealed by his changelessness; the immaculate conception, the form in which the temptations are described, are orientalisms; the resurrection was not of a physical body, but was declared because his followers entered upon a conviction of his spiritual immortality; miracles of healing were wrought by personal influence; miracles upon nature are explained away—the sea became opportunely calm, the five thousand were fed because, at his gracious suggestion, those who had brought lunches in concealment produced them and shared with others. But Jesus was a manifestation of sympathy and love; he was conscious of God's nearness; he imparted this consciousness to others. The greatness of his mission was not so much in his teaching as in himself; he rested in God; he brought joy among men. A recurring comparison between the teachings of Christ and the tenets of Buddhism and Mohammedanism, familiarity with the Holy Land, a graphic, simple style, and a devout sympathy with the scenes and events described, render this story of Jesus of value.

In Professor Briggs's *The Ethical Teaching of Jesus*³ may be found the same patient and scholarly grouping of data, and the same independence of judgment, which characterize the author's other works. For conclusions of criticism, both literary and historical, this book rests upon and naturally follows his *New Light on the Life of Jesus*. There is little attempt to apply the teaching of Jesus to modern conditions, or to interpret it in the terms of life today. It is essentially an essay in biblical theology, and undertakes to disclose distinctively what Jesus in his day taught the people concerning duty. The schoolman's dicta of two codes of teaching, one for the clergy and another for the laity, the "counsels" and the "precepts" of primitive monasticism, while unmentioned distinctly by name, are yet allowed in the chapter "Counsels on Perfection." But the inner secret, the principle of all of Jesus' life and teaching, Dr. Briggs finds in what he terms "holy love."

"The all-sufficiency of inner life," according to Dr. Crooker,⁴ describes the essential and distinguishing elements of the new order of manhood which Jesus exemplified in his personality. No claim of being deity, no merit as organizer, no theory of an atonement, no body of sayings or

² *Das Leben Jesu Christi*. Von Konrad Furrer. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. viii + 262 pages. M. 3.

³ *The Ethical Teaching of Jesus*. By Charles Augustus Briggs. New York: Scribner, 1904. xi + 293 pages. \$1.50 net.

⁴ *The Supremacy of Jesus*. By Joseph Henry Crooker. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1904. 186 pages. \$0.80.

doctrines give Jesus his pre-eminence; he himself was more than all he did or said, or than can be said about him. When historical criticism has adjusted the facts of his life to simpler proportions, eliminated some incidents, some utterances, he but appears the more conspicuous in his essential character and mission; we can appreciate him better, but we must appreciate him anew. He was the master of inner life, which makes the soul a kingdom of peace, the home a paradise, the neighborhood a sanctuary, and the whole universe an embodied smile of God. Jesus saved people by leading them along a new path of life. He taught with authority because he spoke out of his own experience directly to the hearts of his hearers, and revealed an experience in which he had laid hold of the primary and essential facts and laws of the spiritual life. The author's theological dogmas are not disguised, but above them and beyond them he describes a greatness which his own phrases do not adequately explain, just as Martineau and Channing outlined more than their colors portrayed.

These books illustrate what many other facts prove, that serious students of the life of Jesus are far from being at one in their estimate of him. In many lands, in many hands, the work goes forward. But the final life of Jesus has not yet been written.

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Professor Meyer has given in this book⁵ the results of a learned and able examination of the various reports which have been preserved of the appearances of Jesus to his friends and disciples after his crucifixion and burial, and a reverent and courageous discussion of the nature and value of the evidence contained in these reports. He holds that the report contained in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians is the most trustworthy account, and must be the criterion by which the other accounts are tested and corrected.

The six cases which Paul enumerates in this paragraph (1 Cor. 15:5-8) include all the appearances of the risen Lord which were known to him or regarded by him as worthy of confidence. The stories of Jesus' appearance to one or more women and to the two disciples in their walk to Emmaus were either unknown to Paul, and must, therefore, have been later developments, or they were rejected by him. The apostle does not indicate the

⁵ *Die Auferstehung Christi: Die Berichte über Auferstehung, Himmelfahrt und Pfingsten, ihre Entstehung, ihr geschichtlicher Hintergrund und ihre religiöse Bedeutung.* Von D. Arnold Meyer. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. vii + 368 pages. M. 3.

times at which Jesus appeared to these individuals or groups, or the periods which separated them one from another. It is certain, however, that months, if not years, had passed before Paul was himself granted a vision of the Lord; and, as the majority of the five hundred were still living when Paul wrote the epistle, in 58 A. D., it is not probable that the vision was granted them until some years after the crucifixion. Paul's vision of Jesus seems to have been in the form of a brilliant light from which a voice was heard. We cannot infer that the others were in precisely the same form, but it is reasonable to suppose that the objective reality was much the same in each case, and, therefore, that the word "vision" properly describes each appearance. Moreover, Paul's conception, as he defines it in this chapter, of the body of the risen Lord, and of the bodies of his saints when they shall arise, forbade his belief in the resurrection and appearance of a material body. It is not, therefore, due to an oversight that he makes no reference to an empty grave, for that would have been to him of no significance in proving the fact of the resurrection. As "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," the disappearance of a fleshly body from a grave cannot prove the continued life of the spirit which once dwelt in it.

When we turn to the gospels, we find the stories of the appearance of the risen Jesus somewhat increased in number and much embellished. We must reject as unhistorical accounts of Jesus' eating, being touched and handled, exhibiting his wounds, or walking with his disciples, or entering into conversations with them. These features of the reports are due, in part, to the natural and inevitable growth of such stories which have been repeated many a time by ardent believers, and, in part, to the unwitting transfer to this period of events which belong to the days before the crucifixion. Further, some of the words attributed to Jesus in these interviews bear conclusive evidence of the later development of the doctrine and rites of the church.

All the gospels, as they were written, contained reports of the appearances of Jesus. Mark's gospel has lost its conclusion, which contained such a report, but the substance of it seems to be preserved in the last chapter of Matthew. It may have been suppressed because it described one or more appearances in Galilee, but contained no reference to an appearance in Jerusalem. However that may be, the earliest accounts reported the first appearances in Galilee, as is indicated by Mark, 14:28, and 16:7. The fact that Jerusalem became the most important center in the development of the life of the church led to the transfer of these scenes to that city and its vicinity.

Professor Meyer concludes, from this examination of the reports, that Peter and James, the eleven disciples, some five hundred brethren, and all the apostles—viz., a considerable company of Christian missionaries—as well as Paul himself, had experiences which they regarded as due to the presence and revelation to them of the risen Jesus. These experiences were so deep and genuine that they convinced the apostles that they were in communion with their living Lord, and transformed and redeemed their own souls and made them the zealous servants of Christ and the successful founders of the Christian church. But, so far as the nature of these appearances is concerned, they were purely experimental and subjective. Meyer rejects Keim's view that, while they were visions, they were occasioned by an objective reality, a truly risen and present Jesus. The visions, while they strengthened the faith of those who experienced them and of those to whom they were reported, were themselves simply the result of the faith which their previous life with Jesus had engendered. Peculiar physical, mental, and spiritual conditions, however, contributed to make them unusually sensitive to visionary impressions. James had been fasting, according to the gospel of the Hebrews; Peter was suffering from a wounded conscience and an overwhelming desire to see again the Master whom he had denied; the hope of the speedy establishment of the kingdom of God and the return of the Messiah, which Jesus had fostered, prepared his disciples to interpret any striking experience as due to the presence of their beloved and longed-for Lord. The author shows, from the biographies of many men and women, that such experiences are very common; that they are genuine, in the sense that those who see them believe that an objective reality produced the vision; that the persons who have seen such visions have often been among the most intelligent, sincere, and devoted of men; and that their visionary experiences have often been the decisive impulse to clearer views of truth and higher aims and more enthusiastic devotion.

It would be a mistake to infer that the conclusion which Professor Meyer reaches is a mere negation. He believes that Jesus rose from the dead; but that resurrection did not involve the reanimation of his dead body, or the return of his human spirit to its old haunts. Christ arose in the hearts of his disciples and in the community of believers. He was so great, the impress of his life and words was so deep and mighty, that his death could but check for a moment the redeeming force which he had introduced into the souls of those who had loved him and into human society.

This, certainly, is not the traditional view of the resurrection of Christ; it will not, probably, commend itself to any considerable number of Christian believers, but it is advocated, in this interesting book, by a man who reveals, on every page, not only much learning and superior reasoning power, but also that sincerity, humility, and devotion which are the best fruits and the clearest proofs of a genuine Christian faith.

WILLIAM H. RYDER.

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In "The Doctrine of the Essential Deity of Jesus Christ"⁶ we have two essays. The first deals with the terms "Son of God," "Son of Man," and "Christ," as they are used in the synoptic gospels; and the second is an application of the result obtained in the determination of the value of the atoning death of Christ. According to our author, these terms have primarily a metaphysical content and mean virtually the same thing, namely, a being of superworldly or divine nature or essence. This conception of Christ is necessary to account for his saving efficacy, since only a sinless being, of divine and uncreated nature, by suffering bodily and spiritual death, could atone for human sin.

This work does not seem to me to possess any great value. The word-study is imperfect, and the result is scarcely in accord with the ripest scholarship of today; for, while the phrase "Son of God" is used to denote such a relation or relations as a son sustains to a father, it is just the one relation mentioned here—that of likeness in mode of existence—for which we have the least support in the gospels. Though the gospel-writers do not differentiate the ethical from the metaphysical as we do today, yet it is just our ethical relations of sonship that come nearest to their content. Too much is claimed for the much-debated phrase "Son of Man," which, while it has probably a messianic reference, is generally felt to express something of Jesus' consciousness of his relation to humanity.

The admixture of the moral and spiritual interpretations of the atonement with the juristic enables Grass to escape the criticisms against Anselm only by lacking Anselm's clearness and logic. Retribution is held to be the primary element in the punishment of sin, and support is found for this in the feeling of guilt, which, though it is in a plane where abnormality is most probable, and therefore should be carefully examined with psychological and philosophical insight, is nevertheless accepted in a naïve manner without reflection, as if the guilt-feeling were infallible in itself.

⁶ *Zur Lehre von der wesenhaften Gottheit Jesu Christi.* Von Karl Konrad Grass. Leipzig: Dörfing & Frank. 74 pages. M. 1.20.

A justification of the appeal to the legal realm is found in the fact that law is the expression of the ethical ideas of a nation, and so has its final basis in the conscience of the people. But if progress is the law of life, then the moral ideas will always be in advance of the laws, and, moreover, because of the very purpose of law, it can never be more than a clumsy approximation to justice. When we are assured that even if a man could "bring himself into perfect fellowship with God, and there abide in holy harmony both in disposition of will and conduct," God could not forgive his past sin without punishment that would fully equate the sin, we have—though the author denies this conclusion—the quantitative idea of punishment and the legalistic theory of the atonement. Moreover, it is only by illogical processes that the death of Christ can satisfy the demand for punishment of such sin; for since God cannot forgive the repentant one, the sinner himself must pay the penalty. Grass is very anxious to overthrow Ritschl; but had he studied carefully that theologian in his criticism of the doctrine of the atonement in the *Middle Ages*, he would have been better prepared for the task he set himself to do.

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How did Jesus value the Old Testament Scriptures? For the past quarter of a century this has been a question of prime importance for New Testament scholars. To answer this question satisfactorily would carry with it the solution of a great many other problems.

Dr. Macfarland in the volume before us⁷ has devoted his attention principally to Jesus' quotations from, and allusions to, the prophets. In the investigation he employs the modern historical method of study, and assumes the results of modern critical scholarship.

This determines to a great extent his order of procedure. In a brief introduction, he states the problem in hand and the probable sources underlying the synoptic gospels. He then proceeds to the discussion of the seven quotations from the prophets found in all three of the synoptists. Next he takes the two citations common to Mark and Matthew, then the one in Mark alone, and finally the remaining ones in Matthew, Luke, and John. Mark is thus taken to be the *normative* gospel. Under each quotation is given a literal translation of the Hebrew and Septuagint versions of the

⁷ *Jesus and the Prophets: An Historical, Exegetical, and Interpretative Discussion of the Use of Old Testament Prophecy by Jesus and of his Attitude toward It.* By Charles S. Macfarland. London and New York: Putnam, 1905. xvi+249 pages. \$1.50.

passage, together with a brief exegesis and interpretation of the same. With this is compared Jesus' use of the passage.

As a result of the investigation, it is found that Mark is the original source of a large proportion of the twenty-one quotations from "The Prophets," and that, as a rule, the most original form appears in this gospel.

In the gospel of John, among the numerous quotations from the Old Testament, only two seem to rest on genuine logia of Jesus, and both of these are from the Psalms.

A large proportion of the quotations of Jesus are based on the Septuagint. Probably none are directly from the Hebrew, though some are evidently Aramaic renderings. Jesus uses great freedom in abridging, condensing, expanding, and combining. Several passages give evidence of being quotations from memory. Among the prophets Jesus chose largely from Isaiah, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, and Daniel. With these he seemed to have a spiritual affinity. He used the prophetic language far more frequently than that of all other Scripture combined. According to the writer, Jesus at first set himself forth as a prophet and had no full consciousness of his messiahship. He did the work of a prophet before that of Messiah. Later Jesus discovered that he was *more than a prophet*, or at least revealed himself more than a prophet. One remarkable result of the study is the few quotations which Jesus applies to himself—in all only four. And in none of these does Jesus in any way whatever suggest that the passage had anything to do with him in its original meaning. His lot was not determined by what the prophets wrote. His teaching is founded on personal revelation rather than on prophecy. The gospel writers, after Jesus' death, in order to prove his messiahship, often laid emphasis on a literal fulfilment of prophecy. By fulfilment Jesus meant the same that he meant when he said he came to fulfil the *law*—i. e., in general purpose and central aim. Thus in his view of the Old Testament Jesus was no literalist or allegorist. He laid emphasis on the *principle* and *intent* of the Scripture.

For the ground which it covers, Dr. Macfarland's book is without doubt the best popular work on the subject in English, and cannot fail to be helpful to all students of the Bible who prize exact knowledge.

WILLIAM R. SCHOEMAKER.

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THE RELIGION OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

The original of the work of which we have before us an English translation¹ was published in 1903,² and was intended, as the author stated in his preface, to supplement his *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, by showing the unity underlying the various types of religious teaching set forth in the latter. In pursuing this new task the veteran author believes that he has used only historical methods and has reached historical results. The book may be described as setting forth the ideas about religion one will have who thoroughly understands the New Testament and heartily believes its teachings.

Whether the author has succeeded as fully as he believes that he has done, in separating his own theological views from the material which he handles, may be doubted. Many will say that a treatise which, e. g., defines the nature of divine revelation cannot be called a purely historical discussion. They would also say that the presentation of a body of doctrine as the teaching of the New Testament imputes to its several authors a more completely wrought-out theology than some, at least, of them had. Why, e. g., should Paul's teaching about mystic union with Christ, or the value of the Lord's Supper, be made a part of the "Religion of the New Testament?" Whether much or little weight be allowed to these criticisms, a treatise in biblical dogmatics written by a man possessing such learning, insight, and literary power as Dr. Weiss has, is well worth reading, and the publishers have earned the gratitude of the English and American public in printing an English version of it.

It must, however, be said with frankness that the work of translation has not been well done. Elegance and spirit could perhaps hardly have been expected in a work of this character; but an accurate presentation of the thought of the original in fairly idiomatic English was required of the translator. This requirement has not been met. The retention of the German idiom sometimes disfigures the English: as, e. g., (p. 254) "God has made Jesus of Nazareth to (sic) the Lord;" (p. 256) "It suits to the exalted Christ;" (p. 30) "their conduct over against (*gegen*) these." Errors are not infrequent: (p. 3) "With the consciousness of this personal relation with God true religion can only begin" (Only with the consciousness can true religion begin). On p. 267 (German, p. 199) a glaring mistake reversing the author's meaning appears. "And the so-called trinity of revelation . . . the Scriptures do not teach." What Weiss says is,

¹ *The Religion of the New Testament*. By Bernhard Weiss. Translated from the German by George H. Schodde. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 431 pages. \$2.00.

² For review of the original with extended statement of the author's views, see this *Journal*, Vol. VIII, pp. 95 ff.

"Beyond the so-called 'trinity of revelation' the New Testament does not go." ("Ueber die so-gennante Offenbarungs-trinität. . . . geht das Neue Testament nicht hinaus.")

The translation does injustice to Dr. Weiss, and is not worthy of bearing the name of the publishers who issue it. It should be thoroughly revised. In one respect the version deserves commendation; it has a good index, a feature lacking to the original.

In his introductory section Dr. Kögel³ makes a plea for old-fashioned exegesis—the minute study of sacred Scripture, passage by passage, with the view of gaining by insight into details knowledge of the meaning of the whole. He thinks that the prevailing fondness for the so-called "historical method" represented by such writers as Gunkel, a method which endeavors chiefly to find out the place which the portions of Scripture hold in the historical evolution of religious thought, has caused the detailed examination of Scriptural passages to be neglected.

In the study of no part of the New Testament is this neglect to be more regretted, he thinks, than in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is a document especially difficult of comprehension. The anonymous author gives his thoughts in a form peculiarly his own. To understand them it is necessary to find the essence of the thought by penetrating beneath the garb it wears. This can be done only by minute examination of the language, and elucidation of the meaning point by point. Until this is done, endeavors to decide upon the historical relations of the epistle are of little value.

The section chosen for study (Heb. 2:5-18) is believed by Dr. Kögel to be the central point of the letter, "inasmuch as it discusses the question of supreme interest to the author and to his readers; and mentions the point from which all that precedes and all that follows is explained."

The study given to the passage is a fine specimen of thorough and sober exegesis. Without following the discussion, it is perhaps sufficient to say that Kögel explains the passage as an elaborate argument aimed at removing the difficulty presented to Jewish faith in Jesus' messiahship by his humiliation and death. The writer argues that only by the Cross could he have become the Son of God in the messianic sense. Only as one with men in their lot of weakness and mortality could he gain the capacity of sympathizing with them and gaining their affection, which is the condition of his highpriestly work. "In the word 'Son' the entire content of

³ *Der Sohn und die Söhne: Eine exegetische Studie zu Hebräer 2:5-18.* Von Julius Kögel. 144 pages. *Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie.* Achter Jahrgang 1904, 5. u. 6. Heft. Herausgegeben von A. Schlatter und D. W. Lüttger. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.

the person as well as of the work of Christ is comprised." And this thought is the keynote of the epistle—Christ is the true priest because he is the Son of God.

The metaphysical and the messianic conceptions meet and interpenetrate each other. Because Jesus is the Messiah, he is the eternal Son: "Jesus is as the Son the true, complete mediator from eternity."

The argument Kögel holds is one which in its adaptation to the Jewish mind suggests a Jewish-Christian constituency.

EDWARD Y. HINCKS.

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A most interesting popular movement in Germany is that of "vacation conferences." From these are being published brief, popular courses of lectures on great themes, which often form an excellent summary of important subjects. One such course from Greifswald on *Die Autorität der Bibel* was reviewed in this *Journal* in October. Another from the first session of the *Ferienkursus* of Hesse and Nassau now comes to hand.⁴ The volume treats of the conceptions of God found in Judaism and in the teachings of Christ, Paul, and of the gospel of John, respectively. It is significant that in the heading of the section on the teaching of Jesus, instead of *Gottesgedanke* as in the others, we have *Gottesoffenbarung*. The interest of the reader will be sure to center in the chapters on Paul and the fourth gospel, for the teaching of both is placed in sharp contrast to that of Jesus. The peculiarity which marked off Jesus' conception of God from any earlier conception is that the Father is "a sinner-loving God." The forgiveness of God does not depend upon sacrifice, or upon belief, whether in Jesus' messiahship or in anything else. It depends only upon the humble turning of the soul to God. Paul, on the contrary, built up his thought of God, not from the ethical, but from the scribal idea. He could not think of sin forgiven, unless it were atoned for. Two facts stand at the basis of his ideas: Jesus is the Messiah; the Messiah is crucified, and so accursed. God himself, then, has made void the law. If one belongs to the Messiah, he is free from the law, be he Jew or gentile. Thus the crucifixion of Jesus is the central point of Paul's system—a necessary condition of forgiveness; The gospel of John erects this narrowing tendency into a leading principle. God does not hear sinners. Those outside the messianic community are outside his care. "I pray not for the world." Jesus seeks not the lost, but takes care that his own

⁴ *Der christliche Gottesglaube, seine Vorgeschichte und Urgeschichte*. Von Oscar Holtzmann. Giessen: Topelmann, 1905. 80 pages. M. 1.40.

are saved. The thought of the gospel is Pauline, it is Jewish, it is that of the growing Christian church, but it is not that of Jesus.

The book is a very clear presentation of the general idea which is represented in Harnack's *What is Christianity?* and, in more extreme form, by Wernle's *Beginnings of Christianity*. It raises again the question: How fundamental are the differences between Jesus, Paul, and the fourth gospel?

IRVING F. WOOD.

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RECENT ARCHÆOLOGICAL DOCUMENTS.

Professor Price's edition of *Some Literary Remains of Rim Sin (Arioch), King of Larsa, about 2285 B. C.*,¹ contains transliteration and translation of eleven inscriptions of Rim Sin and his father, together with the autographed text of Nos. 7 and 8; also introductory remarks, observations, a list of proper names, and a glossary. The author of the standard edition of *The Great Cylinder Inscriptions (A and B) of Gudea* has laid Old Testament students under great obligations by thus collecting the scattered inscriptions of this ancient king, whom science is wont to identify with the Arioch (Eri-Aku),² king of Ellasar, mentioned in Gen., chap. 14, as a contemporary of Abraham. He was the son of Kudur-Mabuk, an Elamite governor of Emutbal, a western district of the Elamite empire, who seated him upon the throne about 2285 B. C., at a time when Hammurabi, the Amraphel³ of the Old Testament, was the Semitic king of Babylon. The eleven inscriptions record the ancestry of Rim Sin, his regal position, his achievements as king and devotee of the gods, and his relation to other cities than Larsa. They are short and written in the archaic ideograph language of early Babylonia.

W. MUSS-ARNOLT.

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¹ *Some Literary Remains of Rim Sin (Arioch), King of Larsa, about 2285 B. C.* By Ira Maurice Price. ["The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago," Vol. V.] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904. Pp. 167-91 and 5 plates.

² See, on the other hand, Zimmern in *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament*, p. 367.

³ See on this name now Jeremias, *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients*, p. 214, 3. rem. The *l* of Amraphel belongs, according to Hüsing, to the following מלך; thus read *Amraph li-meleh*.

Dr. Edgar J. Goodspeed has given us in his "Greek Papyri from the Cairo Museum,"⁴ another glimpse of Graeco-Egyptian life in the Ptolemaic and Roman periods.

Such an essay as this affords us a view of life on its small side. Men were not all kings nor mighty warriors; it was not all processions and sacrifices. People marketed, drew up contracts, deeds, and prescriptions, paid taxes, litigated, played games, went on excursions, and lived the common life then as now. An invaluable service rendered by workers in this field is the tracing of the links of the literary chain extending from the Homeric cycle down to the present. The New Testament, for example, is not a solitary voice in a desert. These discovered fragments help in the building up of the historical and philological background that gives the New Testament writings their true setting: they give us, too, not only the literary style of the few but also the vernacular of the common people.

There would seem to be a plethora of such material already, as evidenced by such collections as the *Berlinische Urkunden* and the *Rainier Papyri*. But the scholar rejoices in the abundance of treasures and counts toil a pleasure if he may add even a little to the realm of knowledge. The present volume would have been increased in value—though also in expense—had fac-similes accompanied the transcripts the editor has given us. A book so prepared would be an invaluable adjunct palaeographically in more than one seminary library. The editorial notes are excellent and complete. Depositories are noted, sizes, styles, dates, and sources described, and parallels given, as e. g., the references to the Amherst and Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Of especial merit are the historical notes and the attempts to date the fragments (cf. pp. 29, 30). The textual notes and translations are helpful: we could wish they were more numerous. *Τετανός* is translated "smooth-faced," an unusual rendering though sanctioned by usage in reputable authors, as Galen: *τετανὸν καὶ καθαρὸν πρόσωπον*. *Εὐδιαφόρητος* is translated "easy by assimilation," a rendering more euphonious than literal. In spite of the mass of details, the book is remarkably free from errors, though *ἀγοράνομος* (-νόμος), p. 76.

While we have here only scraps, there are many interesting items to note. The peculiar double pointing occurs often: *υπόσαι, ὕιοί, τιμήον*, etc. Peculiar, possibly local, spellings—due, it may be, to dictation in many instances: *ὑγίαινει, ἐγμισθω θαίσης, ἰσσυπος* (ῥσσ-), *καμειλείτης* (-λίτης), *στίππον* (*στυππείον*). Familiar to students of late Greek are such forms

⁴ *Greek Papyri from the Cairo Museum, together with Papyri from American Collections*. By Edgar J. Goodspeed. ["The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago," Vol. V.] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904. 78 pages.

as γένημα, εὐθύρις, συνχώρειν and συνχώρημα. The originals abound in grammatical errors: συμπτοσίμοις (for -μον), πρὸς σαι (for σε), ἐὰν αἰρήσθαι (θε) μὴ ἐπελεύσασθαι(-σεσθε). An interesting grammatical parallel is Ἄνουβιον τῷ καὶ Κολοσίῳ (cf. Σαῦλος ὁ καὶ Παῦλος) in a receipt dated 180 A. D., though, of course, much earlier instances are at hand. Lexically interesting are: ἀράβη (Egyptian, probably of Persian origin); ἐξάκτωρ, σπεκουλάτωρ (cf. Mark 6:27), λεγιωνάριος, πραιπόσιτος, πραιτώριον (familiar Latin forms). Many new or unusual words occur: ἀβρόχιστος, αλαες, γνάφισσα, ἡμίναυλον, ἰδρων, καμελικός; κοινολογεῖν and χαρίζειν (usually of middle or passive form), κολλιων (?), κοναδράριος, ὄνυδιον, ὄρινος, σοκκοφόρικος, σύμπτωμα, φύλακτρον, κ.τ.λ. There is evident the fondness of later writers for elaborate compounds, as συναλλαγματογράφος, προσεισδέχεσθαι, σαγματογράφος. Substantives occur where verbs were used before, or vice versa: δημωσίωσις, ἐξοφθαλμίζειν, ἐφόρβεας, etc.

The historical value of these fragments is evident from the fact that no fewer than four Egyptian and five Roman rulers (Hadrian, Antoninus, Aurelius, Verus, Commodus) are mentioned, as are also eight consuls.

An excellent series of indexes, geographical, personal, and general, closes this interesting essay.

WALLACE N. STEARNS.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Professor Breasted gives us an elaborate and valuable study of the scenes and inscriptions by which the feats of Ramses II at the battle of Kadesh are commemorated. The Egyptian king, campaigning in Syria in his fifth year, is represented as extricating himself, his camp, and his army from a most dangerous situation in which they had been drawn by the crafty tactics of his enemy, the king of the Hittites with his allies. The scenes of chariots in array or wildly driven are familiar to all travelers in Egypt, and the inscriptions and papyri are well known individually to every student; but until Professor Breasted's work appeared, no one had treated them all collectively, and since different copies omit important passages, besides being themselves in fragmentary condition, the accounts of the battle hitherto available have been incomplete or erroneous. This appears from Breasted's summary of the work of his predecessors, commencing as far back as the year 1835.

Breasted distinguishes three sources of information, the "Poem" (one copy of which is on papyrus), the "Record" accompanying the reliefs, and

¹ *The Battle of Kadesh: A Study in the Earliest Known Military Strategy.* By James Henry Breasted. ["The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago," Vol. V.] Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904. 126 pages.

the "Reliefs" themselves. The object of all was not to describe the battle, but to record the courage and valor of the king. Nevertheless, the course of the encounter up to the supreme moment of the attack on Ramses' camp is now fairly clear. The revelation of ordered battle and "strategy" at so distant a date, about 1400 B. C., is unique. The forces on either side appear to have numbered about 20,000 men. The chief of the Hittites commanded over 3,500 chariots alone, each holding three men. His army was ranged on the north of the city of Kadesh, but Bedawi spies in his service persuaded the intelligence department of Ramses, who was advancing on the city from the south, that they were far away toward Aleppo. Thus deceived, Ramses went forward with the first division (of Amon), the other three divisions of his army following behind at a considerable distance. The division of Amon encamped on the northwest of Kadesh, when the spies were forced to confess their frauds. At this moment the Hittites' chariots, having moved around the city, fell upon the second division (of Re) while it was on the march, and pursued the remnant to the camp, which was thus isolated. Meanwhile urgent orders had been sent to the rest of the Egyptian army to push forward; Ramses arms himself, changes, and (single-handed, if we could believe the words) drives the opposing chariots into the Orontes, while those of the enemy who had entered the camp were annihilated by his soldiers. In the end Pharaoh and his army were recruited, and the enemy fled into Kadesh with heavy loss.

We may still perhaps hope for further light on the details. The list of the allies of the Hittites comprises tantalizing names, such as Ionians and Dardanians; some portions of the inscriptions are broken, others obscure, while the scenes, as might be expected, are confused. New copies may be found, or collations with the originals may give new readings. The site of Kadesh seems well fixed by Breasted at Tell Nebi Mendi, five kilometers south of the Lake of Homs. In the sculptures the city appears as if built on an island, and, as a matter of fact, the Tell lies in a fork of the Orontes, the two branches of which were once connected on the third side by a canal. Lake Homs was known also as Lake Oadis to Abulfeda, and the name Oadis was found by Conder to cling to the neighborhood. Breasted's memoir is very clearly and attractively written.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT.

The painstaking toil that has been expended upon this book¹ is evident on every page. The most superficial survey impresses one with the thoroughness of the author. We have here no mere presentation of the text of the historical books according to recent critical theories, nor a restatement of other men's views. First-hand investigation is manifest on every page. A new rendering of each book from 1 Samuel to 2 Maccabees is no small task; yet this has been accomplished with rare felicity, and without those jarring translations and modernisms that characterize certain recent New Testament versions. Along with this, an intricate analysis has been presented in such a way as to command the reader's attention and be positively luminous. The convenient sections, concise summaries, and numerous footnotes constitute an invaluable critical commentary. Thirteen maps and charts add greatly to the usefulness of the work. The plans of Solomon's temple and palace, reproduced from Stade, are a unique addition to the apparatus of the student. Charts always mean more to the author than to the reader, and the one giving the chronology from 597 to 165 B. C. is far too condensed; yet one would have to search long to find so many statistics, facts, and dates as are here packed into one page. The maps are excellently colored, and the one for the Maccabean period is a treasure.

The text proper is buttressed by an introduction and appendices. The latter are bibliographical and historical. A few inaccuracies strike the eye, which will need correction in future editions. On p. 129, note w, *leteth* should be *tellet*; *lay* at the bottom of p. 146 should be *lie*; in the appendix on "Hebrew Chronology," p. 492, Jehu is said to have paid tribute to Tiglath-pileser III in 842 B. C., instead of to Shalmaneser II; *base scoundrels* for "sons of Belial" is vigorous, but inelegant; could not something be found like the New Testament equivalent, "generation of vipers"?

The first nine sections of the text deal with the Samuel and Saul narratives. The problem of the sources is intricate. Dr. Kent finds here a combination of "Early Judean Saul Narratives," "Later Ephraimite Samuel Narratives," and "Later Judean Prophetic Narratives." The analysis is ingenious, but it is almost impossible to classify satisfactorily the material in chaps. 1-6. The author groups chaps. 1-3 and most of

¹ *The Student's Old Testament: Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives, from the Establishment of the Hebrew Kingdom to the End of the Maccabean Struggle.* By Charles Foster Kent. With Maps and Chronological Charts. New York: Scribner, 1905. 506 pages. \$2.75.

4 with 7, 8, etc., while the story of the ark is classed with that of Saul's secret anointing (chaps. 9 ff.). But the affinities of these early chapters with what follows are far from close. The story of the ark both in contents and structure is a unique episode difficult to ascribe to either main source. With chap. 7, however, the interwoven strands are easier to disentangle, and here I would prefer the classification into national and theocratic narratives to that given by Kent. I cannot but question the propriety of the term "Ephraimite" for sections like 1 Sam. 7:8, etc. (theocratic). Kent regards them as later than Hosea, but these sections really form a transition to the ecclesiastical style of the Chronicler, and it is difficult to understand how the figure of Samuel could have assumed in the northern kingdom the heroic, stern, and almost superhuman proportions it presents in the theocratic passages, so unlike Elijah or even Elisha. Floating stories must have existed which cannot be classified by our critical rubrics, someone caught them as they passed from mouth to mouth and, without the exercise of great critical judgment, committed them to writing. Duplicate accounts of how Saul lost the kingdom undoubtedly exist in chap. 13:4b-15a and chap. 15, but a triplicate is probably to be found in chap. 14. A *herem* or taboo has evidently been broken; Jonathan, having tasted the honey in spite of his father's oath, is allowed to go free. Saul's family thus appears to have incurred the penalties of a broken vow. This chapter belongs to the national narrative—Kent's Early Judean group. The two national passages (13:4b ff. and chap. 14) are studies on the problem of Saul's overthrow, wherein the subject has not been thought through; chap. 15—the raid against Amalek—purports to give the complete explanation. Ephraimite material probably exists in the Saul and Samuel stories, but undoubtedly it has been recast in transmission, and our present narratives are successive Judean products. The Nehemiah-Ezra theory of Van Hoonacker and Kesters has been adopted. A service of peculiar value has been rendered in the reinstatement of the Maccabean records in the history of Israel's development.

In conclusion, it is a pleasure to say that we find here, not a mere compendium of the methods and results of criticism, but a lucid exposition of the way the Hebrews wrote history, and a constructive exhibition, in the light of the best scholarship, of what that history is.

AUGUSTUS S. CARRIER.

McCORMICK THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

In Stade's *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, the first part of which appeared more than twenty-five years ago, the treatment of the religion was notably full and thorough. It was among the earliest presentations of the religious development upon the basis of what was then the new critical theory of the order and age of the Old Testament sources, and perhaps the first attempt to use in any comprehensive and methodical way the phenomena of other religions, especially the ideas and customs of uncivilized peoples, to illustrate and interpret the early religion of Israel and its antecedents. After a quarter of a century, in which he has taken a leading part in many fields of Old Testament research, the author returns to the subject in the volume before us.²

The work bears the title "Biblical Theology," and Stade is at some pains to defend this conventional designation; perhaps the best that can be said for it—beyond the fact that it is conventional—is that the proposed substitutes are no more satisfactory. His conception of the task of biblical theology was clearly set forth in an article in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1893.³ It is a purely historical study; its subject is not merely the religious and moral teachings of the Old Testament, but the religion of the people in all its manifestations; it must include the history of Judaism to the first century of the Christian era; its sources, therefore, are not the books of the Hebrew canon alone, but all the remains of Jewish literature down to that time. What we have in the first volume of this "Biblical Theology" is, accordingly, a history of the religion of Israel from its origin in the work of Moses to the age of Nehemiah, divided naturally into two parts: the preprophetic stage, and the transformation of the religion in the age of prophecy.

On the main issues of Old Testament criticism Stade holds substantially the same positions which he took in the *Geschichte*. He rejects, for example, the theory of Kusters and others about the restoration, and the more radical views of the work of Ezra and Nehemiah. The new Babylonian confusion of tongues has not deceived him about the true affinities of the early Hebrew religion, though he gives due recognition to Babylonian influences in later times; the famous "North Arabian hypothesis" is not so much as mentioned. On the other hand, every chapter gives evidence of careful reexamination of critical questions and frequent revision of earlier opinions. Similarly, the anthropological material has

² *Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments*. Erster Band: *Die Religion Israels und die Entstehung des Judentums*. Von B. Stade. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. xii + 382 pages. M. 6.

³ Reprinted in *Akademische Reden und Abhandlungen*, 1899, pp. 77-96.

been much more thoroughly digested. The book, throughout, makes on the reader the impression of maturity; here, in small compass, is the ripe fruit of many years of investigation and consideration. Even where the author's views evoke dissent, they cannot be lightly dismissed.

In its external features, the book has the excellences which we have come to associate with the publications of a firm, which, almost alone among German publishing houses, has discovered that by an intelligent use of paragraphs, running titles, varieties of letter, and the like, typography can be made a help to comprehension instead of an obstacle, and that indexes are an indispensable part of a book that is made for use. In the present volume the full indexes of subjects, biblical passages, and names were prepared by von Gall.

The second volume, the history of Judaism from the age of Nehemiah to the first century of the Christian era, traversing a period which Stade has not before treated, will be awaited with great interest. Let us hope that it may not be long delayed.

Lest the title, particularly the subtitle,⁴ of Köberle's book, *Geschichte des vorchristlichen Heilsbewusstseins*, with its reminiscence of "Heilsgeschichtliche" Erlangen, should create the prejudicial impression that the subject is treated from a dogmatic point of view, let it be said at once that the author's method is historical. The critical premises are those which are now generally accepted.

In the first two hundred and fifty pages Köberle discusses the ideas of sin and divine favor which were current in the old popular religion, and the teaching of the great prophets. The treatment of the subject is fresh, and many acute and original observations show that the author has seen with his own eyes. A chapter of twenty pages on the "Babylonische Anschauung" is prefixed, in which, of course, the so-called Babylonian Penitential Psalms occupy a prominent place.

Greater interest attaches to the latter part of the volume, dealing with Judaism in the Persian period (pp. 250-386), and with later Judaism, from 300 B. C. to the first century of our era (pp. 387-676). The fulness with which these centuries are treated is gratifying evidence that Christian scholars are coming to recognize their great importance. It should also be noted that Köberle makes larger use than most of his predecessors of the rabbinical sources which represent what he calls, not altogether felicitously, official Judaism, the utterances of its acknowledged teachers and religious

⁴ *Sünde und Gnade im religiösen Leben des Volkes Israel bis auf Christum: Eine Geschichte des vorchristlichen Heilsbewusstseins*. Von Justus Köberle. München: Beck, 1905. viii + 685 pages. M. 12.

guides. Concerning the apocalypses he remarks that the multiplication and popularity of writings of this type is attributable to the coming up of the common people in the Maccabean struggle; and the prominence of cosmology and demonology, ultimately derived from Babylonian notions, is explained in the same way. The teachings of the scribes and schoolmen are also, in general, more fairly estimated than, for example, by Bousset. Köberle finds that the ruling idea which determined this whole side of Jewish theology and piety is the faith that the Jews are the chosen people of God—the doctrine of election, which is the prophetic transformation of the old, unreflected notion that Israel is the people of Yahweh, remains the cornerstone of religion. The nomistic character of Judaism and the significance of the messianic hope, in which Schürer and Bousset find the two poles of the religion, are themselves the necessary outgrowth of the idea of election. In developing and emphasizing this point of view Köberle has opened the way to a better understanding and a juster appreciation of Judaism than he has himself attained.

Like other recent German writers on the subject, notably Bousset in his *Religion des Judentums*, Köberle too often allows the apologist for Christianity to take the pen out of the hand of the historian of Judaism. In the contrasts in which he is concerned to show the inferiority of Judaism, he—doubtless unconsciously—compares it, not with the Christianity of the first century, nor with any other form of historical Christianity, but with a highly sublimated “essence of Christianity,” of a specialized Teutonic type. This is particularly the case in the last chapter, “Rückblick und Ausblick,” which is a disagreeably rhetorical peroration in the place of a judicious summing up of a historical investigation. We read for example:

Was von dem Erbarmen und der Vaterliebe Gottes gesagt wird, ist so gut wie nicht gesagt, wenn es nicht dazu führt, die juristische Auffassung des Verhältnisses zwischen Gott und Mensch zu beseitigen, sie als *prinzipiell* falsch zu erkennen und von innen heraus zu überwinden.

Is, then, everything Paul says about the fatherly love and compassion of God made nugatory by the fact that his doctrine of atonement by the death of Christ is grounded in judicial conceptions? Or is the love of God meaningless in Protestant orthodoxy because, so far from recognizing the judicial conception of God's relation to man as false in principle, the Anselmic theory rests on the assumption that God cannot pardon the penitent sinner unless satisfaction be first made to his justice? The truth is that the modern idea of the legal state has made the conception of a judicial relation wholly different from that which prevailed in the ancient

East; and the contradiction which Köberle finds, exists only in the modern conceptions. The Jew, whether he thought of God as father or king or judge, saw no obstacle in him to the forgiveness of sin, nor conceived any other indispensable condition but repentance.

Köberle rightly sees that the weakness of Judaism lay in two points: first, it never wholly detached itself from the national basis; and, second, while it developed its higher religious and moral principles and recognized their pre-eminence, it did not rid itself of the elements which it had brought up with it from a lower stage; physical notions of holiness, for example, survived by the side of the ethical conception. A religion which is to establish and maintain leadership in the world's spiritual and moral progress must possess the power not only to develop continuously what is best in itself and to appropriate and assimilate what is congenial to it from without, but to eliminate what is incompatible with its own highest ideals, whether of foreign introduction or survivals of its own evolution. Judaism, in the age we are considering, fulfilled the first two conditions in a high degree, but it lacked the last. Köberle, like most critics of Judaism, sees this; but he does not see why it was so, and attributes to the blindness of its leaders what was the inevitable outcome of its development. Judaism accepted a great body of religious literature of various kinds, the product of many centuries of history, as a comprehensive and exclusive canon of sacred Scripture embodying a unitary divine revelation. Not all things therein were of equal intrinsic moment, but all were of the same authority; the dietary rules and the multifarious distinctions of clean and unclean, as well as the fundamental principles of religion and morals, were once for all ordained of God. As parts of a revealed law, the survivals were rendered as innocuous as possible; they had no significance or value in themselves; obedience to God's commandments was the thing; but they could not be sloughed off. In taking the product and record of its whole religious history as revealed religion, Judaism made it impossible to reject any element that was historically a part of it without destroying its own foundations. Those who, in theory or in practice, emancipated themselves from these ordinances were presently lost to Judaism.

On the other hand, Köberle does not remark that Jesus did not reject the ceremonial law with its burden of survivals, nor even, in principle, the ordinances of the scribes. The elimination of these elements came about only in the course of the historical process by which Christianity became a gentile religion. Then first it became possible to maintain that the true religion, the possession of which had been the great advantage of the Jewish people, had, in the unfolding of the divine plan, come to the

point where it was ready to become international and universal; that individual election succeeded national election; and that the laws which had been given to the Jews with a pedagogic intent were not binding on gentile converts to Christianity; thus gentile Christianity could reject the law without denying the revealed foundation of religion. The other way out, namely, a historical conception of revelation, was as remote from the thought of the early Christians as of their Jewish contemporaries.

Lest the stress I have laid on this point of criticism be thought to imply that investigation itself is vitiated by polemic subintention, let me say that this is not the case; on the contrary, the author is more than usually fair-minded in his interpretation and presentation. The work as a whole is to be very highly commended, not alone to biblical scholars, but to ministers and students. It is clearly and well written—except some passages in the style which the Germans call *schwungvoll*—and well printed; the indexes look rather meager, but are perhaps sufficient.

In closing, one minor matter: The egg at the beginning of M. Beša, which has been so often thrown at the rabbis, was not laid on the sabbath; and Hillel is not a party in the controversy, as Köberle seems to imply (p. 669).

Staerk's pamphlet⁵ under the same title, *Sünde und Gnade*, is a study of the so-called Penitential Psalms. A translation of these Psalms with short notes is appended. The author takes them, as does also Köberle, as primarily the expression of personal experience and religious sentiment. The seven Penitential Psalms have had a considerable place in the history of Christian piety, both Catholic and Protestant; they have enjoyed no such distinction, nor any such typical character, in Judaism. Most of them are cries of suffering and prayers for deliverance, rather than the outpourings of a penitent soul burdened by the consciousness of actual sin or of habitual sinfulness. Staerk takes many occasions to underscore the inferiority to Christian conceptions of the Jewish ideas of sin, repentance, and forgiveness. The Jewish *Kirchenvolk* could never arrive at the idea of the *servum arbitrium*—an observation which Köberle also makes; the idea of forgiveness, in particular,

ist vom christlichen Standpunkt aus durchaus minderwertig, weil er von der inneren Erlösung von Sünde und Schuld durch die Macht des in Gott gebundenen Willens zum Guten, der das irdische Schicksal unter sich zwingt, nichts weiss. Die Erfahrung des frommen Dichters von dem Segen der Vergebung (Ps. 32:1 f.)

⁵ *Sünde und Gnade nach der Vorstellung des älteren Judentums, besonders der Dichter der sogenannten Busspsalmen. Eine biblisch-theologische Studie.* Von Willy Staerk. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. iv+75 pages. M. 1.50.

ist eine naive Selbsttäuschung, denn erneutes Unglück wird ihn in den Zustand, aus dem er sich durch Reue und Beichte erhoben hat, zurückwerfen.

Such expressions as "kindliche Selbstempfehlungen," "flache Glückseligkeitslehre," "die energielose, pharisäische Ethik der völligen Absonderung von den ἀμαρτωλοί," abound. It is a curious inversion of the parable for the exponent of true repentance to thank God so often and so roundly that he is not as this Pharisee! To an understanding, either of the Psalms themselves or of the Jewish notions of sin and grace, this slight study contributes little.

Ottley's *Religion of Israel*⁶ is intended to supplement his *Short History of the Hebrews* (1901). It is a readable outline of the history from a modern point of view, chiefly at second-hand. It seems to be meant for readers who want to get up some information on the subject in a few evenings' easy reading; to say that it will answer that purpose is perhaps to give it as much praise as it asks.

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SOME IMPORTANT BOOKS ON THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

"The science of religion is a new discipline which has arisen and developed as an independent branch of learning only in recent decades, and is still partly in a state of embryo, struggling for the acknowledgment of its right"—such were the opening words of the second edition of Chantepie de la Saussaye's well-known manual, which may be considered as the standard work of the history of religions. It is interesting to see how the new edition¹ which has lately appeared begins: "The science of religion has in the recent decades acquired and maintained its place in the range of sciences." The difference is striking. Indeed, in the seven years which have elapsed since the former edition was published, the science of religion has decidedly advanced, and there can be no doubt whatever on what its progress is founded. "The science of religion"—I quote again from Chantepie de la Saussaye—"has as its object the investigation of religion, of its character and its manifestations. Therefore it naturally

⁶ *The Religion of Israel: A Historical Sketch*. By R. L. Ottley. Cambridge: University Press, 1905. xii + 227 pages. 4s.

¹ *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte*. Von P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye. 2 Bände. Dritte vollständig neu bearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 543 + 587 pages. M. 24.

divides itself into the philosophy of religion and the history of religion" (Vol. I, p. 4). It is the *historical* part which, in incomparably greater degree, has enlisted, nay almost absorbed, the interests of learned scholars in these last few years. A fast-increasing scientific literature, which is operating with the acuteness of philological method, and taking as its basis the facts which anthropology and ethnology, especially folklore, furnish it, witnesses to the truth of the acknowledgment by philologists also "that the different branches of the science of history and the single philologies which search into the culture of single nations or single groups of nations cannot derive a just and profound knowledge of the forms of religious thought merely from the sources which in their special provinces are accessible to them, and that the single 'mythologies' must halt or go astray wherever the analogies which are to be gained elsewhere are not called to aid."² It is its empirical state which has caused the science of religion to gain the credit which it today enjoys; not its speculative treatment, which, based on so abundant material, still remains the postulate of a distant future.

Of course, Chantepie de la Saussaye's new edition has made use of the progress of detailed empirical investigation; in this consists its main superiority over the second edition. This improvement is noticeable at first sight, even in the external form; instead of 399+512 pages of the former volumes, there are now 543+587; i. e., over 200 pages more. The increase in bulk is due to additional information, especially concerning the religions of the Chinese (58 pages instead of 28), Japanese (57 instead of 10), Semites (138 instead of 81), Greeks (170 instead of 141), Romans 127 instead of 108), and Germans (40 instead of 30). It is not, of course, to be understood that the others have not also been retouched, in particular those on the religions of the uncivilized tribes (40 instead of 32). Here, however, even with this enlargement, I cannot but feel that we have comparatively much too brief a treatment, especially since I am convinced that in the religions of primitive peoples we best get acquainted with certain popular "undercurrents" which are still flowing at the base of higher religions. We are beginning to note the great distinction which is to be made between the official religion of the priests and theologians, and popular religion. The more this distinction is emphasized—I do not think that up to the present this has been done to a sufficient extent—the more we shall find that with an approximatively equal state of culture popular religion always and everywhere remains remarkably unchanged, and is easily to be reduced to quite a small number of elements, while the official

² Albrecht Dieterich, *Vorwort zum Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, Vol. VII (1904), p. 1. Cf. A. E. I. Holwerda in Chantepie de la Saussaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 237 ff.

religion of priests shows an abundance of typical, more or less differentiated varieties, which grow up in the course of time. In the case of language it was observed long ago that the common people work with an amazingly limited vocabulary, while even the average man makes use of a manifold stock of words. Should we not expect something analogous in religion? Much more stress ought to be laid, I think, on its dependence upon the prevailing state of civilization, not only, as is generally granted, of a people as a whole, but of its different classes; for so little is civilization something absolute, that there always will remain in the midst of the higher stage which at any given time has been attained, some survivals of lower stages, which in a process of gradual assimilation have to be raised to its own level. This is the very reason why the study of primitive religions, which can give us the best key to the understanding of those popular "undercurrents," is of so great importance. A more exhaustive treatment of these religions would allow the author to abbreviate some expositions which perhaps the reader will get weary of finding repeated, although in many variations, in the description of any religion among the civilized races, while such repetitions cannot but weaken the impression of some differences which are characteristic of these higher religions.

But, of course, this idea can be perfectly realized only in the work of an author who at the beginning of a new chapter has not before him, as Chantepie de la Saussaye's collaborators had, only blank pages—and with this I have pointed to the weak side of the book. We miss a certain unity of conception which makes any work, as it were, a work of art. We have in it as many histories of religion as there are religions—one might even suggest that it would be desirable in a new edition for the different parts to be also sold separately—while the ideal would be *one* continuous history. The want of unity is all the more apparent in the present edition, Chantepie de la Saussaye having increased the number of collaborators, while keeping for his own subject only the religion of the Germans (the treatment of which is partly based on the author's large work on the subject), of the Celts, and of the Slavs.

On the other hand, what constitutes the weakness of the book creates in reality its superiority. As it is prepared exclusively by specialists, it has the great advantage of presenting a treatment of the matter which is throughout quite up to date and not at all *dilettante*. In this it is exempt at once from one of the objections, which Professor Harnack in a much-criticised lecture,³ has raised against the study of the history of religions in general.

³ *Die Aufgabe der theologischen Facultäten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte.* Reviewed in *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. VII (1903), p. 332.

It is impossible to give here even a sketch of the rich contents of the work. We can only bring into prominence some points where the present edition excels the last one. In the religions of savage peoples, in the treatment of which Thomas Achelis has lent his assistance, more attention is paid to primitive myths, with reference to L. Frobenius' works. Due stress is laid on the interesting phenomenon of secret associations.⁴ The fact is emphasized that, without prejudice to the worship of spirits, the idea of a mighty deity, which is considered as having created the world or as governing it, is widespread. There is especially to be noticed the new conception of animism, not in Edward B. Tylor's sense of the belief in individually formed souls, but in an impersonal vital power, a fluid of life—*tanoana*, as the Bareë tribes of Celebes call it. It may be, I suggest, somewhat like the Orenda of the Iroquois, which I. N. B. Hewitt has described in the *American Anthropologist*.⁵ In the same sense Professor Söderblom, in his valuable booklet on the religions of the earth,⁶ speaks of life-electricity, a soul-material which has the faculty of evaporating or condensing and incorporating itself in different shapes.

In the treatment of Chinese religions, which at the hand of so eminent a connoisseur as De Groot has been given quite a new form, one will be struck at finding Confucianism and Taoism so closely connected as to be quite intermingled. Wu and Hih—i. e., the Taoistic priests—are dealt with under the head of Confucianism, while Yih-King and Tschung-yung figure under that of Taoism. "Properly there cannot be any question of a special Taoistic religion beside the Confucian," says De Groot (Vol. I, p. 104). Quite new, too, is Professor R. Lange's treatment of Japanese religions, whose worship as well in Buddhism as in Shintoism (which itself is "nothing but a mixture of nature- and ancestor-worship") he sketches very clearly, with plenty of interesting detail. For the treatment of Semitic religions in anterior Asia, especially Assyria and Babylonia, Friedrich Jeremias has fully availed himself of the latest results which are due to recent excavations (for Canaan in particular to Sellin's discoveries in Ta'anek). He has given us quite a new piece of work. His manner of treating the matter is governed by the view, to which he positively adheres, of a developed astral system as basis of the divine worship in Assyria and Babylonia, and to a certain, I think by him rather exaggerated, degree even in Canaan. Yet this astral system appears to be combined with a "nature-religion based on the change of the seasons, which goes back to

⁴ Cf. especially H. Schurtz, *Allersklassen und Männerbünde* (Berlin, 1902).

⁵ 1902, pp. 33-46.

⁶ *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, Series III, No. 3, p. 8.

the earliest times and which determines the features of the West-Semitic religions" (Vol. I, p. 271). Jeremiah is certainly right in clearly distinguishing the monarchical speculations of Babylonian priests from real monotheism (pp. 278 f.). One question of detail deserves notice. Jeremiah thinks Rešeph to have been an Egyptian god (pp. 350, 375), while, on the contrary, H. O. Lange, who treats of the Egyptian religion, considers him as Semitic (Vol. I, p. 212). In the chapter on the Roman religion, for the better understanding of which we are especially indebted to Wissowa, we are glad to meet with a fuller treatment of the cult of Mithra, based, of course, on Fr. Cumont's praiseworthy researches. Professor A. E. I. Holwerda, who has retouched this part, has wholly recast that on the Greek religion: its central idea—increasing anthropomorphism, deification of the human—is clearly brought into evidence by him. "The attempt was made to raise that which could give to earthly life a noble and worthy endowment to the range of religion. By degrees it sunk back into its own sphere, in which it retained its eternal value" (Vol. II, p. 403).

I regret that the book has not a fuller index, the present one without proper names being quite insufficient. Finally, special thanks must be addressed to Professor Chantepie de la Saussaye, who with this edition takes leave of his manual, to which we owe so much for having promoted the knowledge of the history of religions. We are glad to know that its future will be secured by intrusting its further redaction to so competent a scholar as Dr. Lehmann, to whom we already are indebted for the entire treatment of the Indian and Persian and partial treatment of primitive religions.

A useful, concise treatment of the history of religions is given us by J. A. Macculloch.⁷ The principal value of his booklet rests in the first part which, after discussing the origin of the religious idea in man, is devoted to an account of certain dominant religious beliefs and practices among savage races. Yet more stress ought to have been laid on sidereal and stone-worship. Its second half, religion among the higher races, is, in parts, decidedly too short; e. g., in Mohammedanism no mention is made of the "five ground-pillars." Here he has too exclusively emphasized the despotic and cruel side of the Mohammedan's god. He is not a loving god, it is true, but the Qur'an does not tire of repeating God's compassionateness. The Egyptians ought no longer to be quoted as classic representatives of the belief in metempsychosis (p. 77). In the statement of the Homeric conception of the future state, the author fails to show any

⁷ *Religion, Its Origin and Forms*. By J. A. Macculloch. ["The Temple Primers."] London: Dent, 1904. 185 pages.

acquaintance with Rohde's *Psyche* (p. 137). I do not wish to argue with him about the origin of religion (cf. p. 112).

It is with only a limited part of the history of religions that Professor D. S. Margoliouth is dealing in his *Religions of Bible Lands*.⁸ He considers as Bible lands "chiefly the lands either comprised in or adjacent to Canaan;" i. e., Phœnicia, Philistia, Syria, Moab, Egypt, Persia. Why not Assyria and Babylonia? "The title 'Bible Lands'," he says, "seems scarcely appropriate to a country in which the greater part of the Israelitish race disappeared from history, and which the restored community abandoned, taking with them no feeling but abhorrence" (p. 4). I do not think this apology to be very persuasive.

Margoliouth's treatment of the Semitic religions is a valuable piece of work. Yet some allegations are to be received with caution. Thus, e. g., Margoliouth declares the name of the Philistines to be Semitic (p. 2). It may be observed that the most recent research concerning its origin arrives at the opposite conclusion.⁹ Is it quite so certain that in Bethlehem there is the name of the god Lahmu (p. 12), that Tyrus is the name of the god Sur which "is familiar in the Old Testament" (p. 18), that Dagan is Sumerian (p. 20), that Rimmon is Rahman "loving" (*loc. cit.*)? And here I may add the author's keen conjecture that Eshmun is perhaps equal to the eight gods of the Egyptian ennead thought of as one god (p. 82). As to his supposition that probably the temples came to serve as treasuries or banks (p. 33), we possess evidence that such has really been the case; cf. Judges 9:4; 1 Kings 15:18; 2 Kings 18:15.

Concerning the religion of Persia I should object to the statement that "the after-world, though recognized, does not enter seriously into the calculation of the Mazdeist" (p. 125). On the contrary, he seems to have been very earnestly interested in his future state, and, as we know, it is still an open question how far, if at all, the Jewish eschatology has been influenced by the Mazdayan. Nor do I think it correct to state that "the Ameshaspends in origin were abstractions is clear from their names" (p. 112). Louis H. Gray¹⁰ may be right in having lately tried to trace the evolution of the Zoroastrian archangels from nature-godlings to spiritual abstractions. Finally, there are two errata: on p. 30 for Micah we ought to read Amos, and on p. 63 Exod. 8:26 is impossible.

⁸ *Religions of Bible Lands*. By D. Margoliouth. New York: Armstrong; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1902. 132 pages.

⁹ A. Noordtjz, *De Filistijnen, hun Afkomst en Geschiedenis* (Kampen: Kok, 1905), p. 17.

¹⁰ "The Double Nature of the Iranian Archangels," *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, Vol. VII (1904), pp. 345-72.

A special problem of the history of religions is treated by Lanessan.¹¹ In what relation do religion and morals stand to each other? Lanessan deals with the morals in the Jewish, Indian, Greek, Roman, and Christian religions, not in religion in general, as his title would lead one to suppose. He furnishes us with a certain amount of materials gathered, partly from the sources themselves (evidently in translations; that the author does not know, e. g., Hebrew is clearly shown by the twice occurring *selanim* on p. 3), partly at second hand. His book consists to a large extent merely of quotations which, as they fill pages and pages, now and then render perusal rather tiresome. Lanessan's own originality in the book is of a very doubtful value: he tries to show that, on the whole, religion did nothing but arrest the natural progress of moral development by superimposing on natural morality an artificial one, as it also arrested the progress of science among the Semites by substituting purely imaginative or metaphysical speculations for scientific observations, so as to transform astronomy into astrology (pp. 236 f.). Thus religion was only an "obstacle" to moral evolution (p. 363), since it added to the ideas born from the relations between men and men, those which are engendered by the interests of the priestly class (p. 238), these two moralities being as much opposed to each other as day and night, as truth and error, as right and wrong (p. 409). Against priestly interest—here, of course, India opens to him a vast field (p. 224)—he becomes greatly aroused, and he scarcely seems to recognize any other origin of the religion (pp. 39, 177, 231, 546). Nor does he do justice to Christianity. In spite of the fact that Islam has not any priestly class (pp. 525, 549)—by the by, Lanessan confounds the *mufti* with the *muezzin* (pp. 490, 525)—still he ought not to have extolled the Mohammedan "*zakat*" above Christian charity (p. 520), nor have reproached Christianity with not having raised the condition of women and children (p. 435). Why does he take as the only basis of Christian ethics the explanation of the Mosaic law given by the *Catechismus Romanus* (pp. 366 ff.), instead of the New Testament? But Lanessan seems none too well versed in biblical matters; else he would not speak of the cry of the Christian (*sic!*) orator: "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity" (p. 568)! But why should he be interested in the Bible? A book whose narratives are "childish, ridiculous, or brutal" (p. 483) is certainly a negligible quantity, even for one who writes on a religious problem. Yet so warm a defender of "human" morality ought not to be mistaken about the author of the well-known, "*homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto*," which is Terence, not

¹¹ *La morale des religions*. Par J. L. de Lanessan. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 568 pages. Fr. 10.

Seneca, as he states (p. 361)! By the way, against the alleged non-heredity of the Egyptian priests (p. 2, n. 1) he may compare Erman, *Die ägyptische Religion*,¹² p. 56.

Of course, the problem of morals and religion is a very perplexing one, but it is not to be solved by prejudice or by *a priori* conceptions, but only by a careful historical investigation; and this path one ought not to tread without a sober historical sense. That originally religion and morality flow from different sources I do not doubt; and there is no lack of historical examples to show that religion can come into conflict with morality and arrest its progress. No Christian of today will, I hope, defend the Inquisition or the crusade against the Albigenses, upon which Lanessan lays stress (p. 412). On the other hand, where religion is acknowledged to have played, on the whole, an important part in promoting morals, the difficulty will be rightly to value the extent to which it is involved in the moral utterances. This is not easy to determine even in the case of Stoics such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius. How much more so with Plato, whom, with Socrates, Lanessan would like to regard as the founder of scientific morality as opposed to religious (p. 274). As a matter of fact, one should not overlook the imposing testimony of so many men, who have been convinced that the real force of their moral life has rested in their religion, and that their best achievements during their life have originated in religious impulses. Here we may compare the fine pages which Professor Dorner devotes to this subject in his philosophy of religion,¹³ where he tries to show how the consciousness that all things are summed up in God, that man is one with him who proves to be absolute activity and reason, cannot fail to increase our own energy and reason.

With Dorner's book we enter the province of the philosophy of religion. "The history of religion cannot do without it," remarks Chantepie de la Saussaye (Vol. I, pp. 4 f.), "because not only the disposition and judgment of religious phenomena, but even the assertion that a phenomenon is of a religious character, depends upon some previous comprehension of the nature of religion." How shall we discover this nature? It is impossible to give any detailed answer to this question within so narrow a compass. How very complex the question is, may be seen from the suggestive essay of Professor Tröltzsch, which gives a very clear survey of the philosophy of religion at the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁴

¹² *Handbücher der königlichen Museen in Berlin* (Berlin: Reimer, 1905).

¹³ *Grundriss der Religionsphilosophie*. Von A. Dorner. Leipzig: Dürr, 1903. xviii + 448 pages. M. 7.

¹⁴ "Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," *Festschrift für Kuno Fischer*, I (Heidelberg: Winter, 1904), pp. 104-62.

"It is," says he, "a sheaf of different problems and methods, very difficult to reduce to a uniform treatment" (*loc. cit.*, p. 108). By distinguishing the empirical from the speculative method, as is generally done, nothing more than the main direction which the investigation can take is pointed out; for as, *in praxi*, we shall find an infinite number of more or less imperceptible compromises, the whole set of possibilities can be only imperfectly included under these two headings. Yet they prove to be the best catch-words, if we look for any; and as for Dorner, there cannot be any doubt that he is even a rather uncompromising representative of the speculative party which is not just now in the majority. "There are," as he says, "at the present time many men who wish to search into religion only psychologically and historically, and to obtain from the material thus gained some general formulæ. . . . Whether the object of religion, the deity, does exist or not, is here hardly to be decided, as experience does not tell us anything about it" (p. 4). To this Dorner opposes his own view, the starting-point of which is "that at the heart of religion there is an overempirical reality; that its character is not to be known by the way of empiricism; that religion in its development tends toward an ideal; that, therefore, the main object is to comprehend this overempirical reality as well as the ideal of religion itself; and that this is possible only by means of speculation" (p. 4).

To these speculative longings Dorner gives free scope in his metaphysics, where, as I should be inclined to say, he carries a rather naïve mythology right into the midst of the divine consciousness itself! In order to explain the manifoldness of the world, he thinks it necessary to suppose in God himself some primordial differences, i. e., different manners of being—a real one, which is God's will, and an ideal one, which is his reason—which by the divine activity are bound eternally together into an indissoluble unity. As such, God knows himself to be the ground of the possibility of all reality; he surveys the possibilities of new forms of existence into which the potentialities united in him can separate, and rejoices at their springing into existence. May I add that apparently there could be only one perfect combination of potentialities? Why, then, does God suffer his perfection to beget a less perfect combination than himself? And if, as Dorner states, the world-potentialities have in a new way to be brought again into unity, the end of the whole process, if ever it tends to perfection, will be a mere reduplication of the absolute being, the use of which nobody can tell! The question how God is to be thought of is preceded by the demonstration that according to reason the idea of his real existence is a necessary one. Dorner goes even farther: There must be realities, since

we are obliged to think in categories of reality. In this form the ontological proof is the basis of his whole argumentation.

While in the second part metaphysics is supposed to guarantee religion as being founded in God as the religious object, the third part deals with the psychological conditions of the religious subject, i. e., with human belief and its expressions. Here, as throughout the book, one will notice that most stress is laid on the intellectual side. It is the intellectual trend for unity which, according to Dorner, causes mankind to conceive the idea of God, and the certainty of belief increases with the development of consciousness, which in its highest form raises the idea of God to scientific certainty. Or again: "At last the religion of the spirit will rise to a free knowledge which does not recoil from historical and speculative criticism, and which distinguishes between the religious principle and the peculiar form in which it has been historically realized at a certain time" (p. 259). "Not the historical, but the metaphysical brings blessedness"—this opinion of Fichte is shared by Dorner. He thinks that historical facts are nothing but a stimulus for believing. By the "religious principle" he means the idea of God-manhood. Such is the conclusion of the first part of the book where the phenomenology of religion is dealt with. The development of religion keeps pace with the development of the human intellect; at its height, in Christianity (which he esteems to be a higher combination of the Aryan and the Semitic spirit), immanence and transcendence of the Deity are united, and the immediate communion of God and man is realized. Dorner tries to trace historically the absolute religious ideal; and once more it proves to be God-manhood.

In the last part some laws of the religious life are deduced: first, the teleological law which presides over the development of religion, the religious consciousness materially progressing toward the absolute ideal of religion, while formally it advances toward monotheism and tends to become a continuous fundamental feeling. This law conflicts with the psychological one of persistence, the balancing of both leading to that of gradual transitions.

The pleasure of reading Dorner's *Grundriss* is diminished by the fact that it is not at all a *Grundriss*; the author's prolixity would be a serious reproach even to an exhaustive handbook. In fact, we miss a well-planned structure in the book. Yet there is much to be learned from this work, and it contains some remarkable pages; e. g., where Dorner describes the *ego* as being by virtue of its relation to God the most concentrated power of the world (pp. 403-6). As he thinks that where the religious ideal is realized there is no more need of a specific practice of religion, the necessity

of a public cult is called in question, and from the cult, as it still exists, he wishes to banish the religious art which, as he states, remains only symbolical. It thus distracts attention from a realization of the communion with God which the cult ought to bring (p. 398). This I consider to be the erroneous consequence of Dorner's overrating the intellectual side of religion. In observing how much preference he gives to the "word" as the most spiritual expression of spiritual things, I cannot help feeling that we have an intellectual "survival," as it were, of that old word-superstition, the fascinating history of which, complex as it is, ought some day to be written. May I here contrast Morris Jastrow's¹⁵ words: "In our days, when all conditions favor the suppression of the emotions, emphasis should be laid upon the value of allowing our emotions freer play. . . . Applying this principle to the religious cult, it is eminently proper for our emotions to be aroused by soul-stirring chants, by the resonant peals of an organ."

¹ Quite different from Dorner's somewhat old-style work is Tiele's *Outlines*,¹⁶—a philosophy, or rather, as he prefers to call it, a science of religion in a new style. The method which he follows can be designated as the purely historical, inasmuch as it starts from what is established by historical research. "The science of religion, however," says he, "has to give equal consideration to the results of anthropology, psychology, sociology, and especially comparative religions" (p. 2). What has become of Dorner's metaphysical fancies? We find in Tiele's booklet no metaphysics whatever: "Not the superhuman itself, but only what results from belief in this superhuman, is the object" of his treatise; it deals only with man as a religious being. So he briefly leads us through the whole process of religious development from the lowest nature-religions to the highest ethical ones. His pregnant and concise characterizations of religions at once betray the hand of the connoisseur. We are shown, not only various grades, but different trends of development within the different religious groups, as well as within any single group. Here we meet with Tiele's well-known distinction between theanthropic (= Aryan) and theocratic (= Semitic) religions. But are not certain laws to be deduced from this whole development? At this very point a philosophical manner of viewing the matter is seen. Tiele affirms that there are laws of development of the human spirit in general in relation to religion, and he enumer-

¹⁵ *The Study of Religion* (London: Scott, 1901), p. 282.

¹⁶ *Grundzüge der Religionswissenschaft*. Von C. P. Tiele. Autorisierte deutsche Bearbeitung von G. Gehrich. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 70 pages. M. 1.80.

ates some of these. But are there not more? In particular I miss the above-cited law of psychological persistence, which explains a good deal of religious conservatism. Moreover, it is easy to observe in the history of religion certain tendencies which, without strictly assuming the character of laws, are not far from having the same value. So we universally find the progressing deification of extraordinary religious men—that is the truth in the Euhemeristic theory—while under certain circumstances a continuous process of degradation of divine beings takes place. Further, there is a regular tendency to materialize piety, which, as Dorner has well pointed out, characterizes almost all religions (p. 301).

Religion being in a process of continuous development, Tiele calls the part dealing with its history the morphological, as contrasted with the ontological, which fills the second half of his booklet. That is to say, as a center of religious development there is something common to all religions which is constant and permanent, whatever shape it may assume. To discover this permanent element Tiele analyzes religious phenomena—i. e., (1) religious ideas, (2) religious deeds, (3) religious association—and by a synthesis he tries to determine the character of religion. It is, he concludes, religious feeling which we best call piety or religiousness, something which is most like the feeling we have toward men who are above us and with whom we are intimately united (pp. 61, 63). Its essence is the adoration of the Highest. (p. 64) As to the origin of religion, Tiele states that unconsciously man carries the idea of the infinite within himself, that he is created to aspire to it, and that this constitutes his very character as man. With this idea is associated the innate impulse to causality. Historically religion is born, he thinks, from some kind of reaction of the religious feeling against dissatisfaction with all worldly insufficiency and limitation (p. 67). Here, it seems to me, is the greatest lack in Tiele's system; for, as the history of religion clearly teaches us, every new religion, at any rate, takes its rise from a concrete human experience of some manifestation which is always considered as being of superhuman origin. Are we not permitted, nay even forced, to imagine religion's first beginnings likewise in this way?

Tiele's outlines will not fail to induce many readers to take up his Gifford Lectures on *The Elements of the Science of Religion*, which of course afford the best commentary on the present work.

Finally a few words may be said on a booklet which has a practical aim.¹⁷ What conclusions are to be drawn for missions from the character

¹⁷ *Das Heidentum als religiöses Problem in missionswissenschaftlichen Umrissen.* Von Georg Stöckh. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1903. 155 pages.

and present state of non-Christian religions as viewed from the standpoint of Christianity? (Let me immediately add: Christianity, as the author understands it.) The premises from which he starts is that Christianity is the only "revealed" religion. From this premise there results for him an unfavorable critical judgment of the "pagan" religions: they are religions of gradual defection from a primordial revelation, the vestiges of which he tries to trace from the history of religion. In spite of these relics of revelation, the essence of paganism is in direct contradiction to that which forms the essence of true religion. Therefore it is the object of missions to mediate to paganism the divine revelation (p. 129). Stosch's book is, I dare say, an esoteric one for "believers" in the narrowest sense of the word, while for readers who do not share his dogmatic presuppositions it is interesting merely as showing how difficult it is for circles standing under the constraint of an unalterable dogma to remain in touch with the progressing work of science. One can scarcely enter upon scientific discussion with an author who adheres to the principle that psychological truth in the perfect sense requires the assertion of historical reality (p. 45); who still decides the question of priority concerning the book of Enoch and the epistle of Jude by asserting the derived character of the pseudepigraph (p. 49, n. 3); who thinks that the agreement of biblical and Babylonian accounts is not to be explained by any literary dependence or priority, but by primeval influences (pp. 37 f.). But there is worse yet. I need only quote the few following sentences: "The Hindu lives in mere illusions, and he *knows* that he lives in imaginations. But he considers it to be normal. The Sivait is not Sivait in the sense of holding Siva as a reality," etc. (p. 142). It would be better, I think, not to reproach the modern science of religion with a desire to avoid the categories of "true" and "false." Personally, one may have the unswerving conviction, even scientifically founded, that Christianity is the true religion, and yet be more just and modest in his judgment. Who knows? Perhaps it will be the very best fruit of our studies of comparative religion to render us more just and modest.

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This¹⁸ is a really alluring attempt to rationalize the Mosaic tradition on the basis of our most imperfect knowledge of the old Arabian religion. It is true, on the one hand, that all revelational value vanishes from the story as completely as in the reconstructions which admit no wilderness

¹⁸ *Die altarabische Mondreligion und die mosaische Ueberlieferung*. Von Ditlef Nielsen. Mit 42 Abbildungen. Strassburg: Trübner, 1904. 224 pages. M. 5.

or Egyptian period at all, and, on the other hand, that Dr. Nielsen carefully guards himself from deciding, in the meantime, whether the story is a true echo of events or merely a demoniacally clever reconstruction by the Hebrews from their idea of their early history and their knowledge of Arabian theology. But there cannot be much question to which view Dr. Nielsen inclines. The other presupposes among the Hebrews a great imaginative artist with a collection of materials for local color like those of our modern historical novelists—say Homer developing the *Odyssey* on the method of Mr. Winston Churchill. Yet, if—and it is a large “if”—this reconstruction of Arabian religion is sound, the Mosaic reconstruction, in turn, has much to say for itself. Much better than even Budde’s hypothesis does it put before us living figures, a possible environment, and a self-developing action.

The book divides itself into two parts. First, an exposition of Arabian religion as a lunar religion—the author will not permit us to say lunar worship; the personal, ethical God of the oldest stratum of Semitic names is connected in figure with the moon in its varying phases, but the personality and qualities remain. Further, Arabia, with its nomad night-journeys, chooses the moon, while the peasant life and interests of Babylonia choose the sun. Next, a sacred moon leads to sacred phases with corresponding ritual seasons. So a lunar reckoning of time develops in Arabia and a solar in Babylonia. We have the origin of the week, and then the problem of combining weeks into solar years. This Dr. Nielsen hunts with pertinacity and skill through all the old Semitic calendars. But to it all there is the great handicap that the south Arabian inscriptions have not yet yielded any calendar information. Sacred times and seasons being thus provisionally settled, places and symbols are taken up. For these there is much more evidence, and especially important is a hitherto unpublished description by Glaser of the temple at Marib.

In the second part the agreement is worked out of all that has been thus developed with the Mosaic story. It is certainly most suggestively close. The idea, in a word, is that it was to an Arabian sanctuary that the children of Israel were brought; that the theophany on the mount consisted in the rites of that sanctuary, as seen by the ignorant and fearful people; and that they were then sent on their way, equipped by a regular authority with a tribal god and a body of laws and ritual—admitted, as it were, to the fellowship of the Arabian people. The hypothesis, as I have said, is most alluring, if we could only be sure of the basis. The materials are too scanty, and, until Glaser’s hoards are published, not much increase can be looked for. Those which Dr. Nielsen draws from Muslim sources

are somewhat risky. A connection may possibly lie between the *istihtal* cry, at new moon, and the exceptional use of the same word, in a tradition, for the cry of the infant when Satan touches him at birth; another, curiously confused, between the new moon and the phrase "between the horns of Satan," where the sun is said to rise and set, at which times prayer is forbidden. For this last, see Goldziher's *Arabische Philologie*, Vol. I, pp. 113 ff.; others could undoubtedly be gathered from the traditions.

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M. Decharme, well known for his excellent volume on Greek mythology, proposes in the present book¹⁹ to treat historically the attitude of Greek thinkers toward the myths of gods and heroes. Some of the myths, when judged by human standards, are grossly immoral; in many of them the miraculous element is the center of interest; all the myths deal with supernatural beings. From Hesiod on, the poets and historians and philosophers are studied in the effort to trace the development of the tendency first to modify myth, then to criticise it, to reject it, and finally to explain it. That the author occasionally stops to develop the positive conceptions of the god put forward by philosophy (pp. 47, 56, 211) is readily pardoned, even though it sometimes introduces lack of symmetry into the discussion. The section on Plato's eschatology (pp. 191-208), for example, has but little to do with the main theme. On the other hand, few readers will feel either that Lucian should be omitted from the discussion, or that Homer sings "with full belief in the reality of the legends of the past." On the contrary, the light tone in which the epic often handles the gods as actors in its drama may well be regarded as the original source to which the current of sceptical thought may be traced back.

The standpoint from which myths are criticised is predominantly either religious, or moral, or philosophical. For Hesiod, the Ionic philosophers, and the early historians, the inconsistency of the myths and their contradictions of experience are the motives which lead to their modification. The chapter on the theogonies perhaps lays undue stress on the foreign elements introduced, and on the philosophical interest of those who composed them; still, it is true that in the theogony attributed to Hesiod myths are freely modified to fit into a definite system. Herodotus' naïve criticism, and the strict historical sense of Thucydides in handling the myths, are admirably described. In Xenophanes, and in less degree in Theognis,

¹⁹ *La critique des traditions religieuses chez les Grecs des origines au temps de Plutarque*. Par Paul Decharme. Paris: Picard, 1904. xiv+508 pages. Fr. 7.50.

we find the earliest religious criticism of myths; in Pindar and Æschylus moral and religious standards combined to cause the rejection of some myths and the modification of others. The freedom with which religious men like Pindar, Æschylus, and Sophocles handle the content of myth should have led M. Decharme to define his theme more carefully. Sometimes Æschylus is as ready as the "atheists" to reject the myths of Zeus in his effort to reach a higher conception of God. The freedom with which our author turns from the criticism of religious belief to the criticism of myth, and the reverse, often leads to confusion in the argument. In reality the criticism of myth and the history of impiety, the double theme outlined in the preface, are two themes which, however closely they are related, should be kept distinct in the discussion. That poetry and history and philosophy should have been permitted to handle myth so freely is due to the fact that no real inconsistency between their procedure and popular religion developed before the middle of the fifth century B. C.

It was, however, inevitable that the criticism of myth and the rise of natural science should come into conflict with established religion. The explanation of religion as a device to frighten men away from crimes, the rejection of stories of the gods by historians and philosophers and poets, the substitution of natural causes for divinities in the attempt to reach a scientific account of the world, all contributed to bring on this crisis. The chapter on lawsuits for impiety treats this theme in an interesting but rather summary fashion. For example, an account of the suits against Anaxagoras and against Phidias is not at all so simple a matter as the reader of this chapter would imagine.

Both the breakdown of popular religion, and the recognition that philosophy attacked popular theology rather than the worship of the people, tended to make this crisis less acute after 400 B. C. "*L'athéisme finit par être toléré.*" The philosophers as a rule were not atheists, but men who in their systems substituted another kind of gods for the divinities of the people. Even when the popular gods were explained as natural forces and the myths as allegories of nature, even when these gods were regarded as men of old distinguished for their great power or beneficent deeds, the discussions of the philosophers had little or no influence to break down the institutions of worship.

The two longest sections of the book, perhaps the sections of greatest interest to the general reader, deal with the Stoics and with Plutarch. In both the author goes outside his theme in that he deals not simply with the criticism of myth and religious belief, but more particularly with the inter-

pretation of popular religion by these thinkers. Of the two chapters on the Stoics, the first outlines the theology of the school in connection with its physics, and the second discusses in detail the interpretation of each god in the Stoic system. The book would have been more symmetrical in its argument if the second of these chapters had been omitted, for in a section added to the first chapter the different principles which had been used for the interpretation of myth are examined—principles which the Stoic applied without any considerable change. It is interesting to note that these principles are still in vogue. The physical interpretation of Greek myths, begun by Theogenes in his study of Homer, and continued by Metrodorus of Lampsacus and the Stoics, finds its exponents now in a physical school of myth-critics, of which W. H. Roscher is the most eminent living representative. The interpretation of myths as moral fables has continued from the time of Antisthenes to comparatively recent days. Thirdly, the study of the gods through their names is a method not invented by modern students of linguistics; it began in the Homeric hymns and flourished among the Stoics.

For a French critic, who would not need to blush at the comparison, it would be an interesting task to examine the treatment of somewhat this same topic in an attractive volume recently published in Boston.²⁰ It is a bad omen for a book to begin with a sentence in which a singular verb follows a plural subject ("love of life and aspirations . . . constitute . . . and is")—no doubt a printer's error, even though this is not the only instance of its occurrence. The style of the book is awkward, often heavy. In spite of his wide reading and judicious quotations, the author often succeeds in missing the point in his discussions. The section entitled "Greek Religion" contains one or two striking thoughts, though the argument in general proceeds along wrong lines. The account of Greek philosophy fails entirely to trace the significance of the movement that ended with Socrates, and concludes lamely with a bare suggestion that "the philosophy of Greece reached its highest point in Plato and Aristotle," who are omitted from the discussion.

Still, the book has this value, that it is written by a man who seems to have come under the influence of the high moral standards of Stoicism. Apparently he feels their force and, however awkwardly, is seeking to pass on their message to his readers. The selections from Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius are well chosen. The author does not state whether they are his own translation or not, and the omission of references makes

²⁰ *Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of its Disciples*. By Charles H. Stanley Davis. Boston: Turner. viii + 269 pages. \$1.40.

it difficult to compare them with the original. The passages which I have taken the time to hunt up are rendered with reasonable accuracy, though not always in pleasing English.

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SOME RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY

Professor Santayana's first two volumes¹ in his proposed series of five will arouse wide interest. The remaining volumes² are entitled *Reason in Religion*, *Reason in Art*, *Reason in Science*. As the titles indicate, the author aims at presenting a broad-minded constructive synthesis of the main results reached through the free investigation of the nature and implications of human experience. Science, Art, Ethics, Religion are, in turn, called upon to contribute data. These data (as the title, "Reason," indicates) are woven together into a consistent fabric, in whose variegated pattern may be traced a unity of design and treatment. Professor Santayana's problem is to spell out clearly for the individual mind its own characteristics and meaning, as these have been determined by the larger processes of humanity, of whose activities the individual mind is but the passing embodiment. His method is that of observing and analyzing life in its objective forms, taking as his instructors all those who in times past have labored upon the same problems, but correcting and supplementing each by his own observations and keen analyses. His field, therefore, is as broad as human life, measured to the confines of barbarism, on the one hand, and of the highest forms of civilization, on the other. With sympathetic but clear-minded insight he endeavors to interpret life through itself. His motive is to be found in the desire to formulate an intelligent ideal of conduct—for to Professor Santayana the life of reason is as truly practical as reflective. Its conquests are never made in the interest of barren abstractions but always as the means of formulating the conditions of more fruitful and noble forms of living. Such a task, intelligently confronted, might well seem impossible of achievement in any but the most crass and superficial manner. Of this, Professor Santayana is fully conscious. His is not the mood of the blind enthusiast, nor that of the shallow dilettante. He is entirely serious and keenly cautious. There

¹ *The Life of Reason*. By George Santayana. Vols. I and II: *Reason in Common Sense*; *Reason in Society*. New York: Scribner. ix+291 and viii+205 pages. \$1.25 each.

² Vols. III and IV have already been issued; Vol. V is still in preparation.

is no writer of today who is more quick in perceiving, and more direct in laying bare false pretensions, blundering observations, groundless generalizations, or absurd analyses. His is a mind for nice distinctions, fine articulations, and strong, clean-cut expression. The keen criticism which characterizes the volumes throughout is not that of barren cynicism but the insistent demand of a marvelously well-informed mind which is precise and well-balanced in its own movement, and demands a similar breadth, balance, and precision on the part of all others who take upon themselves the responsibility of reading the characteristics of life, and consequently of furnishing the cues for its succeeding movements. Professor Santayana admits frankly that the attempt to formulate the movements of human life into a world-view, which at the same time must constitute a humanitarian method of conduct, would be absurd and impossible in the extreme were every philosopher to attempt the task entirely on his own resources and from the beginning. Fortunately, the investigator of life's processes and problems today may avail himself of the results of the labors accomplished by a large number of workers in the varied fields of science, and may have the perspective of his own insight determined by an intelligent appreciation of the insights won by those thinkers with whose labors the history of philosophy makes us acquainted. Of the results of scientific investigation Professor Santayana shows himself to be exceptionally well informed. Proof of the thoroughness of his assimilation of scientific methods and results is found alike in the *tone* which is so characteristic of his volumes and in the *point* which each sentence individually exhibits. That our author has clearly won the right to attempt a re-reading of the interpretations which have been made of the most abstract problems of human life and destiny is evidenced by the clean-cut and masterly expositions of the great philosophic classics introduced incidentally into the movement of his argument.

As one would expect from the virility and concreteness of his critical expositions, Professor Santayana is exceedingly trenchant in the presentation of his own point of view. Out of the turmoil and confusion, so characteristic of the complex intellectual life of our day, two complementary methods emerge. First, we may find our interest center in the fact that our common world is a stream of activities whose intimate characteristic is continuous flux. This discovery of Heracleitus has been made the starting-point of modern scientific insight and investigation. For, whatever else the world may be, to the scientist it is essentially dynamic—a world of change whose evanescent, concrete forms change with kaleidoscopic rapidity, yet exhibit in their change certain constant recurring

values. To examine these processes, to determine precisely their characteristics and constant principles of recurrence is the problem of science. Its solution leads from qualitative experience to quantitative measurement, from apparent spontaneity to the definiteness of fixed principles. Hence science must, inevitably, formulate its results in terms of quantitative mechanical conceptions. And yet, for the scientist, quantity and necessity are not things-in-themselves, but, rather, formulations of the constant conditions of the come and go of concrete processes, and, consequently, mere methods for the manipulation and control of the same. They are instruments and not entities. Second, interest may center in the fact that the world is an interconnected whole whose varied processes exhibit definite functions. If, now, we investigate from this point of view, we find that quantity is absorbed by quality, and necessity by spontaneity. Life as a value with determinate norms or standards presses in upon us; nature appears no longer to be dead, rigid, and mechanical, but a thing alive and glowing with enthusiasm for inspiring and effective ideals. As the processes of life gave the scientist an ever-deepening insight into its permanent conditions, so attention to their uses reveals to the inquirer ever richer, nobler, and more efficient standards of value and norms of conduct. For just as science gives us control over the processes of the world, so morality, art, and religion enable us to organize more complexly and efficiently the values to which the same nature gives rise. Ideals, also, are instruments and not entities.

Thus from both results we are led to a demand for a final synthesis. Realism and idealism are not contradictory but complementary. As scientists, we may insist upon reading nature in terms of necessary mechanical conditions; as appreciators of art, morality, and religion, we may insist upon reading nature in terms of free ideals. Each conception taken in itself is an abstraction. Both alike fall within that concrete movement by which, in its myriad individuals, humanity emerges from the matrix of nature, defines that nature to itself, and through this definition controls it and establishes its own identity in principle with its source. Hence, reality is defined through the movement of human life, and human life attains its proper insight when it realizes its dependence upon, and affinity with, reality. Science and appreciation are distinctively human and at the same time distinctively of nature. Only as nature fabricates humanity can either arise. The form each takes at any moment depends entirely upon the concrete problem which nature sets for human life. However, as life gains insight into the conditions of its own processes and into its proper methods of functioning, it bends nature to its will, stamping its

science and its appreciations as distinctively human, and nature in this as its recognized and affiliated source. Thus humanity is naturalized and nature humanized.

After this fashion Professor Santayana lays firm and deep the foundations of a marked and distinctive contribution to philosophy. Certain features of this contribution may bear renewed emphasis. The dualism between the mechanism of science, on the one hand, and the teleology of art, morality, and religion, on the other, is resolved. The relationship of the world to human ideals, is adjusted, without violence being done to either. Both the unity and the diversity of the interests of realism and idealism are found in the instrumental conditions and methods of human activity. Knowledge is exhibited as essentially humanistic and pragmatic. Finally, while he demonstrates that all knowledge is humanistic and pragmatic, Professor Santayana points out that in being human it is yet of nature, and because it is pragmatic, it is also affiliate with its own concrete ground. He thus avoids the danger of confusing his doctrine with Protagorean relativity, on the one hand, and with static, absolutistic idealism, on the other.

One cannot take leave of Professor Santayana without grateful recognition of the excellencies of his style and the marvelous lucidity and untechnical character of his language. Many difficulties present themselves to the reader in the course of the argument but they are difficulties of content and not of form, of the inherent complexity of the subject-matter and not of the exposition.

In taking up Professor Flint's³ book, one comes into a very different atmosphere. In the one case thought is free to seek and to find the norms of conduct in the great mart of life; in the latter it is "cribbed, cabined and confined" within the limits of evangelical orthodoxy. Behind all Professor Flint's endeavors at philosophizing, one sees the specters of theological assumptions in the background. Hence, while the volume doubtless has value for certain minds, it has comparatively little interest for the student of philosophy. The one serious endeavor at consecutive philosophic thinking is to be found in the opening chapter upon the general field and methods of philosophy. The distinctions and definitions here are, in general, trite, and should have been compressed into a very few pages instead of being diffused over sixty-three. The remainder of the book is a rambling account of a variety of historical endeavors at a classification of the sciences. One is almost tempted to feel that, having com-

³ *Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum and a History of the Classifications of the Sciences*. By Robert Flint. New York: Scribner. x+340 pages. \$4.50.

pleted his serious work, Professor Flint found that he had a variety of odds and ends of erudition left over which he put into the form of a book.

*The World as Intention*⁴ is also an endeavor to harmonize scientific methods and results with the preconceptions of conservative supernaturalism. While admitting that the methods and discoveries of science have turned the theological world upside down, Gratacap maintains that if we push scientific assumptions hard enough, we shall find that they can be forced back upon a supernaturalistic base from which the theologian may advance to the firm re-occupation of his earlier miraculous, authority-revelation positions. The volume is written in a serious, straight-forward manner, and is worthy of attention for this if for no other reason. Its results are, however, inconclusive, and serve best to illustrate the impossibility of synthesizing the methods and results of natural science with the methods and assumptions of traditional theology. The volume is an indication of the imperative necessity for religion to dig deeper than it has in the past and to rest its foundations in nature rather than in supernatural, if it would regain its lost hold upon men of scientific training.

The volume of Dr. Fors⁵ illustrates the truth that the conception which was once so universal, of mythologies as mere works of the imagination, aesthetic or otherwise, has given way before the investigations of comparative literature and anthropology. Nowadays we see in the myth the embodiment of the unreflective conceptions of man concerning his world and himself. When to myth are added ritual and magic, we have before us the three factors in custom, and in custom we have the record of the prehistoric life of peoples from a very remote past. What history is to civilization, that custom is to barbaric and more primitive times. And as barbarism and savagery underlie civilization, so custom underlies history. Important in this respect, both for the understanding of civilization in its larger sweep, and European civilization in particular, is the mythology of the Norse peoples. The work of Dr. Fors is valuable to the English student in that it brings him into touch with original sources and authoritative references, and, moreover, furnishes a very clear and readable outline of the predominant characteristic of Norse mythology—its ethical stamp. This essentially practical aspect the author finds to be the reflex of the life of the people, whose circumstances placed them in a hard environment both physical and social, and which of necessity generated in them those

⁴ *The World as Intention*. By L. P. Gratacap. Boston: Eaton & Mains. viii + 346 pages. \$1.25.

⁵ *The Ethical World-Conception of the Norse People*. By A. P. Fors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 57 pages. \$0.50.

habits of courage, independence, love of liberty and fair play which had so large a part in originating the representative institutions of Anglo-Saxon peoples.

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In his *Transitional Eras in Thought*⁶ Professor Armstrong has applied the conception of "growth and decay" to those periods in the history of thought when the mind pauses, critically reviews the way traversed, doubts the value of results attained, and then, rising from its despondency, presses on to new achievements. He carefully analyzes, as typical eras, the period of the Sophists and of the Sceptics in Greece, and the eighteenth century in western Europe, points out their similar and dissimilar elements, and then presents the commingled threads of thought and feeling in the present age which he regards as transitional.

The crest of the negative wave in modern thought he thinks is past, and insists that the reconstruction already begun should conform to the one method, or process, by which such eras have been terminated in the past, viz., "the process of synthetic development," which is but the correlation of results attained in the manner "characteristic of all thinking in its higher reaches." He subscribes to the so-called "faith-philosophy," but is careful to indicate that *faith* is nearest *belief*, which psychologically "is an attitude of mind with reference to conscious contents."

The feeling one gets, while reading the book, that the present age, viewed constructively, is but a period in which to take account of stock, and that consequently there is danger of arrested development, is offset by the author's insistence that it is "better, far better, to grope in mental darkness, better to abandon any cherished conviction, no matter how bereft its loss may leave the soul, than to depart from the central principle of intellectual integrity." He is not a peace-at-any-price advocate. At times, too, one feels that he has not analyzed far enough, that he has not seen certain objections and suggestions that might be made; but later in the discussion enough comes to light to indicate that the author had these matters clearly in mind, so that eventually one feels the thoroughness of the work.

On the whole, Professor Armstrong has viewed his problem from many sides, and the wealth of historical, scientific, sociological, and philosophical knowledge he displays, together with his maturity and sanity of thought, leaves little to be desired in his solution.

⁶ *Transitional Eras in Thought*. By A. C. Armstrong. New York: Macmillan, 1904. 347 pages.

In his *Social Law in the Spiritual World*¹ Professor Jones has given some interesting "studies in human and divine interrelationship." He has not sought to develop a "metaphysical treatise," but "to help earnest and perplexed seekers to find a good working conception of God and man's relation to him." He has attempted "to show through psychology," as Drummond showed through biology, "that life can be unified from top to bottom." His philosophical bias is neo-Hegelianism mediated by John and Edward Caird, "who helped him more than any other British thinkers of recent times." He also acknowledges his indebtedness to Palmer, Royce, James, and Baldwin.

Personality is his central theme. This "is not a primitive possession," but "is made through ideals." "*At every stage it involves interrelation.* To be a person means to be a conscious member of a social order. . . . Individuality does not come first and society next as a product. Society is fundamental, and it is an essential condition for self-consciousness and personality."

But if man's "*personal life is conjunct*," that fact "must have profound religious significance. If man cannot be a self alone, no more can God." Thus he passes easily to the "inward side" of "all personal religion," which he illustrates from the mystics and Quakers. The "negation mystics," as he terms them, tend to reduce their consciousness to zero, but the "affirmation mystics" consider that "obedience to vision is more important than vision itself. . . . Error is to be attacked and truth is to be advanced. . . . Those who would have a closer view of the divine must seek it in a life of love and sacrifice." To this latter class he maintains that the Quakers belong. Their true principle is based on "primitive experience. Men found God in their lives." Their formulation of that experience "must hold that God is the inward principle and ground of the personal life. . . . To become spiritual is to become a divine-human person."

The test of spiritual guidance, the real Reformation principle, and always prominent among the Quakers, he regards as the crux, which, however, he resolves by asserting that a man "*must test*" his own inner promptings "by the spiritual life in other men." "All truth is put to a social test," and this can be no exception.

His discussion of "faith," still in close harmony with his central theme, is especially good. "To be a person means to act for ends which we believe are good, to live under the sway of an ideal. . . . But this kind

¹ *Social Law in the Spiritual World*. By Rufus M. Jones. Philadelphia: Winston, 1904. 272 pages. \$1.25.

of life is never for a minute possible without faith," which, as he finally defines it, is "the will to act as though we knew, for the sake of an end which we seek. . . . It begins with a trust in the goodness which is dimly shadowed forth in the world we see," but which ultimately "begins to show its actuality *in us*. . . . On its higher side, therefore, it is an actual appropriation of the Divine Life, a positive realization of spiritual goodness, which steadily moves toward a conscious relationship of the soul to God." In him we come to live, move, and have our being.

In his final discussion of the "divine-human life," in connection with which he cites many New Testament passages, he makes a very significant statement, wholly in line with the central thought of the book, and apparently in harmony with his quotations, viz.: "The goal which the gospel presents is the attainment of no far-away heaven—not admission at the gate of some jeweled city in the sky. It is the reproduction of this type of the divine-human life which Christ manifested."

If, in the face of the author's fine spirit, and of the many exceptionally valuable thoughts and suggestions which he presents, one were to criticise, such criticism would be directed against the apparent tendency toward hypostatization, the failure to define "spiritual" precisely and consistently, unless the vagueness were intended—sometimes it is used as coextensive with one's total inner life, and sometimes as a God-imparted life—and the constant use of the term "feeling" where the "interpretation of one's feeling" would seem to be more appropriate. Strictly speaking, one does not feel God present. One interprets one's feelings as evidence of God's presence.

The book in its entirety shows that Professor Jones is wholly in sympathy with the so-called theanthropic type of religion, rather than with the theocratic, and at the same time illustrates President Schurman's remark, that at present there is taking place "a change from the dogmatic religion of Christendom to the spiritual religion of Christ."

This author,⁸ as his preface indicates, had access to the best sources for a study of Descartes and Spinoza. His treatment is biographical and expository, though the critical is not neglected.

After a just characterization of the period preceding the New Philosophy, he gives Descartes' life, and then develops his system with frequent quotations. He treats both sides of his dualism in detail, and shows how necessary the conception of God was. "The proof of the existence of God," he maintains, "is the essential principle of the Cartesian philosophy."

⁸ *Descartes and Spinoza*. By J. Iverach. ["The World's Epoch-Makers."] New York: Scribner, 1904. 245 pages. \$1.25.

He regards Descartes as the "man who embodied the spirit of the age." "He set the world a-thinking, and the answers to his questions form the history of modern philosophy."

He emphasizes the fact that Spinoza was a Hebrew. Early training and tradition unconsciously influenced his view of the world. His dependence upon Descartes at first, and later divergence from him, are traced with a firm hand. "Causation is the fundamental concept of his philosophy," but "he never lost sight of the practical, ethical end—to form man to a perfect character." In his "*Ethics* his philosophy assumed its final form." "His system, except in the parts which deal with the emotions, cannot be said to be an interpretation of experience," which in the last analysis "a system of philosophy ought to be," but, "after all drawbacks, Spinoza must be reckoned among the great thinkers of humanity."

The book is a fresh, independent interpretation of Descartes and Spinoza, readable, and one that whets the appetite for a more extended study.

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TESTIMONY FROM SCIENCE AND FROM PHILOSOPHY CONCERNING THE FUTURE LIFE

It is quite unnecessary to enlarge upon the interest that belongs to the subject of a future life. Couple with the evanescence and uncertainty of our present life the transcendent and far-reaching character of human ideals, and we shall be less surprised at the rather remarkable fact that, in spite of the silence of those who have passed beyond our ken, in spite of the fact that no traveler has returned to tell the story of that other land, the belief in human immortality retains its hold upon the minds of men; and no stone is left unturned to prove what we already believe, or at least hope for.

In the two small volumes before us the question is approached from quite opposite standpoints. In the one, some *proof* of a *scientific* sort is sought for the existence of discarnate spirits; and philosophy is declared to be "helpless and worthless for proving a future life." In the other, the whole argument for immortality is philosophical in its character, even to the extent of denying the ability of science to give us a knowledge of the ultimate meaning of things.

Science, Professor Münsterberg¹ reminds us, deals with the realm of

¹ *The Eternal Life*. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. 72 pages. \$0.85.

phenomena, that realm in which law and order, mechanism and necessity, are all-pervading. This is as true of the psychical as of the physical. Viewed under the time-form, the world is a mechanism. And the proof of God, freedom, and immortality does not depend on the discovery of some little section of reality where law is not operative, and where the supernatural takes the place of the natural. Science considers the world from a certain point of view, assumed for the purposes of our practical life, and in a sense really artificial. But this very construction of reality under the forms of space and time requires and presupposes that the subject, who is the agent of such construction, shall in his own nature and operations transcend those forms, and not be imprisoned within them.

Eternal life, then, cannot logically mean a mere extension in time. Such mere extension could not have any real value. Eternal life must be qualitative, and not merely quantitative. To attach all-importance to endless time-extension is to judge by standards of quantity that which can be truly appraised only by standards of quality.

The solution of the problem is really, then, an ethical one. Final values are always to be found in attitudes of the will. "There is no truth and no perfection and no progress and no eternity but in that world which is given to our will, and in which we ourselves are will." "Values are found only in the world of subjects." Not, then, in the world of objects, and not in any time-world. "A will can never strive for more space and time, but only for more significance and influence and value and satisfaction."

Professor Hyslop's book² is an inquiry into the evidential value of those groups of facts which since 1882 have been the subject of the investigations of the Society for Psychical Research. The lion's share of attention is devoted to the celebrated Piper case, and the main question in Mr. Hyslop's mind is whether such phenomena as are presented by this remarkable case can be accounted for without the hypothesis of discarnate existence. After a description of the phenomena themselves, the various conceivable methods of explanation are discussed at length. Chance coincidence, guessing, suggestion by experimenters, and fraud are ruled out, to the satisfaction, one would think, of any reasonable person. The eminence of the persons who carried on the investigations, the elaborate precautions against error, the great number of tests, and the evident honesty and candor of Mrs. Piper herself, all warrant us in dismissing every hypothesis involving intentional deception of any sort, so far as the facts are concerned.

That the phenomena can be accounted for by telepathy seems to the

² *Science and a Future Life*. By James H. Hyslop. Boston: Turner, 1905. x+369 pages. \$1.50.

author an untenable position, for many reasons; and we seem, therefore, shut up to the hypothesis of spirit communication, so far as the facts at hand are concerned.

That the investigations have been carried on with the utmost care, and with disinterested motives, seems beyond question. That Professor Hyslop's discussion is careful, moderate, and dispassionate is also obvious. The reader, of course, feels the grotesquely slender nature of such evidence, in relation to the tremendously important doctrine that rests upon it. But the scientist very properly ignores our feelings in the matter.

Issue must, however, be squarely taken with Dr. Hyslop when he denies the ability of philosophy to do anything in this field. It is quite true that philosophy is not able to prove the reality of a future life, if "proving" means demonstrating after the manner of mathematics. Philosophy does not prove things in this sense of the term, for it is precisely in those regions where such proof is impossible that philosophy finds her vocation. But philosophy has the right to ask what conception of man's destiny will most satisfactorily account for the facts of his nature as we know them. And, surely, if the nature of his knowledge as an activity of his intelligence, the aspirations of his heart, the ethical ideals which he sets before him, the moral imperatives which he lays upon himself, and the restless hunger of his being for a satisfaction never fully attained in any human life—if these things require the belief in human immortality in order to render them coherent and intelligible, then surely that belief is justified, and the future life proved in a deeper sense than demonstration.

On this account we seem to be on higher ground when, with Professor Münsterberg, we reason from the nature of man's true being to the conception of his immortality, than when, with Professor Hyslop, we seek in the sporadic communications of a trance medium some proof that deceased persons have not wholly ceased to be. By this remark we do not intend to discredit the work of science, but only to claim for philosophy the right to investigate the question in her own way.

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THE INFLUENCE OF SCHLEIERMACHER ON MODERN THEOLOGY

Two recent publications illustrate the keen interest taken by German students of theology in the origin and import of Friedrich Schleiermacher's system of thought. E. R. Meyer¹ traces in minute detail the youthful

¹ *Schleiermachers und C. G. Brinkmanns Gang durch die Brüdergemeine*. Von E. R. Meyer. Leipzig: Friedrich, 1905. viii + 288 pages.

Schleiermacher's relations with the Moravian Brethren. In an estimate of the famous *Glaubenslehre* Carl Clemen² analyzes his doctrinal system and indicates how far later German theologians follow him. Meyer's book represents an immense amount of labor. He has ferreted out the history of Schleiermacher's family; the correspondence of the members of the family with one another and their friends; the accounts given in their letters and otherwise by Schleiermacher, Brinkmann, Fries, Garve, Hartley, Stähelin, Albertini, and other students in Moravian schools of the manner in which those institutions were conducted; the religious life that swelled and surged there; their own personal experiences while resident there, and their views of the manner in which their lives were affected thereby. It might be expected that the mass of material put together would prove confusing, or at least uninteresting, to a twentieth-century reader, but this is far from being the case. There is scarcely a dull page in the book. We find in it not only a narrative, such as can be found nowhere else in literature, of an extremely fertile period in the life of the famous German preacher and theologian, but also a satisfactory exposition of the religious beliefs and customs, and of the organizations of that wonderful band of people known by the name of Moravian Brethren. Under Meyer's guidance we trace the following outline:

From his earliest childhood Schleiermacher was nurtured in the piety of the Brethren of Herrnhut. Both his father (a Prussian army chaplain) and his mother were Moravians in sentiment, though members of the Reformed church, and they committed the education of their children to these people. When Friedrich was but a child at Gnadenfrei he became an earnest seeker for that experience of supernatural grace which they regarded as the essential fact of the Christian life; and later at Niesky, where he spent four years in their academy, he earnestly devoted himself to their religious ideas and practices, and, passing through the successive grades of admission to their society, advanced to full membership. The only stumbling block he seemed to meet was their Calvinistic doctrine, which, with all their pietism, they regarded as Christian truth. At times grave doubts troubled him. Nevertheless he endeavored to suppress these, and cheerfully submitted to the strict surveillance which was so marked a feature of the government of the school. But when at the age of seventeen he passed to their seminary at Barby with the purpose of fitting himself for their missionary work, his keen intellect and strong will, stimulated by the new surroundings, revolted against the constant iteration of orthodox

² *Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre in ihrer Bedeutung für Vergangenheit und Zukunft.* Von Carl Clemen. Bonn: Ricker, 1905. x+132 pages. M. 3.

formulae and the rigid exclusion of "dangerous" literature. In spite of rules, he studied Lessing, Kant, Herder, Goethe. A long inward struggle issued in the renunciation of the orthodox system—particularly the deity of Christ, vicarious atonement, and everlasting punishment—and the ultimate announcement of his change of mind to his astounded and exasperated father. Securing permission to study without restriction in Halle under the direction of Stubenrauch, his mother's brother, he left the society forever. Here he began a course of omnivorous reading which lasted for years, wrestling bravely with those grave problems which chain the attention of all thoughtful men, and finally triumphing over his unbelief. For though he never re-entered the Moravian society, the vivid religious impressions of his youth renewed their sway over his mind, religion became to him the question of all questions, and, to use his own words, he found himself "a Moravian still, but of a higher order;" for he learned that doctrinal forms are only the clothing of the spirit of religion, which ever seeks new and more adequate forms of self-expression.

Meyer does not trace the outcome of all this in Schleiermacher's later career, for it lies beyond the scope of his essay, but he gives us a careful analysis of Herrnhuterism, which is really the secret of Schleiermacher's power as a preacher and theologian. Herrnhuterism is pietism of the Franciscan type—individualistic, but communion-forming; semi-monastic in organization, but not separatist; a church within the church and a state within the state. The essence of its devotion is the worship of Jesus—i. e., contemplation of his person, participation in his inner experiences, fellowship in his sufferings—and its religious ideal is a communion of love with him in his heavenly exaltation. Accordingly the substance of this religion is not found in doctrine, ritual, or morality, but in feeling—*Gefühl, Genuss*—a religion not of the understanding or of the will, but of the heart.

Turning to Clemen's essay, the reviewer must express a feeling of disappointment. For this work, though exhibiting the author's keen analytical skill and wide acquaintance with the ablest German theologians, fails to give us a clear view of Schleiermacher's relations on a broad scale to the great theological movements of modern times. The title of the book would lead one to expect to find in it a survey of the main lines of theological progress since the times of Schleiermacher, and of the general field of theological investigation and speculation in the present, combined with an estimate of the extent to which these great movements of thought have received an impulse from him, and at the same time an indication of the manner in which his principles relate themselves to present-day problems.

We find, instead, a statement of the harmony or disagreement of Schleiermacher's views with those of such thinkers as K. J. Nitsch, Twisten, Rothe, Schweizer, Martensen, Dorner, Biedermann, Lipsius, and A. Ritschl, together with the author's view of the self-consistency of the *Glaubenslehre* and its harmony with truth. We might have hoped also to find some reference to English and American thought; for that same Moravian piety which glowed in Herrnhut, Niesky, and Barby, powerfully affected the religious life of the Anglo Saxon world through the great evangelical revival of the eighteenth century, which was permeated through and through with the Moravian spirit; but the author never looks beyond Germany.

The author's examination of Schleiermacher's system of theology consists, first, of a discussion of his views on questions preliminary to dogmatics proper, namely, the subject-matter of dogmatics, its problem or task; and, second, the main lines of his dogmatics critically examined; third, in conclusion, a summary of the results of the investigation. Instead of restating Schleiermacher's views from a new standpoint, Clemen quite properly takes his position within the system and follows Schleiermacher's own order of exposition. All that can be done in a brief review is to touch on a few of the many questions discussed.

Dogmatics, as Schleiermacher conceives it, is concerned with religion and is pursued in the interests of the church as a religious communion. Nothing, therefore, can be reckoned as dogma that does not spring out of the religious consciousness, no matter what other basis it may possess, for with Schleiermacher religion is in the last analysis a psychological fact. Accordingly, his system of theology is intended to be based upon the essence of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. This Clemen accepts, while he points out that, owing to a prevalent ignorance of the history of religion, Schleiermacher's view of the nature of religion was defective. Piety (personal religion) is described as "a determinateness of the *feeling*." Clemen holds that, while Schleiermacher's view is defensible as against intellectualism and moralism, in this form it is indefensible because it overlooks the *idea* which, though ever so obscure, is always involved in feeling. This defective view of religion works to the detriment of his whole system, which cannot be made to develop out of a religious consciousness which consists in the feeling of absolute dependence. The influence of this conception of the relations between religion and dogma is manifest in the efforts made by the most eminent theologians of later times to arrive at an adequate description of the nature of religion, and of Christianity in particular. The Ritschlian school has labored to prune Schleiermacher's system of its defects; for, while they emphasize the

points of distinction between his views and theirs, Clemen declares: "There is not a single dogmatical idea by which Ritschl is distinguished from his nearest predecessors and contemporaries which was not present in Schleiermacher's system at least in germ; yes, even the most important supplement which Herrmann has made to Ritschl's system is found beforehand in Schleiermacher."

Clemen proceeds to point out the lack of harmony between Schleiermacher's definition of religion and his conception of Christianity as redemptive, the failure to do justice to historical truth in his interpretation of Christianity, and the impossibility of developing a peculiarly Christian dogmatic out of the antithesis of sin and grace within the consciousness. Yet our author finds so many germinal ideas in Schleiermacher manifesting themselves in the speculative systems of succeeding dogmaticians, that he quotes with approval the prophetic saying of Gass in 1822: "With Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* a new epoch in the whole range of theological studies will begin;" and the statement of Bernoulli in 1897: "The history of Protestant dogmatics in the nineteenth century is the history of Schleiermacher's influence."

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

The Roman Catholic religion may be considered as a spiritual force moving men upward and onward to Christ; it may be considered as a theology, representing the adjustment of divine revelation to the growing intellectual needs of mankind; it may be considered as a polity governing the world in things spiritual, and organizing the spiritual forces at its command for the greater glory of Christ.

As a theology the Catholic religion presents today its most interesting, its most instructive side.

Since Leo XIII ascended the papal throne, the zeal for things intellectual has grown apace in Catholic circles. The great encyclical "Aeterni Patris" (1879) sought to bring again into vogue the philosophy of the Schoolmen, and particularly the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas, to the end that Catholic scholars might be able to "give reason for the hope that was in them." The intellectualism which is so marked in Thomas was dominant for a time; then there came a decided tendency to return to the positions advocated by Scotus and his followers. Leo revived interest in sociological science by his letters on "Democracy," "Labor," and kindred

topics; and this interest, at first intellectual, has produced practical results in Italy, Germany, Belgium, and France. Leo opened up the Vatican archives to all serious students, and there has resulted a new epoch in writing church history in accord with the best scientific methods of the day.

When over ninety years of age, Leo established the "Biblical Commission," that Catholic scholarship might keep abreast of the times, and satisfy the demands of Catholic students who look to the church for direction in all that concerns Holy Scripture. The result of this ferment is a new theological literature, which endeavors to state the position of the ancient faith in the way of modern thought, and gives to Catholic Christianity the apologetic needed in the world of today.

The works we have chosen show that constructive and destructive forces are at work.

The method pursued is largely positive, largely historical. The writers strive to show how any phase of Christian thought has developed from its original elements into the fuller expansion of a theology; they point out that such growth is no deviation, but rather the natural outcome of the original revelation; they are chary of the use of words that would make the original deposit a mere fossil, and Christianity the resultant of the addition of "foreign elements," a sort of geological stratification; they contend ever that Catholic doctrine is rather an *organic* whole, and its growth and development the result of the principle of living continuity. And this *traditio semper viva*, they hold, is guided by the Spirit of truth promised to the church, and abiding with it forever. This view of doctrinal development certainly puts Catholic scholars in a position to defend Christianity in the face of a century that explains all things by a theory of organic evolution. In some instances we see the influence of a destructive spirit, and there are a few cases in which men have allowed a critical and negative spirit to undermine their faith. This latter phase is represented by such men as Marcel Hébert. In his work *L'évolution de la foi catholique*,¹ he follows what he calls the *méthode positive*. He endeavors to trace the growth of Catholic faith from the religious sentiment born in man, to its transformation into a theology. He states that the Old Testament hardly possesses a theology in the full sense of that word, but only a theology *en images, en mythes* (p. 15). He finds a more developed theology in Paul and in the gospels, particularly in John's gospel, where the tendency to express the sentiments of early Christianity by images and ideas has become more and more intense. But in the main body of his work he

¹ *L'évolution de la foi catholique*. Par Marcel Hébert. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 257 pages. Fr. 5.

professes to describe chiefly the attitude of the Catholic church on the question of the relationship between faith and reason. He traces the doctrine from the earlier Fathers through the Schoolmen, even to the time since the Vatican Council. He concludes that, though the Catholic faith has been an interesting phase in the evolution of the human conscience, still its day has passed; and he predicts that the present apologetic, put forward by Brunetière, Loisy, and others, is destined to serve merely as a transition to a purer religion—a sort of socialism which will interest, not as an economical theory, but as an evolution of a new mental point of view—*évolution d'une nouvelle "mentalité"* (pp. 209, 210).

Throughout the works of the constructive party one is struck by the scholar-like modesty with which conclusions are put forward but at the same time by that sense of security that is ever present when the human mind feels a greater power back of its attempts at truth.

The attitude of the new apologetic toward some questions is particularly enlightening. We choose for illustration: (1) the much-mooted question of the power of the human mind to reach a knowledge of God and things divine; (2) the problem of the development of doctrine; (3) the problem of the actual development of theology in the New Testament; (4) the attitude of the new apologetic to modern Scripture controversies, especially to the question of "inspiration."

Marcel Hébert seems to think that the Catholic church is bound by the Vatican Council to an impossible intellectualism, which must eventually be its undoing. He recalls the decree in which the council, asserting a rational basis for our belief in God, states that human reason can with certainty reach a knowledge of God's existence (p. 163). He sees in the new apologetic of Brunetière, Blondel, and Loisy a return to the doctrine of the Traditionalists or Fideists. He describes Catholic dogma as in the grasp of a wise, philosophic thought on one side and historical criticism on the other; and, with a dogmatism proper to such men, he prophesies the final destruction of the Catholic religion—"qu'il y soit brisé, c'est incontestable" (p. 164).

Among Catholic schools in times past there was one which, denying reason its sovereign rights, met with condemnation. It was at this school, represented by such men as Bautain and Lamennais, that the council aimed its decision. True, Pascal, Bossuet, and Newman, following the path of earlier writers, have been accused of refusing to accept the finality of the ordinary metaphysical demonstrations for the existence of God; but it is not possible to show that they run foul of the Council of the Vatican, and equally impossible is it to reach such a conclusion in the case of

Brunetière or Loisy. True, the council has defined in the second chapter of *De Revelatione* that "the church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be *known* with certainty by the natural light of human reason, by means of created things;" and one recognizes that such a position is not only good philosophy, but is also the evident doctrine of Paul in the first chapter of his epistle to the Romans: "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, his eternal power also and divinity." Nor does M. Hébert refuse to recognize at least the theoretic value of this teaching:

Let us recognize, first of all, that from the theoretical point of view this teaching of the church is unassailable. If reason proves that God exists and can speak to us, and if the facts show that he has really spoken to us, the duty of believing is indisputable (p. 164).

But he immediately adds:

But are the philosophic proofs of the existence of God so established, and are we sure of the authenticity of the gospel documents containing the miracles which attest this revelation? We know that it is not so. The latest works of Abbé Loisy have given us the results of a conscientious and loyal criticism. Jesus was conceived of a virgin and was raised from the dead, not historically or physically, but "for faith." As to the idea of God, Loisy who, fearing lest he should be accused of being influenced in his criticism, as was Renan, by philosophical theories (e. g., *a priori* denial of the supernatural), has always avowed a dislike for metaphysics, nevertheless cannot refrain from declaring: "The advance of science presents the problem of God in new aspects" (p. 164).

He attempts to read into the council what is not there. The council purposely omitted the word *demonstrari* from its decree, and inserted *cognosci*; and with Catholics the term "reason" includes conscience and moral sentiment as well as understanding, nor are they bound to believe that the philosophical demonstrations, so called, necessarily hold every intellect. They believe, after the fashion of Paul, that in some way from the works of God man may have a certain conviction of God's existence. Pascal's position is therefore not condemned; for, though there is much doubt concerning some passages found in his writings, still Pascal was a firm believer in the power of man to reach God through nature, though in nature he included man's power to know and man's power to feel.* Nor is

* *La vraie religion selon Pascal*. Par Sully Prudhomme. Paris: Alcan, 1905. 439 pages. Fr. 7.50. In this work the author with rare judgment arranges methodically the sayings of Pascal on matters religious, and defends him from the charge of skepticism brought against him.

Newman read out of the church, though he, too, may have doubted the convincing power of the ordinary arguments, and appealed to the argument from conscience; though he may have asserted that the ordinary demonstrations, good in themselves, do not appeal to the intellect of our day. This doctrine is not new in the church. True, our apologetic has been made largely on the lines laid down by the Thomists, but from the days of scholastic supremacy the followers of Scotus curtailed the province of reason, and maintained a sort of supremacy of moral feeling over the intellect in the acquisition of religious truth.³ And it is with the apologetic of Duns Scotus and Cardinal Newman that the Catholic writer today meets the agnostic position set down by the author of the *Évolution de la foi catholique*, and brings the good old doctrine of "immanence" to the help of intellectualism in his campaign against unbelief.

M. Hébert in the above-cited passage finds fault, too, because Catholic apologists declare that faith in Jesus Christ, faith in his resurrection, results not from philosophy or history alone (p. 164). The council does decree:

In order that our faith might be in harmony with reason, God willed that to the interior help of the Holy Spirit there should be joined exterior proofs of his revelation. Thus, while the assent of faith is by no means a blind action of the mind, still no man can assent to the gospel (much less to individual truths) without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

History, philosophy, and the spirit of faith, the moral temper expressed in the question, "What must I do to be saved?" all combine to produce our acceptance of Christ.

That in Catholic theology there has been *growth and development* needs no proof. To formulate a theory of development is not so easy, and in the Catholic church it seems to have special difficulties. All are agreed that revelation submitted to the ordinary processes of the human mind must expand; and this particularly because revelation was given "at sundry times and in divers manners," and was not proclaimed after the logical order of a religious system; and also because much has been revealed, not explicitly, not clearly, but in an implied fashion and dimly. All, too, are agreed that the church in her formulæ must use a human language, while speaking of truths that are beyond man's ken. These formulæ are ever inadequate, and will sometimes appear inaccurate, if pressed too closely. Will not the human mind pondering over these truths gradually reach clearer understanding of divine revelation, especially as the great purposes of God unfold through the ages; and will not this

³ *New York Review*, Vol. I, No. 1, "Scotus Redivivus."

clearer understanding produce a clearer human expression of revealed truth? Some law, therefore, of development must be admitted.

In present Catholic theology there is a certain wise timidity in accepting a fixed theory of doctrinal evolution. The hesitation displeases many non-catholic writers, and our attempts to formulate theories are also severely criticised (Hébert, p. 168). In the presence of a question so delicate, one may commend modesty and reserve, and, before all the facts are obtained, one may praise those who hesitate to form a synthesis. Tixeront,⁴ in a note at p. 7, writes concerning this subject as follows:

As I am not writing a treatise on theology, I will not here set forth the theory of the development of dogma and the manner in which either Catholics or Protestants understand it. A few remarks will serve our purpose. The history of dogma assumes that these dogmas have passed through certain changes and that they have been subjected to certain developments or transformations. For only living and changing things have a history. The existence of these changes cannot even be questioned. We need only to open our eyes to see them. The important point is to determine upon the character and results of these vicissitudes, to notice their limits, their causes, and laws; in a word, to state in what measure the substance of dogma is affected by this evolution. The subject can be treated theoretically from the *a priori* standpoint, building upon the teaching of the church the inherent immutability of dogma; or it can be treated *a posteriori*, by the historical method, collecting the results that a close study of the facts reveals. This latter method is naturally the only one which the historian can follow. Protestant authors and rationalists assert that historical study has led them to the conclusion that the primitive deposit of Christian revelation has not only been scientifically expounded and developed in subsequent dogma, but has been very substantially altered and modified. As an example of this view see Harnack's statement.⁵ Quite different, as is well known, are the conclusions reached by Newman, while he was still an Anglican, on the basis of like historical investigations, and set forth by him in his well-known essay, mentioned above. Catholics have, as a body, accepted these views. But, I will add, the theory of the development of dogma, although much studied in our day, is far from being satisfactorily worked out. Scholars are generally too much given to vague formulæ, simple inexact analogies (the child who becomes a man, the seedling that becomes a tree). The question to which we must give a technical and satisfying reply is this: Under what circumstances is an idea or a doctrine, related to another idea or another doctrine, only a simple development, and under what circumstances is it an alteration or a real transformation? For example, can the idea of the church be considered as a simple development of the eschatological

⁴ *Histoire des dogmes: I, La théologie anténicéenne*. Par J. Tixeront. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 475 pages. Fr. 3.50.

⁵ *Précis de l'histoire de dogmas*, Introduction, p. x.

idea of the kingdom of God, or is it rather something quite different? The analogy of the oak which grows from the acorn shows how doctrines can differ in appearance while in reality proceeding one from the other. To this problem not enough attention has been given by certain writers who manifest too narrow a conception of the progress of dogma.

There is a feeling that the old concept of doctrinal development was too narrow, too restricted; that a larger development must be admitted to meet the facts which history ever brings before us. How this theory will be formulated remains to be seen. The subject is receiving much attention, and permanent results may be expected ere long.

Perhaps the condition of Catholic thought concerning *doctrinal development* may be best illustrated by the teachings of Catholic writers anent a gradual development even in the New Testament. Father Tixeront is very interesting from this standpoint. He lays down the principle that the Holy Spirit guided the apostles in their teaching, and that the office of the apostles was to complete and to bring into a harmonious whole the doctrine of the Master. He distinguishes five different stages in the development of Christ's teaching in the New Testament: (1) the words that came from Christ's own lips; (2) the apostolic teaching prior to Paul; (3) Paul's teaching; (4) the teaching of the apostles after Paul; (5) the teaching of the gospel of John (p. 63). In the synoptists Christ's words hardly go beyond the bounds of Jewish thought. True, the horizon is ever enlarged, the spirit is loftier, the concepts are more spiritual, but not so as to make his words unintelligible to a Jewish audience (p. 113). Paul accommodates his thought to the Greeks and the Hellenizing Hebrews, while John, setting aside the particularism of the Jew, proclaims the universality of the religion of Christ, and the Messiah of the Jews is proclaimed in clearest terms the "Word made flesh," true God of true God, who gives light and life to men. He writes:

It is in the gospels that we have access to the personal teaching of Jesus Christ. The synoptics give us the accepted form in a redaction which unquestionably reproduces most closely the original teaching. The fourth gospel has perhaps preserved certain more profound expositions of the Master's teachings, but, on any hypothesis, has given us transformation rather than a literal reproduction of them (p. 63).

And the great question that underlies such doctrine he puts tentatively as follows (p. 63, n. I):

These two sources, however, can and must be used, if we wish to arrive at an exact and complete interpretation of them. Two questions present themselves here which I cannot discuss, but on which, practically, I must take sides. First, can the discourses represented by the fourth gospel to be the discourses of

Jesus Christ, be considered as representing accurately his preaching, and, consequently, can they be used in expounding the teachings of the Master?⁶

Second, although recognizing in general the faithful reproduction of Christ's teachings in the synoptics, may we not recognize here some departure distinguishing what was really spoken by the Savior in person from a later development of Christian thought attributed to him before the final redaction of the gospels? But suppose that it were possible and legitimate (this we cannot absolutely deny), we could not undertake it here, and, on the whole, for our purpose, it would not lead to any important result, since it is generally admitted that the doctrine transmitted by the synoptics is, save perhaps in a few particulars, the original doctrine of Jesus.⁷

This speaks for itself, and is an illustration of the doctrine given above. John is but a faithful and consistent evolution of the thought of Christ as found in the synoptists.

Since the establishment of the Biblical Commission, there has been great activity in *Scripture work* among Catholics. In all the leading reviews, in books, in pamphlets, all sorts and kinds of questions are being mooted, and none more than the question of the nature of inspiration and its effects. The wisest think the time not ripe for definite decision, but all recognize that the question of inspiration is the burning question of the hour. The Jesuit Hummelauer has given us a very notable contribution on the subject;⁸ and Father LaGrange, in his *Méthode historique*,⁹ treats the subject with the learning of a critic, and the acumen of a scholar trained in the order that gave to the church Thomas Aquinas. The formula, "God is the author of Scripture," comes to the church from the earliest ages, and is consecrated by the Councils of Florence and Trent. But because many are the ways of conceiving divine authorship, this decision leaves much to be inferred, much to be determined by direct observation. Father LaGrange is anxious to point out that the *a priori* method of inference must have its place; but the application of the *a priori* principle must ever be modified by direct observation of facts of the

⁶ See, as an example of the affirmative answer: J. Bovon, *Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, I, 2d ed., pp. 162 ff.; F. Godet, *Commentaire sur l'évangile de saint Jean*, I, 4th ed. (Neuchâtel, 1902), pp. 138 ff.; Batiffol, *Six leçons sur les évangiles* (Paris, 1897), pp. 125 ff. Stevens, *The Theology of the New Testament*, p. 176.

⁷ See B. Weiss, *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie*, §§ 10, 11; Lagrange, *Revue biblique*, 1903, pp. 299, 300; Rose, *Études sur les évangiles*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1902), p. 63, n. 1.

⁸ *Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf das Alte Testament*. Von Franz von Hummelauer. St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1904.

⁹ *La méthode historique*. Par Marie-Joseph LaGrange. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904.

Sacred Writings, and these facts are so many that within the past few years the whole question may be said to have entered upon an entirely new phase, and in the new phase scientific investigation holds a much larger place than it did in the elder day when the *a priori* method dominated the situation. Thus, while Father LaGrange, in describing the nature and influence of inspiration would proceed chiefly by way of logical inference from the data of revelation and the principles of psychology, still he adds: "It is proper that greater reserve be maintained in applying this mental process to the divine historical fact itself." We know so little of God's ways that

when it is a question of affirming what may or may not be the object of divine inspiration, or to whom it was proper that the gift should be imparted (though we may not lose sight of the exigencies of reason), we should be cautious in concluding by way of inference as to what is or is not fitting.

Facts must outweigh our preconceived ideas concerning the fitness of things, and, in working out these principles, he insists that an inspired book may be anonymous, nay pseudonymous, and it may be the work of several authors. The more delicate subject of biblical inerrancy is also touched upon. He speaks thus of the purpose of inspiration:

The purpose of inspiration is not essentially to give immediate information, but to preserve with a divine authority what we ought to know, to show clearly that the teaching contained in the Bible, although sometimes given directly and clearly, is often also a resultant which is exceedingly difficult to understand correctly; and it is for this reason that the interpretation of the Bible has been intrusted to the church alone (p. 92).

With this principal clearly stated he asks the question:

Was all the history that God willed to preserve, then, free from imperfections in respect to religious truth? Even if the principles are established, the application of them is a very delicate matter. Whatever the sacred writers teach, God teaches, and consequently it is true. But what is it that the sacred writers teach? What do they categorically affirm? But it has long been admitted that the Bible is not a collection of theses or categorical affirmations. It belongs to that type of literature in which nothing is absolutely affirmed as to the reality of the facts. These facts serve solely as a basis for a moral lesson, as in the case of a parable. Now, inspiration does not change the characteristics of literary types. Each one must be interpreted according to its peculiar rules. It is evident that in the Bible this teaching is not in the form of revealed propositions entirely complete and isolated in their splendor. It is a mixture of narratives, discussions, poetic effusions, anecdotes, prayers, and metaphors (p. 93).

Also in the *Revue biblique* for April he touches another phase of the subject when he says that there are many things in the Bible which are

related, without being affirmed as articles of belief, and he alludes to what he terms "profane things." These he is perfectly ready to accept, if there are reasons for such acceptance; but no one can compel acceptance of truths of the profane order, because there is nothing to prove that such things are imposed upon us as articles of belief, for the simple reason that, being of the profane order, they cannot of themselves be objects of faith.

These few extracts, culled here and there from works that are current in Roman Catholic circles, will perhaps be indicative of the trend of the new apologetic. The novelty does not seem to frighten the intelligent among Catholics. They seemingly desire to embrace the truth, in whatever form it comes, mindful ever that truth is one, and that erroneous positions must soon be detected; mindful, too, that, while it is human to err, there is in the church an abiding spirit of truth which is ever leading men into the fuller light, even though the modes of thought determining men's convictions are different today from what they have been in ages that are gone.

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In this treatise¹⁰ on the eucharist we are moving in the atmosphere of the ancient Catholic church, as it adapted Christian teaching to the ways of thought and expression in the Græco-Roman world. No effort is made to interpret or to readjust the eucharistic language to modern conditions, no effort to explain what is assumed to be an ineffable mystery. The author travels over the whole field of discussion from Paul down to the moment in the Latin church, when, in the ninth century, strict "realism" first asserted without qualification that the bread of the eucharist was changed by a miracle into that body of Christ which was born of Mary. This becomes the standard by which M. Batiffol passes judgment on every antecedent utterance and finds that all alike, though in different degrees and with varying approximations, fall short of the highest truth.

But M. Batiffol does not fail to notice modern speculation. In his chapter entitled "*Critique de théories récentes*" he gives the theories of Hoffmann, Spitta, Weizsäcker, Jülicher, and Holtzmann; but he states them for the purpose of refutation only. He discerns in the view of Weizsäcker, which has been more fully developed by Jülicher, "*une interprétation subtile et séduisante*," but he does justice to it in his statement:

¹⁰ *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive*. Deuxième série: L'eucharistie, la présence réelle, et la transsubstantiation. Par Pierre Batiffol. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 388 pages. Fr. 3.50.

Weizsäcker first suggested the word "parable," and characterized the words spoken over the bread and the wine as a parable to which Christ has not given the key. Jülicher admits that this parable was by no means an enigma to the disciples. There was no deep and premeditated design in the words of Christ. A simple association of ideas led him to compare the bread to his body, and the wine to his blood. There is no more significance in this simile than in the case where Christ (John 15:1 f.) calls himself the vine and his Father the husbandman. But here it has a more pathetic meaning. In the hour when everything points to his approaching death, and when Christ's spirit is itself sad even to death, Christ takes occasion, in breaking the bread and blessing the wine, to teach his disciples that his death is to be for them a source of blessing. Christ solaces his own heart; and not for his disciples only, but for himself, he finds a word to indicate how a man can meet the ruin of all his plans and of all his hopes.

Upon this statement M. Batiffol comments: "This is a beautiful conception, but it is the creation of Jülicher."

But within his chosen field of inquiry, with its inevitable limitations, M. Batiffol moves with the air of supreme mastery of the situation. His discussion is learned and scholarly, omitting no utterance of any importance, and above all absolutely fair and impartial. His work, therefore, has great value in the department of doctrine-history. The passages about which Roman Catholics and Protestants have disputed since the Reformation come up for a rehearing by a judge who has honesty of purpose, as well as abundant knowledge and clear insight. Everywhere he shows downright unwillingness to twist language or distort expression in the interest of some prejudged conclusion. He admits that Cyril of Jerusalem comes near to the true doctrine of "conversion of substance," but he refuses his assent to Loofs's opinion that Cyril practically asserted transubstantiation in the comparison of the water changed to wine. Cyril, the patriarch of Alexandria, approximated the true view, but he was under the influence of the controversy about the "two natures" and saw only the fusion of the bread with the body of Christ. On the other hand, Pope Gelasius fell short of the full truth, misled by the monophysite controversy into adopting a false analogy, when he interpreted the eucharist in harmony with the Chalcedonian formula. The early Alexandrian writers, Clement and Origen, failed because they sought allegorical interpretation of the mystery. In treating the African writers, he remarks of Tertullian: "Aucune subtilité d'exégèse ne permettra de dire que Tertullien a reconnu dans l'eucharistie la vérité du corps du Christ." Among Latin writers, Ambrose alone came so near the truth that he may be said to have contributed the direct line of thought which the doctrine of transubstantiation followed. Augustine was a symbolist, maintaining the *praesentia spiri-*

tualis, and by his great influence in the West retarding the progress toward the truth. Ratramnus did little more than reaffirm the teaching of Augustine, and the same is true of Berengar at a later time.

Out of all the writers of the first eight centuries, M. Batiffol approves only two, as leading in the right direction—Gregory of Nyssa and Ambrose. "Among the Romans the authority of Augustine until the ninth century sanctioned a language which made an abstraction of the subject, allowed long periods of uncertainty, and gave rise to bitter controversies, which, even outside Catholicism, still exist."

It might almost seem as if M. Batiffol admitted that in the long controversy Protestant scholars who have affirmed that the doctrine of "conversion of substance" was not taught in the ancient Catholic church have been nearer the truth than Roman Catholic scholars who have found transubstantiation in the language of Justin, of Irenæus, and most of the writers who followed them, even yielding with difficulty the allegorical Alexandrians. But, on the other hand, M. Batiffol finds what he calls "realism" in every church father of any prominence; or, in other words, that even if they take the symbolical or figurative view of the sacrament, yet they all agree that some objective gift is imparted, which is tied to the bread and the wine, as by some organic law. Here M. Batiffol falls back upon the theory of Dr. Harnack, and applies it vigorously, that the ancient writers did not use the word "symbol" in the modern sense, distinguishing between the symbol and that which it signified; but the symbol was in some manner that which it symbolized. Hence M. Batiffol applies the term "realistic" to the earlier teaching about the eucharist, as opposed to "spiritual," which is subjective and unreal. Realism becomes the first stage in the development of transubstantiation.

It is at this point that the issue must be taken. M. Batiffol discredits the erudition of Luther, who had maintained that transubstantiation was based on the false philosophy of Aristotle. Luther, it is true, was mistaken in affirming that the Latin doctrine was first taught by Aquinas. But that it is based upon Aristotelian premises may yet be true. According to the Platonic teaching—and under its influence were nearly all the writers of the ancient church—that which is spiritual is most real. "Realism," as the word is used by M. Batiffol, is a misnomer, part of our Aristotelian heritage of the Middle Ages, which makes the spiritual to be unreal, and that which is physical or quasi-corporal to be alone the real. The spiritual presence of Christ is the most real presence.

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RECENT MISSIONARY LITERATURE

Mr. Mott's lectures¹ were delivered, in advance of publication, before the students of several divinity schools. Mr. Mott employs "missions" in its ordinary sense, to describe that evangelization of non-Christian nations, which the bishops of the Lambeth Conference declared to be the "primary work of the church, the work for which the church was commissioned by our Lord." Taking for granted the acceptance by his hearers of this proposition, he spends little time in urging the duty of missions; but, after an introductory chapter upon "The Non-Christian World at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and its Message to the Churches of Christendom," proceeds to a very practical discussion of the pastor as an educational force, a financial force, a recruiting force, and a spiritual force in the world's evangelization. In an appendix a useful bibliography for the minister's library is furnished. It is gratifying to find attention called in the opening chapter to the marked movement in the direction of unity and co-operation among the Christian forces on mission fields. Not that Mr. Mott is the first to ask the churches at home to consider this important fact; it is taken into account in every recent serious discussion of missionary questions; but to the ears of many true friends of missions it is still a new and strange thing that Christian men in China or India are quite indifferent to the particular doctrinal statements or ecclesiastical politics upon which denominations divide in England and America. Until they have become more familiar with this astonishing fact, however, they are not prepared to deal intelligently with the really urgent problems of the twentieth-century missionary endeavor. It is more than a question of interdenominational co-unity in mission fields. These concessions are now quite generally made, if at times in a somewhat grudging spirit. Mr. Mott has larger matters in mind. He shows the unmistakable tendency toward practical unity among the organized forces of Protestant Christianity, fostered by the activities of the Young Men's Christian Association and similar organizations, by Bible and Christian Literature Societies, and, we may add, in one great mission field, by the China Inland Mission, which makes its appeal to all denominations, and depends upon none. Again and again great mission conferences abroad have borne testimony to a conviction that not the co-operation of one Christian body with another, but corporate unity of Christian forces is essential to the most successful evangelization. "Without doubt," says Mr. Mott, "the church in non-

¹ *The Pastor and Modern Missions: A Plea for Leadership in World Evangelization.* By John R. Mott. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1904. 247 pages. \$1.

Christian lands has important lessons to teach the church in Christian countries, both in the theory and in the practice of Christian unity and co-operation." The body of the book is occupied with the discussion of the practical methods by which the activities of the church in world-evangelization may best be promoted and directed. To one who has not learned by experience how serious are the everyday matters with which Mr. Mott deals, this discussion may seem superfluously minute and even trivial. But it is not so. His plain and practical advice is well considered, pertinent, helpful.

A second series of "Student Lectures on Missions" is offered in Mr. Shedd's *Islam and the Oriental Churches*,² dealing with the "neglected and misunderstood Muhammadan missionary problem" as exhibited in the historical relations of the two faiths in the limited field of the Nestorian and Jacobite churches. This field is selected with a purpose. "It exhibits Islam in the region where it developed, where it was dominant, and most free to work out its own destiny. It presents both religions where political rivalries have been least prominent and where missionary activity has been most marked" (p. 9). Four of the six chapters are occupied with a historical survey of the reciprocal relations between Islam and Christianity, the condition of the Christian churches under Muslim rule, the Muslim propaganda in western Asia, and the final ruin of the eastern churches. But Mr. Shedd is writing this history with an end in view, and he keeps steadily before his reader its bearing upon the particular missionary problem which Islam today presents. It will never serve as a stepping-stone to Christianity, while between the two religions is interposed the barrier of the "unchanging and unchangeable Quran." In this irreconcilable conflict Christianity is today paying the penalty of its neglect for six hundred years to carry the gospel into Arabia. But if Christianity lost its opportunity in Arabia and failed to hold its conquests in central Asia, it is not now waging a losing battle. Protestant missions, in co-operation with the oriental churches, are calling them back to their historic task and service. Islam, on the other hand, is plainly unequal to the large demands which modern thought and civilization are making upon it. The Bab movement in Persia and that of the so-called Mutazilites of India are not so much reforms as revolutions, forecasting unconsciously the downfall of the system they profess to uphold—a system which is doomed when it can no

² *Islam and the Oriental Churches: Their Historical Relations*. [Student's Lectures in Missions, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1902-3.] By William Ambrose Shedd. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work, 1904. 253 pages.

longer "hold and inspire high and noble minds." The contrast between Christianity and Islam, as Mr. Shedd finely puts it, is the contrast between Christ and Muhammad. Thus the ideals are disclosed to which the religions are tending, and to compare the ideals is to give a renewed assurance of the ultimate triumph. There is much in Mr. Shedd's book, incidental to its great theme, that is pertinent to every missionary undertaking, such as his illustration of the importance of bringing our arguments against other religions into strict conformity to the facts, and of allowing to them every concession that truth and generosity require (p. 136); his insistence that "Christianity, in order to be a permanent and effective force, must lay hold of the nation, and be itself so organized in its outward form and in its intellectual character as to become an integral part of the life of the nation" (p. 186). This is a discovery of the modern missionary, and it proclaims the new day of new mission methods and aims.

*New Forces in Old China*³ well describes a miscellany of papers, made up of lectures delivered on the Student Lectureship Foundation of Princeton Theological Seminary, together with articles contributed to various magazines. This material is distributed into five parts: "Old China and its People," "The Commercial Force and the Economic Revolution," "The Political Force and the National Protest," "The Missionary Force and the Chinese Church," "The Future of China and Our Relations to It." It will be seen that something is said on nearly every important question raised today, regarding the political, commercial, and religious condition of China. The most obvious omission is that of the vital matter of education, but with the help of the index even this defect may be in a measure supplied. Events move so rapidly of late in the Far East that the chapters on the political situation have already received revision. With the questions at issue between the missionary and his critics Dr. Brown deals at length in discussion of "Missionaries and Native Law Suits," "Missionaries and Their Own Governments," "The Responsibility of Missionaries." His conclusions appear to be candid and fair, quite unbiased by prejudice. As regards the matter of missionary interference in lawsuits, for example, he cites the result of an investigation made by the president of the Shantung Protestant University, from which it appears that out of one hundred and forty-six concrete cases, interference was positively mischievous in sixty-seven, and of doubtful value in twenty-six. On the still more difficult question of the relation of the missionary to the consular and diplomatic representatives of his own government, Dr.

³ *New Forces in Old China*. By Arthur Judson Brown. Chicago: Revell. 382 pages. \$1.50.

Brown holds—as against those who contend, to quote Dr. Henry M. Field, that “to get behind diplomatic guaranties in order to evangelize the nations is to mistake the sword for the Spirit, to rely on the arm of flesh, and put aside the help of the Almighty”—that it is “neither necessary nor expedient for the individual missionary to renounce his claims to the protection of home citizenship.” But the enterprise, after all, is an unworldly one, and the missionary who is true to his calling will not hesitate to take risks. A specially interesting chapter is that which treats of the Chinese Christians, and the testimony to the genuineness of their faith offered by the fortitude with which they faced the awful trials accompanying the Boxer uprising. The closing chapter, entitled “The Paramount Duty of Christendom,” is an eloquent appeal for the reinforcement of the endeavor to Christianize China. “The West has something more to offer China than a civilization. As a matter of fact, the best people of the West are not trying to give China a civilization at all, but a gospel. With whatever is good in Chinese civilization they have no wish to interfere.”

All who have read Mr. Clement's admirable *Handbook of Modern Japan*, published a year or two ago, will welcome this companion volume, *Christianity in Modern Japan*.⁴ It is equally clear, compact, and well arranged, and would serve excellently, as indeed its author desires that it may, as a textbook for mission classes. It is furnished with a map, photographic illustrations, and a brief but serviceable bibliography. One realizes anew how short is the history of the Christianity now existing in Japan, when one reads that the first Protestant missionaries to land in Japan, representatives of the American Episcopal church, are still living. But that short history has had its period of popularity, of reaction, and now of revival marked by great Christian reform and educational movements, and in particular by a recent wide-reaching evangelistic campaign in which the initiative was taken by the Japanese Christians. The signs multiply that the Christian churches in Japan will at no distant day become the Christian church of Japan, and that the particular forms of denominationalism introduced from the West will vanish. One wonders, as he glances at Mr. Clement's chapter headings, “Baptists in Japan,” “Congregationalists in Japan,” “Methodists in Japan,” what designations will take the place of these in a history of Christianity in Japan written twenty-five years hence! Not the least interesting material of the book is an article in the appendix entitled “Christianity versus Heathenism in Japan,” in which a striking parallel is drawn between conditions in the Roman

⁴ *Christianity in Modern Japan*. By Ernest W. Clement. With Map and Illustrations. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1905. 205 pages. \$1.

Empire when Christianity began to spread through its provinces, as described in Uhlhorn's *Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, and the religious condition of Japan today. Mr. Clement's conclusion is that Christianity is rapidly taking possession of Japan, and that the expectation is reasonable that within this twentieth century Japan will become practically a Christian nation.

Quite another opinion as to this matter is held by Dr. Nitobé in *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*.⁵ With some irritation he repudiates the claim that the Christian missionaries contributed an appreciable quota to the making of New Japan. "I would fain render honor," he says, "to whom honor is due; but this honor can as yet hardly be accorded to the good missionary. More fitting it will be to their profession to stick to the scriptural injunction of preferring one another in honor than to advance a claim in which they have no proofs to back them." As to proofs "the good missionaries" might have something to say. But let Dr. Nitobé's denial stand. If not Christianity, what then? "Bushido, the maker and product of Old Japan, is still the guiding principle of the transition and will prove the formative force of the new era" (p. 172). It is easier to say what Bushido, literally "Military Knight Ways" or "Precepts of Knighthood," is not, than what it is. It is not a religion, though Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism have all contributed to it. It is not a written code of laws with outward sanctions of any sort. It is not a system of ethics. At the most, it is a few maxims, handed down from mouth to mouth, concerning the warrior virtues, such as justice, courage, benevolence, veracity, courtesy, honor, loyalty, self-control. Upon this ancient faith of the gentleman and the soldier Dr. Nitobé comments in a singularly suggestive and winning little book. Its influence upon Japan in the past has been incomputable. Bushido is rightly called the "soul" of Japan. And it survives still in the courtesy for which Japan is proverbial, in the loyalty and fortitude which conquered in the recent Russian war, and in the magnanimity which made possible the peace which closed that strife. But plainly there is no place for Bushido in an era of democracy and peace. "Alas for knightly virtues! Alas for samurai pride! Morality ushered into the world with the sound of bugles and drums is destined to fade away as the captains and the kings depart." "I said the other day to a lieutenant on a man-of-war," to quote from a missionary periodical: "'There are some people who think a country like yours can do without Christianity,

⁵ *Bushido: The Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought*. By Inazo Nitobé. With an Introduction by William Elliot Griffis. Tenth revised and enlarged edition. New York and London: Putnam, 1905. xxv + 203 pages.

that Bushido almost takes its place. What do you think?' He answered emphatically: 'Taranai,' 'not enough.'" This Dr. Nitobé admits. Bushido has done its work for Japan. Christianity is the only ethical system powerful enough to cope with present-day utilitarianism and materialism. His difference, he protests, is not with the teachings of Christ, but solely with the ecclesiastical methods and forms which obscure these teachings. Certainly, if they obscure these teachings they must have an end. The missionaries are rapidly coming to an agreement with each other and with Dr. Nitobé as to what Japan really needs.

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FRESH LIGHT ON THE DARK CONTINENT

Of six recent books on Africa, two are of value as contributions to knowledge of the land and its people, two are voluminous additions to the discussion of the Congo Free State problem, and two are textbooks on missions throughout the continent.

Gibbons' *Africa from South to North*¹ is one of the most important contributions to our knowledge of Africa since the works of Stanley. The author had been in Africa three times before the journey recorded in these volumes, and had made himself well acquainted with a portion of Marotseland,² that native empire, as large as Germany, in the center of the southern portion of the continent, having the notable ruler Lewanika. Major Gibbons' various expeditions have covered more than twenty thousand miles in uncivilized Africa—a distance approached by only two other explorers. The expedition under review occupied a little more than two years (July, 1898, to August, 1901), entering Africa by the mouth of the Zambesi, and departing by way of the Nile. Its objects were

to determine the geographical limits of Lewanika's country, to define the Congo-Zambesi watershed, to discover the main sources of the Zambesi, to make a hydrographical and ethnographical survey of the whole of Lewanika's territory, to study its resources and industrial possibilities, to ascertain how far the Zambesi and her confluent could be considered as navigable waterways, to furnish the late Mr. Cecil Rhodes with such information as might be of assistance in the location of a route for the projected transcontinental railway.

¹ *Africa from South to North through Marotseland.* By A. St. H. Gibbons. London: Lane, 1904. 2 vols. 276 and 297 pages.

² *Exploration and Hunting in Central Africa 1895-96.* By A. St. H. Gibbons. London: Methuen, 1898. 408 pages.

These purposes were carried out with thoroughness and success. The geographical observations and discoveries made are embodied in a large map of Marotseland folded at the back of the first volume, and maps of other regions in the second volume. The account of the expedition describes enough of the human vicissitudes involved to give the story a flavor of adventure. It is a graphic narrative. It leaves something to the reader to imagine, and yet tells enough to enable one to see, not only the progress of the expedition, but also the conditions which called out the personal resources of the explorers. Major Gibbons expresses ungrudging appreciation of his comrades in the expedition, black as well as white.

The source of the Zambesi was finally reached, and proves to be four or five days' march from the conjectured position it has long occupied on maps. Several of its great tributaries are now for the first time reduced from the dotted lines of conjecture to the solid lines of ascertained course. While there are no vast regions of the earth's surface remaining to be opened to knowledge, no end of details must still be ascertained. "I can assure my readers that the map of Africa will be subjected to more additions, alterations, and modifications than even many of those interested in geography at home suppose."

The author's observations concerning the natives are of special value, because they are characterized by fairness and the sincere appreciation of both the better and the worse sides. At times Major Gibbons traveled with only a handful of personal attendants, and never had a body of armed followers, as is deemed necessary by many explorers. Without ever experiencing serious opposition, he went over thousands of miles where no white man had preceded him, and he believed that the only occasions when his life was in danger were the results of impressions left by armed parties that had been in the country. On only one night was a watch kept over the camp, and that was without orders from the chief, the voluntary act of one of his faithful attendants. He calls attention to the exceedingly significant facts that the three African explorers who have traveled farthest were all British subjects, that no one of them ever employed a single native soldier, and that each is free from the stain of blood.

His account of Lewanika and his government of a vast empire in the heart of the continent shows that the African possesses intellectual and moral qualities of high grade. This Marotse empire is apparently in some respects more advanced than was that of the Czar before the recent revolution in Russia. Major Gibbons describes the transformation which took place years ago in Lewanika and his government, ascribing it to the work of the French Protestant missionaries.

Gradually the lofty character and impressive personality of Monsieur Coillard, who established his mission at Lialui . . . have obliterated the harsh side of his nature, engendered nobler aspirations, and developed a certain liberality of sentiment and a laudable desire to raise his people to a higher scale of civilization.

The four closing chapters, called appendixes, are a summary of the more serious conclusions arrived at as a result of experiences in various parts of Africa. Trade communications, material prospects, missionary enterprise, and administrative methods are discussed.

There is only an occasional slip in the diction. It is for the most part smooth and readable. The volumes are well, and not too profusely, illustrated. The descriptive gift of the author makes every page live. For example: A petty native chief is brought to him in a hammock.

Over the hammock there appeared a black head surmounted by an old top hat which, in the owner's anxiety to make his first appearance impressive under cover of this handsome headpiece, had slipped partly forward and partly sideways over the right eye. This was slowly followed by the rest of the presence of the great Dimbudi, who shortly stood before me clad in his very best—a pair of very old evening-dress trousers much too long for the wearer, and looking something like a couple of Concertinas in their lower extremities, a red serge coat much too small and short in the sleeves, and the old top hat fixed with jaunty effect, and of course brushed against the grain.

The following may be taken as a fair sign of both the moral ideals and the British loyalty of the author:

I know of an instance of a dispute between an Englishman and a Frenchman newly arrived in British Central Africa. "Why do you not take the case into court?" asked a friend of the latter, also a foreigner. "I would do so if I were a British subject, but I am a Frenchman, and it would be useless," was the reply. "Tut! that makes no difference here. Right is right, and wrong is wrong under the British flag," was the foreign settler's answer. The dispute was taken before the magistrate, and the Frenchman won his case.

Dr. Nassau's *Fetishism in West Africa*,³ is the result of forty years' experience as a missionary in the Gabun country. The author, after preliminary chapters on the constitution of native African society, the idea of God and polytheism, devotes twelve chapters to the description of fetishism in various aspects, including its philosophy, its results in witchcraft, in civil, social, and industrial life. The two closing chapters are given to "Tales of Fetish Based on Fact," and "Fetish in Folk-Lore."

The author writes more in the light of traditional opinion than in the

³ *Fetishism in West Africa: Forty Years' Observations of the Native Customs and Superstitions*. By Robert Hamil Nassau. New York: Scribner, 1904. 389 pages.

light of modern psychology. For instance, he assumes that the underlying realities of the witchcraft phenomena in Africa are due to demoniacal possession.

The possibility of a permanent possession by Satan being admitted, it is easily possible that the fetish doctors or priestesses may be temporarily entered into by Satan's power, and that some wonderful things they do and say while endowed with that power are used by the devil to blind men's minds against the truth.

While the author's speculations as to the origin and philosophy of fetishism lack scientific breadth, his descriptions of fact are clear and are the product of intimate, friendly association with the natives. He appreciates the reality of the native's faith to himself.

A native heathen Akele chief, Kasa, my friend and host in the Ogowé, in 1874, showed me a string of shells, bones, horns, wild-cat tails, and so forth, each with its magic compound, which he said could turn aside bullets. In a friendly way he dared me to fire at him with my sixteen-repeater Winchester rifle. I did not believe he meant it, but on his taking his stand a few paces distant, he did not quail under my steady aim, nor even at the click of the trigger.

Dr. Nassau's experience leads him to the conclusion that it is more difficult for the native to abandon his faith in fetish than it is for him genuinely to reform his moral character. Our author has never found a tribe that did not have in the background of its belief some thought and name of the Supreme Being. There is a broad and genial human sympathy in the author's work, which gives real value to his observations. For instance, it seems clear to him that, in addition to the purely religious considerations, it is well worth while to work for the African natives, "simply for the elevation of the heathen during their present earthly life."

This volume is valuable as a trustworthy collection of materials and graphic data for the study of fetishism.

The latest books in the Congo Free State discussion are marked instances of special pleading, on the one side in behalf of humanity, and on the other in behalf of King Leopold II.⁴

*King Leopold's Rule in Africa*⁵ is written by Edmund D. Morel, secretary of the Congo Reform Association. He divides his thirty chapters

⁴ Leading previous volumes, one on each side of the controversy, are *Civilization in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-Doing*, by H. R. Fox-Bourne (London: King, 1903; 311 pages); and *New Africa: An Essay on Government Civilization in New Countries and on the Foundation, Organization, and Administration of the Congo Free State*. By E. Descampes (London: Low, Marston & Co., 1903; 402 pages).

⁵ *King Leopold's Rule in Africa*. By Edmund D. Morel. With Illustrations and Maps. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1905. 466 pages.

into six parts: I, "Historical;" II, "The New African Slave Trade;" III, "The New Slave Trade in Being;" IV, "The Working of the System as it Affects International Commercial Interests;" V, "The Congo Debate in the Belgian House of Representatives;" VI, "The Attempt to Discredit Consul Casement's Report." Nearly one hundred pages of appendix give original documents in the case.

The author's fundamental contention is that the land policy and monopolistic exclusiveness of the Congo State government are contrary to the acts of the Berlin and Brussels Conferences which sanctioned the establishment of the state. He next goes over the whole area of the state, district by district, and produces testimony as to the brutality with which the autocratic government is administered for revenue only. Perhaps the most convincing part of the evidence is that given in the speeches of leaders in the Belgian House of Representatives.

The book would carry more conviction to many minds if it were written in a calmer style. The constant use of irony in quoting the pretensions of King Leopold's government as to philanthropic motives becomes wearisome. In spite, however, of defects which belong to special pleading, the evidence advanced is so varied and so overwhelming as to carry with it inevitable conviction.

"The first intimation that Congo troops were in the habit of cutting off the hands of men, women, and children in connection with the rubber traffic reached Europe through the Rev. J. B. Murphy, of the American Baptist Missionary Union, in 1895." From that time on, the evidence of this and similar barbarities has been accumulating on every hand. While the missionaries of all the Protestant bodies have borne witness, travelers and explorers, though having less intimate and sympathetic relations with the natives, have fully confirmed and enlarged their testimony.

Major Gibbons, while warmly appreciating the work of representatives of the Congo State in some portions of its vast dominion, is constrained to speak in severe terms of the methods of the state in other portions which fell under his observation. Sir Harry Johnston, another authority of highest standing, is not only convinced himself, but says that Sir Henry Stanley, the principal agent in founding the state, and its defender for many years, had the last year of his life embittered by the conviction that great wrongs were being perpetrated by the state.

On the other side comes Wack's *Story of the Congo Free State*.⁶ It

⁶ *The Story of the Congo Free State: Social, Political, and Economic Aspects of the Belgian Government in Central Africa.* With 125 Illustrations and Maps. By Henry Wellington Wack. New York: Putnam, 1905. 634 pages.

is a plea for the defendant made by a member of the New York bar, who in the preface most carefully and explicitly disclaims any personal considerations in making this plea beyond general interest in the truth. But if he had been retained at an enormous fee by the defendant king, he could not have managed his argument with a more obvious intention to carry the case at any cost. There are thirty-seven chapters of the argument, followed by one hundred and twenty pages of appendix, giving the text of various documents. Like all other defenders of the king, he dwells mainly on the original purpose in the establishment of the Congo Free State, as declared by King Leopold and his representatives, and embodied in the discussions and conclusions of the Berlin and Brussels Conferences, and the treaties recognizing the state.

Great emphasis is laid on the work of the state in abolishing the Arab slave trade. Various departments of the Congo administration are described so as to show their most favorable features. The chapter on missions enumerates the Protestant missions with strictures, and magnifies the Roman Catholic missions. All through, the agitation in England concerning the administration on the Congo is attributed to pique and jealousy on the part of a group of English commercial houses, abetted by a few Protestant missionaries and other sentimentalists. The author contends, in common with defenders of the king, that the Congo government has a right to the land and its products. Four chapters are given to "Testimony of Travelers and Thinkers," including the favorable opinions of some who have since changed their views on the subject.

The combined impression of these two volumes is to the effect that King Leopold may have begun his work on the Congo with more or less purely philanthropic intentions, but that the difficulties of practical administration, combined with the allurements of great possibilities of wealth, have perverted the original purpose, until at last there has been established a government more despotic than that of any czar, with barbarities on a vaster scale than any that have been seen in modern times.

Of precisely the same tone, apparently with the same inspiration, as the volume of Mr. Wack in America, is MacDonnell's *King Leopold II*,¹ published in England. There are variations of emphasis. For example, the English form of the plea is more stringent in its sectarian strictures. It puts more marked aspersion on all the Protestant missions and more extensive laudation on all the Roman Catholic missions on the Congo.

¹ *King Leopold II., His Rule in Belgium and the Congo*. By John de Couvey MacDonnell. London: Cassell, 1905. 382 pages.

Several succinct statements of the case against the Congo State⁸ are available in this country. But the brochure which is likely to do the most popular execution is *King Leopold's Soliloquy*, by Mark Twain. The great humorist never wielded his pen more pointedly in behalf of honesty and humanity.⁹ It is significant, too, that he puts added emphasis in his second edition, issued since the publication of the report of the king's commission.

Minor publications on the other side of the case are issued by the Federation for the Defense of Belgian Interests Abroad.¹⁰ They make a telling *tu quoque* argument, as all defenses of the Congo State do, by pointing out the wrongs of other administrations in Africa, especially English, French, and German.

King Leopold is the strictly constitutional king of Belgium, but his sovereignty of the Congo is an entirely distinct, almost unrelated, government, and is admitted to be the most unchecked autocracy of modern times. It was expected that the commission which he appointed to investigate the alleged cruelties of his own government would put the facts in the most favorable light possible. This they have done. But their findings¹¹—not published till eight months after the report was made—are such that the existence of enormous wrongs is no longer an open question.

Modern philanthropy is increasingly marked by wide scope and by studious intelligence. The missionary enterprise is world-wide philanthropy in practical form. It is now being subjected to comprehensive study in two interdenominational courses. In both, the current year (1905-6) is devoted to Africa. The seventh volume¹² in the "Forward

⁸ *Memorial Concerning Conditions in the Independent State of the Kongo*. U. S. Senate Document No. 282, Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Session. 136 pages.

Grounds for Action by the U. S. Government: Conditions in the Congo State: Synopsis of Case. Boston: Congo Reform Association, 1905. 39 pages.

The Treatment of Women and Children in the Congo State. Congo Reform Association, 1905. 30 pages.

Evidence Laid before the Congo Commission of Inquiry, together with data down to July 1905. Congo Reform Association. 96 pages.

The Report of King Leopold's Commission and the Testimony which Compelled It. Congo Reform Association. December, 1905.

⁹ *King Leopold's Soliloquy: A Defense of His Congo Rule*. By Mark Twain. Boston: Warren, 1905. 50 pages.

¹⁰ *The Truth on the Congo Free State*. By the Federation for the Defense of Belgian Interests Abroad. No. 19, May 13, 1905. 28 pages.

¹¹ *Bulletin officiel de l'État Independent du Congo*. Nos. 9 and 10. Bruxelles: le 31 Octobre 1905. 285 pages.

¹² *Daybreak in the Dark Continent*. By Wilson S. Naylor. New York: Young Peoples' Missionary Movement, 1905. 315 pages. \$0.50.

Mission Study Courses," edited under the auspices of the Young People's Missionary Movement, is by Wilson S. Naylor. Professor Naylor has done a scholarly piece of work, comprehending in his eight chapters the most important facts about Africa, its people, its religion, its social condition, its modern opening, the progress and present status of missions, the heroic pioneers and the noble first fruits. The material is presented with as great clearness as is possible when covering such a wide and diversified area of time and space in every chapter. The typographical form is excellent. Each chapter is followed by questions in review of the material and by references for further study. There are two excellent maps. In the appendix are valuable tables and a brief bibliography.

The fifth volume¹³ in the "United Study of Missions Courses," published for the Interdenominational Committee of Women's Boards, is by Ellen C. Parsons, with an introduction by Sir Harry Johnston. In fifty pages Sir Harry gives an admirable and authoritative¹⁴ compendium of the geography, races, and history of Africa. Following this, the first chapter is concerning social and religious conditions in general. The remaining five chapters give an account of missionary endeavor in northern, western, eastern, central, and southern Africa, respectively. Within these great divisions the field is considered in its natural minor divisions. This geographical treatment is the only method which can keep perfectly clear such a vast amount of material as must be handled. The author has managed to pack in a surprising amount of concrete and stirring story. The volume is furnished with map, tables, and bibliography. Each chapter is followed by brief extracts from various writers on Africa.

L. CALL BARNES.

WORCESTER, MASS.

¹³ *Christus Liberator: An Outline Study of Africa*. By Ellen C. Parsons. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 309 pages. \$0.50 net.

¹⁴ Cf. especially *History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races*. By Sir Harry H. Johnston. Cambridge, England: University Press, 1899. 319 pages. For details compare his *British Central Africa*, his *Tunisian Sahara*, his *Nile Quest*, his *River Congo*, his *Uganda Protectorate*, and other volumes on Africa.

BOOKS RECEIVED

VAN KOETSVELD, C. E. *Das apostolische Evangelium*. Aus dem Holländischen übersetzt von D. Köhlschmidt. Leipzig: Jansa, 1904. Pp. 166. M. 4.

This book was written by a Dutch pastor to edify the Christian public of Holland. The author says in his preface that the church of that country is divided into three parties: orthodox, who cling to the traditional Calvinism, and are concerned with defending the authority of Scripture, the deity of Christ and the Trinity, the sovereignty of divine grace, and the need of regeneration, also original sin and an expiatory atonement; the adherent of the "modern theology," which claims that to find Christianity one must go back of the apostles to the religion of Jesus, but which really finds its support in the "divine in man," and derives all religion from man himself; and a third section, which feels the need of a divine gospel, and finds this want satisfied by Christ, but does not cling to the letter of Scripture, nor holds the claims of science to be invalid.

EDWARD Y. HINCKES.

ABBOTT, EDWIN A. *Paradosis; or, "In the Night in Which He Was Betrayed."* London: Black, 1904. Pp. 216. 7s. 9d.

ANDERSON, ROBERT. *Pseudo-Criticism; or, The Higher Criticism and its Counterfeit*. Chicago: Revell, 1904. Pp. 122. \$0.75 net.

ARTHUR, W. *The Tongue of Fire; or, The True Power of Christianity*. London: Kelly, Pp. 227. 6d.

CARUS, PAUL. *The Canon of Reason and Virtue*. (Lao-Tze's *Tao Teh King*.) Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. Pp. 138.

DAEDER, IOANESS. *Theodoret's Graecarum Affectionum Curatio*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1904. Pp. 339.

DAVENPORT, WILLARD G. *The Bible and the Church*. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1904. Pp. 78. \$0.50 net.

GRAHAM, HENRY. *Old Truths Newly Illustrated*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 229. \$1.

GRIGGS, W. C. *Shan Folk Lore Stories*. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. Pp. 108. \$0.75.

HARVEY-JELLIE, W. *Ezekiel: His Life and Mission*. (Bible Class Primers) Edinburgh: Clark. Pp. 99.

HITSCH, J. D. *Der Aberglaube*. Bielefeld: Helmich. Pp. 80.

LAW, WILLIAM. *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*. London: Dent. Pp. 422.

LITTMANN, ENNO. *A List of Arabic Manuscripts in Princeton University Library*. Princeton, N. J.: University Library, 1904. Pp. 84.

MOOREHEAD, W. G. *Outline Studies in the New Testament: Philippians to Hebrews*. Chicago: Revell, 1905. Pp. 249. \$1.20.

MÜLLER, MAS. *The Silesian Horseherd*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. 220. \$1.20.

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William Rainey Harper

For the third time since the foundation of the *American Journal of Theology* the ranks of the editorial staff have been invaded by death. William Rainey Harper passed from this life January 10, 1906, in the fiftieth year of his age. His early death brought to an end a career marked with energy, versatility, geniality, and large achievement.

Mr. Harper began his career as graduate student and as teacher in the field of the Greek and Latin classics, and to the end of his life retained a deep interest in classical studies. But his great work for scholarship was done in the Semitic field. Entering at the age of twenty-two upon the teaching of Hebrew in a theological school, he pursued his work with such skill, devotion, and energy, that he created, first in the school with which he was connected, and then throughout the country, a genuine revival of the study of Hebrew. Gradually broadening the field of his own activities to include on the one hand the other Semitic languages, and on the other the critical and historical study of the Old Testament, he achieved in these fields also results scarcely less significant. Extending his interest, though not his own personal work, to the New Testament, and eventually to religious education in general, he did more, perhaps, than any man of his generation to promote the study of the Bible among the people.

But his sympathies and his intelligent co-operation were not confined to the special field of his own studies. Though not himself a graduate of, or even a student in, a theological school, and not widely read in any field of theological study except the Old Testament, he was for nearly fifteen years head of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, and in that position wrought most intelligently and effectively for the promotion of the interests of theological education. Alike in matters affecting the curriculum of the school, in the selection of men for positions in the faculty, and in his relations to the work of his colleagues, he manifested keen insight, intelligent sympathy, and a broad and catholic spirit.

In the dual position of President of the University and of its Divinity School, he maintained with admirable poise the middle course between undue prejudice in favor of that school with which his own teaching most closely allied him and the sacrifice of its interests to those of the University at large. Especially valuable was the service which he rendered to the Divinity School in his defense of the principle, hitherto rarely recognized in America, that a theological school ought to, and for its highest development must, enjoy the same measure of academic freedom that is granted to other schools of the university. Fully recognizing the rights of the past and the duty of the theological school to fit men for practical efficiency in the ministry of the present, he as steadily defended the right of the members of the theological faculty to pursue their investigations without fear and to teach without restraint that which, as the result of such investigation, they had been led to accept.

Consistently with his recognition and defense of the rights of theological scholarship, President Harper maintained the legitimacy of the existence of a theological school in the University. Believing in the necessity of religion to life, and in the university as an agency for the betterment of life, he held that a school devoted to the discovery and promulgation of the truth in the realm of religion, and to the training of men for the work of proclaiming this truth, had a place in a university inferior in legitimacy and importance to that of no other division of it.

Believing in scholarly research, President Harper believed not less firmly in the necessity of publishing the results of scholarly

work. In the early days of his career, as a teacher of Hebrew he supplemented the instruction of his classroom by teaching, by correspondence, and through the printed page. To this period of his life belong the founding of the *Hebrew Student*, now known as the *Biblical World*,¹ and *Hebraica*, now called the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*. And when he was charged with the task of organizing a new university, he made publication one of the three great divisions of its work, co-ordinate with that of resident instruction and university extension. To the periodicals above named, which he brought to the University, there were added under his fostering care journals in the various fields of scientific research. It was in pursuance of this same policy that in 1896 he led the Divinity Faculty in the establishment of the *American Journal of Theology*, and advocated from the first to the last a broad and generous policy for its conduct, in accordance with which its pages have been open to scholars in all divisions of the field of theological science, and to writers of all schools and shades of opinion. In no enterprise to which he put his hand did he cherish a deeper interest than in the maintenance of this *Journal* upon a high plane of scholarly excellence and usefulness to the cause of theological learning.

His colleagues, to whom there falls the responsibility for carrying forward without his personal presence and help that work in which he was formerly their associate and leader, desire here to record their deep affection and sincere respect for him, their reverence for his memory, and their allegiance to the ideals of which he was ever the steadfast exponent and defender.

¹ The *Biblical World* for March, 1906, is devoted wholly to memorials of President Harper, and contains fuller and more definite information concerning his career than is here presented.

CHANGES IN THEOLOGY AMONG AMERICAN CONGREGATIONALISTS

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To describe in any adequate way the changes which have taken place during the last quarter of a century in the theology of the Congregational churches of the United States is a difficult task. Unlike many religious bodies, those churches have no general creeds binding upon ministers or lay members. From their foundation each local congregation has been free to formulate its faith in words of its own choosing. No single line of creed statements serves, therefore, as an authoritative guide to modifications in the theological conceptions of these churches. Such changes as have taken place have been, moreover, for the most part gradual. The progress has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary in character. Its stages are not readily marked, and have varied widely in extent in different regions; oftentimes, also, in the apprehension of churches situated side by side in the same community. Speaking broadly, the East has been more disposed to welcome modifications of long-accepted theologies than the West; but this generalization is subject to many exceptions. The individualism always characteristic of Congregationalism has nowhere a more conspicuous illustration than in the divergence frequently apparent between adjacent pulpits.

Congregationalism has always been peculiarly responsive to new interpretations of religious truth. It has often had occasion to reformulate earlier conceptions of Christian doctrine. From the time that John Robinson declared to the Pilgrim fathers just about to sail on the momentous voyage across the Atlantic, that "the Lord had more truth and light yet to break forth out of his holy Word," Congregationalism has been marked by a large degree of open-mindedness, though this quality has not been always equally manifested in Congregational history. The eighteenth century witnessed a fresh, and in many ways original, interpretation of Calvinism in the discussions

of Jonathan Edwards and his spiritual disciples; and the Edwardean heritage was nobly developed in the last century by such men of independence and intellectual acumen as Nathaniel W. Taylor and Edwards A. Park.

To Horace Bushnell, however, the chief preparation for the more modern development of Congregational theology is to be ascribed. His own contributions to the discussion of particular doctrines—as, for example, those of Christian nurture and the atonement—were of no slight importance; but much more far-reaching in its influence was his view of the nature and basis of theology in general. Developing ideas drawn from Coleridge, who in turn was indebted to Schleiermacher, Bushnell broke with the conception of theology as a severely logical and primarily intellectual science, to be demonstrated by processes akin to mathematical deduction, prevalent in the Congregational thinking of his day, as it had been since the Reformation, and sought to ground it largely upon the feelings and intuitions of our spiritual nature. To even so open-minded a representative of the older habit of thought as Professor Nathaniel W. Taylor, himself the champion of a decidedly modified Edwardeanism, Bushnell's position seemed nothing less than the utterance of insanity; but his point of view has gained constantly increasing adhesion during the last half-century, until it has become widely characteristic of Congregationalism. It has not merely smoothed the pathway for recent theologic modifications, but has led to a spirit of mutual toleration of divergent interpretations, impossible when theology was regarded as demonstrable to its utmost detail by strictly logical processes of reasoning.

Yet, in spite of Bushnell's work, the importance of which in producing an altered attitude of mind toward theologic questions is increasingly recognized, the declaration made by Professor Park at the National Congregational Council held at Boston in 1865 was undoubtedly true of the vast majority of American Congregationalists at the time of its utterance: "We are Calvinists, mainly, essentially, in all the essentials of our faith;" even though Professor Park's added affirmation that "the man who, having pursued a three years' course of study—having studied the Bible in the original languages—is not a Calvinist, is not a respectable man," must be regarded

as a rhetorical expression of personal opinion. But the Calvinism which undoubtedly characterized the Congregational body, historically, was even then not too rigidly held, and the National Council which met at Oberlin in 1871 adopted a "Declaration on the Unity of the Church" confessedly intended to make easy the entrance of those of Arminian sympathies into Congregational fellowship—an inviting attitude of which pastors from among our Methodist fellow-Christians have largely availed themselves. Interest in the older discussions characteristic of the first half of the nineteenth century had even then evidently passed largely away.

In 1883 there was issued, with the approving signature of twenty-two, out of a committee of twenty-five appointed by the National Council in 1880 for that purpose, a creed for the use of such Congregational churches as might see fit to adopt it, which has met with very wide acceptance among them. Signed by such men as Rev. Dr. Henry M. Dexter, President Julius H. Seeley, Professors George P. Fisher, George T. Ladd, James T. Hyde, and George Moore, or Rev. Drs. Alexander McKenzie, William M. Taylor, Lyman Abbott, Constans L. Goodell, and George Leon Walker, it undoubtedly represented as fair and complete a consensus of Congregational opinion as could then have been obtained. Its spirit was broad and catholic. None of the theological controversies that had agitated these churches half a century before was obtruded. The purpose of its writers was evidently irenic and inclusive. It showed, not merely that the way was open for extensive modification of the Edwardean theology generally accepted during the first half of the nineteenth century, but that such modification had become a fact. Yet, though of so comparatively recent composition, and so broadly drawn as to be easily susceptible of interpretation in harmony with the more recent tendencies in theology, the creed of 1883 moves in the path of the older rather than in that of present theological thought.

At the time when this creed was composed, however, the Congregational churches were on the eve of controversies which were to be the means by which a gradual alteration in the theological standpoint of a large portion of their ministry was to obtain such recognition as is possible in a body so uncentralized in organization. The theological discussions of England and Germany have been followed

with much interest by many Congregational scholars, ever since Coleridge awakened the thought of Bushnell, or Stuart translated a treatise of Schleiermacher on the Trinity. The sermons of Robertson, the discussions of Maurice, the doctrinal expositions of Tholuck and Dörner, the critical investigations of the Scriptures by Wellhausen, and, with a less sympathetic hearing, those of Baur and his successors, the studies of Beyschlag in the life of Christ, and the transforming interpretation of church history inaugurated by Ritschl, together with the great evolutionary hypothesis of Darwin—to mention no other names of significance—aroused response, and were modifying the views of Congregational teachers and scholarly pastors. This was conspicuously the case at the oldest Congregational seat of special ministerial training—Andover Seminary. By 1884 its professors had founded the *Andover Review*, designed to further a fresh discussion of theologic problems, along lines indicated in the title of the volume of essays reprinted by them from its pages, in 1887, as *Progressive Orthodoxy*.

This welcome to what was then known as the “new theology” aroused opposition, and resulted in formal charges against the professors of Andover Seminary of disloyalty to their ancient creed. A trial before the “Board of Visitors” of the institution in 1886 resulted in the removal from office by the board of Professor E. C. Smyth, but the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, by which the proceedings of the board were found to have been imperfect, and the matter returned to the board for retrial. These contests had extended over a period of six years; and in September, 1892, the board dismissed the then aging charges “without thereby expressing any opinions on the merits of the case.” The accused professor was, of course, retained in office. It would be too much to affirm—in view, for example, of subsequent events in the Chicago Theological Seminary—that the dismissal of a Congregational teacher for heresy has become impossible; but the outcome of this trial undoubtedly much enlarged the limits of toleration in classroom instruction, and increased the freedom of professorial expression in all Congregational seats of learning.

Parallel to, and complicated by, this Andover controversy there ran a yet more formidable debate in the annual sessions of the great

Congregational foreign missionary society, the American Board, which for several years turned these usually peaceful gatherings to discuss the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom into theological battles quite out of harmony with the purposes for which the Board was founded. A hypothesis that man's moral character is so indetermined, till brought to the knowledge of the historic Christ, that the fate of those who have not had him adequately presented in this life cannot be regarded as finally settled on leaving this world, and therefore that a further probation in their case may be hoped for, had been presented by some candidates for missionary appointment, especially from Andover. A corollary from a particular system of German theology, it was seized upon as the ground of contest between the conservative and the liberal tendencies in the Congregational churches. From 1886 to 1893 the right of the officers of the Board to reject candidates holding such views, or to impose any religious test not warranted by the general usage of the Congregational churches, was acrimoniously debated. It seemed, for a time, as if a rival missionary society would be formed, or even that the Congregational churches might possibly be divided into two denominations; but by concessions, in which the conservative element certainly exhibited much generosity of spirit, the issue was adjusted in 1893, so that any candidate, otherwise fit, might look for missionary appointment if in harmony with the general theological position of the churches—such harmony being practically that which would be sufficient to warrant his induction into a pastorate in the home-land.

The result of this peaceful adjustment was most happy. The meetings of the Board resumed their normal functions. Conservatives and progressives found a new respect for each other's religious integrity, and the spirit of mutual tolerance was diffused to a remarkable degree. Some considerable divergence of opinion on questions in debate was widely recognized as consistent with Christian brotherhood, pursuit of common aims, and co-operation in religious activities. To the turmoil and mistrust of the period from 1886 to 1893 has succeeded more than a decade of mutual forbearance and good-will. Not the least notable feature has been the kindly sympathy and co-operation with which conservative laymen, trained in the theological conceptions of a half-century ago, have received and supported the

ministry of those whose ideals reflect modern phases of biblical criticism and recent interpretations of Christian doctrine. Congregational freedom is far from mere theological eclecticism. The Congregational churches hold fast to their heritage of belief in the righteous rule of God, the sinfulness of man, redemption through Christ, and the certainty of divine mercy and retribution; but the gospel message seems to them far simpler, less dogmatic, less a philosophic system, and more ethical than once it did. The Christian life is seen to have its explanation in the recognition of obedient sonship, rather than in the acceptance of a dogmatic interpretation of a particular "scheme of salvation."

It has been fortunate for Congregational harmony that the present period of mutual tolerance began so early, and that the discussions of the preceding epoch of debate concerned themselves so largely with questions now seemingly of relatively minor importance. The last decade has witnessed far more deep and fundamental questionings of doctrinal positions. Congregationalism has felt the full force of the great currents of biblical criticism as they have flowed from Germany; and has lent a willing ear, in the case of many of its teachers and pastors, to the new presentations of the gospel message, and the fresh interpretations of the person and work of Christ, and of the history of the early church to which Germany, France, and England have so largely contributed. Its position in these matters has been generally that of an open-minded inquirer; but the results at which it has arrived have been largely in sympathy with the newer presentation characteristic of the prevalent Protestant schools of the lands just mentioned. Every one of its theological seminaries, from the Atlantic to Ohio, is now dominated, though indeed in varying degree, by a type of theology that two decades ago would have been deemed "new", and was then widely looked upon with grave suspicion. Its eastern colleges, with few exceptions, and many of its western seats of learning, are similarly characterized.

It is evident from what has been said, that the main tendencies of theological thinking at present influential in modifying the conceptions of Christian truth prevalent in the Congregational churches of the United States are not original or peculiar to them, but are those influencing American religious opinions in general. These

churches have produced no single leader of formative power, capable of striking out a path for himself, or of founding a school of thought, in the sense in which Jonathan Edwards did in the eighteenth century. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of a peculiarly Congregational tendency in theology as marking the present age. They have been responsive in a greater degree, perhaps, than any other body in America, to such light as has come from the work of Harnack, Herrmann, Lobstein, Schürer, or Bousset in Germany; of Wernle in Switzerland; of Sabatier in France; and of George Adam Smith or Tennant in Great Britain. But they have been far from merely dependent on outside influences. The general results of scholarship have been promptly appropriated, and to these has been given an interpretation which renders the work much more than that of mere reproduction. While the representatives of the "new theology" would be far from claiming an exclusive right to speak in behalf of American Congregationalism, and while a large portion of the Congregational ministry and churches are decidedly conservative in tone, it is to those who advocate the more recent conceptions of religious thought that most of the present publication of theological or biblical discussions is due. Volumes of a strongly conservative tendency are in the decided minority. To the work of such writers as Rev. Drs. Theodore T. Munger, Washington Gladden, Amory H. Bradford, George Harris, Lyman Abbott, or Newman Smyth, all still active in these churches, there has come reinforcement, as far as the general tendencies which they may be said broadly to represent, from scholars and pastors such as Presidents Hyde and King, Rev. Drs. Geo. A. Gordon, and William H. Ward; from Professors George F. and Edward C. Moore, George B. Stevens, Frank C. Porter, Benjamin W. Bacon, George H. Gilbert, Albert T. Swing, or from Rev. Edward M. Chapman—not to mention other names. The friendly reception accorded Professors H. P. Smith and A. C. McGiffert, when their position in a sister-communion proved uncomfortable, may be mentioned as exemplifying the cordial attitude of Congregationalism toward progressive scholarship. Yet the Congregational churches have no intention of repudiating their historic past. It is growth, not revolution, that the more liberal of their leaders would see in the movements of the present. Nor would the advocates of theological

restatement hold themselves as wiser or more devoted in their attempts to meet the problems of the hour than those who have gone before them were in endeavoring to interpret and apply Christian truth in the light of the knowledge and needs of an older generation. Each age must solve its questions in its own way, and the utmost that they would claim is freedom to use what they believe to be the best established results of a scholarship that is limited by no denominational boundaries and is international in its community of effort.

Undoubtedly this tolerant attitude has been greatly aided by the growth of a spirit of fellowship which is one of the most marked traits of recent Congregational development. To a degree unknown half a century ago, these churches feel that they constitute one body. No fact in their life in the nearer past is more conspicuous than their tendency to seek organic expression for this feeling of unity. The formation of the Triennial National Council in 1871, and its steady augmentation in influence, are but the highest illustrations of a disposition to emphasize fellowship rather than independence, which is increasingly exhibited in state and local associations of churches. This growth of a real corporate unity, based on common traditions, likeness of organization, and similarity of spirit in Christian work, and fostered by ease of modern communication, and to some extent, it may be, by the free transference of pastors, has operated largely to counteract whatever divisive tendency theological differences might cause. It has neutralized the effects of divergencies which three-quarters of a century ago would have led to the founding of rival theological seminaries, and induced party struggle and embittered controversy. Nor is this craving for fellowship, so characteristic of present-day Congregationalism, confined to the limits of the group of churches which bears the Congregational name. Union efforts looking toward affiliation with other Protestant bodies, are in vigorous development; and where such official federation is not being sought, a wide-spread feeling of sympathy with other Protestant communions exists, as with common workers in the one great harvest-field. The present Congregational spirit is one of broad fellowship in Christian activity, and the divergence in doctrine must be very considerable that would overcome it. In this willingness to minimize denominational barriers Congregationalists trust that they are but

the more advanced in a tendency that is rapidly growing to be characteristic of all American Christianity; but its effect upon theological divisions is evident.

In attempting to state present theological tendencies in the Congregational churches the observer is in danger of generalizing from personal preferences. The time is so largely one of transition, the degree in which theological modifications manifest themselves is so various, and in the Congregational body tests of universal application are so wholly wanting, that the utmost that he can presume to do is to note the certain broad characteristics, without affirming that they fully present the teachings in particular groups of churches, or are all illustrated in the thought of any one Congregational leader. With this *caveat* in view, the writer would endeavor to present certain widespread modifications of earlier theology, in the spirit of a historian rather than in that of an advocate or of a critic.

God.—In marked contrast to the emphasis formerly laid on the divine transcendence is the present tendency in Congregational thought towards an assertion of God's immanence. God's righteous rule was, indeed, always looked upon as extending to all persons and events, and nothing was regarded as beyond his providential ordering; but his relations to the world were viewed by the Congregational teachers of half a century ago as external and apart. Though the two realms constantly touched, the gulf between the natural and the supernatural was deep and wide. The relations of the Creator to his world were looked upon largely as those of a maker to a mechanism. In common with modern religious thought in general, Congregationalism now tends to conceive those relations under the likeness of an organism of which God is the vital force. It sees no fundamental severance between the natural and the supernatural. God is constantly working in and through the world of which he is the animating spirit, by processes which to our apprehension may best be interpreted as those of evolution. In a truer and deeper sense than was formerly given to the apostolic declaration, "in him we live, and move, and have our being." The world in all its order, and especially man in his moral and intellectual nature, is a revelation of God. Undoubtedly the danger of pantheism attends this emphasis on the divine immanence, as that of deism lay close to an exaggeration of his

transcendence; but modern Congregationalists are no more pantheists than their ancestors were deists. Though in and of his world, of which he is the fundamental reality, he is for them the highest manifestation of personality; and, to a degree greater than ever before, modern Congregationalists are disposed to interpret his connection with men in terms of personal relationship.

Hence modern Congregationalism is laying ever-increasing weight on the thought of the divine fatherhood. The older conception of God's sovereignty is not abandoned, but it has sunk relatively into the background. The attitude of mind, reported for instance by Rev. Dr. Edward Dorr Griffin, writing of the feelings of converts of the revival of 1799, regarding their final destiny, that "many have expressed a willingness to put their names to a blank, and leave it with God to fill up; and *that*, because his having the government would secure the termination of all things in his own glory," is one that no longer represents to them the relations of Christian sonship. The Calvinistic conception of an arbitrary selection for salvation of a portion of an equally guilty race is one from which they increasingly recoil. They cannot view God as angry with any class of his creatures, however truly he may show displeasure at their sins. All that he has made must be alike dear to his fatherly heart, and paternal affection must go out to all his sons. Not in God, but in man, must be, in the last analysis, the barrier that keeps men from recognizing their sonship and returning to the Father's house. If the divine immanence interprets his relation to the world, the divine fatherhood no less illuminates his attitude toward men.

Christology.—While modern Congregationalists hold as firmly as did their fathers to the divinity of our Lord, they are far less confident that that oneness with the Father is philosophically explainable by the historic definitions. For most of them the apostolic declaration is sufficient that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." They see in him the complete and unique revelation of the moral character of God, and of so much of the divine nature as can be exhibited subject to the limitations of a life lived under human conditions. They hold firmly that in knowing him and him only is God adequately known. He is to them the revelation of the Father, equally with the Father an object of worship, and the founder of the

kingdom of God on earth. But they feel that the attempts of the early church to explain the nature of the great fact of his unity with the Father, of which the first disciples were so conscious, were, however valuable as interpretations of that mystery, after all but interpretations. Whether by the virgin-birth, by pre-existence as the eternal Logos, by enduement at baptism, by Davidic descent, by all these lines of argument combined, or by others like his sinlessness and moral oneness with the Father, that unity is to be explained or no, the great truth to which these interpretations bear witness is the fundamental fact of Christianity—that of the incarnation. Its explication is relatively a matter of speculation; its reality is of prime importance. Undoubtedly many Congregationalists would see the true philosophic interpretation of this mystery in the historic Athanasian and Augustinian conceptions; others, not a few, would hold with Bushnell that the distinctions in the divine existence are affirmable of our finite apprehension only, and hence prefer a position that may be designated as immanent modalism rather than that known historically as Sabellian; while some would seek its explication in the presence in Christ in fullest measure of that divine indwelling which enlightens in some vastly less degree every man, and that rose in him to unique sinlessness and perfect moral unity with the will of God.

While they are thus convinced that in Christ man possesses the revelation of God, they see in him no less the realization of perfected and glorified humanity. The reality of Christ's humanity modern Congregationalism would emphasize as a practical truth more than did its spiritual ancestors. As a life among men, his life is imitable in its manifestations of character and aim; and they would lay a new stress on its imitableness. They would bring Christ near to men, while reverencing no less those manifestations in which he transcends all merely human classification.

They look upon his work increasingly, not as a penal satisfaction for sin paid to offended justice, or as an exhibition of reverence for offended law, but as the crowning revelation of the sacrificing love of God for his children—the convincing manifestation of the divine fatherhood, ready to give unto the uttermost to bring men back to him. From the standpoint of this sacrifice alone can men learn to

look upon sin as God views it, to appreciate the divine character, or to feel the deepest drawing of the heart to the life of obedient sonship.

The Bible.—Modern Congregationalists believe that God has been and is constantly revealing himself to men. He has never left them without some witness of himself; but that witness has not always been equally clear and manifest. The religions of the world, apart from Christianity, are not creations of man's folly or inspirations of evil. They are, at bottom, attempts, though often frightfully intermixed with human superstition and error, to "seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him." As such they have each their value, and command sympathy and respect. But to none has he made such an adequate revelation of himself as to the religious leaders of Israel, and to those who were the companions and disciples of Christ. The record of that revelation, as men apprehended it, is in the Bible. Its inspiration is in the writers rather than in the pages of the book. Its authors wrote removed from one another by centuries, and they varied greatly in apprehension of spiritual realities. They were not exempt from errors in interpretations or emphasis. They saw truth in the light of their own ages and religious training. They were not always in agreement in the presentation of doctrine, nor were they miraculously preserved from the inaccuracies to which all historical writers are liable. Hence the Bible is a religious literature rather than a book of unvarying uniformity of teaching. But in its grand fundamental apprehensions of the character of God, the nature of man, and the way of salvation, it stands unique and authoritative. In that sense it is "the perfect rule of faith and conduct." It is the classic record of the highest religious experience of the race. It becomes the means by which our minds are enlightened by the historic facts of Christianity, and through its revelation alike of the nature of God and of the possibilities of a redeemed humanity. By it our consciences are quickened to the service of sonship.

Congregationalists holding this view of the Bible realize that the basis of its authority has been variously described in different ages of the church. Some Christian generations have seen the chief witness to it in fulfilment of prophecy, in the miracles by which the declaration of the message is recorded to have been accompanied,

in the history of what the Bible has done in the world, or in the inward witness of the Holy Spirit. These considerations have value; but they prefer to rest its claims on the response of man's spiritual nature. Made in the image of God, however that image may have been distorted, man recognizes and answers to the truth of the divine revelation, because the witness to it is within himself. Its highest authority is the response to it of what is best in him.

The church.—Early Congregationalism believed that its system of organization and government was of exclusive divine warrant. Its founders taught that the New Testament revealed a complete and unalterable pattern of the church. It was this confidence that sent the Pilgrim Fathers across the Atlantic. Though some leaders of eminence have held this conviction in recent years, and it probably still persists, its supporters are now very few. The utmost that most modern Congregationalists would claim for their polity is that, when adequately exemplified, it illustrates, they believe, better than any other, certain broad characteristics of the gospel—intelligent discipleship, mutual responsibility, direct loyalty to Christ alone, full-rounded Christian manhood. To most present-day Congregationalists the prime characteristic of Christian history is the manifestation of the divine life in humanity—the revelation of the kingdom of God. That kingdom is inward and invisible; but, like other invisible and potent realities, such as patriotism or philanthropy, it must take on visible and organized forms to become effective. Such forms will vary with the needs, the intelligence, and the difficulties of different ages and places. None is equally efficient under all conditions. Hence Congregationalists, while loyally devoted to their own type of Christian organization, feel impelled to co-operate in the spirit of friendliness with all forms of Christian life, however constituted; and this breadth of sympathy is one of the characteristics of modern Congregationalism.

In the life of the church modern Congregationalism emphasizes the social aspects of Christianity. It believes that the gospel message is not only for the individual, but for society. This world is the object of redemption; and, to a degree not felt by the earlier generation of its membership, it sees the work of the gospel in the subjection of the present social order to Christ, as well as in the salvation

of the individual after death. It can conceive of no real Christian life without the redeeming, transforming, and upholding grace of God. Salvation, whether here or hereafter, is a divine work; but its highest manifestation is character—and a Christianity that is chiefly emotion, or dogmatic conviction, has missed its most distinctive fruitage. Modern Congregationalism has no hostility to revivalism, or to conscious conversion, as appropriate methods and avenues into the kingdom of God; but it is deeply permeated with the belief that Bushnell, in presenting his conception of Christian nurture, set forth the normal method by which those at least of Christian parentage and training should be expected to grow up into Christian life.

Eschatology.—The thought of non-conservative Congregationalism is not so centered on questions of the future as on the problems of present life, character, and Christian activity. Yet here, too, a modification is in progress. Till within a generation American Congregationalists, unlike their brethren across the Atlantic, stood in practically unanimous acceptance of the eternity of future punishments as well as rewards, and in the limitation of all probation to the present life. The alteration of this belief, apparent in the controversies which distressed the American Board from 1886 to 1893, has already been mentioned. The tendency then apparent has gone farther. Not a few Congregationalists are disposed to hold that biblical teaching on this theme is far from absolutely clear, and that a reasonable hope may be entertained that in some way God will bring all his erring children ultimately to the Father's home. They recognize the fearful tendency of character to become fixed in ways of evil, and the exceeding depths of sin; but they trust in the final triumph of righteousness as at least a not unwarranted hope. They are not Universalists in the sense of making the restoration of all men a cardinal tenet of their faith; but no modern aspirant for a Congregational pastorate, otherwise of promise, is in very great danger of rejection, at least in the East, because his confidence in the divine willingness to "have all men to be saved" leads him to trust that somehow the divine mercy may yet triumph in universal redemption. At the same time, modern Congregationalism holds fast to the certainty of retribution, and to the truth that "whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap," with an intensity of conviction never surpassed in the past.

Any attempt to set forth less conservative traits illustrative of a large and increasing section of modern Congregationalism would be inadequate which did not recognize that these modifications have been accompanied by no diminution of spiritual earnestness, and no abatement of the sense of the greatness of salvation needed by sinful men. The demands of the life of the spirit were never more seriously pondered or more faithfully preached than at present. If Congregationalism is in an epoch of doctrinal transition, in common with American Christianity in general, and has responded, perhaps more than any other considerable denomination, to influences affecting all in some degree, it is a matter for grateful recognition that it has never felt the claims of loyalty to Christ or the needs of men more than in these days of debate and restatement.

THEOLOGY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

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"Functional psychology" is the designation given to the present tendency to treat consciousness from the biological standpoint, and with particular reference to its functions in the total life-process.¹ It is contrasted more or less sharply with "structural psychology," which undertakes an analysis of mental life in terms of its characteristic states and forms, without specific reference to their origin in the needs of the organism, or to their service in determining its adaptation to the environment.² The functional psychology is thoroughly evolutionary. As Professor James puts it: "Mind and world in short have been evolved together, and in consequence are something of a mutual fit."³ And in the course of this evolution mental life has developed as the chief instrument in the process of adapting the psycho-physical organism to its physical and social environment. Our minds are therefore practical affairs, useful in satisfying the needs of our nature. "Mental life is primarily teleological; that is to say that our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they are because of their utility in shaping our *reactions* on the outer world."⁴ Great importance, in this view, attaches to the genesis of the different forms of consciousness, and a general formula is offered concerning the origin of consciousness itself.⁵ This placing of consciousness and all its "states" in a larger life-process deter-

¹ Angell, *Psychology*, pp. 6, 7, 64; James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, p. 24.

² Serviceable statements of the functional psychology will be found in the following articles: Angell, "The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," *University of Chicago Decennial Publications*, pp. 5-8; Dewey, "The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III, pp. 357-70. For the structural psychology see Titchener, "The Postulates of a Structural Psychology," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. VII (1898), pp. 449-65.

³ James, *Psychology, Briefer Course*, p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Angell, *Psychology*, p. 50.

mines the functional psychology to the use of dynamic, rather than static, conceptions. It maintains that the fundamental characteristic of the organism is activity. In the lowest forms of life there are spontaneity and internal co-ordination in the maintenance of adjustment to environment. The child, with a few reflexes and a great wealth of uncontrolled energy, is primarily a "behaving organism," as Professor James expresses it.⁶ Certain forms of this behavior are native, and others acquired. There is in reality no mere passivity. In the course of its reflex and instinctive movements the organism is continually developing new "situations" and "problems," in reference to which constant adjustment is made. Abounding energy, issuing in impulsive movements, which bring in return a wealth of sense-impressions through hands, eyes, ears, and muscles, is the original possession of the child. These impressions lead in turn to modifications in the movements; and thus a circuit of reactions is maintained. The organization of his efforts in order to make his activity most effective, and to attain the fullest satisfaction of his various needs, is the one great concern, psychologically expressed, of the human being.

This explanation of the different phases of consciousness with reference to the concrete life-conditions which call them forth, and with reference to their service in the ultimate control of those conditions is extended over the whole scope of the mental life. Not only the mental activity of the savage and of the child has its value as a means of furthering their welfare, but also the abstract thinking of civilized man roots itself at last in practical needs, and is estimated by the degree to which it serves them. The "truth" of science and of metaphysics is tested at last by the success with which they aid the life-processes. Every hypothesis of science stands ready at any moment to submit to actual tests, and every system of philosophy in the last resort is judged by the results which follow from it. In this way functional psychology extends its claims over the whole domain of experience and philosophy. The problems of ethics are involved in the psychology of desire and volition, and it is only a matter of convenience that the field of ethics is separated from psychology. In the same way logic and æsthetics are elaborations of the psy-

⁶ James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, chap. 3.

chology of judgment and feeling. Metaphysics is granted a distinct field, in the same provisional and practical way, only as a means of specializing the problems for convenience in treatment. Any thorough handling of the psychological problems of cognition takes one straight into the midst of metaphysics without any break or leap. The philosophical sciences are all, in the words of Professor Angell, "organic developments of a common root and represent phases, or stages, in the solution of a single complex problem" — "the problem of the structure and function of consciousness." Accordingly, "when psychological study is interpreted in a functional, as well as a structural, sense, the theoretical distinctions between psychology and philosophy have ceased to exist."⁷

Theology stands in essentially the same relation to psychology. A thorough consideration of the concepts of theology, their origin, development, and significance for man's life, requires a psychological study of the religious consciousness. On the other hand, if one starts with the psychology of religion, and pursues it to the full extent, it is found to involve the recognition and investigation of the ultimate problems of theology. Any demarkation of the spheres of the psychology of religion and of theology is therefore just as arbitrary, and is to be held just as lightly, as that between psychology and metaphysics. If this relation is not so clear between psychology and theology as it is between psychology and other metaphysical sciences, it may be due to the present undeveloped state of the psychology of religion, and to the tendency of theology to cultivate its field in greater isolation from the influence of the natural sciences.⁸ There are some results already at hand which indicate in a general way the significance of functional psychology in the domain of theology.

This psychology has fruitfully employed the genetic and historical method, by which developed forms of consciousness are investigated through their earlier stages, and, if possible, in their very beginnings. Pursuing this method, it is pertinent to inquire what place was held

⁷ Angell, "The Relations of Psychology to Philosophy," *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III, pp. 20, 21.

⁸ Of the works in the psychology of religion only Professor James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* indicates the import of such studies for theology. Investigations in this field have been limited mainly to the gathering and classification of material concerning certain phases of the religious history of individuals, particularly during the period of conversion.

in primitive religions by the intellectual processes which, in the developed forms of religion, have given rise to theology.

The study of the beginnings of the religious consciousness has greatly lessened the claims of the intellectualists as to the character, function, and importance of specific religious ideas. It is no longer claimed by the best authorities that all peoples possess a definite idea of God. Many primitive forms of religion, and others which have reached a high state of development, are quite without the conception of a personal deity. The Blackfellows of Australia,⁹ for instance, do not get beyond spirit ancestors and other spirit individuals. Even these are involved in their explanation of practical needs. The absorbing interest with these races is the immediately practical and social character of their ceremonies and activities. The mainsprings of these ceremonies are the elemental life-interests—birth, youth, marriage, food, war, death. For instance, among the Malays of Malacca there are elaborate ceremonies accompanying the planting and harvesting of rice, hunting, fishing, and mining. The object is to make sure the results of such activities. In the totemism of the tribes of central Australia, where each group of people identifies its life and welfare with those of a certain class of animals or plants, the purpose of the ceremonies is to increase the number of the totemic animals or plants; and often this means provision for the food supply; but their performance of ceremony is not associated in the native mind with the idea of appealing to the assistance of any supernatural being.¹⁰ The conception of “spirits” and of the supernatural, where it does arise, is therefore not fundamental in the development of religion, but is rather secondary and incidental.¹¹ “Mere animism can hardly be called primitive religion more than primitive science. It is simply a postulate from which to explain things, a principle of which one may take advantage in many practical problems.”¹²

Further evidence that an exaggerated importance has been attached to reflection and conscious control of religious activities is

⁹ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 207.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

¹¹ Irving King, *The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness*, p. 28.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 38, 48; cf. Brinton, *Religion of Primitive Peoples*, p. 84.

found in the domination of imitation and custom. The force of social habits is tyrannical in the extreme, in spite of the fact that they are often due to the most trivial, accidental causes. Among the Malays "another tribe on undertaking to mine tin would imitate every detail in the method of those who first did it, even to such irrelevant details as those of language and dress."¹³ It is the old fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, and is due not so much to incorrect thinking as to the influence of unreflective imitation. How far these customs are from being the expression of definite ideas is shown in the explanations given of them. Among the Australians the reason for performing the ceremonies as they do is that their ancestors did so. If any further explanations are sought, the inquiry appears to the natives ridiculous and incomprehensible.¹⁴

The priority of practical, social activities, and the secondary character of the ideas which later arise in explanation of them, are well illustrated in the field of æsthetics. "The dance before the chase or battle, the mimes at agricultural festivals or at initiation ceremonies, which seem to the uninstructed onlooker crude forms of art, are to the minds of the actors entirely serious. They give success in the real activities which follow these symbolic acts. They bring the rain or sunshine or returning spring."¹⁵ Art is here the state or attitude of consciousness which is built up in these activities, and which results from them. This state may eventually be cultivated on its own account, and may be employed as a test of the artistic character of other activities; but the view that the dances or ceremonies arose in the first instance in order to give expression to the already existing art-consciousness, or art-ideas, is discarded. "Art has not arisen primarily to satisfy an already existing love of beauty. It has arisen chiefly, if not wholly, from other springs, and has itself created the sense by which it is enjoyed."¹⁶ In the same way it may be said that the religious consciousness is built up in the course of certain activities performed by the social group with reference to needs which are often of a very material kind. Gradually this attitude is de-

¹³ King, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁴ Spencer and Gillen, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 136 f.

¹⁵ J. H. Tufts, "On the Genesis of the Æsthetic Categories," *The University of Chicago Decennial Publications*, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

tached from the setting in which it arose, and becomes in turn a standard and test by which to determine whether other given experiences are religious or have religious value. This agrees also with the increasing evidence of the priority of ritual over moral or theoretical teaching.¹⁷

Direct confirmation of the source and character of the first stages of the religious consciousness is found in the experience of the child. His interest in religion is chiefly concerned with its forms and ceremonies. He is little interested in the meaning which older persons attach to them, and he participates in them either in the imitative spirit or with reference to the securing of his personal ends. His prayers are for the most part repetitions of words with scrupulous regard for the precise order in which they have been learned; or, where they are spontaneous, usually express petitions for the objects which he most craves. It is only in late adolescence that there comes to consciousness any deep questioning concerning the meaning and value of the religious exercises. And even then it is only in exceptional cases extended beyond the conventional, and it may be rather simple, forms of thought in the social group of which he is a part.¹⁸

The functional treatment of developed theological conceptions keeps in view their genesis and growth in actual experience, and tests their truth and value in terms of the control and guidance of conduct. Conceptions are shorthand symbols for summarizing and unifying experience. They involve images, sensuous and detailed, or schematic and symbolic. There is always imagery in the most abstract concept. The distinguishing feature of the conception, however, is the element of meaning, the expression of relations. Both constituents are subject to change. The images may be now visual, now auditory or again motor; and the meaning may gradually become larger, finer, and more ideal. This growth of conceptions is dependent upon experience, for they are at last just the registrations of experience. Every different use of an object involves a new mode of conceiving it. "There is no property absolutely essential to any one thing."¹⁹

¹⁷ Henry Preserved Smith, *Old Testament History*, p. 68; William Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 16, 20.

¹⁸ Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, chap. 15, especially p. 194.

¹⁹ James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 333.

The significance of this psychology of conception for all theological ideas may be illustrated in terms of the most fundamental and central conception, the conception of God. This idea is not innate. It arises with the power of generalizing and unifying experience, and under the practical demand for such generalization, in the maintenance and furtherance of practical interests. When the idea does appear it bears the impress of the social and material conditions of the community which formulates it, and with the growth of society the conception changes both as to its imagery and its meaning. Among the early Semites, for example, the thought of the deities was evidently determined by the natural conditions under which the people lived. Living water, whether from springs or running streams, formed the basis for community life by creating vegetation for food and trees for shelter. On this account the springs and rivers were sacred. The water was itself the deity or his abode. The land which it fertilized was holy ground, clearly distinguished by the growth of vegetation, and all things within the sacred precincts were guarded by tabus. When life was nomadic, and herds and flocks were the chief forms of wealth, the gods were often conceived as animals, such as the sacred bull or goat. When agriculture was cultivated, the natural elements which conditioned the growth of harvests determined the idea of the deities.

The growth of the idea of God reflects also the development of the social organization. Each tribe or social group had its own gods, expressing, and in turn strengthening, certain characteristic phases of its life. As the tribes enlarged and took on new activities, the deities evidenced corresponding growth. On the other hand, if a tribe was exterminated, or lost its identity, its god reverted to the lower condition of demons, whose chief characteristic was that they were without worshipers. The success of a particular group in conquest meant the subjugation of the conquered gods, and finally their extinction. Yahweh was originally the god of a single Semitic tribe. He gained power and significance with the leadership and conquest which his subjects were able to accomplish, so that in the end, with the organization of the nation, the ancient name of the deity was retained for the God of the whole people. This correspondence between the stage of social development and the nature of the gods is still further

illustrated by the significant fact that, when the mother was the head of the family, the deities were goddesses.²⁰ Later, when the father became the recognized head of the family, the deity became masculine, and took on the attributes and characteristics of paternal authority. Among the Hebrews, to whom has been ascribed an ethical monotheism derived in a unique, supernatural way, the development of monotheism was coincident with, and apparently dependent upon, the rise of the monarchy. The coalescence of smaller social groups into larger unities was reflected in the fusion of the gods themselves, until, in the attainment of the kingdom centering in the person of the king, the basis was laid for the idea of one God, which obviously was closely fashioned, though in heroic proportions, upon the model afforded by the earthly monarch. The heavenly king, like the earthly, gradually developed a court with angelic messengers and numerous cohorts ready at command to execute the sovereign will. Another stage was reached for the Hebrews during the exile. That great strain upon their social institutions and the enforced removal of many people from Jehovah's land magnified their sense of his distance from them and emphasized the idea of his transcendence. To the sensitive minds of the great prophets the contact with other peoples gave rise also to the conception of Jehovah as the God of all nations, though this idea was evidently born of patriotism and hope rather than of actual political supremacy. This feeling of the greatness and the transcendence of Jehovah, in connection with their national distress, resulted with the Hebrews, as it has with other peoples, in the need of mediation and in the hope of a savior. Their Messiah, under the stress of the national humiliation, took the form of a suffering servant. It is an impressive fact that the two typical Jewish conceptions of the redemptive work of Jehovah were the counterparts of two contrasted periods of the national life. One was projected from the background of the golden age of the monarchy under King David. As he put to silence his enemies and established a glorious kingdom, so God would some day, by another mighty one, deliver his people and make them supreme. The other view of divine deliverance was an expression of the humbled and chastened national spirit in the period of oppression and exile. Humility and

²⁰ W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, pp. 58 ff.

suffering innocence were its central elements. . In the end, when his life was completed, the character and work of Jesus conformed best to the latter type, while his own experience and powerful personality added vividness and strength to the ethical, social conception of God as a loving Father.

In the same way the thought of God has been various and changing as it reflected the life of different peoples. The temper, culture, and social customs of the Greek, Roman, and Teutonic peoples have reacted vitally upon the Christian conception of God. The process still continues. The idea of God is now undergoing perhaps the profoundest transformation in history. The forces accomplishing it are not vagaries of speculative philosophy, but the tremendous influences of modern civilization. The change is from the transcendence to the immanence of God. It is due to the rise of democratic institutions and the birth of an intense social consciousness. The old notion of transcendence was the reflection of the monarchical form of government which has prevailed in all the great nations from antiquity to the modern era. The king or emperor was far above the people. He was surrounded by vast estates, by castle walls, and by large armies. He could be approached only through mediators and subordinates. His arbitrary will was law. His ways were full of secrecy and mystery. The corresponding characteristics of his subjects were implicit faith, unquestioning obedience. They sang his praises, and most humbly offered before him their gratitude and petitions. Could anything describe more exactly than such terms the conception of a transcendent God, and the relations men sustain to him? On the other hand, nothing could be farther from the spirit of democracy. In a democracy the chief concern with reference to the leader or ruler is not his lineage or inheritance, but his own personality and efficiency. His will is not arbitrary, but justifies itself in experience, and is held to the standard of law and consistency. The citizens feel themselves one with their leader. They share in the exercise of sovereignty, and in its responsibilities and dignity. The inmost reality and significance of the state is found in the individual citizens. They are mutually dependent, interrelated, and conditioned. In such a society the old conception of a transcendent God is out of place, just as much as is the idea of an auto-

cratic, arbitrary monarch. The great awakening of the masses of men in all nations to self-government through the exercise of intelligent self-control; the emancipation of slaves; the elevation of women; the humane care of the dependent, defective, and criminal members of society; the great constructive organizations of labor; efforts toward the purification of politics; popular education; various world's congresses for the promotion of science, art, and religion—all these are the expressions of a growing social consciousness, stronger, more enlightened, and more determined than mankind has ever before experienced, and they are also the causes and the justification of the conception of the immanence of God.

Such a statement of the evolution of the conception of God involves also the question of the truth and validity of that conception. Here the relation in which the functional psychology conceives itself to stand to metaphysics has the utmost importance. In this psychology the statement of the genesis and development of an idea carries its own indication of the truth or reality of the idea. The historical survey reveals the function of the idea and its value in experience. In so far as it aids and furthers experience, it is true. It is always relative, always conditioned. But just on this account is it real. Psychology does not then merely lead up to the boundary of metaphysics, at which point it is compelled to transfer its problem to a different kind of inquiry. Metaphysics is only the more detailed and persistent investigation of the psychology of conception. The theological problem is therefore radically changed. The question heretofore, from the standpoint of transcendence, has been: Does a supreme, absolutely perfect being exist? Is there an actual, objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea of God? No one has ever been able to produce any adequate answer to that question.

The question itself has fallen under suspicion. There is no criterion by which it can be judged. It is impossible to get outside of experience to investigate the assertion that something exists there. The attempts to do this, and the dogmatic insistence upon "faith" in such a transcendent existence, have been the most fruitful sources of skepticism. The implications of present knowledge may point to further related experience, but it is difficult to realize how they could

prove the existence, truth, or objective reality of anything beyond experience. The alleged "proofs" of the being of God give the impression of purely formal, abstract circles of reasoning. They were given up long ago by Kant on the ground of the impotence and futility of such "pure reason." He boldly declared the idea of God to be a "regulative" conception, justified by the practical way in which it served to unify and guide experience.

This did not mean for Kant, and it does not mean for modern pragmatism, that the idea of God is false and meaningless. It does involve, however, a different conception and criterion of "truth." In functional terms truth means value. The question, Is the idea of God true? means: Is the idea of God of value in actual experience? Does it serve to organize the highest interests of life, and to vitalize them with dynamic power in eliciting and controlling efficient reactions of the will? If the idea of God has these values and performs these functions, it is true. Without these, it is irrelevant and untrue. By the same criterion, that conception of God is truest which aids most in guiding, ennobling, comforting, and strengthening man in his devotion to moral ends. The idea of God in this view becomes the great "working hypothesis" of religion. It corresponds precisely to the hypothesis of natural science. It guides activity and is progressively modified by the results. That eminent pragmatist, Professor William James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* has graphically described the process in these words²¹:

The deity to whom the prophets, seers, and devotees who founded the particular cult bore witness, was worth something to them personally. They could use him. He guided their imagination, warranted their hopes, and controlled their will; or else they required him, as a safeguard against the demon and a curber of other people's crimes. In any case they chose him for the value of the fruits he seemed to them to yield. So soon as the fruits began to seem quite worthless; so soon as they conflicted with indispensable human ideals, or thwarted too extensively other values; so soon as they appeared childish, contemptible, or immoral when reflected on, the deity grew discredited, and was ere long neglected and forgotten. When we cease to admire or approve what the definition of a deity implies, we end by deeming that deity incredible.²²

²¹ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 29.

²² In an article entitled "The Pragmatic Interpretation of the Christian Dogma," by Irving King, in the *Monist*, Vol. XV, pp. 248-61, the functional psychology is applied to the conception of the Holy Spirit, the Son of God, the second coming of Christ, and the inspiration of Scripture. He says: "Our concepts are only functionally valid and do not refer to ontological realities. All our realities are of the functional variety."

So far from being incompatible with Christianity, such a view finds many confirmations in the teaching of Jesus. He taught that what one is and does determines the truth for him. The pure in heart see God. Those who hunger and thirst after righteousness attain the great satisfactions and insights of religion. He who "wills to do" is able to know. The summons of Jesus was to service—to a way of living. He himself was the example of religious faith, not because of his demonstration of the existence of a God, but because in the unfolding of his will there appeared the fullest exhibition of the meaning and power of his conception of God.

The same principles may be applied to all other theological conceptions. The place and function of various ideas are instructively presented in the history of Protestant denominations. Here religion confronts the individual in the form of certain doctrines. The prominence of creeds and the refinements of religious controversies have given religious bodies the appearance of being primarily intellectual movements. But it is becoming clear that such bodies took their rise in great practical issues, in support and defense of which they elaborated special theological systems. The creeds have been results rather than causes, and have come to their final formulation only when the circumstances out of which they sprang have become quiescent, and when the habits of the social group were becoming fixed and rigid. The great causes which produced the Reformation were moral, social, political, and commercial. The practical motives in Luther's work are well recognized. In the same way every reformer was possessed by some great humanitarian purpose. With Calvin it was the freeing and elevating of the individual. His efforts to emphasize the dignity and worth of man led him to exalt the principles of man's immediate relationship to God. It is God, and not the church, who orders the life of man. Hence no church or state has the right to assume to mediate between them. This spirit of independence has worked itself out in various forms—in congregational polity, and in political freedom advocated by many religious societies. The practical impulse is still more prominent in such bodies as the Methodist, the Salvation Army, and Christian Science.

In all communions changes in statements of doctrines are gradu-

ally forced by the development of social conditions and the progress of culture. Within the short time since his day, the theological views of Jonathan Edwards have been outgrown by the devout New Englanders themselves. Even when, as in the early stages of a denomination, the problems are most acute, it is doubtful whether the intellectual views are conspicuous in the minds of many besides the clergy and a few official leaders.²³ The masses of every communion are held to it primarily by the practical values of religious living and by family traditions, social influence, and force of habit. Even doctrinal statements often have more practical than intellectual significance. For instance, the confession in terms of the creed may be as much an act of worship, or an emotional reaction, as an exercise of reason. These forms of worship and ordinances are also subject to social and cultural changes. They must be submitted to the final test of their influence and fruitfulness in the lives of those who employ them. If they further and enrich the spiritual nature, they establish themselves with increasing spontaneity, and their value is continually self-evidencing. But if they are maintained only by an appeal to authority, or to the precedent of earlier and very different religious experiences, then they show themselves in the process of becoming mere survivals and vestiges of past conditions.

The acceptance of the functional psychology means, then, for religion the recognition and justification of the gradual and continuous modifications of doctrines. It does not mean that these doctrines are inherently false, illusory, or useless.²⁴ Heretofore doctrinal changes have gone on either unconsciously, and therefore in a random way, or they have been opposed by the established habits of

²³ James H. Lueba, *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, p. 162.

²⁴ Neither does it mean that religious knowledge is to be sought through some unique experience. The suggestion of Professor James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 431, elaborated by Professor Starbuck, in support of the view that the feelings may furnish an avenue of religious knowledge, has not commended itself to many scholars. For instance, F. M. Davenport, in the discussion of the passional and rational in religion, says: "I would take straightforward issue with those who still hold that the subconscious, the imperfectly rational, the mystically emotional in spite of all its vagaries, is *par excellence* the channel of the inflow of divine life" (*Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, p. 279). E. D. Starbuck, "The Feelings and Their Place in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, Vol. I, pp. 168 f.

thought known as orthodoxy, often in blind prejudice and with tragic results. If, on the other hand, changes in theology were understood to be the marks of growing religious life and real aids in such growth, theology would come to take its place among the sciences. It would in that case surrender its claim to any unique authority, but it would gain the dignity and the working authority which the natural sciences now possess. These sciences do not claim any infallible knowledge or methods. Their conclusions have no finality. They are always subject to revision, and yet they are respected and employed in affairs of the greatest moment. Moreover these sciences possess the fundamentally important dispositions of inquiry, of investigation. Nothing is exempt from questioning. Doubt is in a true sense the instrument of scientific progress. But theology has labored under the assumption of infallible elements or sources, and therefore, at certain points, has felt compelled to raise the red flag against any critical inquiry. Nothing more characteristically indicates the difference between theology and science than the way in which the one has feared, and the other favored, free investigation. The psychology of religion bids fair to point the way to a less pretentious, but really greater, service to religion than theology has ever before been able to perform. Working in the spirit and with the methods of modern science, recognizing the tentative nature of its principles, and setting itself patiently but bravely to practical experiments, religion may yet hope to enter upon more secure and substantial progress, just as education and other forms of social activity have done.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THE CHRIST

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The dogma of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures, with its corollary of "infallibility" and "inerrancy," has so extensively leavened the popular mind as to become in some places a positive obstacle in the way of a truly scientific study of the Bible. Its habitual tendency is either to misconceive, to conceal, or to pervert the significance of the undeniable human element in the sacred writings. The leading churches of the Reformation maintained the doctrine of divinely secured human action by the monergistic operation of the Holy Spirit, and that doctrine held general and powerful ascendancy in the Protestant world until the beginning of the nineteenth century. And it is powerful still. Many who reject the necessitarian philosophy and metaphysics are so accustomed to formulas of expression which have their origin in the dogma of positively secured human conduct, that they unwittingly accept the notion of the inerrant infallibility of the entire biblical record.

A natural result of this widespread conception is the habit of speaking of the entire Bible as if every word of it had been miraculously dictated by the Spirit of God. Every sentence is assumed to be equivalent to a "thus saith the Lord." The older catechisms and compendiums of theology cite their proof-texts *ad libitum*, as if a saying of Eliphaz the Temanite, or a song of Asaph, or a proverb of King Lemuel which his mother taught him, were just as truly and as fully the word of the Lord as a specific commandment from the lips of Jesus Christ. "According to traditional theology," says Reuss, "prophets and apostles can have been nothing but the passive instruments of the revealing will, which for the secure fulfilment of its purposes is supposed to have neutralized and arrested, either temporarily or permanently, all intellectual action in the organs of its choice."¹

¹ *History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age*, p. 17.

A further result of this dogma is a conspicuous lack of discrimination in speaking of the different portions of the Bible. The Old Testament is often tacitly assumed to possess in all its parts and for these Christian times as much divine authority in matters of faith and practice as any portion of the New Testament. And distinguished writers have even gone to the extreme of maintaining that the recorded falsehood of Abraham and Isaac, the assassination of Sisera by Jael, the barbarous execution of Agag by Samuel, and the vindictive psalms, were in fundamental agreement with the ethics of the Christian religion.

Still another result of this mistaken idea of the Scriptures is a habit, unfortunately too prevalent and conspicuous, of breathing out obloquy, not to say "threatening and slaughter," against anyone, no matter what his high moral character and standing, who points out the imperfect ethics of Old Testament saints; or who calls attention to the fact that nearly all the precepts, laws, statutes, and judgments of the Pentateuch are now obsolete and without obligatory force for the Christian conscience; or who alleges that "many of the Psalms are highly improper for the mouths of a Christian congregation,"^a and that a large proportion of the Old Testament prophecies have immediate reference to peoples and social conditions long since passed away, and are profitable to us now only by way of inference and modified practical application. And all this is done in the face of the teachings of Jesus which made manifest the defects and limitations of the Old Testament two thousand years ago.

In view of the facts now mentioned, it becomes us to inquire: What was the real attitude of our Lord toward the Old Testament Scriptures? We must look for our answer to this question in the record of Jesus' sayings as we find them in the four gospels. We classify and arrange in the following pages all those passages which serve to show the spirit and the manner in which our Lord made use of the Scriptures, and we shall endeavor to ascertain the essential import of his language, and at the same time guard against unwarranted inferences and assertions.

1. We first make note of that important class of *biblical texts*

^a These are the words of John Wesley, written in 1784 and printed in the Preface to his *Sunday Service for the Methodists in North America*.

which are of the nature of hallowed epigrams and *highly profitable for purposes of spiritual edification and comfort*. To this class belong the citations from Deuteronomy made by Jesus in his resisting the temptations of Satan, and the record (Matt. 4:1-11) furnishes an example and an illustration of what the saints of God in all ages have found a solace, an inspiration, and a source of strength in the hour of trial, namely, the appropriation of a holy commandment or promise, a motto or a proverb, adapted to the situation and embodying some noble rule of life. Our Lord's exclamation on the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" is another example of his use of an appropriate scripture to express his awful sense of abandonment. Such citations need no comment; they contain an utterance strikingly suitable for the moment, and very impressive. It matters not where such texts are found, or what their immediate context; the authorship and first application of them may or may not have a particular value; they carry in their sentiment and on their face a self-evidencing worth. Their all-sufficient authority is their own intrinsic excellence. Blessed is the man who is so filled with maxims of deep religious content that in the hour of temptation he can readily cite them for assurance and defense. Such practical use of the Scriptures accords with the statement of Paul that "whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that through patience and through comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope" (Rom. 15:4).

We may observe also, in this connection, how quickly our Lord discerned and rejected the error of literal and presumptuous interpretation of a scripture like Ps. 91:11, 12, which the devil himself quoted as an inducement for the Son of God to cast himself down from the temple. The entire psalm abounds in assurances of divine help to him who "abides under the shadow of the Almighty;" but he who presumes to take such poetic passages literally ought to learn something from this example of Jesus in explaining one scripture by the help of another. Jesus replied to Satan: "Again it is written, Thou shalt not make trial of the Lord thy God." It may be that modern literalists, who boast of "taking the Bible just as it says," sometimes unwittingly entangle themselves in the wiles of the devil.

2. Another class of texts contains *allusions* made by Jesus to well-

known persons and events supposed to be familiar to every Jewish hearer. It is sufficient here to mention as examples the references to Noah and Lot in Matt. 24:27; Luke 17:28-29; to David entering the house of God and eating the showbread (Matt. 12:4); and to Moses lifting up the serpent in the wilderness (John 3:14). There is not the slightest necessity for maintaining that in such allusions the question of authorship or of historicity was for a moment thought of. The references were made solely for the purpose of illustration, and that purpose was served just the same whether the matters mentioned were or were not historically demonstrable. In the same manner one may, and often does, refer to characters and acts recorded in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, in *Hamlet*, in *David Copperfield*, and in current histories of Greece, Rome, and England. Such allusions can prove nothing by themselves as to date, authorship, or literary character of the books cited. In the reference to Abel and Zachariah in Matt. 23:35 we may see a recognition of the beginning and end of the Jewish canon; for the Zachariah referred to seems to have been the one mentioned in 2 Chron. 24:21, "who was stoned with stones at the commandment of the king in the court of the house of Jehovah." Chronicles is the last book of the Jewish Scriptures, as Genesis is the first, and so Abel's death recorded near the beginning of Genesis, and Zachariah's near the end of Chronicles, are naturally mentioned as the first and last examples of martyrdom in sacred story. Jesus thus appears to recognize the order of the Old Testament books as they were at that time arranged by the Jewish scribes and elders, but he expressed no opinion as to the correctness or incorrectness of the arrangement. The citation of Old Testament books by their current names, or the names of their supposed authors, is no necessary expression of critical judgment as to the real authorship of writings thus cited, for the same principle of reasoning would require us to maintain the genuineness of the apocryphal book of Enoch because of the citation from it found in the epistle of Jude.

3. During his whole life and ministry Jesus *showed a becoming respect for the rites of the Mosaic law.* He himself was "born under the law" (Gal. 4:4), and after having been circumcised he was formally presented at the temple with the appropriate offerings required by the law (Luke 2:21-24). He submitted to John's bap-

tism, declaring that thus it became him "to fulfil all righteousness." When he cleansed a leper, he bade him go to the priest and "offer the gift that Moses commanded" (Matt. 8:4). He admonished his disciples that "the scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat," and their teachings were therefore to be duly observed. He even represented father Abraham as speaking to the rich man in Hades about "Moses and the prophets" (Luke 16:29). He enjoined upon those who asked him what they must do to inherit eternal life, to keep the commandments of the Decalogue; and he condensed them into the two great commandments of love (Matt. 19:16-19; Luke 10:26-28). These two commandments are found in Deut. 6:5 and Lev. 19:18; but the superior wisdom of our Lord is seen in the discrimination which assigns to these two the substance of "the whole law and the prophets." The Lord's prayer is made up of petitions which had probably been uttered in substance and in separate parts a thousand times before, but only the wisdom of Jesus was sufficient to collect and combine them into one short universal prayer.

4. Jesus also declared on various occasions that *many scriptures of the Old Testament were to find fulfilment in him*. Some of his reported sayings imply a sort of divine necessity that the messianic prophecies "must be consummated." He would not call to his aid twelve legions of angels, for "how then should the scriptures be fulfilled that thus it must be" (Matt. 26:54). In the synagogue at Nazareth he read Isa. 61:1-3, and said: "Today hath this scripture been fulfilled in your ears." At the same time he made a significant reference to Elijah and the widow of Zarephath, and to Elisha and Naaman the Syrian. He taught the two disciples on the road to Emmaus that it behooved the Christ to suffer and to enter into his glory, "and beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself" (Luke 24:25-32). Again and again we find him citing the words of Isaiah as having new fulfilment in his time (Matt. 13:14-15; 15:8; 21:13; Mark 11:17). He cited Ps. 118:22, 23, "The stone which the builders rejected," etc., as having application to his own time and work (Matt. 21:42). He quoted Ps. 110:1, and put the Pharisees to confusion by asking them how the Christ could be

both Lord and son of David (Matt. 22:41-45). In Matt. 24:29-31 we observe how he appropriated the highly metaphorical language of various Old Testament prophets to portray his own future coming and the end of that age. His triumphal entry into Jerusalem seems to have been a designed procedure, symbolic in its suggestions of his entire ministry on earth, and fulfilling in a striking manner the prophecy of Zech. 9:9.

5. Another phase of Jesus' attitude toward Old Testament laws and customs appears in his *denunciation* of the Pharisees and the scribes for their *overmuch attention to outward formalities*, and their making the more important commandments of no effect by their traditions. He spoke in no mild terms against the undue importance they assigned to bathing the body, washing the hands, baptizing cups and pots and brazen vessels, and their disputing over meats and drinks. He charged them with nullifying the commandment to honor father and mother by their ostentatious gifts to the temple of what should rather have been devoted to the welfare of a needy parent (Mark 7:1-23). "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites," he cried; "for ye tithe mint and anise and cummin, and have left undone the weightier matters of the law, justice, and mercy, and faith. . . . Ye cleanse the outside of the cup and of the platter, but within they are full from extortion and excess." In many other like words of rebuke he exposed their efforts to appear outwardly righteous unto men, while inwardly they were "full of hypocrisy and iniquity" (Matt. 23:16-28).

In like manner he condemned their superficial ritualistic notions of sabbath observance. He pointed out to those sticklers for law that, according to their rigid rule, even the priests in the temples were continually profaning the sabbath in performing the required work of their office (Matt. 12:5). He cited the case of David "when he had need and was hungry," and declared that "the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath; so that the Son of man is lord even of the sabbath day" (Mark 2:24-28). How futile, in the light of this view of all Old Testament law and its fulfilment in Christ, is the whole modern controversy of the sectarian literalists who insist on keeping a "seventh-day sabbath" rather than sanctifying the "first day of the week." The Jewish sabbath day, as it

was ordained and guarded by the Old Testament legislation, is of no more binding authority for the Christian conscience than the old sabbatic year, or the new moons, or the feast-days and fast-days of the Jewish people, or their laws and customs of meats and drinks (cf. Col. 2:16, 17). Like all the other commandments of the Decalogue, the sabbath law is transfigured into the loftier ideal of the believer's entrance into the peaceful rest of God, wherein every day is holy and every spot is holy ground. The believer who has entered into this rest (cf. Heb. 4:3), like the Christ himself, becomes "lord of the sabbath" and discerns most clearly that "the sabbath was made for man." His observance of one day in seven will be based, not on the mere pronouncement of an external commandment, but on the deeper conviction of the essential value of an institution which makes for the highest good of man. He must "do good on the sabbath day" (Matt. 12:12). In like manner every other commandment of the Decalogue may be shown to involve an intrinsic ethical principle which appeals to the universal moral sense of man. And our modern "sabbath" or "Sunday laws," if they bind the enlightened conscience, must needs establish their claim on a like deep principle of universal humanitarian obligation, not on the bare letter of an ancient law of Israel.

6. In this connection we should notice also those admonitions of Jesus which indicate *the greater responsibility*, and consequent greater exposure to condemning judgment, *of them that heard his words and saw his works*. "It shall be more tolerable," he declared, "for Tyre and Sidon and Sodom in the judgment than for Chorazin, Bethsaida and Capernaum" (Matt. 11:20-24). "The men of Nineveh and the queen of Sheba shall rise up in the judgment and condemn the generation that witnessed the ministry of Jesus" (Matt. 12:38-45).

7. But that teaching of Jesus which calls for our more special study is his explicit showing of the defective elements of the law, his setting aside sundry positive enactments of the Mosaic legislation, and his declaration that *he came not to destroy but to fulfil the law and the prophets*. His fulfilling the law and the prophets, as contradistinguished from destroying them, has been strangely misunderstood. We shall find, in the light of Jesus' own teaching, that his

fulfilling the content and purport of the Old Testament involves the complete displacement of the statutes and rites of the old covenant as a norm of religious life in Christ. His saying that "one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass away from the law till all things be accomplished" (Matt. 5:18) does not mean or imply that the law in all its parts is to remain in force forever. On the contrary, the great Teacher made it very clear and positive that he himself is the end of the law; and his fulfilment, accomplishing, or consummation of the law and the prophets is a *making of all things new in the gospel of a new and better covenant*. Law and prophets are swallowed up and superseded by the gospel of the kingdom of heaven. The distinction between destroying and fulfilling is illustrated by the obvious impropriety of putting a piece of new undressed cloth upon an old garment, and of putting new wine into old wineskins. It is equally incongruous for an invited guest to be found fasting at the time of the wedding-feast when the bridegroom and his friends are expected to rejoice together (Matt. 9:14-17). And so we are taught that the gospel carries with it a new spirit and a new life. It is not a dispensation of partial reforms, with the omission or modification of a number of old customs, but a deep, radical, and permanent uplift from the bondage of the letter to a glorious freedom of the Spirit. Jesus came not to set aside an indefinite portion of the Old Testament regulations, and to institute a sort of eclectic system in which the old law and the prophets were, with a few exceptions, to remain as the authoritative guides of Christian life and thought. He came as the Mediator of a new and better covenant, enacted upon better promises (Heb. 8:6). He made the old things pass away in order that all things might become new (cf. 2 Cor. 5:17 and Rev. 21:5). The old is not destroyed; it remains as an invaluable object-lesson, showing how God did at sundry times and in divers ways reveal himself of old. But every jot and tittle of the former revelations have been taken up, as by a process of living growth, and incorporated by the power of a new and higher life into the gospel of our Lord. One of the "Thirty-nine Articles" of the English church declares that "the law given from God by Moses as touching ceremonies and rites doth not bind Christians, nor ought the civil precepts thereof of necessity be received in any commonwealth; yet, notwithstanding,

no Christian whatsoever is free from the obedience of the commandments which are called moral." We may even put it in stronger terms, and say that the entire law and prophets and psalms are fulfilled or perfected in the new covenant of Jesus Christ. Every jot and tittle of them all, possessed of any permanent religious value, have become part and parcel of the gospel system. This great *pleroma*, "the fulness of him who filleth all in all," gathers up into itself every essential element of the old covenant, and imparts to everything a higher and more heavenly aspect. No jot or tittle of the old law can therefore remain precisely what it was. The great Teacher issued no rule and set no example by which we are now to go through the Hebrew Scriptures, and presume to say of one text, This is fulfilled, and of another, That is not yet fulfilled; the law of tithing is yet obligatory on the Christian, but the prohibition of swine's flesh is now null and void. No such eclectic procedure can be made to work with self-consistency. There is no authoritative voice in church or state throughout the world, no general council, and no prophet or teacher, that can be accepted as an infallible guide in any such a separation and selection of ancient oracles fulfilled and unfulfilled. Alas! Has the great Teacher been so long time with us, and we yet fail to grasp his word? We strangely heed his testimony, and that of his apostles after him, if we refuse to see that the whole Old Testament revelation, not excepting one jot or tittle of the law and the prophets, is fulfilled by being fused into a new and better covenant, which is enacted upon broader and higher principles and better promises. Even the Ten Commandments, the richest kernel of the law, are exalted into new life and acquire depths of divine significance unknown to the ancient fathers. "Thou shalt do no murder" is now shown to condemn "everyone who is angry with his brother." The crime of adultery is committed whenever one "looketh on a woman to lust after her." The prohibition of blasphemy is superseded by the higher commandment, "Swear not at all." The sabbath laws are lifted far above the plane of a bare and barren statute that requires a man to suspend his usual work for some twelve or fifteen particular hours out of a specified twenty-four (which could never be the same for men living on opposite sides of the world), and they are fulfilled in a principle of Christly life

which grasps the deeper and more universal obligation of observing sabbath by doing good therein, and by so commanding all one's time that a suitable proportion of it shall be duly consecrated to the loving service of God and of our fellow-men. Thus may we, like our divine Master, become lord, not the slave, of the sabbath day. Other statutes and precepts of the ancient times become transformed and transfigured in their fulfilment in Christ. The old law of retaliation is consummated so as to be eclipsed and lost from view in presence of the heavenly love that turns the other cheek to him that smites, prays for the enemy and the persecutor, and seeks to "be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect."

8. Not only in such a heavenly fulfilling of the great ethical precepts of the law does the Lord Jesus open to us ideals of the new and higher Christian life, but also in other ways, and *in some instances by direct antagonism to the old Mosaic legislation, he reveals the superior standards of truth and righteousness in the kingdom of God.* Observe how explicitly he put aside the easy-going regulation of divorce which is written in Deut. 24:1-3, and there stands along with much more that is said to be "the words of the covenant which Jehovah commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel in the land of Moab," but which, according to Jesus, Moses permitted because of the people's hardness of heart. He himself, on the contrary, declared strict monogamy to be God's law "from the beginning of the creation," when he made them male and female. According to the text of the gospel of Mark (10:2-11), Jesus prohibits all divorce. Any man or woman who puts away wife or husband and marries another is guilty of adultery. No exception or qualification is mentioned in this oldest record of the words of Jesus, and there is good reason to suspect that the exceptional clause now found in Matthew's gospel ("except for fornication," Matt. 5:32; 19:8) is an early interpolation, foisted into the text by some Jewish-Christian scribe who felt the teaching of Jesus at this point to be altogether too severe.

9. According to Christ's teaching, *the Old Testament prophets as well as the law, were inferior and defective in the light of the kingdom of heaven* and the new covenant of love. Jesus was quick to appreciate a saying like that of Hos. 6:6, "I desire goodness and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings," and he

quoted it in self-defense against the Pharisees (Matt. 9:13; 12:7). But he rebuked those disciples who wished, after the manner of Elijah (2 Kings 1:10), to bid fire come down from heaven and consume a Samaritan village that refused to receive him (Luke 9:55). The Jewish scribes taught that, according to Mal. 4:5, "Elijah must first come," and the "Second Adventists" of modern times insist on following the same method of literal exegesis; but Jesus showed a deeper penetration in pointing out to his disciples that Elijah had already come in the person and ministry of John the Baptist. He also showed them that John was the last of a long succession of prophetic voices that had spoken of the coming of the Christ of God. "All the prophets and the law prophesied until John" (Matt. 11:13). But at the same time he admonished them and us that, while "among them that are born of women there hath not arisen a greater than John the Baptist, yet he that is but little in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." If, then, the greatest of the Old Testament prophets is less than the little ones in Christ's new kingdom, with what propriety can we, who have been thus enlightened, and have tasted the heavenly gift, and been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and of the powers of the gospel age, go back for our authoritative guidance to a system that is superseded, finished, and fulfilled? Is it not possible for us, through a blinding bondage to the letter, to sell our heavenly birthright for an old patriarchal or Jewish mess of meat? Let us allow no veil upon our heart that will prevent our beholding, whensoever Moses is read, that the ministration once written and engraven on stones is finished and fulfilled, and has become permanently eclipsed in the Christly ministration of righteousness, which far excels in glory (cf. 2 Cor. 3:7-11).

10. In further illustration of the manner in which the "Mediator of the new covenant" maketh all things new, we notice a few examples of *his spiritual discernment in certain portions of the Old Testament*. The superficial Sadducees thought to confound him by their gross fleshly conception of the resurrection of the dead, and proposed the concrete example of a woman who, according to the levirate law, had married seven husbands. "Ye do err," said Jesus, "not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God." And he cited Exod. 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc., and made the profound, suggestive

comment: "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." Such teaching, we are told, astonished the multitudes. But what was the peculiar element of his teaching that astonished? Was it not the spiritual insight that lifted their ideas above carnal things? The resurrection is attainment of angelic life, in conditions of being in which they "neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more" (Luke 20:35, 36). At another time, when the Jews spoke of their fathers eating manna in the wilderness, Jesus answered: "It was not Moses that gave you the bread out of heaven, but my Father that giveth you the true bread out of heaven. For the bread of God is that which cometh down out of heaven, and giveth life unto the world. I am the bread of life. Your fathers ate the manna in the wilderness, and they died" (John 6:32-49). When they boasted that Abraham was their father, he admonished them that Abraham did not go about seeking to kill a man that told the truth. He astonished them by saying: "Abraham rejoiced to see my day," And then he added to their confusion by his solemn declaration: "Before Abraham was born, I am" (John 8:40, 56-58). With what scathing exposure he condemned the narrow dogmatism that required circumcision on a sabbath day in order "that the law of Moses might not be broken," but was offended in him "because he made a man every whit whole on the sabbath" (John 7:19-24). Once, when they would have stoned him for the supposed blasphemy of calling God his Father, he cited the eighty-second psalm, in which magistrates who execute judgment are called "gods and sons of the Most High," and thereupon put to them the searching question: "If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and if, as ye assume,³ the scripture cannot be broken, say ye of him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God" (John 10:36). Here Jesus called the psalms "your law," and his answer to those Jews was strictly an *argumentum ad hominem*, not the utterance of any dogma

³ According to the majority of exegetes, the words "and the scripture cannot be broken" are not to be taken as a parenthesis, but rather to be construed as an additional clause depending on the "if" of the preceding sentence. Hence the words are not to be understood as a parenthetical expression of our Lord's opinion touching the inviolableness of the scripture, but are purely hypothetical in an argument which simply assumes current Jewish opinion as its premise.

of his own concerning the Scriptures. So also the great lesson, inculcated in the famous passage in John 5:39-47, is the moral impossibility of apprehending the deep spiritual significance of the Scriptures when one has not the love of God abiding in the heart. "Ye search the Scriptures," he says, "because ye think that in them ye have eternal life; and these are they that bear witness of me; and yet ye will not come to me that ye may have life." Here we read no command to search the Scriptures, as the common version has long erroneously implied; nor does Jesus himself affirm that the Scriptures contain eternal life, or that the Jews in thinking so were right or wrong. The passage is one of those characteristic sayings of our Lord which charge upon the superficial Jewish literalists a total failure to comprehend the real witness of the Old Testament to Christ. And he went on to say that their one accuser was that very Moses on whom they set their hope. "For if ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" How must those Jews have been astonished at being told that they did not believe the writings of Moses? Had they not been brought up on Moses? From childhood they had heard him read every sabbath in the synagogue. And yet this presumptuous man of Nazareth tells them that if they had only believed Moses, they would also believe in him! They probably all believed that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. They found no trouble in accepting any recorded statement of the five books as veritable fact. They knew nothing of that modern criticism which detects the composite elements in those venerable writings, and discovers the different codes of law imbedded therein. And yet Jesus told them to their face that they did not believe Moses or his writings! Alas! It may be a very small and bootless thing to believe that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, but an unspeakably more important thing to be able to discern the real witness of these ancient books to Christ. Where can the literalist find the passage in which it is written that Abraham rejoiced to see the day of Jesus of Nazareth? Where is the passage in the Pentateuch in which it is clear that Moses wrote of Christ? Jesus did not say that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, but "he wrote of me." And not Moses only, but "all the prophets from Samuel and them that followed after, as many as have spoken,

they also told of these days" (Acts 3:24). The law, the prophets, and the psalms all bear their witness to the Christ, but not in accordance with the literalist's notions of predictive prophecy. Whosoever insists that Moses must have written the books of Moses, and Samuel the books of Samuel, and whosoever goes through the Old Testament writings selecting here and there a text which seems to him to speak directly and specifically of Jesus Christ, and yet retains the veil of defunct Judaism upon his heart, so that he fails to see that every jot and tittle of the law have been fulfilled by a heavenly fusion into the richer content of the gospel of the new covenant, is still like the Jews of old whom Jesus charged with a culpable failure to believe either in Moses or in himself. Such a failure arises from want of spiritual discernment.

For a freedom from such bondage to the letter, and from such false conceptions of biblical inspiration as were held by the scribes and Pharisees of ancient and modern times, did Christ set us free. We should stand fast, therefore, in our liberty, and not be entangled again in such a yoke of bondage. Seeing that the whole law, the prophets, and the psalms have been fulfilled and consummated in the Christ, so that every element of permanent value is exalted into a higher life and power, and everything that was imperfect, defective, or temporary is displaced and superseded by a clearer revelation of God, we shall not henceforth be offended at perceiving how large a portion of the Old Testament has fallen into desuetude, and presents no proper moral standard for us to follow now. We should no longer apologize for the falsehood of Abraham, or the polygamy of the patriarchs and of David and Solomon. We need not be troubled over the anger and the shortcomings of Moses. We may still appreciate the poetry of Deborah's song, although she barbarously extols the murderous deed of Jael, and would probably have been as ready as the mother of Sisera to exult in the capture of a heathen damsel or two for every warrior in Israel. Cutting off the thumbs and toes of Adoni-bezek, hewing Agag into pieces before Jehovah, and hanging the seven sons of Saul for the pacification of Jehovah, need no more excuse for occurring in Israel than if the same things had occurred among the Philistines or the Moabites. The system of slavery which finds a sanction in the laws of Moses calls for no more vindication

from a Christian than does the law of retaliation—"hand for hand, foot for foot, eye for eye." The marriage and divorce laws of the Pentateuch are as foreign to the teaching of Jesus as are the sentiments of the vindictive psalms. The cruel separation of husbands and wives, as narrated in the last chapter of the book of Ezra, and the prohibition of all foreign marriages as written in Deut. 7:1-5, could not be tolerated in a Christian commonwealth today. The vengeful slaughter of over seventy-five thousand men, so gloatingly told in the ninth chapter of the book of Esther, should not be held up as a commendation of the womanly virtues of the favorite wife of Ahasuerus, who petitioned the king to continue the massacre for another day! Nor can we admire the spirit of Mordecai in ordaining the feast of Purim to perpetuate the memory of such a horrible retaliation. Such deeds of ancient barbarism, when justified by the notion that the Old Testament abides as an authoritative norm, become warrant and excuse for such a tragedy as the massacre of St. Bartholomew in Parisian history. The true disciple of the kingdom of heaven, gifted with the spirit of his Lord, perceives at once that all such deeds of vengeance are utterly out of place under the gospel. It is a sad blot on the history of the Puritan colonists of New England that they assumed the perpetual validity of the Old Testament commandment, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." And scores of American divines during the last century were too blind to see that the Jewish laws touching slavery are as inconsistent with Christian ethics as were their ancient customs of polygamy and their loose doctrine of divorce.

The plain fact is that the larger portion of the Old Testament treats of times and peoples so different, and so far away from our conditions both of thought and of life, that the messages of the Hebrew prophets can have at most only a modified application to us and to our times. The entire Levitical legislation, which comprises the larger part of the Pentateuch, can have no binding force upon the Christian church, having long ago waxed aged even unto vanishing away (Heb. 8:13). Nearly one-half the book of Job consists of the speeches of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, who were sternly rebuked by Jehovah for not having spoken the thing that was right. The Song of Solomon and the books of Ecclesiastes and Esther have for

hath been baptized in thy holy name and hath been elected in the Holy Spirit of thy Father, and now waits for thy promise of truth, "Tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem until ye be endued with power from on high," that it may set in order his spirit and mind and body, and cleanse him of all evil thoughts; and do thou give unto him thy Spirit which thou didst receive of the Father at the River Jordan; strengthen thou him and open, Lord, his mind to know the Scriptures

begets, and perpetrates it and goes to destruction. The face of the whole world is so destroyed by sin that not a child is born free from the taint of death. The hearts of the boy and the youth are as sordid as that of the old man, and no period of life is without its blemish. The small boy, hardly masculine—but I will not speak, I will not mention such wickedness, such mad wickedness. I will refrain from uncovering and bringing to light the more foul things. What it were a crime to publish defiles heart and tongue.

Fiery passion stands erect, the golden girdle of modesty is unloosed, wrong stands erect, the nets of madness are drawn tight. All, all, I say, have ceased to restrain their lusts. I will not omit to score and upbraid each. That the crowd has drifted into all things impious, all things base, I grieve and laugh at, am both Diogenes and Democritus. The race thinks it right to have known the harlot's couch; the law of his nature, it says, bids one lie here and her with him. For why was woman given or made, unless to suffer it? Sex commands, it says, that she bear, that he be borne. A drunken race, unknowing how to restrain itself, thinks harlots as permissible as dinners. The whole world rushes freely into all kinds of evil in all directions; once it stood firm, now is going to pieces. It slides back of itself, disintegrates of itself, goes to destruction of itself, while lust and crime flourish and right is buried in a tomb.

Where the Don flows and where the shore of Syene approaches the Tropic, everyone casts off restraint and none will gird up his loins. A race of asses is forever reveling in drunkenness, and a serious life and chaste grace are treated with obloquy. Everyone, like a springing horse, neighs unto crime or bleats to it like sheep, springs to passion, fondles it, cherishes it, and hence begets evil. We see nothing wicked and all things beautiful let alone. Blood-relatives give each other the bonds of the flesh and kisses. Base kisses and by no means sisterly the sister showers secretly upon the brother; and the way of the pit, in a word, is broad. Kinsfolk are united together, and the passion of love is the one thought of all. Not now is the seventh degree the last in giving birth. The lawful heir perishes, and an heir not the father's plows the father's fields, while blind license permits all things through women. The uncertain palace of nobility brings forth spurious offspring, while many sons of unlike rank, though of like blood are born. The adulteress burns, and the man of high position respects not his vows. An uncertain Herodias is given to many, and there is no John. Now even the lilies of the spirit are prostituted, the living necklace and heavenly lilies are defiled. The sacred dower is broken, and the veil loosened into wickedness. Everyone looks out for

himself, and is afraid to show devotion to God. The virgin band is wasted, the spotless couch gone, the bride of God falls, and all men drift weakly into wickedness. Oh, the rule of chastity groans at the baseness of all life, this lamentation or tragic cry mounts to the stars. I shudder to tell the things I am often on fire to reprove. The shouts of crime alone, alas, strike the heavens. The perpetration of crime and its voice are all that is heard; the guilt of the time of Noah, or worse, I should say, is upon us. The earth is filled with bloodshed and fraud and lust. Moderation is spitefully entreated of gluttony, favor of bribery, good gifts of money. All that you see goes into the vice of fornication; nothing stands secure, nothing stands safe now from lust. There stand the harlots, in short, as the devil's nets, lost bodies, a well-worn path, a public door. Luxury flourishes, impiety is unyielding, and wickedness abounds. All things are defiled by the abominable gang, the herd of the wantons. The impudent wantons lead a life of riotous license in speech, feeling, actions, debauchery, drunkenness, gluttony, their one and only glory their love of the slippery things of the flesh, defiling their hearts with rioting, their members with lust. Woman sordid, perfidious, fallen, besmirches purity, meditates impiety, corrupts life. Evil woman becomes the spur and bridle of sin or goodness. Woman is a wild beast, her crimes are like the sand. I am not going to find fault with those whom I ought to bless as righteous, but because I ought, I direct the sting of my verse against these locusts of the soul. Now evil woman fills my page and my discourse. Herself I appreciate, but her doings I disapprove, and will therefore castigate. Woman persuades to wickedness by glance and ways and deeds, rejoices in driving to sin and living all woman. There is no good one, or, if you do find any good one, the good one is a bad thing, for there is almost no good woman. Woman is a guilty thing, a hopelessly fleshly thing, nothing but flesh, vigorous to destroy, born to deceive and taught to deceive—the last pitfall, worst of vipers, beautiful rottenness, a slippery pathway, public curse, plundering plunder, a horrible night-owl, a public doorway, sweet poison. All guile is she, fickle and impious, a vessel of filth, an unprofitable vessel, breakable, vicious, insatiable, self-centered, and quarrelsome. Goods lightly sold but quickly lost is she, a slave of gold, a firebrand in the house, loving only to deceive and be deceived. She shows herself an enemy to them that love her and a friend to the enemy. She seeks if she is not sought, and reaps as gain her wickedness. The night is her joy, her own, her light; she makes no exception, conceives by the father or the grandson. A trench of lust, the arms of chaos, tongue of vice she was and is and will be, and through her the ranks of the good go to destruction.

As long as crops shall be given to the husbandman and put into the soil, this lioness will roar, this wild beast will rage against right. She is the last madness, the inmost foe, inmost destruction. While she refuses, she allures, and impels the well-regulated to sin. She is flesh of the flesh, and is acknowledged to surpass herself in guile and Proteus in changeability, seeming pious in impiety. She teaches vice, but my verse may not call her vicious; but I call it vice, I prove the perfidy and name the harm. A large article, a very bad thing, the worst of things, cleverer than any other skill, is the skill of woman. No wolf is worse than she, because his attacks are less frequent; no dragon, no lion; what can I say is worse? You would condemn not only all her harmful points, but also the good ones. John upbraids this sin, and falls by the sword. Through her Hippolytus is destroyed because he was a man; through her Ammon is destroyed; through her Joseph is tormented; through her is thy hair shorn, Samson; through her are destroyed Reuben and David and Solomon and the first man. She gives and does that through which shame is brought to ruin and we are brought to ruin. Woman in heart and speech and deed is a dire dragon, a terrible fire creeping into the vitals like poison. Evil woman paints and bedecks herself for her crimes, dyes, adulterates, changes, varies, colors her natural self. In pursuit of guilt she roams like a lion, runs about like a wild beast, runs burning with devouring flames of fire and burns others. Shining with treacherous light, glowing with sin, the incarnation of sin herself, she is unwavering and fixed only in passion and frivolity. She fastens upon him and draws him on when she spies one spying closely, and delights to do harm whenever she gets the opportunity. When she looks most faithful and most closely united to you, she will set a slave before you if he gives her more. Frail is the heart, frail the word, and brief the faithfulness of a woman. A woman gives for a present brief sport and long tears. Sad is the end and sweet the beginning in love; the outcome of that sin is apt to be pain. In the beginning fierce fire kindles the lost heart, but the outcome of the sin is a cry from the depths: Oh, woe is me, woe is me! Woman is a stench, all aglow to deceive, a flame of madness, the beginning of destruction, the worser portion, the robber of shame. Her own germs, O savage crime, she casts from her body, and, when put forth, cuts them up, throws them away, kills them in her wickedness. Woman is a viper, not a human being but a wild beast, and not true to herself. She is the murderer of that creature, nay of herself first. Fiercer than an asp, and more madly raging than the raging, is she. O savagery, she drowns her own flesh in the waves. Woman is faithless, ill-savored, ill savor itself, the throne of Satan. Shame is a burden to her;

flee from her, reader! We even read that the sins of a man are more pious, more acceptable to the Lord, than the good deeds of a woman.

O evil days! Why? Because they have begotten so many filthy things and have put forth such foulness, not to say such horrors. All good goes to pieces, all men drift into every kind of sin. All good lies prostrate, all evil pleases all alike. The chaste couch is esteemed mean, a broad one sought; compacts of marriage or union are allowed. The married woman refuses her husband, rushes after men, and draws them to her; in order not to sleep alone, in countrified fashion, she gives herself and what she has. Who is a good woman? What one has a good name? What one is chaste? What one stands out in piety or suffers her chamber to be inviolate? What one suffers the marriage contract to be sacred? She signs, that she will not commit sin and adultery, nor bring forth young like the wolf without any law or order, that the boy shall be marked by the features of the father, the father be known by the face of the boy, and no blemish be found in birth or likeness. Thus shall the progeny presented to the husband have the husband for father, not a servant of the household; show the features of the father and display the characteristics of the father in behavior. Who holds the agreement sacred and the blessing given at the altar? Who has pious eyes? Who is a good woman? Very few, believe me. Such are very rare birds, plants very difficult to find. I castigate such things, laugh at them not without tears. Few keep their troth, for all the husband's authority is going to pieces. A flock without a turtle dove, for there is none without the coveted sparrow.

All nations like a husband who has a single wife. To many a single wife becomes a slippery way, a broken path. The husband goes outside, takes pleasure in adultery, in the woman of the town; presently she prepares to sin, coquettes with it, burns and risks it. Troubled she looks upon her husband's repose, gladly upon his bier, danger, imprisonment, death. Julian Order and Scatinian Law, where do ye slumber? Everybody lives without law and without rule. Many women, many sins, much ruin; many a Lydia, few Lucretias, no Sabine woman. There is almost no good woman; no man sees an Amazon now; and I hear of none without three suitors, and these shameless ones. Almost every woman is as eager for sin as for light, and delights as much to become common as once to be one man's wife. The adulterous wife would rather be sent to hell than to be the partner of one husband, O impious madness! She is better satisfied with a single eye than with a single partner, O heathen madness, O guilty earth! Select any you will, take out any you will, and put these together; you will scarcely find one chaste of heart and not guilty of body.

In various ways Venus lords it over the lordly. Lamentable! But to whom? To them that burn for the stars and hate the depths. She defiles and fastens to herself everything in the world, and drives the sluggish heart into her nets. She is more voracious and more rapacious than flames of fire. She burns kindled with dead and rotten wood. One and all rush into passion, and animal indulgence. The pledge-money of one husband becomes that of another; his death is near.

Who is not a father now? Even the boys are eager to have boys, and threaten to fill their father's house and halls with offspring. Everyone wants a wife, enters into matrimony and becomes a husband, to be blessed in Jacob's line and not without seed. He becomes a father, a child is born, and the new-born progeny is handed to him. Most of the father's force goes outside, of the mother's to her lactation.

O strange age! Now even the small girl is agog to be married, the unripe maiden craves the kisses and force of a husband. A dowry is given her, a ring put upon her finger, the pledge-money fixed. Then come the jovial groom, the bustling cook, the wandering viands; the hall glows with choruses singing congratulation, and the procession comes with the bridal songs before and after. In a twinkling she conceives, becomes a mother. Her offspring grows older and tall; presently the offspring is doubted. Her son is thought to be his father. Lust brings forth sickly young and many broods. The flock springs up quickly, and the crop comes forth quickly. So is the generation of children, so do they grow and multiply. In a word, numbers of the worst kind wander everywhere, a herd of men without a ray of light in their evil hearts. Almost the population of the city is scattered all through the country. No place is empty, none without its crowd. Individual places, mountains,¹⁸ caves, islands, fields, meadows, are besieged with dwellers and wanderers. The Caspian ridges, pathless of yore, are trodden by feet. The hermit is not now in highest esteem, because he is so many. Countless and wretched is the race today, all too ready for evil, all too prone to evil, tending to evil.

Everyone teaches evil, and it is no harm to be harmful; everyone gets heated with wine, and it is of no profit to be wise. The wine-shop is sought more quickly and more gladly than the temples of God sacred with divinity and splendid with light. An impious race drinks maddening wine beyond measure. The hearth is kindled, and the jest goes round in blind order. A drunken race thirsts for famous wines, wines of Belgium, maddening wines, bringing violence, full of ruin. By such was Noah overcome, by such Lot burned, chaste as he was before; an evil heat sticks to the glut-

¹⁸ It seems as if *mors* in the text must be a mistake for *mons*.—H. P.

tons and drinkers. You who desire to go to bed drunk frequently want to loosen your belt quickly for unmixed cups. By these you are quickly overcome, burn, and are burned with love of the fire; your mind boils with mad fires, your frame is roasted with heat. More ravenous than a serpent—this is no lie—is the enemy in thy vitals, and he flourishes on the fire within. Straightway you lose all self-control under the sting of lust; this foe rages more fiercely than any foe, this heat more fiercely than any heat. Passion craves wine; by its torch is the mind inflamed, the deed made to smoke. Soon the stomach is filled, the man surrenders to passion and boils over into sin. Through unmixed cups first the throat, and afterward the belly, rages. Soon passion rouses furiously the hidden members. Food fills it, passion fills it, sin loves these two members. The indulgence of one rushes to the bottle, slips into wickedness; hence a flood of lust and rottenness on the spot. The madness of the other causes shame to be thrown aside, force to perish, vigor to die, order to be destroyed. The one care and general struggle of the flesh is to eat; drunkenness is in favor, and thy words lie neglected, good Jesus! The gullet reigns greedy and full of drunkenness, the heart is oppressed with intoxication and goaded with wicked desires. The times are full of evil excitement, full of lust, full of gluttony, and their only passions are eating and pandering to the flesh. The famous thing now is to give over the belly to food and the mouth to drink. Venus and the gullet, is the motto of the belly-worshippers. I say they are not worshippers of Christ, but gluttons and belly-worshippers, that hate not any wickedness or baseness.

Now the good man is a culprit, the stomach is good, the belly is men's school. Everyone devotes himself to the gullet, and is disgusted and ashamed to walk modestly.

Hear what I say: Jerusalem lies in ruins while the prince of cooks stands erect; a sea of food—nay, of foods—is what is wanted. The narrow path is scorned and lo, the broad way is demanded. First the gullet, then Venus, fasten their chains upon everyone. O woe! See the age held tight by threefold madness, bound by threefold sin—lust, fraud, and pride. Pride binds the heart, and lust the drunken body. Fraud binds body and heart, and death bends both to itself. The burden of earth weighs down the guilty heart and the sinking neck. In heart we incline, nay, turn back to Pharaoh. We go into the trackless regions, take our stand on evil, evil that we are, and fond of the things that pass and perish utterly. We go and shall continue to go where we shall perish and be destroyed, seeing only the things that perish and are destroyed.

Peace weeps, love dies; one rages and smites, another is smitten;

Mars roars unbending, one stands, one groans, and men plunge into guilt. Wrath seizes and brandishes and whirls about its bloody scourge, brings out savage spears, wild dangers, murderous war. The peace of the heathen flourisheth, the one and only peace of the Christian perisheth. If I see well, the union and peace of wild beasts is firmer. See, guilty race, lions and boars do not slay and devour each other, while the vengeance of the fathers slaughter their offspring.

Finally the impious mind takes to trying constantly battles of the soul, and sprinkles itself with homicidal blood. Ah, how I grieve that right and wrong grow at even pace! Here is madness fighting, there is madness arming both hands. Here are parents at war, there brothers of the same blood. The race rages against its own flesh, and savage Furies hold sway.

O the murderous cruelty! The son longs for the father's death, laments because death is so slow to come to a man; and the impious father desires in beautiful sequence to lay the son's splendid limbs in a mean tomb first. The daughter rejoices to close her mother's aged eyes, and to weep at her funeral, afterward freely daring what she will. The stepmother gives cups of poison and food filled with death. Cruel death overtakes him who goes abroad with rich merchandise, the rich man atones for his wealth, host and guest rush at each other's throats. Rarely is a wife safe with husband surviving, never with husband safe and secure. The husband perishes at the hands of his spouse, and the sharp sword of her husband smites her. The tender youth is in danger from the fully grown, the son-in-law from the father-in-law. The brother pursues the friend with death, or, if not, with importunity; whom he cannot slay with the sword he destroys by wiles, O wicked heart!

The noxious race, the more than impious crowd, are their own destruction. Thy neighbor is to thee and thou to him as the wolf to the lamb. Grace is dead, and the fire of love grown cold. The royal path, the path of character, is lost. The heart void of light and full of sin congeals; the soul is frozen clearly, and the cold is real. Grace is dead, and a cold broods over us deeper than the Danube. The peoples are without morals or order, magistrate or ruler. The law of the Lord is fallen, and his head is dripping all around with moisture who in his goodness poured them forth—O terrible sound!—warmed with the breath of his mouth.

Why tarry, in short? Pride and wrath, the sister of pride, are over all things, and twofold deceit of heart and tongue. The upright race has passed away, a wicked and perverse come forth, altogether given over to babbling and drunkenness, full of sloth, full of lust, full of sin, cunning of heart, small of body, and meager in manliness.

Almost no one displays the spirit or the strength of the fathers. The son is no more like his father than Sisyphus is like Polyphemus. Parents and grandchildren have no likeness. All the characteristics of the body are like a waning moon, and as the body has degenerated, so also the mind. A withered race abounds, and the bodies and souls of the race are feeble. Worthless in heart and most like himself is everyone now. He who appeals to you develops twofold craft and cunning. Unity is cleft in twain and destroyed by division, agreement by differences, simplicity by duplicity. This man becomes that man's foe, that man his, or friend. A man smiles and hates, holds off and stands by, is friendly and hostile. The royal path of sincerity is ruined and gone; impious falseness puts on the cloak of duplicity.

I want you to believe what I mean to say, no age has brought forth false prophets more numerously and abundantly than this one. In short, these Pharisees with their inward foulness are a slippery road, a public doorway to destruction. A pestilent brood of hypocrites has sprung up and rushed upon us, a race of darkness, horrid of body and slippery of soul. They have sacred names and sacred exterior with proud hearts. They appear in sheep's clothing, but there is a snake in the grass. Their hearts are wanton, their brows stern as Cato's, waxen in morals, brazen of face, inclining to evil. Sheep's clothing disguises and cloaks their lowering, greedy, wolfish hearts. Their hearts swell with pride, and lack the uttermost fragment of heart. They are pious of face, impious of deed, halls of filth. They put on wiles as one trims and cuts off the hair. The wolf counterfeits the sheep, the bramble personates the rose. Unmixed cups and many dainties, is their only motto; place is their one desire, dissimulation their right; their will their only law. Scandals and schisms are in them, but no sabbath of the soul. In short, order is not found in their deeds, but in the dressing of their hair. They are canonized for their tongs, for their combs and the arrangement of their locks. Is this a silly lie I am telling? At any rate, they imitate the thing. One of them, older of face and apparently more righteous, is the pattern of morals for the lower brethren. His heart meditates evil, his tongue sows good and speaks fair. O shame, O sin! He is a devil and is thought to be an angel. The same man is a devil in deed and an angel in word. What his speech teaches, his actions unteach, hostile to it. The Argus-eyed sees not his own baseness nor the impieties of his brethren, a sower of praise and lavish giver of indulgence to himself.

His heart is void of wisdom, his words show themselves good words of wisdom; his aged limbs are stirred by youthful desires. He hides the

wolf with the fox, shows himself well regulated outside, is fair of speech, but guile within. His evil conscience, a burden and pest in himself, surrenders to him, the witness within flees away. His brow presents a Hector, his age is believed to surpass Nestor's, his skin is parched, and he has bristles on his hairy arms. Near the time of death, he reckons his years on his fingers, and, though he totters with age, he has the spirit of a tyrant. What is plainer? Lo, a third Cato sent from heaven, sterner of brow, juster on the surface, worthless within. He is a Cato, with time will be a Mauritanian Hiarba. First Venus unmans him, then a bristling beard makes him a man. His brow shows a man, within the man is dead, he is a wolf within. But thy king's daughter is all glorious within. Why weave delays? Order is abandoned, and evil stands. Hypocrisy stands, obedience is mocked at. The teaching of Pythagoras is a dead letter. The guiding hand lies idle for thee, and thou chooseth to walk the broad way of sin. The narrow way is left, the broad taken by all. We seek the pathless, uncertain, drifting, and drift with it.

Aiming at toastmasterships, scepters, and the chief seats, everyone is in a constant turmoil and bustle. All the world is panting for honors and not for morals. Now luxury, idleness, falseness, overenthusiasm, pretense, dissimulation, gaming, drunkenness, fraud, gluttony, and wrongdoing are the things in vogue; double-tongued speech, quarrels, murder, war with its trumpets and alarms, violence, debauchery, wrangling—in a word, all that error teaches. Such germs become troops of vices, such germs give the death-blow to morals. Pride first suggests to the soul to plunge into the trackless, brings in the troop, the great sins, the seven sins. Pride first bade men do impiously, and the crowd howled approval, first lays siege to the heart, and quickly gets possession of it subdued by the crowd. It persists, the man falls, overthrows the good and keeps the evil, heaps up sin, while lust and sin are in high feather. It drowns the male offspring of Irsael, and saves the female for luxurious wantonness.

O evil age! Why? Because bound by no rules. The man ready without and learned within is thought a fool; not long-suffering, but violence, brings peace now. He that is silent goes hungry, and loquacity begets gain. The tongue of the sophist, the tongue of the tyrant, the tongue of the market-place, orders all things and smites down all opposition like a sword. The voluble tongue is the famous one now, and hears the words, "Come hither." A dumb bishop, a backslider in the order, closes the door. You have no boastful knowledge, and you are proved to be a sheep or a blockhead. You are a sort of viper, and you show you have a free mind. Now to return evil for evil is held glorious, to yield is a fault.

Irreverence is praised, and patience regarded as a sin. It is just as much a disgrace not to return evil as to live on husks. In crime and wickedness the vicious race riots night and day.

Alas! Speech is bad, actions are worse, practices worst of all. The vigor of sin stands out sharply, the old vigor of order is blunted. I say that not as many worthy and serious spirits can be found as there are mouths of the Nile, not as many pious bodies as there are planets in the sky. If I see there is one anywhere of simple, modest heart, I reckon him unsophisticated, and count an honest heart a prodigy. It is like plowing the sea with chariots, or the dry land with sails, finding fishes in the fields, ships in the air, camels in the stars.¹⁹

What would Horace and Cato, Persius and Juvenal, do, I ask, if they were in life now? Lucilius would gaze in astonishment on the doings of this age, and would call his own prosperous and holy; would say the times were admirable which he called very bad; would write the age was golden which he wrote was black, guilty, evil. See the age, see the separate things plunged in darkness. Fall into evil and you will be loved for the fall; stand straight and you will want. Wish to leave evil, to pursue the right and live rightly, you will be the butt of a concert hall, and a scene on the stage will be based upon you. O woe! A veritable Charybdis sinks all things into wickedness. Concoct crime, and you will be considered a chieftain and walk in high esteem. Do you want to live quietly and safely, do you want peace? Be suave to powerful sinners, and flatter the bully. When you see guilty deeds, be a roe with the eyes of a mole. Quickly drive forth and scrape out of your heart what you have seen. If you want to expose evil, and score others' sins, you do yourself no good and suffer ostracism besides. To puncture base faults now brings fierce quarrels; to criticise wrong and tell the truth proves a fountain of hatred. He that even for good exposes my sins is a burden to me; an evil conscience cavils at and hates all the doings of light. A drunken race drinks baleful cups, cups of forgetfulness, such as the poet invented for all who die. Everyone is mindful of evil alone and forgetful of piety. The righteous man lacks a hearth and home; no one is willing to give to the good for nothing. Separate things go for value, all things for wares, but nothing without price—if you bring nothing. The cottage of the poor man, alas, shows no smoke rising from its chimney.

The halls and high-paneled ceilings of the rich man shine with light. Small sons in infant strength smile upon him. He reclines in luxury at

¹⁹ The text seems to be corrupt here and the grammar peculiar, but I think I hit the sense.—H. P.

dinner, and goes about raised upon the shoulders of a Liburnian. Whenever he will, he retires to his lofty ivory-inlaid couch. In the morning the cook calls him, and he straightway sacrifices a bull to his stomach. Golden service bears his honied wine and rich dainties. Night returns to give him joyful dreams, and day its joyful feasts. His throat is like a deep pit that lusts after whole ages. The steaming odor is savory to him, and the bait of the cuisine catches his gullet. His are feastings, usury, wrangling, lucre, and plunder. The man is a beast, the victim of his belly; a beast forsooth, of swelling belly, lively tooth, and dead mind. He wants good dinners, wants good estates, wants good meadows, wants good cups, wants good viands, but not good deeds.

Wealth is mighty, and money the thing; with these one gets honors, an ark for his days. Eloquence, knowledge, and a worthy life are nothing without wealth. Good things are multiplied for the rich, blows for the humble. The lesser are threatened with the law, the lower with arms. Money commands all things, and, moreover, gets all things. The rich man and famous, rolling in money and high in his castle, possesses the earth, and gets its good things for himself, increasing and heaping them up. Perhaps he keeps the pile for robbers or foes, and finally is more consumed with grief if his chest or his house is broken into than if he had buried his children and dear ones. He compasses the ages, meditates evil, revolves low schemes in his heart, goes over seas and mountains and through the markets of the world, changing his clime. Hurries across the sea, expatriates himself, and tries a new world. The winds bring him to shore or to the open sea, not into narrows. His wealth is vanity, his mind, crafty, his lot pitiable. He dreams of sales, exaggerates things bought and belittles things to be bought. He wins gains with gains, and makes this or that with his pencil. Debits and credits are all hidden away in a rich chest.²⁰ It is sweet to him to sleep at the foot of a pile of riches; he loves to turn over his gold often and add to it oftener. Finally he lacks because he has so much, shriveling in abundance. He is thought a Mammon, and thirsts for more, O overwhelming thirst! He becomes a Tantalus without the name, by the implications of the name. Joys and gains, money, farms, and estates, are his. He builds barns, abounds in all things in his vast wealth, slow to good, ready for evil, first in the market.

The rich man is swift to all wickedness, slow toward the right. He looks like a blooming rose, is rolled over like a wheel, and his things with him. Today he stands noted, tomorrow falls, himself yet different. In the morning the rich man sees possessions his; in the evening, poor, he sees

²⁰ This passage is pretty obscure.—H. P.

them yours. He will sleep in luxury, but in death he will straightway lose everything. Presently the robber will carry off his wealth, no longer his but his, and will lay him low in death. In a little while the thief will take away his goods like a frail leaf, and death himself. Then he leaves all his guilty gains, a new lot is his. All the splendor and beauty of the rich man, which it took a year's labor to acquire, a single hour takes away. O pitiable, O mournful, O wretched being! As fast as his money grows, his self-effacement grows. He fears all things whom his own wealth makes poor. His money takes possession of him, grows and occupies his mind altogether. Care worries his soul, worry fuddles him, error hinders him. His face turns pale, craft here, grief there, alarm everywhere. Sleep brings him vain and numerous dreams; by day his affairs, by night the threatening visions, torment him. A robber seems to break open his safe and carry away everything else. The poor rich man quakes and wakes with a groan, fearing the fact. He rises straightway, opens his chest, and finds his money. Night wears away, day calls him to the market, business buzzes, and he goes. He runs after gain, fights for gain, sighs for gain; he sighs and roams the seas in ships or the markets afoot. By means of vast evils and many a blow he avoids poverty. He cheats and steals, gives this, takes that, gets money with his money. The miser tries to give little to his own and nothing to thee, Lazarus. Tears are thine, but shall be his, and what tears? Right bitter ones. Though he walk in riches now, and attain to the full his impious desires, he shall fall after a little while and all his wealth collapse. Like sand will the heap of his riches pass away. His abundance shall disappear, his wealth pass away and their master. Lucre is evidently fleeting and transient. Man has always desired and worshiped it, and will always do so. As long as England gives milk, India ivory, Smyrna grasshoppers, many a son of Adam will run over markets and mountains in search of gain. Gain, money, property, wealth, now rule; O woe, the blessed tears of the poor count for naught. The man who has gained much land or pelf wrongfully is blessed now and called happy. Everyone wants a great palace and builds him a house, as if he were to abide here through all the ages. No one builds the halls that endure, all build earthly ones. Gorgeous halls and flourishing castles are the roses of this world. We adorn our halls with marble, wicked troop, sons of Canaan, that we are, perhaps even with the woods of Arabia. We adorn our halls, and Christ groans at our gates. We fill ourselves with feasting, and he goes hungry. We are relaxed with drink, a prey to our gullets, overcome with wanton music; he is thirsty and hungry, trembles,

and groans and wails loudly. We feed upon quail and goose, he upon neither. The sinner is fawned upon, God spitefully entreated—a fine order of things. We feed upon birds and lamb and pork and beef; not so he. The devil holds fast our stony hearts and brazen flesh. We are a drunken race, an impious race, filled with the devil; a worthless people, a crooked generation, an alienated race. We seek many dainties, a fine load for the belly, and give, or rather leave, the poor bits for our hungry Lord.

O evil age! Why? Because the separate parts are now vitiated, one a prey to luxury, another to dissipation. The rich man stands erect, the poor man falls; the people cast out the latter and honor the former. The fool that has money rages at will, and buys official protection against the upright. Right is dead, for the broad road of luxury, babbling, drunkenness, gluttony, lies open. The lovers of the flesh and envious foes of right, whoremongers, godless, insolently ambitious, leave no baseness, no villainy undone. Wickedness is now actually perpetrated that was not even spoken of before. Mad, unnatural crimes are committed. The last and worst times are evidently at hand. The couch of the harlot is hardly thought anything of, and is called pardonable because natural. Honest manliness is dead, and all are plunged in filth and wallowing in sin.

When was the lap of goodness smaller and of wickedness ampler? When was vice more dominant, the power of evil greater, or the realm of good morals narrower? If God commanded all things impious and deadly, who could keep the commandment more vigilantly and more comprehensively? If it were lawful to heap up sin and scorn the right, who could heap the one higher and scorn and avoid the other more completely? In various ways the arrow of passion cleaves every head, everyone shuns the salutary and none the vicious. If high rewards were given for great wickedness, wickedness could not be pursued more readily nor good more sluggishly. As I speak, I shudder; I have not power, ability, or will to tell all the execrable things. Who could fitly bewail them? What rivers, what floods of tears, would suffice, I ask, to wipe out all the baseness of this mad time? If I should tell of such madness, it were not right, if it were not a crime. Alas! The course of the law lies afar off.

I weep as I sow my verse; not in verse nor in prose can I tell all the evils, uncover the wickedness, bring out the wicked things. They are so manifold my voice would fail for telling them. They are not for words, I am ashamed to disclose them all. I know that paper, speech, and time would fail, if I wished to touch upon and castigate even the more serious.

My Muse, indeed, is very weary of noting these things, but the guilty brood is not weary of doing them.²¹ Therefore shall my dactyles not stop here, my Muse shall speak of the lost ages and their successors. We have been scudding over the high seas; let the anchor now be cast. When our strength is replenished and the breeze stronger, we will go on.

²¹ The end words of these two lines seem to be interchanged, and the footnotes show confusion in the manuscripts.—H. P.

END OF BOOK II

[*To be concluded*]

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

HARPER'S COMMENTARY ON AMOS AND HOSEA

Students of the Old Testament have now, for the first time in many years, an adequate commentary on Amos and Hosea.¹ We have been living in an era of abridged textbooks, and have suffered accordingly. The "compendious hand-commentary" is usually like a cheap field-glass, having neither a wide circle of view nor sharp definition. It is far from being useless; but the purchaser who really feels the need of a supplement to his eyesight will generally wish that he had bought something else. It is, therefore, especially pleasant to welcome President Harper's thorough and comprehensive treatment of Amos and Hosea, the two most important members of this difficult group, the *Dodekapropheton*.

The introductory part of the *Commentary* contains a little more than one hundred and eighty pages. This includes a valuable essay, of about seventy pages, on the historical preparation for the work of Amos and Hosea, as well as a special introduction to the book of each prophet, under the headings: "Personal life," "Message," "Ministry," and "Literary Form of the Book" (with a table). There are also brief chapters on the poetical form of these prophecies, their language and style, and the text and versions. Each of these two last-named chapters contains a good deal of illustrative material conveniently arranged. The old Greek (LXX) version is perhaps dismissed a little too summarily, and the statement that "the character of its rendering is in general the same in Amos and Hosea as elsewhere" (p. clxxiv) might mislead the student. The Greek Old Testament contains almost every variety of translation, the work of translators of the most widely differing equipment and methods. The literature of the two prophecies is given with great fulness; there is a chronological table of Israelitish life and thought, covering three pages; and at the end of the book a good index and a sketch-map.

The interpretation of the prophecies is given in three parts: first, a brief discussion of the text and versions; then the commentary proper; and

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Amos and Hosea*. By William Rainey Harper. ["The International Critical Commentary."] New York: Scribner, 1905. clxxxi + 424 pages. \$3 net.

lastly, grammatical, lexical, and other technical annotations, in fine print. In each of these divisions the discussion is sufficiently full, and generally clear. Like some of its predecessors in the series, this *Commentary* pays considerable attention to the history of exegesis, including both the older and the more recent literature. The work of collecting and sifting this varied and scattered material has been done with great industry, as every page bears witness. Nearly every modern publication with any reasonable claim to attention seems to have been taken into account. Occasionally the work of compilation bears the marks of haste. It sometimes happens that several mutually conflicting views of the point under discussion are recorded without criticism or any expressed preference, so that the reader is left in doubt as to the view held by the author of the *Commentary*. Again, the somewhat bewildering plan of the book, according to which any given passage may be discussed in several different places, has occasioned some disturbing omissions. Thus, the fact that the last clause of Amos 2:12 is here regarded as an interpolation might conceivably be mentioned on pp. 53 f. (fine print; poetic structure of the passage), or p. 54 (fine print; text and versions), or p. 57 (large print; the main comment, where primary and secondary portions of the text should of course invariably be distinguished), or p. 59 (fine print; the more technical commentary). As a matter of fact, it is mentioned only on p. 54, and there in an ambiguous way. Similarly, anyone who wished to get the author's view of Amos 1:14 would read through his whole discussion of the verse, in the three separate places where it is treated (text, commentary, technical details), without ever suspecting that he excides the last clause as secondary. The reason for the excision in each of these two cases, it may be added, is the supposed demand of the strophic structure.

The treatment of the text is on the whole conservative, the emendations adopted being generally those which the soberest scholarship of the present day would approve. No new examination of the old versions is attempted, but the work of previous investigators is sifted with excellent judgment. In the separation of secondary elements from the work of Amos and Hosea, the conclusions reached by President Harper are essentially the same as those which have already been adopted by most commentators of the more advanced school. The exceptions are occasional clauses which are excided—or, in one or two cases, added—in the interest of the supposed strophe. I confess to having felt a little disappointment at his treatment of the important passage Amos 6:2, which he expunges, as do the most of the leading commentators. But it is so certain that we know

the exact circumstances of the time in which Amos wrote?² There is no attempt to rearrange the prophecies, according to the taste of the moment, but they are allowed to stand as they always have stood. A few clauses are transposed, to be sure (see the list, p. clxxvi), and in the first three chapters of Hosea one or two more considerable transfers are made; but these are chapters whose mutual incoherence is generally recognized, and this new attempt to solve their chief difficulty will be found a helpful one.

Considerable space is devoted to the literary character of these prophecies, and it is here that President Harper's principal independent contribution to their interpretation is made. He proceeds on the theory that the typical form of the prophetic "message" was poetry, not prose, and that there can be no satisfactory exegesis without due recognition of the literary quality and form of each utterance. These are ideas which have been more or less familiar to students of the Old Testament for some time past. Numerous attempts have recently been made, principally by German scholars, to restore the original metrical form of this or that prophecy, and each one of these attempts has brought us nearer to the goal, though the most of them have made such an impression of arbitrary procedure as greatly to lessen the value of their results, and even to make the reading public suspicious of every theory of Hebrew metrics. President Harper's own investigations in this field are not new to American students of the Old Testament, for they have been published from time to time, since 1898, in the *Biblical World* and elsewhere. In the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago* (First Series, Vol. V, 1904), moreover, he has printed the Hebrew text of Amos in full, according to his idea of the original form, and accompanied it with a translation; and the student who wishes to follow, step by step, the methods by which the results contained in the present volume were reached, will do well to have before him this tentative restoration. Similar attempts in the case of Hosea have appeared in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages*, Vols. XVII, XX, XXI, and (the translation) in the *Biblical World* for December, 1904.

The main fact, that the Hebrew prophets composed at least a considerable part of their homilies or rhapsodies in true poetic form, seems

² Of course I admit that the text of vs. 1 is corrupt; and I would make the same slight changes in vs. 2 that are made in this *Commentary*. But may not the difficulties of vs. 1 be entirely removed by emending נקב" according to the Greek, and reading לכם instead of להם? Thus: נקפו ראשית הגנים ובאו לכם בית ישראל; "They [the Assyrians] have plucked off the foremost of the nations, and your turn will come next, O house of Israel!" נקפו, ἀκροαρχίας is a telling word here (cf. Isa. 17: 6; 24: 13), and this is just the sort of figure of speech to expect from Amos. The veiled allusion to the Assyrians is also thoroughly characteristic; cf. vs. 14 in this same chapter.

now likely to make its way rapidly to general recognition. The present volume states the argument clearly and forcibly, and applies the principles of the theory with such painstaking care and genuine literary appreciation that it must be counted a valuable contribution to the whole discussion. An outline of the author's own theory is given in the Introduction, in the section on "The Poetical Form of Amos and Hosea," pp. clxxiv-clxxix. This is brief compass, to be sure, and one could wish that more space had been given to this summary; on the other hand, it is to be remembered that the author has treated these matters elsewhere, and that he gives abundant references both to his own discussions and to those of other scholars. The conclusions which he has reached independently are, in the main, those which have recently been promulgated by other investigators. There is true meter in these prophecies, and not simply a more or less rhythmical diction. Well-defined varieties of meter can be recognized, and the laws which govern their composition can be discovered and formulated.

In the attempt to restore the original form of these "poems," the author's attitude toward the two prophets is everywhere that of an interpreter rather than that of a redactor with full powers. Instead of making a Procrustean bed, and then hacking his victim into the desired shape, after the manner now usual, it is plain that he regards it as his task to make his theories fit the traditional text. In one point, however, he seems to the present reviewer to proceed without due warrant, namely, in the emphasis which he lays on the strophe, or stanza. Underlying all his reconstruction is the assumption that poetic form implies strophic form. He says, for instance, in his Preface (p. ix): "It is impossible now to study the thought of these prophetic sermons without recognizing fully this fundamental factor [viz., arrangement in regular stanzas] in their form of composition. As a matter of fact, 'strophic structure' is only another name for 'logical structure.'" But can such a sweeping statement as this be justified? Why may not poetry be logically constructed even when it is not arranged in stanzas of fixed length? A large part of the world's best poetry, both ancient and modern, is altogether devoid of strophic structure. The comparison of the poetry of other Semitic peoples, moreover, would not lead us to expect the use of strophic forms by the Hebrew writers. Arabic poetry, as a rule, has no stanzas; the same is true of Syriac (in less degree), and apparently also of Assyrian poetry. Even in the Hebrew Psalms, where corresponding verses of equal length might first of all be looked for, it is surprising how few are the evident traces of anything of the kind. And in the Prophets, many of which

have recently been investigated from this side, it does not seem to the writer that any clear case of deliberate arrangement in regular strophes has thus far been demonstrated. President Harper proceeds here with admirable caution, it is true, making the fewest possible alterations in the received text (I do not know of any other advocate of the "strophe" who has proceeded with so small a measure of arbitrariness); nevertheless, the number of transpositions, omissions, and even occasional additions which his theory makes necessary must raise a serious doubt in the mind of any reader, especially when it is observed how forced many of these changes really are.

But such details as these, in regard to which there may well be difference of opinion, are relatively of only slight importance. The main question is concerning the value of the *Commentary* as an interpretation of these two great prophets, and as a true account of the religious conditions in which they did their work. And here the verdict must be emphatically favorable. It is written on the basis of a thorough study of the history of Israel, and with true perspective. Its author has made his way far into the thought of Amos and Hosea, and is in full sympathy with them. It is everywhere plain that his primary aim is to interpret them fairly and helpfully. And he has done so. Few, if any, of the commentaries of this series will be of more real assistance to the student and the layman than this one. It is greatly to be regretted that its author was not enabled to carry out his plan of commenting on all of the books of the Minor Prophets. But the most important part of the task, by far, is this which he has here completed.

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A NEW EDITION OF CORNILL'S INTRODUCTION¹

Cornill's compact and masterly "Introduction to the Old Testament," of which the first edition appeared in 1891, has enjoyed a deserved popularity. The second and larger edition appeared in 1892, the third and fourth editions were published in 1896, and now a fifth edition is necessary. This is described on the title-page as a "new and completely revised edition." The description is true in so far as the book has been reset and printed from new plates. The contents, however, have been changed but little. Page after page is identical with the last edition, except for trifling corrections and improvements of the style.

¹ *Grundriss der theologischen Wissenschaften. Erste Abteilung: Einleitung in die kanonischen Bücher des Alten Testaments.* Von Carl Heinrich Cornill. Fünfte, völlig neu gearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 350 pages. M. 5.

The only important additions to the previous edition are as follows: The bibliographies that precede each section have been enlarged and brought up to date. A number of the more important English works are given, but many others might have been added. It is inexplicable why, under sec. 7, concerning the analysis of the first four books of the Pentateuch, the work of Carpenter and Battersby is not mentioned, nor that of Kent, which appeared before the publication of this work. An entirely new section on Hebrew meter and metrical form is added on pp. 9-17, in which are discussed the systems of Ley and Bickell, the lament form discovered by Budde, and the theories of Gunkel, Grimme, and Sievers. On pp. 40 ff. an entirely new paragraph is added in regard to the theories of Eichthal and Vernes that Deuteronomy is a product of post-exilic times, and that the account of its finding in 2 Kings, chap. 22, is unhistorical. There is also a discussion of the theories of Steuernagel, Erbt, and Cullen in regard to the composition of Deuteronomy.

The only important omission of matter found in the previous edition is the exclusion of the entire introduction to the apocryphal books. These are now treated in a separate volume of the same series by Hermann Gunkel. Through this omission space has been gained for the additions to the "Introduction to the Old Testament," and a more adequate and thorough discussion of the Apocrypha has been secured.

So few are the changes in this edition in comparison with the previous one that the old paragraph-numbering has been retained unaltered down to 46, where the omission of the Apocrypha occurs. The new section on *Metrik* has been inserted as 4a, so as not to disturb the numbers that follow it. The few modifications that have been made in the statements of the previous edition are interesting as showing the present drift of Old Testament criticism. In the Blessing of Jacob (Gen. 49:1-27) Cornill now follows Gunkel in recognizing that individual sayings concerning the tribes are as old as the period of the judges. The composition as a whole he ventures to date precisely in the time of the sovereignty of Judah over Israel. The Song of the Red Sea (Exod., chap. 15) he now regards as entirely the product of a late period. The first trace of it, he holds, is found in Neh. 9:11, and it was not written long before that time. In the analysis of Genesis there is a clearer recognition of the J^s stratum (cf. p. 56). The two main sources in Judges and Samuel are now ascribed without hesitation to the same documents as the J and E elements of the Hexateuch. The author says that this is now so widely recognized that there is no reason why one should hesitate to put it into a textbook as one of the accepted results of criticism (cf. pp. 107, 116, 117).

The song of Hannah (1 Sam. 2:1-10), which was previously regarded as pre-exilic, and was assigned to the reign of Jehoiakim, is now regarded as a late post-exilic composition. The historical section, 2 Kings 18:17-19:37, formerly regarded as a worked-over form of a document of the time of Hezekiah, is now pronounced in its entirety a work of a later period. The little oracle in Isa. 17:12-14, which begins "Ah, the uproar of many peoples," is no longer assigned to the same date as the passage which precedes it in 17:1-11—viz., the time of the Syro-Ephraimitic war in 734—but to the period of Sennacherib's reign, between 705 and 701. In the previous edition Isa. 1:4-17 was assigned with some hesitation to a time shortly after the Syro-Ephraimitic war in 734. It is now assigned, with the majority of recent critics, to the year 701. The messianic prophecies in Isa. 9:1-6 and 11:1-9 are ascribed to Isaiah with more confidence than in the previous edition. The author speaks as follows:

It must be conceded that both oracles present difficulties and occupy a unique position among the words of Isaiah, but they are comprehensible as disclosing the culmination of Isaianic ideas and expectations, while they would be miracles, if they were products of a post-exilic scribe. The entire origin and development of the messianic hope remains an unexplained riddle, if Isaiah's messianic hope is limited to 1:26.

Isa., chaps. 15 and 16, is no longer regarded as a quotation from an older prophet who was contemporary with Jeremiah, but is now regarded as a post-exilic production, dating between 450 and 400 B. C. The enemies that threaten Moab in this oracle come from the south, and therefore can be neither the Israelites nor the Assyrians, but must be the Nabatæans whose overthrow is predicted in Ezek. 25:10. Isa., chap. 19, is now assigned to the time of the invasion of Egypt by Artaxerxes III in 343 B. C. Isa., chap. 23, which was formerly regarded as the work of a contemporary of Jeremiah, is now referred to Ochus's destruction of Sidon in 348 B. C. In regard to the Ebed Yahweh songs in the second half of Isaiah, Cornill maintains that Selin, Roy, Laue, Giesebrecht, and Zillessen have not proved their claim that these songs are of independent origin from the rest of Deutero-Isaiah. He still maintains that they and the rest of Deutero-Isaiah come from one hand, and that the Servant of Yahweh in these passages must be interpreted by the allusions to the Servant in the rest of Deutero-Isaiah (see p. 181). Isa., chaps. 49-55, he dates immediately after Cyrus' conquest in 538 B. C. In regard to Isa., chaps. 56-66, he no longer maintains that these chapters were written by Deutero-Isaiah, using material derived from an earlier prophet of the time of Manasseh, but he adopts completely the Trito-Isaiah theory, and follows

Cheyne in assigning these chapters to a contemporary of Malachi (see p. 181). The book of Nahum, which in the last edition was assigned to the year 624 B. C., or possibly even to 650 B. C., is now dated in the year 608, immediately before the fall of Nineveh. The Jeremian authorship of Jer., chaps. 30 and 31, is given up, except 31:31-34. Lamentations is considered to contain elements as late as the fourth century. In the last edition the relationship of Obadiah to Jeremiah was explained by the hypothesis that both Obadiah and Jeremiah quoted an early prophet. It is now maintained that Jer., chap. 49, is an interpolation, and that the prototype of both prophecies was written between 450 and 400 B. C., the rest of the book of Obadiah proportionately later. The older parts of the book of Proverbs are now ascribed with more certainty than in the previous edition to the fourth century. Prov., chaps. 1-9 and 30-31, are definitely assigned to the Greek period. From this it appears that the author has kept up with the most recent discussions, and that his book represents the very latest phases of the more advanced criticism of the Old Testament. It is an excellent outline to put into the hands of students, and it is a pity that it has not been translated into English.

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POPULAR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE HEBREW PROPHETS

There are many good books on Hebrew prophecy, but this one¹ has a place altogether its own. It deals, not specifically with the literary prophets, but with the whole prophetic movement, from its crudest to its maturest form; and with much vividness it shows what manner of men the prophets were, the influence they exerted on politics, and the opposition they encountered from the church. The discussion, though eminently readable and popular, is carried on in a thoroughly careful and scientific spirit. There is no parade of learning, but every page is stamped with traces of an intimate familiarity, not only with the prophetic literature itself, but with the most recent modern discussions of that literature. The most extreme views receive from the author a courteous hearing, though his own sympathies do not lie in that direction. He deals, e. g., much more leniently with the Chronicler, and with the references to Judah in the book of Hosea, than most modern scholars are apt to do; and his book would be for this reason, among others, an admirable guide to put into the hands of students beginning the study of Hebrew prophecy.

¹ *The Hebrew Prophet*. By Loring W. Batten. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 351 pages. \$1.50.

An idea of the contents may be gathered from the following titles of some of the chapters: "The Prophetic Institution," "The Prophet's Call," "The Prophet's Credentials," "His Relation to the State," and "His Relation to the Church." The treatment is interesting, fresh, and skillfully related to modern life. The analysis, e. g., of the call of Amos, and the discussion of the question whether the prophets spoke extempore or very carefully prepared, may be selected as specially happy illustrations of the author's method.

The following are some of Mr. Batten's suggestions or conclusions: "The *nebi'im* denounced by all the writing prophets were members of the guilds established by Samuel, and this order existed all through Old Testament history" (p. 58). Again, with regard to the literary prophets, while admitting that they were more enlightened than their predecessors, he says, "I am not sure that, all things considered, they were really greater men" (p. 195). He thinks it not improbable that Hosea was a martyr. Naturally on a few points issue might be taken with Mr. Batten. Whether, e. g., the midrashic story of 1 Sam., chap. 16, deserves the attention which it receives on pp. 325 f., and whether "the lion which met the seer in the way [1 Kings, chap. 13] was undoubtedly an assassin," may be fairly questioned (p. 278). But the book is, without doubt, a well-informed, interesting, and helpful introduction to Hebrew prophecy.

This volume,² together with its companion volume on *The Priestly Element in the Old Testament*, goes far to explain the vast and profound influence of the late President Harper as a teacher. It is not exactly the book which one would take up to while away a leisure hour; it is too searching for that. But it is a book which stimulates, and indeed compels, to independent study; and that was what the author, like all true teachers, desired before all things—that the mind should move among the material till it learned to arrange and control it. The book bristles from end to end with questions and points for consideration; but the author continually carries the reader back to the biblical material within which the answer must be sought. He admirably fulfills, therefore, the purpose with which, according to the preface, he set out—to encourage among students familiarity with the Bible, and independent thinking on the Bible.

The original plan contemplated a study of the whole of Hebrew prophecy after this manner; this volume carries it down only to Hosea. But the work is thoroughly done. The chapters dealing with the background and product of prophecy and prophetism (including the prophetic histo-

² *The Prophetic Element in the Old Testament: An Aid to Historical Study for Use in Advanced Bible Classes.* By William Rainey Harper. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905. 142 pages. \$1.

rians) before the period of the literary prophets, are searching and valuable. For President Harper's questions are never mere questions; there lurks in them always a happy suggestion. There is a certain relentlessness about his manner of forcing his way into the problem; but every stroke tells. Every question, to the student who will take the trouble to answer it, contributes to an ever clearer and more organic knowledge of the subject under discussion. Behind the questions is a mind of singular clearness and sanity, sure of itself, knowing where it is going, and where it will have the reader go too. For, though the author had no desire to bias the student, and incidentally shows himself not only just, but sympathetic, to other types of thought, the tendency of the volume is of course altogether in the direction of the modern view of revelation.

The answers to the questions which Dr. Harper here puts to his readers, and had first of all put to his own mind, will be found in the connected presentation of the prophetic and pre-prophetic movements given in the author's volume on *Amos and Hosea*; but for the student who is willing to do his own thinking, and to reach his own conclusions, there will be found in this volume stimulus, suggestion, and guidance, such as will be found, in this particular form, nowhere else.

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SOME RECENT LITERATURE ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

We are once more introduced to the Old Testament¹ by a work that "does not pretend to offer anything to specialists. It is written for theological students, ministers, and laymen, who desire to understand the modern attitude to the Old Testament as a whole." In these words the author sets forth the *raison d'être* of this book. It puts matters wholly in popular form, refers to the Revised Version rather than the Hebrew text, and mentions Hebrew words only in transliterated form. The style is easy, clear, concise, and fulfils the purpose laid down. It is a good piece of modern, up-to-date pedagogical work, and will doubtless do much to clear the atmosphere of the popular mind regarding knotty critical problems of the Old Testament. But we question the advisability of arranging the books, in an *Introduction* purely for readers of the English Bible, in the order preserved in the Hebrew canon. That will rather confuse than aid the layman. Again, the layman, minister, and theological student would

¹ *Introduction to the Old Testament*. By John Edgar McFadyen. New York: Armstrong, 1905. xii + 356 pages. \$1.75.

have been very grateful for a small favor which would not have used more space than is left blank at the beginning or end of each book. We refer to a brief bibliography of a few of the new works that would be most valuable to the reader of the English Bible. Such a list would add at least 25 per cent. to the value of the work.

Redpath's essay² is a criticism of the modern view of Genesis, particularly as represented in Driver's recent commentary. The tone of the criticism is good, and the spirit and method scholarly and courteous, rather than denunciatory and demagogic, as is too often the case in apologies for traditional views. Redpath contends for the origin of Genesis in the age of Moses, and for the essential unity of the book. He concedes to the historical and literary critic the existence of an occasional brief interpolation, the fact of errors in the transmission of numbers, and a case or two of the transposition of materials from its original place in the narrative. The exegesis of the essay is at times somewhat forced, and there is a strong tendency toward literalism. The defects of the presentation are the natural result of the author's mechanical view of revelation, which compels him to find unity, self-consistency, and harmony with the fundamental facts and principles of science and history at any cost. In Redpath's words, Genesis "is not in its primary intent and in its contents a scientific or a historical manual; its purpose is a much higher one, and that purpose it will be found more and more to fulfill, without in the least traversing any *absolute* truth which science or history may finally arrive at. A divinely inspired book could, we feel sure, never do that." Theological presuppositions of any kind are detrimental to accurate interpretation.

A great *desideratum* for the progress of sound textual criticism of the Old Testament is a reliable text of the Septuagint. Various recensions of the Greek text are known to us in whole or in part, some only through fragmentary quotations in the church fathers, or through the medium of translations, such as the Old Latin and the Ethiopic. A comparison of all these variant forms of the Greek text is essential to the recovery of the original form; and not until this original form lies before us are we in a position to use the Greek confidently as a corrective of the Massoretic text. Lagarde, the great orientalist, was the first to realize this need and to set to work in a practical way to supply it. In a series of Septuagint studies, dedicated to the memory of Lagarde, Rahlfs proposes to follow in Lagarde's footsteps, working toward the same end. The first contribution is a

² *Modern Criticism and the Book of Genesis*. By Henry A. Redpath. New York: Gorham, 1905. viii+93 pages.

series of studies on the Greek text of the books of Kings.³ The first two studies, concerned respectively with "MS. 82 of the Books of Kings" and "Theodoret's Citations from the Books of Kings and II Chronicles," furnish materials for the correction of Lagarde's edition of the Lucian recension of the Septuagint. The third study takes up all the quotations from Kings made by Origen, and arrives at results of value for determining the pre-hexaplar Greek text employed by Origen. The editor has entered upon a long and laborious task, but one worthy of the best efforts of any scholar, and one for the accomplishment of which every student of the Old Testament text will be profoundly grateful.

Diettrich⁴ has followed close in the wake and method of W. E. Barnes, who recently published a work on the critical apparatus of the Peshitta text of Chronicles. The inferiority of the Syriac texts of the Paris and London Polyglots, as well as that of the version of Samuel Lee of 1823, led Diettrich to collate the variations in Isaiah from the best Syriac MSS in the great libraries of Europe. He goes through the book of Isaiah chapter by chapter and verse by verse, and cites the most important variations of the five printed texts, of the eleven Nestorian MSS, of the seventeen West-Syrian MSS, of three Syrian Fathers, of three versions, and of three text-critical *Vorarbeiten*. He discovers the singular fact that the MS "F," in Florence, though dating from the ninth century, stands close to Ephraem in many cases and preserves within it an older tradition than MSS "A" (Ambrosiana B. 21) and "D" (London, Brit. Mus. Add. 14432), written in the sixth century. This material is of great value for a text-critical study of the greatest of the Old Testament prophets.

The handy pocket commentary is coming to the front. *The New Century Bible* will soon relegate the *Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges* to the stack-room. The day is certainly gone by when the Authorized Version can be used as the basis of a commentary. The employment of the Revised Version for that purpose saves valuable space in a commentary of so small compass as Whitehouse's *Isaiah*.⁵ The "Introduction" discusses, with ample fulness for the purpose of this series, such problems

³ *Studien zu den Königsbüchern*. Von A. Rahlfs. [—"Septuaginta-Studien," herausgegeben von Alfred Rahlfs, 1. Heft.] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1904. 88 pages. M. 2.80.

⁴ *Ein Apparatus criticus zur Peshitto zum Propheten Jesaja*. Herausgeg. von G. Diettrich. [—"Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft," VIII.] Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. xxxii + 223 pages. M. 10.

⁵ *Isaiah I-XXXIX*. Revised Version, with Notes, Index, and Maps. ["The New Century Bible."] Edited by Owen C. Whitehouse. New York: Frowde, 1905. 16mo, 381 pages.

as the contemporaneous history of Isaiah's time, the religious and social condition of Israel, the theology of Isaiah, and critical problems of the book. Chronologically, he makes Hezekiah a regent of Ahaz from 726 to 715, as a solution of the troublesome questions in 2 Kings 18:13 and other passages. However, contrary to the analogy of Hebrew annalists in earlier estimates, he does not count the regency years of Hezekiah in making up his totals, which would rather weigh against the validity of his solution. In all his historical and archæological discussions he makes ample use of the best results of Assyrian research. His textual notes, and his exegetical material, are succinct, concise, comprehensive, and well up to date. Though he quotes from a wide range of literature, he has independence of thought, and does not hesitate to differ with leading authorities on Isaiah, and usually we entirely agree with him. An index puts the little volume at one's immediate disposal.

Giesebrecht's work⁶ deals with a subject much discussed in recent years, viz., the poetic element in the writings of the prophets. Practically every scholar now grants the poetic form of most of the oracles of the prophets; the only question is what the exact measure of that form originally was. The publication of Siever's *Metrische Studien* added to an already keen interest and called forth further contributions in support of, or in opposition to, his views. Special applications of theories of meter to the prophecies of Jeremiah have been made by Duhm,⁷ Cornill,⁸ and Erbt.⁹ Duhm's radical treatment of the Jeremiah text was based on the supposition that Jeremiah used only one meter in all his poetical productions, and this was the *Qinah* or dirge-measure; everything manifestly in a different meter was assigned to other hands. Cornill also demands regularity of poetic form of Jeremiah, and lays down as the standard a metrical unit of four distichs. This involves so much violent treatment of the text as to cause Cornill's theory to break down under the weight of the burdens it must carry. Erbt applies the principles of Sievers to the text of Jeremiah, and is harrassed by the same difficulties as Sievers in making the Massoretic text, for which he has an unscientific respect, fit these

⁶ *Jeremias Metrik am Texte dargestellt*. Von Friederich Giesebrecht. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. viii+52 pages. M. 1.80.

⁷ *Das Buch Jeremia erklärt*. ["Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament," 1901.]

⁸ *Die metrischen Stücke des Buches Jeremia reconstruiert* (1901).

⁹ *Jeremia und seine Zeit: Die Geschichte der letzten fünfzig Jahre des vorexilischen Juda*. Beigegeben ist der Untersuchung des Jeremiabuches eine Uebersetzung der ursprünglichen Stücke und die Umschrift der Prophetensprüche mit Bezeichnung des Rythmus (1902).

principles. Giesebrecht, recognizing the failure of these previous attempts, but not one whit discouraged thereby, has now put out his edition of the text of Jeremiah in its original poetic structure. He proceeds on the principle, represented in America by Briggs and President Harper, that the metrical norm of the Hebrew poem is furnished by the number of tone-syllables in the line, no attention being given to the number of intervening unaccented syllables. Instead of limiting Jeremiah to the use of the *Qinah*-rhythm, as Duhm does, he permits him to employ also lines composed of two, three, or four tone-syllables. Thus far Giesebrecht is in the right as over against Duhm, Cornill, and Erbt. But the present reviewer would commend a less cautious attitude toward the Massoretic text and the tradition of Jeremianic authorship than is exhibited here and in Giesebrecht's commentary, of which this is the textual basis. Not only so, but any attempt to recover the original poetic form which disregards strophic structure is necessarily incomplete. The impression made by an examination of Giesebrecht's text with its meters changing every few lines is that of a collection of poetic fragments entirely lacking in any inner or outer connection. They need organization. These are, however, points which in no way detract from the great value of that which is here set before us. It is a study of Hebrew meter which will compel the attention of all students of Hebrew poetic form.

Gunkel's works on the earlier traditions of Genesis gave him large recognition for thorough scholarship, vigorous writing, and liberal views. His technical work has not crippled him for popular presentation of spiritual truths, as is seen in his "Selected Psalms."¹⁰ Forty-three psalms, including Hannah's song and Jonah's poem, are translated into German, and printed in strophical form, with no apparent attempt at rhyme. The translation is modern as compared with Luther's, and is popular and simple, as compared with the critically exact and stiffly scientific work of Kautzsch. Appended to the translation is a sane and clear exposition of the main thought of the psalm. Occasionally in the footnotes we find a Hebrew word in transliteration, but there is nothing to mar the distinctly popular character of the work, and there is everything to encourage the reader to extract from these poems the best that the authors make available. Other footnotes of an historical or literary character also add to the attractiveness of the treatment. The table of contents is incomplete, covering only one-half of the titles in the book, left in this shape apparently when the additions to the text were made for the second edition.

¹⁰ *Ausgewählte Psalmen*. Uebersetzt und erklärt von Hermann Gunkel. 2te Auflage. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. 289 pages.M. 3.20. . . .

A commentary on the book of Job,¹¹ prepared by Berechiah, a French rabbi, who seems to have been a contemporary of Ibn Ezra and Qimchi, is now made accessible to the scholarly public, in its original Hebrew text and in English translation. The work of the editor and the translator has been well done. The commentary itself is of more interest and value than the average rabbinical commentary. It exhibits true interpretative insight and ability. The book as a whole will appeal to two classes of scholars, viz., those interested in the history of the interpretation of the book of Job, and students of rabbinical Hebrew.

Aitken's *Job*¹² constitutes an altogether admirable manual for the average Sunday-School teacher's use. It represents the very best recent thought on this greatest of Old Testament books, in a form to be easily grasped by the non-specialist. Its comments are fresh and suggestive, and its introductory paragraphs are instructive and illuminating. An admirable feature of the book is the fact that it presents the entire content of Job in succinct paraphrase. This, with the careful and full analysis, renders unnecessary a multitude of detached, fragmentary comments, and has the added advantage of getting the thought of the book as a whole clearly before the mind of the student, without bewildering him with a mass of minutiae.

Haupt's metrical translation of Ecclesiastes¹³ was prepared for use in the now defunct *Polychrome Bible*. The Hebrew text, with a discussion of the poetical form of the book, is promised for the fifth volume of *Beiträge zur Assyriologie*, etc. The translation here presented is a good one—accurate, fresh, suggestive, and rhythmical. The notes are for the most part useful and interpretative. The conclusions embodied in this work were formulated fourteen years ago, and have proved so satisfactory to Haupt that they have remained unshaken by all the publications upon this book since that time. The present reviewer cannot feel the same satisfaction with them. They seem to rest upon too uncertain and subjective grounds. Haupt's "must-have-been's" are too often, at the

¹¹ *A Commentary on the Book of Job, from a Hebrew Manuscript in the University Library, Cambridge*. Edited by W. A. Wright; translated by S. A. Hirsch. Published for The Text and Translation Society. London: Williams & Norgate, 1905. viii + 394 pages.

¹² *The Book of Job*. By James Aitken. ["Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students," edited by Marcus Dods and Alexander Whyte.] Edinburgh: Clark, 1905; New York: Scribner. 114 pages. \$0.45.

¹³ *The Book of Ecclesiastes. A New Metrical Translation, with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes*. By Paul Haupt. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1905. 47 pages. \$0.50.

best, only might-have-been's. He treats the book as little more than a collection of miscellaneous and heterogeneous sources, lacking all logical order and relationship, from which it is his task to construct with an absolutely free hand a harmonious whole which shall commend itself to his good taste and judgment. The result obtained is a series of eight poems, the second one of which, for example, is composed of the following materials: 9:2, 11, 12; 8:14, 10; 7:15-18a; 10:1 b. In addition to the large place allowed to transposition, the hypothesis of interpolation is freely employed, about two-fifths of the text being relegated to the margin under this head. A theory which carries such heavy burdens as these must inevitably break down. But the value of the translation itself and of the accompanying notes still abides, and renders us grateful for this addition to the literature of importance for the interpretation of a most difficult book.

Bible problems¹⁴ multiply faster than they can be solved. Every question of the Old and New Testaments that we once regarded as reasonably well settled is being opened anew. Cheyne appeals to churchmen and scholars to throw aside every prejudice, and impartially to receive for consideration new information that flows in from many quarters. The real background for his discussions of views that are problematical is found in the most recent archæological discoveries and theories of Semitic scholars. Though himself a worker for the most part in the Old Testament, the bulk of his problems, or rather his most elaborate discussions of problems, pertains to the New Testament. Four distinctly New Testament problems taken up and presented, but not fully discussed or settled, are, (1) the virgin-birth of Jesus Christ, (2) his descent into the nether world, (3) his resurrection, and (4) his ascension. On the basis of the archæological facts, he maintains that "it is plausible to hold that all these arose out of a pre-Christian sketch of the life, death, and exaltation of the expected Messiah, itself ultimately derived from a widely current mythic tradition respecting a solar deity" (p. 128). In the all too brief discussion of each of the above points Cheyne utilizes material collected from the most diverse sources, and arrives at conclusions that are wholly subversive of the common Christian belief in these four doctrines. The Old Testament problems mentioned are mainly those based on the discoveries and theories of Winckler and Gunkel, and present no startlingly new questions. The

¹⁴ *Bible Problems and the New Material for Their Solution: A Plea for Thoroughness of Investigation Addressed to Churchmen and Scholars.* By T. K. Cheyne. ["Crown Theological Library."] New York: Putnam, 1904. 271 pages. \$1.50.

book is stimulating and thought-provoking, even though its theories are now and then insufficiently supported by facts.

The publication of Delitzsch's third *Babel und Bibel* lecture carried with it a reaffirmation of his positions taken in the first lecture, and the addition of several items that openly challenged his former antagonists. König¹⁵ at once takes up the gauntlet thus thrown down, and reviews seriatim the new points intended to prove the dependence of the Bible on Babylonia. He quotes largely from Delitzsch's theses and, in refutation thereof, cites the opinions of other Assyriologists, e. g., in the discussion of the so-called "Sumerian people." König shows himself thoroughly familiar with the already too long drawn out *Babel-Bibel* controversy, and with the latest utterances of the best authorities on Assyriology. After reviewing every utterance of Delitzsch, he concludes that Babylonian culture is neither parallel with, nor a source of, the religious principles of the Bible. Those religious people of the old world—the Hebrews—lived in Palestine and not in Babylonia, and in their Bible and not in the cuneiform libraries are to be found the classical sources of the religion of mankind. Such a vigorous handling of the subject deserves wide circulation and careful reading.

There is no more loyal defender of the Old Testament than Eduard König. His little brochure¹⁶ is the counter-stroke to an attack on the credibility of the text of the Old Testament made by Joh. Lepsius in his journal, *Das Reich Christi*. König's defense is: (1) traces of the old orthography, (2) dialectical differences, (3) linguistic phenomena peculiar to the development of Hebrew history, (4) syntactical peculiarities, (5) stylistic variations, (6) orthographical variations. All these peculiarities have not been wiped out, as they would have been, if there had been an attempt to standardize the Hebrew text at some late date in the history of the Old Testament. König's *Einleitung*, pp. 56 ff., amplifies the points made in the above discussion. Lepsius proposes to rearrange the text, citing especially reconstruction of the early chapters of Genesis. König carefully reviews his proposed changes, and then remarks that if such alterations of the Old Testament should be allowed, the books of the Old Testament would be worthless. The second part of the document is a succinct statement of König's belief in the credibility of the historical content of the records of the Hebrews. Such a brochure makes for the retention of the pre-eminent position of the Old Testament.

¹⁵ *Die babylonische Gefangenschaft der Bibel*. Von Eduard König. Stuttgart: Kiemann, 1905. 81 pages. M. 1.20.

¹⁶ *Glaubwürdigkeitsspuren des Alten Testaments*. Von Eduard König. Gr. Lichterfelde-Berlin: Runge. 54 pages. M. 0.75.

The astronomical data of the Old Testament¹⁷ are many. The scientific treatment of these scattered facts by the director of the Brere Observatory in Milan assures us that we can place confidence in the results obtained. The distinguished author treats his theme in a sympathetic manner. He has been careful to consult the best authorities on the meanings of Hebrew words from a purely philological point of view, the chief specialists on the history of Israel, and the contemporaneous light that comes to us from Babylonian-Assyrian sources. Such facts reveal the care with which the author has prepared his material for this little work. The introduction discusses Israel's learned men and its so-called scientific knowledge; and its general view of the physical world as seen in the book of Job. The firmament, the earth, and the abysses are sketched in a figure, which seems to represent, as nearly as can be done, the Hebrew idea of the world. Indeed, it greatly aids the reader in understanding many hitherto obscure passages regarding the abyss, the depths of sheol, etc. With a master's skill he treats stars and constellations—dependent, however, in many places on the results of Hebrew scholars for his word-meanings. The days, months, and the year of the Jewish calendar are particularly instructive after his discussion. While he recognizes some value in the Babylonian astronomical data, he is distinctly conservative in his use of them. We are disappointed to find that the Clarendon Press should allow a book of such intrinsic value to leave its presses without an index of subjects and Scripture texts. Such omission discounts its value in these times.

"Egoism lies at the seat of all human conduct, and altruism is a disguised or indirect form of egoism." With such affirmations Wallis¹⁸ attempts to show that "the sacred literature of our western society has obtained its pre-eminence because it gives the best historical expression to egoism in general." The author sketches the history of Israel in the Old Testament to substantiate his proposition. His picture is a summary of the modern view of the Old Testament, touching the history and religion of Israel, and doing it in a live, sprightly manner. But the reader finds himself continually asking: "What has this or that to do with egoism as a sociological theory?" In other words, the theory rather suffers from the immense strain to which he puts it to cover the ground outlined in his review. While it may be true that permeating the whole history of Israel there is an egoistic element at work, we can scarcely admit that his dis-

¹⁷ *Astronomy in the Old Testament*. By G. Schiaparelli. Authorized translation from Italian. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. viii + 178 pages. \$1.15.

¹⁸ *Egoism: A Study in the Social Premises of Religion*. By Louis Wallis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905. xiv + 121 pages. \$1.

cussion proves it. Only one short chapter discusses "Jesus of Nazareth," where he might well have put the bulk of the discussion of his theory; for here he has material of a more tangible character, and better understood. In the practical issue of the case he deals with the church as a sociological fact of no mean proportions. The line of argument is interesting and stimulating, and calls for more thorough work before we can feel quite satisfied that the case is proved.

IRA MAURICE PRICE.

JOHN M. P. SMITH.

Meinhold's brochure on "The Old Testament Sabbath and Week"¹⁹ is most startling and bewildering in its conclusion, viz: that the Old Testament septenary sabbath is an invention of the prophet Ezekiel.²⁰ It is thus neither of Mosaic origin, nor an early inheritance from the Canaanite peasants of the country possessed in later years by the Israelites, nor even of Babylonian parentage, as has lately been shown by Pinches' article "Šapattu, the Babylonian Sabbath."²¹ To prove his thesis the author takes up in three chapters: (1) The sabbath as a full-moon festival. An examination of the pre-exilic literature shows that there was no seven-day week with its concluding day, the sabbath, known before Ezekiel. Hosea 2:13 and Isa. 1:13 show that new moon and sabbath were celebrated as religious festivals and rest-days in northern as well as in southern Israel. This sabbath was the day of the full moon. These festivals were, in all probability, brought by the nomadic Israelites from the Arabic-Midianite Sinai peninsula. It was, in ancient Israel, a day of joy, not of penitence. This old sabbath was discontinued by the deuteronomic legis-

¹⁹ *Sabbat und Woche im Alten Testament*. Eine Untersuchung von Johannes Meinhold. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. vi+52 pages. M. 1.80. [—Heft 5 of "Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments," herausgeg. von W. Bousset und H. Gunkel.] The preceding numbers contain: (1) *Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständnis des Neuen Testaments*, by H. Gunkel; (2) *Im Namen Jesu*, by W. Heitmüller; (3) *Die Offenbarung des Johannes*, by J. Weiss; (4) *Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen*, by van den Bergh van Eysinga. The series, as far as we can judge, is remarkable, and of great value especially for students of comparative religion. It is commended to the careful consideration of the readers of this *Journal*.

²⁰ But what about Ezek. 20:2 ff.?

²¹ Published in the *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology*, 1904, pp. 51-56. The text, K 6012 + K 10, 684, is, however, to be used with great caution by advocates of either side; for nothing, to any certainty, can be proved on the basis of this text, in which the fifteenth day is called ša-p(b)at-ti. The text does not contain a complete hemerology. It appears to be rather a lesson-sheet by some young Babylonian scribe, and is therefore of no special significance.

lation, and a new septenary sabbath introduced in its stead by Ezekiel. The original meaning of *שבת* is to "rest, cease to work," i. e., be complete, be finished. The moon is complete on the full-moon day. (2) The sacred number seven among the Babylonians and also among the Israelites; more sacred among the latter even than the numbers five and three; and probably also brought by the Israelites from the Sinai peninsula. The sacredness of this number can be seen in the legislation concerning the sabbatical year; in the gradual development into a septenary festival of the original one-day festival of the Feast of Tabernacles and of the Pass-over. The seven septenary weeks of the spring harvest time with their dividing rest-days, observed originally only in Juda, Ezekiel and the deuteronomic lawgivers combined with the old sabbath, producing the consecutive septenary sabbath. (3) The sabbath as an institution of the Jewish community. The new sabbath ordinance of Ezekiel was very slow in gaining ground. Haggai, Zechariah, and Maleachi know nothing of this sabbath, which had not yet become universal. That its observance is one of the commandments of the decalogue proves nothing to the contrary; for the decalogue is even later than Ezekiel, emanating from the priests' code of Ezra. The universal observance of the sabbath by the Jewish community is due to the well-known activity of Nehemiah. But even then, about 400 B. C., the people did not yet take kindly to the strict observance of this septenary rest-day, which gained its final and permanent victory during the Maccabean period, with the help of the party of the Chasidim.

We call, in this connection, the reader's attention to Professor Emil Schürer's important article on the seven-day week in the early Christian church,²² because it connects closely with Meinhold's book. Schürer discusses: (1) The origin and the observance of the Jewish week and sabbath, adopted by the early church, with the single exception of the observance also of the Lord's day and its designation as *κυριακή*.²³ (2) The planetary week. The Babylonian system is closely connected with the course of the moon; the weeks beginning anew with each successive month, the last two days being reserved for days of rest. The Jewish week of seven days, on the other hand, rolls along uninterruptedly without special reference to the course of the moon. Neither is determined by the facts that there were seven planets. The planetary week is mentioned in Greek and Latin authors, who probably learned of it in Egypt, whither it came from Babylonia. The fact that the inscriptions are silent on this

²² "Die siebentägige Woche im Gebrauche der christlichen Kirche der ersten Jahrhunderte," *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1905, pp. 1-66.

²³ 1 Cor. 16:2; Acts 20:7.

subject leads to the assumption of a comparatively late origin of the planetary week. The Jewish week is of earlier date than this planetary week. Both were adopted by the early church, ran for a time side by side, and were finally combined. A detailed examination of the spread of the planetary week in the Roman Empire from 100 B. C. until 300 A. D. is one of the most attractive sections of this second chapter; followed by a study of the observance in the Christian church of the fourth and fifth centuries, the church making only this change that its week began with Sunday (*dies solis*) corresponding to the *κυριακή*, instead of with the Saturday of the pagan planetary week. (2) Most interesting is the third chapter, "Gang der Entwicklung," in which the author describes the gradual development and spread of the Jewish and the planetary week in the Roman Empire, finally resulting in the present nomenclature.

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THE PARABLES OF JESUS

Hardly five years after Jülicher finally completed his great work on the parables,¹ there appeared another book of generous proportions (about 500 pages) devoted to the same theme.² Its author is Dr. Chr. A. Bugge, of Christiania, who has previously published in Danish several monographs on topics relating to the teaching of Jesus. His purpose in this German work is to correct and supplement the treatise of Jülicher. More particularly he states that his book aims to show how the parables of Jesus are related to the rhetorical art of his age and people, as over against the Aristotelian standard set up by Jülicher. Then, too, he will urge a vigorous protest against what he regards as the arbitrary and bootless text emendation and reconstruction of this same writer. There has been, he feels, in our New Testament study too much literary criticism and too little historico-theological exposition, and hence the demand for a new presentation.

An introduction of ninety pages takes up the question of method in parable exposition. The work of the past is briefly noted, but the real beginning is made with Jülicher, whose arguments are reviewed and summarized; namely: that each parable seeks to illustrate one main thought;

¹ *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*. Bd. I. Freiburg, 1888; zweite Auflage, 1899. Bd. II, 1899.

² *Die Haupt-Parabeln Jesu*. Ausgelegt von Chr. A. Bugge. Mit einer Einleitung über die Methode der Parabel-Auslegung. Giessen: Ricker, 1903. 496 pages. M. 5.40.

that its purpose is always to elucidate and never to obscure, and there is accordingly no room for a double purpose of revealing and hardening; that the allegories and allegorical elements were not an original part of Jesus' teaching. Are then, Bugge would ask, the evangelists so far wrong in their report of the parables of Jesus, whether because of their failure to understand or because of purposeful alteration; or, on the other hand, does this new theory fail to take account of all the facts? The historical evidence available indicates that this last alternative is the true one. Jülicher has yielded to the besetting temptation of logical minds to generalize too much. Starting with a definition of Aristotle according to which the sole office of the parable is to prove, he has proceeded, Procrustes-like, to make the parables fit this theory, in entire disregard of the accounts of the synoptists, which show that Jesus used various types of parable, with different purposes. And this is just what might be expected of Jesus, in view of the practice of contemporary Jewish teachers. Among other forms, he made use of paradox, and in proof sixteen examples are cited (e. g., Matt. 5: 29, 30; 8:22). The paradox differs from the parable in the seeming contradictoriness and unreasonableness of its statements, but is like it in needing translation (*Uebertragung, translatio*.) Reflection and knowledge of the situation are demanded for the understanding of such sayings. That a real relationship existed for the Jews between paradox and parable is manifest from the fact that they included both in the category of *maschal* (משל, Gk. παραβολή or παροιμία). In the *maschal* the fundamental notion is representation, rather than comparison, and it is this conception that is common to the group consisting of parable, fable, allegory, paradox, etc. We find, further, that from antiquity there has very readily and very frequently been associated with this attribute the conception of the enigmatical. Jülicher's assertion that this element is very largely a product of later scribal activity is not warranted. At considerable length passages are introduced and discussed to prove that both the illustrative and the enigmatical *maschal* were used in the classical period of the Old Testament, as well as in the talmudic age, the only difference being that the latter form came gradually to be more prominent. Mixed forms were also common, and it is often difficult to make a sharp distinction between parable and allegory. In the light of this usage, it is not strange that Jesus should speak as he does in Mark 4:11 and parallels. For the Jews of that time speaking in parables was under certain circumstances equivalent to speaking in riddles. It is manifestly unjust, when there is such a wide variety of forms of the *maschal* in the Old Testament, in the Hellenistic Wisdom literature,

and in the rabbinical writing, to limit Jesus to two or three forms which accord with a definition of Aristotle.

The statement of the evangelists regarding the double purpose of speaking in parables—to veil or conceal as regards the multitude, and to reveal as regards the disciples—refers not to parables in general, but to those employed on that particular occasion. Thus they can record without any sense of contradiction many other *meschalim* used for a very different end. Jülicher's interpretation, which gives the words a general application, disregards the actual evidence and puts theory in the place of historical investigation. Instead of being improbable, as he holds, there are several reasons making it very probable that Jesus used the "secret parables" for the double purpose stated in the gospels. Four such reasons are named and elaborated. They carry us into the realm of the self-consciousness of Jesus, and are a reminder of what the author has already stated, namely, that his book was written for the most part in Giessen.³

(1) Jesus, with his unique ideals of the Messiah and of the kingdom of God, must seem an enigma to his countrymen. It would be in accord with the demands of the situation for him to reveal himself in the enigmatical *maschal*. (2) Regard for the people would demand the same course. He must guard against an outburst of enthusiasm. This called for some method that would restrain the multitude, without at the same time in any way denying or minimizing his messianic pretensions. Confronted with the need of self-concealment made necessary by the situation in Matt., chap. 13, Jesus vindicated his procedure to himself and to his disciples by an appeal to Isaiah. The hardening seems included in God's plan for his kingdom. (3) Regard for the disciples would likewise call for the enigmatical *maschal* at this juncture. It gave him an opportunity to train them, by unfolding privately the hidden truth at a time when, by reason of their astonishment and perplexity, their minds would be most alert and receptive. He is likewise by this means enabled to continue his work with the people which as a true prophet he is bound to do. (4) Regard for his own self-development, what he owed to himself and his cause, would dictate the same course. To reveal openly now his messianic dignity and pretensions to his enemies would have been suicidal. Such are the reasons, Bugge holds, which make it evident that at this stage of his preaching of the kingdom no other course than the use of the enigmatical *maschal* was left to Jesus.

³ The author of *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, Professor Baldensperger, is a member of the faculty of Giessen.

The classification of the parables is the next topic considered. Jülicher's division into comparisons (*Gleichnisse*), parables or fables, and narrative examples is pronounced inadequate. For the sake of convenience, thirty-six shorter forms are grouped together under the heading *Parabel-Embleme*—a word borrowed from the older Delitzsch, and another group of longer passages is entitled "Parables." The members of both these groups are classified under two main heads, argumentative and illustrative. Of these the latter approaches closely to allegory, and in expanded form is often hardly distinguishable therefrom. The argumentative parable seeks to substantiate the correctness of some moral teaching by the help of analogy drawn from everyday life or from nature, whereas the illustrative parable seeks for clearness and consistency without any real attempt to prove the correctness of the teaching with which it deals. Paradoxes and paradoxical comparisons are classed as didactic because they help to an understanding of what was not before known or comprehended. A diagram is given, showing the scope of the synoptical *maschal*. Its three main divisions are: (a) paradox, (b) parable, (c) allegory. Parable is subdivided, as stated above, into didactic, argumentative, and illustrative. The argumentative form presents either an example or an argument. Under the illustrative a distinction is made between the *Parousiagleichniss* and the symbol (*Sinnbild*). Only the Sower and the Tares are counted as allegories; the rest of the closely related secret parables of Matt., chap. 13, are symbols (*Sinnbilder*).

There can be no doubt that each of the longer parables aims to set forth one main thought. What this is, is usually indicated by some short, pithy sentence at the beginning or end; e. g., "For many are called, but few are chosen" (Matt. 22:14). This contains the quintessence of the parable, and is frequently introduced by some formula; e. g., "I say unto you." We are thus able to feel assured that we know how the disciples understood the parables, and how they have reproduced them in the gospels. Farther back than this we are not able to go, in spite of the claim of theorists to read a more original form between the lines. There is no reason to distrust the reliability of the synoptists; all the evidence is in their favor. This will be the conclusion of an untrammelled theology after it has proved its sources, which as a science it is bound to do. The gospels show evidences of composition and arrangement, and there is little, if any, difference between them in this respect. Contrary assertions are based on some theory of interdependence, rather than on the observable facts. It is probable that Jesus used the same parable on different occasions, with variations in its form and application. In cases like that

of the Talents and the Pounds we have no evidence warranting us in pronouncing one or the other form as unhistorical. Jesus was a great propagandist, and this means that there must have been in his teaching much reiteration.

Bugge begins the expository section of his book with "The Parables of the Secrets of the Kingdom of Heaven" in Matt., chap. 13, and Mark, chap. 4. Preceding this is a section emphasizing the need of a historical method of interpretation and explaining again the circumstances that led Jesus to adopt this particular method of teaching. A chapter of thirty pages on what may be learned from this group of parables regarding Jesus' conception of the kingdom of heaven follows the exegesis. The second exegetical section takes up "The Later Parables of the Kingdom in Matthew," and the third, "The Individual Parables of Luke." The material in these sections is very conveniently paragraphed and well arranged. In the case of each parable there are added at the close, under the caption "The History of Interpretation," a few important or curious points in the views of old interpreters. In the exegetical treatment textual questions receive scant notice. The method and the conclusions are throughout those for which the introduction has prepared us.

Many who find themselves in agreement with Bugge in his negative criticism of Jülicher's position will not feel that he has made a very considerable positive contribution to the discussion, at least none commensurate with the extent of his book. His contention that we are to come to the study of Jesus' parables from the Jewish side is undoubtedly correct, and would be granted readily by Jülicher himself. What is done to help to this end is claimed to be one of the chief merits of the treatise, and yet its service in this respect is comparatively small. There is no systematic study or use of sources. The author employs miscellaneous quotations, giving to them at times questionable interpretations.

The work here does not compare with what Paul Fiebig accomplishes in his little book, *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu*.⁴ In this the parabolic material of the Mechilta is classified and translated, and there follows a discussion, first as to whether the sections in question are allegories, and secondly, as to what light they throw on Jesus' use of parables. Fiebig's conclusion accords with the view of Bugge that Jesus did not probably limit himself to the so-called pure parable, but employed mixed forms.

Many of Bugge's positions are no more convincing or helpful in their

⁴ *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu*. Von Paul Fiebig. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 167 pages.

new dress than they have been in former writers. This is true of a view introduced several times, and more at length on pp. 95 ff., that Jesus came to use parables to a considerable extent only after he had failed of his purpose with an earlier mode of preaching, of which the Sermon on the Mount is a type. Or, it is said, he reaches a stage in his ministry where another form of teaching is demanded, and a distinction is made between the kinds of truth and the underlying purpose at different periods of his activity.

Keep to the sources is a repeated admonition, but our recapitulation of the introduction has shown that this is not an excellence of which our writer can always rightfully boast as over against Jülicher. It is easy to confound holding to the sources with upholding one's interpretation of the sources.

Bugge's book is a welcome addition to our parable literature, but it is impossible to place upon it as high an estimate as it claims for itself, or indeed as might be possibly accorded, did it not stand, as it inevitably must, in constant comparison with the masterly achievement of Jülicher.

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RECENT LITERATURE IN CHURCH HISTORY

EARLY CHRISTIANITY

While recent "finds" of ancient documents bearing on the earliest days of Christianity encourage the hope that there may be much more light to break on this subject from this source, it is becoming increasingly clear, on the other side, that the older and better-known sources have not yet given us all the information contained regarding it. At least the addition of two such works¹ to our literature, already so rich, on the history of the ancient church, as those by Harnack and Knopf, deepens the consciousness of the existence of problems of prime importance in this field, which neither the old and well-known data nor the later-discovered sources entirely solve.

As to how this new light is to break upon the question, the two works before us give quite clear indications. It is by disengaging the subject

¹ *The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries.* By Adolph Harnack. Translated and edited by James Moffatt. London: Williams & Norgate, 1904, 1905. Vol. I, xv + 494; Vol. II, ix + 488 pages.

Das nachapostolische Zeitalter: Geschichte der christlichen Gemeinden vom Beginn der Flavierendynastie bis zum Ende Hadrians. Dargestellt von Rudolph Knopf. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. xii + 468 pages. M. 9.

from the conventional method of treatment, and attacking it from unaccustomed points of view. Both Harnack and Knopf treat broadly of early Christianity as a whole. They differ in that the first covers the longer period which ends with the Nicene Council, and the second takes the period which ends with the reign of Hadrian. But Harnack views the history as a process of expansion, and Knopf regards it as the unfolding of community life. But with both the main question is: Can we secure fresh glimpses of the beginnings of Christianity by singling out one phase of the subject, fixing the eye upon it, and viewing all else as related to that?

A natural result of this method is the increasing difficulty of recognizing in the earliest days of Christianity the lines and colors with which the modern Christian has been made familiar by the conventional church historian of the past. These studies force the conviction that if one is to hold to a denominational (i. e., the conventional) standpoint with any degree of tenacity, he must somehow persuade himself that the development of principles held valid in the apostolic and subapostolic ages necessarily leads to his position, and not that his position is even in the most essential respects identical with that of the apostles or of the subapostolic church. The only other alternative is the subjugation of history to the yoke of sectarian interest or partisan prejudice, which, it goes without saying, no honest man would at the present day be willing to entertain as morally permissible.

To illustrate these features of the current method, let us take the questions of baptism and church polity in early Christianity. From the nature of the case, these are matters which were bound to establish sharp lines of division among earnest-minded Christians; and they did so. But, in the light of investigations such as those before us, what modern doctrine of baptism can be said to be completely vindicated? If we take Harnack's findings as decisive, the baptism of infants began to be practised in the church not earlier than the middle of the second century (Vol. II, p. 483). This would favor the antipedobaptist position. But in the very next sentence the same historian informs us that baptism was held to be "a mystery which involved decisive consequences of a natural and supernatural kind," and "to actually cancel all past sins." The typical antipedobaptist will find small comfort in this doctrine, which would suit rather his neighbor of the sacramentarian persuasion, who would not withhold baptism from infants, because it imparts grace needed by them. But if the believer in the supernatural efficacy of the ordinance finds his theory vindicated to that extent, he must not rejoice prematurely; for he is destined to receive a rude shock when he comes to discover, through

Knopf's investigations, that the authority to baptize was not vested in the clergy, but in the people. Baptism was not a church sacrament, but the privilege of every believer leading others to faith in Christ, though, of course, usually administered by office-bearers in public church services. Similarly as to the form of baptism, our historians agree that the normal method was that of immersion, but not necessarily of submersion. Pouring the water on the head of a candidate was permitted (Knopf, pp. 271, 272); and its main and common signification was taken to be ceremonial purification. Subordinate correlated ideas were occasionally read into it, making it a rite of initiation, the symbol of the impartation of the Holy Spirit, the emblem of the new birth and of illumination, the seal of acceptance with God, and the sign of communion in the death of Christ.

The picture thus put on the canvas, as far as it refers to baptism, is one in which each of the varying wings of the modern church may find some lineament or color of its own doctrine and practice, but none the complete image of that doctrine. And what is true of baptism is equally true of church polity. On this point both Harnack and Knopf present the results of some thoroughgoing researches (Harnack, Vol. II, pp. 46-114; Knopf, pp. 147-222), and their results agree. The organization of the subapostolic church did not correspond with that of any modern Christian body. It was not exactly Episcopal, although the terminology of Episcopalianism is used in it quite extensively and consistently; but neither was it exactly Presbyterian, in form at least, though in principle it approaches this polity; nor was it Congregational, although some features of it would indicate the recognition of Congregational democracy as the dominant idea. It was more like a composite photograph out of which, by the elimination of some lines and the "forcing" of others, any one of the great historic patterns of church polity might be educed.

Evidently a method of investigation which leads to such results is free from partisan bias, and without question this freedom is a great gain. Even though what has been reached thus far may not be regarded as final, there is in it the promise of great help. Properly used, this method may be expected to lead to the exact facts as to early Christianity. The further problem of how nearly apostolic and subapostolic Christianity is to be regarded as ideal, and how far men should strive to restore the Christianity of the present to the pattern thus rediscovered, may be safely left to the enlightened Christian consciousness of the day. The task of history has been accomplished when it has thrown pure and full light on the past, and has led men to see the facts as they occurred.

But the situation cannot be dismissed with this optimistic account

of the tendencies and principles at work. There are certain dangers into which the modern aggressive historian is apt to fall, and does fall if Har-nack and Knopf are to be taken as fair representatives of the class. If he has successfully found his way out of the swamp of sectarian prejudice on the one hand, he seems likely to wander, on the other, into the dense forest of conjecture, wherein he will see all sorts of fantastic forms in the dim light. And nowhere is this danger more subtle than at the very thresh-old of the investigation, in the almost preliminary step of the criticism of the sources. Breaking away from all traditional guidance, the investi-gator at once begins here to build out of very slight materials whole struc-tures of the authorship, date, and design of the literature he is about to use. Of course, he has a right to do so. So much of value has been secured through the use of rigid criticism in sifting sources that to protest against the process would be to put an obstacle in the way that leads to the truth. On the other hand, not enough can be said by way of urging caution, and a wholesome reserve in the acceptance of unproved theories in the realm of the criticism of sources. Space will not permit of our naming as illustrations anything more than the pastoral epistles and the fourth gospel, which both of our authors, upon insufficient grounds, as it seems to us, draw down into the second century.

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Professor Bigg's book* on *The Church's Task under the Roman Em-pire* comprises four lectures delivered at Oxford. They are delight-ful reading, fresh and breezy in their manner, with an ease of handling the material that speaks of long familiarity. The footnotes add very much both to the size of the book and to its value. There is one lecture on "Educa-tion under the Empire," two on "Religion" and one on "Moral and Social Conditions;" also an excursus on the relation of Christians to the municipal councils and curial service. Professor Bigg sketches the task which lay before the church when she set out to evangelize the Græco-Roman world. What kind of raw material did the church have to make over? What was the intellectual, moral, and material condition of the people who made up the rank and file of the churches? About the great public events of the empire Gibbon knew almost as much as we. Of the education, the club-life, the town government, and the daily life of the people we know far more today, and it is for the church historian to work this mass of new information into the substance of his science.

**The Church's Task under the Roman Empire.* With Preface, Notes, and an Excursus. By Charles Bigg. Oxford, 1905. 136 pages. \$1.75.

In the two lectures on "Religion under the Empire" the author covers ground which is fairly familiar. His account of Isis and Mithra-worship is an admirable summary of our information. On the other hand, in his sketch of Gnosticism, which he regards as a phase of heathenism, he seems to me to drop back into the old tone of contempt for the "monstrous systems" of the Gnostics. "They maintained their existence down to the time of the Albigensian War and St. Thomas Aquinas. During all these centuries they never produced a great man, or won a place in the kingdom of letters. The reason must surely have been that they addressed themselves to the congenital infirmities of the human mind, but could not satisfy its higher powers." This seems hardly fair. It assumes that during all these centuries there was a free field for thought, so that if Gnosticism had anything high and good in it, it would have appealed to men and won their approval. In reality Gnosticism after its first efflorescence, was outside the pale of the church and subject to the asphyxiating pressure that stifled all heretical parties. Would it be fair to say that the Waldenses existed for centuries without producing great men and great books, and therefore must have appealed to the congenital infirmities of human nature? During its early productive period Gnosticism certainly produced great thinkers and made a deep literary impression. It would be hard to find a set of orthodox Christian thinkers in the second century who, man for man, could be matched against the chiefs of the Gnostic schools.

The first lecture, on "Education under the Empire," is exceedingly suggestive and of great practical value. Professor Bigg leaves the universities aside, and deals with the grammar schools and schools of rhetoric, in which the common people received their education. As the public school follows our flag in the Philippines, so the grammar school followed the Roman standards. But the training was purely literary; its aim was to produce polished gentlemen, who could appreciate æsthetic beauty and make a fine speech on anything under the sun. It multiplied eloquent lawyers and fertile minor poets, and these "finicking dilettanti" were the material out of which the administrators of the empire were made. In these schools the children of Christian parents were educated, and some of the great church teachers, like Cyprian, Basil, and Augustine, had been professors of rhetoric. This training must have colored their style and vitiated their taste. One of the most important points emphasized by the author is that this system of education neglected history and imparted no conception of historical development. As a consequence, credulity was unchecked by the habit of historical criticism, and the church

had no good answer when the Gnostics insisted on the moral inferiority of the Old Testament. With some ingenuity it would be possible to find parallels in our American theological education.

The volume of lectures on *Religions et sociétés*³ is a product of the religious and educational situation in France. Theology, which used to be the mistress of the sciences, and gathered philosophy, history, and philology about her as her servants, has been banished from the universities, sacred history from the *lycées*, and the catechism from the primary school. But the authors believe that religion has been so deeply interwoven in the texture of nascent civilization, and is still so important a part of social life, that the social and historical sciences are incomprehensible without it. The churches furnish nothing adequate "to the most modest demands of impartial science." Each church gives information only about one religion, in its present condition only, and only from a few aspects; the rest it ignores or vilifies. As the state is slow to respond to the scientific need, private initiative is taking it up. The volume before us has collected some of the lectures delivered at *l'École des hautes études sociales*. They all treat religion mainly from its social aspect. M. Théodore Reinach contributes an introductory lecture on "Progress in Religion;" M. A. Puech, one on "The Christianity of the First Centuries and the Social Question;" M. Raoul Allier, one on "The Brethren of the Free Spirit;" M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, two on "Christianity and Democracy" and "Christianity and Socialism;" Baron Carra de Vaux, one on "Islam Confronting Modern Civilization;" and M. Hippolyte Dreyfus, one on "Babism and Behaism." The lecture on early Christianity and the social question is the only one that comes strictly within the scope of this review, and I shall confine my report to that.

Has Christianity a social doctrine? Does it at least contain a latent sociology? The early Christians "had declared an implacable war against the pagan cults, and they could not escape entering into conflict with the empire, with the political authority. Were they also in violent opposition to the social condition of the Greek and Roman world?"

The answer is negative. Jesus proclaimed the messianic kingdom, but it was eschatological, and the oppressed and poor had to wait for it in patience. It is true, he turned especially to the poorer classes, but his pity was not so much for poverty as for all human woe. His social influence was through brotherly love. The Jewish churches had no organ-

³*Religions et sociétés: Leçons professées à l'École des hautes études sociales.* Par Théodore Reinach, A. Puech, Raoul Allier, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Carra de Vaux, Hippolyte Dreyfus. Paris, 1905. 286 pages. Fr. 6.

ized communism. The social question was transformed into a moral question. In the city churches of the empire, too, there was no attack on the social conditions. The slaves were fairly free in their choice of religion, and that was sufficient. In the first century men did not seek material aid in the churches, but brotherly fellowship, religious faith, and the hope of immortality. Justice would be realized only in the messianic revolution. As the hope of the parousia faded out, the charitable apparatus of the church became more important, but there was no attack on the social status. What sounds like communism in the Fathers was only insistence on large benevolence. Ebionitic communism became sectarian and heretical. Monasticism dug canals and ponds for the communistic impulses to gather in safety. In short, primitive Christianity was a purely religious movement and not at all social. It has always tolerated the existing social order, while opposing its principles. It had to take this course in the nature of things. But it was not under any obligation of becoming a prop of the existing order, as it has so often become.

To all of which it is possible to assent and yet feel that the last word has not been said.

The little book⁴ by Bittlinger on "The Materializing of Religious Conceptions" is very fresh and seems to me very important. In ancient culture literary tradition and its authority counted for vastly more than with us. The educational system of the Greeks rested on the authority of Homer; the moral education of the Jews, on the authority of the law and the prophets; the old-catholic system of doctrine, on the inspired Scriptures. But ancient civilization had no historical comprehension of past conditions and no scientific methods of hermeneutic. It did not even dare to understand the past as it really was; for that would at once have revealed the gulf that separated the present from that past under whose authority the present sought to shelter its institutions and beliefs. The difficulty was further increased by the essential peculiarity of religious language. The language of religious genius is of marvelous power, but it is necessarily mysterious, symbolical, imaginative, enigmatic. The tamer minds materialize this poetic imagery. Religious reformers have to use the familiar terms of religion, but they infuse a new meaning into them. But later times again fail to perceive the new and higher sense, and there is an atavistic reversion to a lower stage of religion through faulty hermeneutic.

⁴ *Die Materialisierung religiöser Vorstellungen: Eine religionsphilosophische Studie auf geschichtlicher Grundlage.* Von Ernst Bittlinger. Tübingen, 1905. 128 pages. M. 2.

The science of exegesis has been revolutionized in our time, but the history of hermeneutic has been neglected. Yet it is most important for the study of religious origins to know how each epoch used and interpreted the older religious authorities. The allegorizing of the Fathers is the point most often dwelt upon. It was, indeed, most important, for it sidetracked some parts of the Bible altogether and gagged the testimony of other portions. But it did not create new dogmas; it only proved by fanciful methods the doctrines already accepted. Our author emphasizes another tendency of even greater importance, which he calls the materializing of religious ideas. It is the opposite of allegorizing. In allegorizing a spiritual meaning is given to a statement which was meant as a prosaic statement of fact; in materializing a poetic and figurative expression is petrified into a crude statement of actual fact. Poetry becomes history; proverbial expressions are understood as historical data; mythological beings which had evaporated into mere figures of speech are taken as real, and thus become active myths once more; poetic personifications of abstract ideas are understood as actual hypostases. This tendency to materialize is not, like allegorizing, a conscious mental exercise, but is an unconscious drift and habit of mind. It was the dominant tendency in ancient hermeneutic, and has been profoundly influential in the creation of religious facts and history.

Dr. Bittlinger adduces a very large amount of material from the Old and New Testament, and from Justin and Irenæus, to explain and prove this process. He traces the account of the passage through the Red Sea, of the manna and the water from the rock, from the earlier to the later documents, and shows how the religious comprehension of God's help became more crudely miraculous by the materializing interpretation put upon the older accounts. The conception of God and his help in human affairs became mechanical through this process; all history followed a cut-and-dried scheme. The hypostatizing of Wisdom, the Spirit, the Memra in Jewish theology; the transformation of prophetic vision into apocalypticism; the transmutation of religious stories into historical accounts by the Priest Codex—in all these our author sees the same process.

In the section dealing with the New Testament the brief study of the fourth gospel from this point of view seems to me most interesting and noteworthy. In the full treatment of Justin and Irenæus, who are selected as the chief representatives of old-catholic theology, the author shows how it was possible that the New Testament should offer so little resistance to the development of Catholic dogma, which departed so widely

from it. Christology, the sacraments, immortality, and the deification of man are treated under new and very interesting lights. Few will read the book without raising many objections in detail, but the main thesis is impressively confirmed. How was it possible that Catholic theology could ever be built on the foundation of the prophets and of Jesus? The decay of civilization and the passage of Christianity from the oriental to the western world account for a good deal; but the creation of new religious facts by the materialization of religious ideas was another important factor.

*Das Abendmahl im Urchristentum*⁵ seems to be the *Erstlingswerk* of a young man. It bears all the marks of youth. The style lacks finish, abounds in cumbersome transitions and repetitions, and occasionally drops into grammatical errors. The writer is very radical, very sure of himself, and impatient of inherited prejudices. But one feels kindly toward him. He is so doggedly honest, and he hews his way with a scientific obstinacy and mental grip that promise well.

When Christ ate his last meal with the disciples, did he mean to institute that mysterious and efficacious sacramental rite which the later church celebrated? Or did he institute a purely symbolical rite which he meant to have his disciples repeat in memory of him? Or did he perform a symbolical act which was meant to announce his death and comfort his disciples in that hour of trial, but without any idea of having it repeated? Or was it an anticipation of the messianic meal to be celebrated at his triumphal return, and without any reference to his impending death?

The first part of the book is a critical examination of these four propositions, in that order. Hoffmann refutes each, but adopts a correct residuum in each. He regards them as successive interpretations put upon the eucharistic meal in the course of its evolution, each of which has left its layer of deposit in the New Testament records, and he undertakes to peel away these sedimentary strata to get at the original fact, and also to explain the successive interpretations put upon it.

In the second part of the book he gives his own construction of the historical process. Jesus came to Jerusalem to depose the hierarchy. The cleansing of the temple failed to explode the mine. He realized his failure, but rose to the conviction that God would immediately intervene and give the victory. He did not expect his death. He had all drink of the cup to bind them together in mutual fidelity as a *Treubund*.

⁵ *Das Abendmahl im Urchristentum: Eine exegetische und historisch-kritische Untersuchung.* Von Johannes Hoffmann. Berlin, 1903. 267 pages.

The words reported in connection with the cup and referring to his death are all of later origin. The meals celebrated by the earliest group of disciples were not intended to repeat the last meal (in this he differs from Spitta), but were held spontaneously as religious meals of the same sort as his last meal. The burning eschatological hope was their essence. The disciples met to await the coming of the Lord; the *ἀγάπη* and the *δείπνον* were not distinct. But the riddle of Christ's death occupied them intensely. It was necessary for their faith to believe that he foreknew and foretold his death. The last meal was the fitting occasion at which such an announcement would have been made. All that was needed was a reinterpretation of the symbolism. Now the original words "This is my body," were paralleled by the new phrase, "This is my blood." At this stage, then, the symbolic reference to his death was injected, but as yet there was no idea that their meals were repetitions of his last meal.

Meanwhile their Christology was developing. Christ was a heavenly being. His death had not merely been foreknown; it must have had a profound propitiatory purpose. At this stage the words "shed for many" would be added. It became a duty of loving gratitude to remember the death he had suffered for them, and they believed that he wanted them so to remember it and to repeat his action. Thus the third stage in the evolution of the meal was reached; it was a symbolic act expressing his atoning death and was to be repeated till his return.

It was at this stage that Paul laid hold of it. It still contained the double element evenly balanced: the reference to the *parousia* and the reference to the atoning death. Now, Paul's theology everywhere laid the heaviest emphasis on the death of Christ. The eschatological hope was still vivid with him, but it was drifting toward the circumference of his thinking; salvation, as he conceived it, was essentially moral and in the present tense. Paul would not have invented the eucharist. He found it, and reconstructed it under the influence of his dominant idea. The eschatological element receded still farther; "until he come" is the last remnant of it in Paul's account; the reference to drinking the fruit of the vine again in the kingdom drops out. The reference to the atoning death is further emphasized by a slight change in the phrase: "this cup is the new covenant in my blood". Thus, Paul's conception of the act influenced his report of it, and his report in turn influenced the synoptists. It was now not merely an act of remembrance, but an act of confession, a declaration of the Lord's death. Through it the worshipers entered into communion with the Lord, the Spirit, as heathen worshipers

communed with their deities in sacrificial meals. It was more; it was not only a communion with the Spirit, but with the body and blood. It was this idea that was seized by Hellenic thought. Paul's idea of Christ's death as the emancipation from the Jewish law remained incomprehensible to Greek thought; the mystic sacramental union was wholly congenial, and that was elaborated.

There are additional sections discussing the views of Ignatius, John, the Didaché, and Justin Martyr. Also a comparison between the Greek mysteries and the eucharist. Altogether it is a book that bristles with question marks, and is often most suggestive where the reader differs most widely from the author.

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To the history of the earliest Christian churches Harnack makes a valuable contribution in a book which his publishers have just laid before us.⁶ In his memorable work on the spread of Christianity in the first three centuries he considered briefly the relation of the primitive Christians to military life. In the present book he takes up the theme again and treats it at greater length.

The study falls into two main divisions. In the first the author considers the relation of the gospel, as a message of peace, to strife and war. Here he cites first of all the references of the New Testament to the subject. He finds little of a determinate character. Christ and the apostles neither condemned nor approved war in itself. Passing from the New Testament to the earliest uncanonical Christian writers, he finds them following the example thus set for them, except that they begin to regard the church as an army and its clergy as military officers to whom exact obedience is due. Later, as in the case of Origen, this imagery is retained, and even made more emphatic, while secular warfare by the Christian is pointedly condemned. Still later the figure is developed in various directions, while the condemnation of all earthly warfare by the Christian is made more express and vehement.

In the second part of his work Harnack considers the much narrower subject of the relation of the church to the calling of the soldier. War might have been condemned while still many of those who waged it might have been regarded as Christian brethren. Were the members of the

⁶ *Militia Christi: Die christliche Religion und der Soldatenstand in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten.* Von Adolph Harnack. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 129 pages. M. 2.

church permitted to serve as soldiers? The Roman army was recruited chiefly by voluntary enlistments. Hence the church was called upon to decide this question.

But until about 170 A. D. it is not once mentioned by any Christian writer. Multitudes of other ethical questions are discussed, but this one is ignored. The silence may be explained on the supposition that Christians were permitted to enlist as a matter of course, so that nothing was thought of their action. It may be explained also on the supposition that but few Christians enlisted, the condemnation of military life being so well understood that the converts avoided it without discussion. Of these two explanations Harnack decidedly prefers the second. There were some Christians in the army, but their number was so insignificant that they attracted little attention.

After 170, however, they became sufficiently conspicuous to suggest a discussion of their profession. It was condemned as unlawful. But this did not prevent all Christians from adopting it. Thus, when Constantine began his victorious career, a majority of his soldiers were Christians, and his adoption of Christianity was more politic than it has often seemed to those who have commented upon it. After his time all opposition to the calling of the soldier ceased in the church.

Rev. G. Horner, in his edition and translation of *The Statutes of the Apostles*,⁷ has made a valuable contribution to the discussion concerning the sources of the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions. He holds that the Apostolic Constitutions were probably "written in Greek by the pseudo-Ignatius in Syria, and probably at Antioch, A. D. 350-400." But he supposes that the author worked from materials already existing in writing, a part of which he identifies with the documents gathered together in this volume.

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*The Valerian Persecution*⁸ is written by a Catholic historian who in aiming to make a critical use of the sources succeeds far better than many writers belonging to the Roman church, when they set forth the experiences

⁷ *The Statutes of the Apostles; or, Canones Ecclesiastici*. Edited, with Translation and Collation from Ethiopic and Arabic MSS.; also a Translation of the Saidic and Collation of the Bohairic Versions; and Saidic Fragments. By G. Horner. London: Williams & Norgate, 1904. xxxix+480 pages. 8s. 6d.

⁸ *The Valerian Persecution: A Study of the Relations between Church and State in the Third Century, A. D.* By Patrick J. Healy. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905., xv+285 pages. \$1.50.

of the early martyrs. He deliberately rejects much material found in the *Acta Martyrum* as wholly unworthy of credence, while yet accepting much that, to say the least, borders close on the edge of legend. The marvelous dreams and visions which gave guidance and comfort to the confessors and martyrs, and the precise predictions contained in them which were literally fulfilled, appear not to have taxed the author's credulity. The critical historian who bases his narrations on hagiographical writings has for his task the separating of fact from fable—a task in which Professor Healy has only partly succeeded.

The bare historic facts preserved to us concerning the persecution under Valerian could be set down in a very few pages. The author has so brought together these scattered details, and amplified these meager notices, as to make upon the mind a pleasing and plausible impression. How far his delineation accords with the actual history we can never know, but, in view of the paucity and legendary character of the material at his command, his attempted reconstruction has been, on the whole, skilfully and judiciously made. By far the most noted victim of the persecution was Cyprian, whose deportment his friends report as commendable throughout; the accusations of his adversaries our author passes in silence.

In the book are nine chapters, only four of which deal strictly with the Valerian persecution. The first four describe the irreconcilable antagonism between paganism and Christianity, the repressive measures of the several emperors beginning with Nero, the internal confusion of the empire, and the invasions of the barbarians. The ninth chapter deals with the death of Valerian, the ensuing civil disorders, the accession of Gallienus and his edict of toleration, "which guaranteed to the Christians the full and free exercise of their religion." These chapters are quite as valuable as those which treat of the Valerian persecution proper. The data on which they rest are more genuinely historic, and the matters with which they deal are of prime importance.

The tone of the work throughout is candid and temperate, the style is clear and engaging, and the conclusions reached are, with minor exceptions, justified by the evidence.

*The Latin Writings of St. Patrick*⁹ is a section out of the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy. The writings include the Confession and the Epistle to Coroticus. They are given in the Latin and in an English

⁹ *Libri Sancti Patricii: The Latin Writings of Saint Patrick*. Edited, with Introduction, Translation, and Notes. By Newport J. D. White. ["Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Vol. XXV, Sec. C, No. 7."] Dublin: University Press, 1905. Pp. 201-326. 25.

translation. The critical apparatus is exhaustive. It includes, among other matters, notices of the six manuscripts which are still preserved, a carefully selected bibliography, notes on the text and on biblical quotations, a list of recurrent phrases, an index of scriptural references, and an index of authorities. Here is furnished an *apparatus criticus* on the brief but most precious writings of the great apostle of the Irish, which seems to have exhausted the present knowledge of the subject. Readers whose chief interest is to learn of Patrick at first hand will turn to the text and its translation; learned specialists will find their pleasure in the accompanying dissertations.

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THE MEDIÆVAL PERIOD

In mediæval church history we have an interesting work¹⁰ by Albert Michael Königer. Burchard I was bishop of Worms from 1000 to 1025. He was an industrious and just ruler, who did much to correct the disorders of his dark age. One of his most important measures was the compiling and publishing of an extensive work on canon law. This labor was occasioned by the confusion of the existing codes and the ignorance of the clergymen whose duty it was to interpret and enforce them. The entire compilation consists of twenty books. Burchard adapted the collection of laws to his own time, omitting much that had become dead when he wrote, so that his work is a mirror of his age. It is in this sense that Königer interprets it. He is aware of the danger of taking a code of laws against vice and crime as an evidence that no virtue existed, and checks himself from this extreme. We do not know any other picture of Germany as it was at the beginning of the eleventh century at once so comprehensive, so minute, so temperate, and so fair.

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This collection¹¹ of Professor Boehmer includes a very learned and critical introduction of seventy-two pages, followed by documents which he classifies as genuine, doubtful, and spurious; and embracing important discussions of various matters, such as the stigmata. A short but valuable

¹⁰ *Burchard I. von Worms und die deutsche Kirche seiner Zeit (1000-1025): Ein kirchen- und sittengeschichtliches Zeitbild.* Von Albert Michael Königer. München: Lentner, 1905. 244 pages. M. 4.80.

¹¹ *Analekten zur Geschichte des Franciscus von Assisi.* Von H. Boehmer. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr, 1904. 146 pages.

glossary is also added. The work has been very carefully done in all its parts, and is an invaluable contribution to the study of St. Francis and his times.

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THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

Strangely enough, the thrilling story of Italy still waits to be told. The masters tell us that it cannot be done until a vast amount of preliminary work in the way of investigating the history of the many Italian communes shall have been accomplished. They warn us that all prior attempts will be unreliable and so well-nigh useless. This work is being carried on by such competent scholars as Villari, who has made a most valuable contribution in his *History of Florence*.

When we saw the announcement of Mr. Sedgwick's *Short History of Italy*,¹² we entertained the hope that at last we were to have a general history of Italy. But when we referred to the short preface, we found the author hastening to tell us that his volume "makes no pretense to original investigation, or even to an extended examination of the voluminous literature which deals with every part of the subject." This is at first a disappointment. However, as we read on, we became convinced that the author is excessively modest, and that, for a book made up from secondary sources, and, as his bibliography at the end of the volume indicates, a rather limited range of these, he has given us a valuable and interesting book. We came to the end wishing that it had been longer, and with a distinct impression that its author ought to continue his studies in Italian history, get acquainted with the original sources, and at last give us in moderate compass the general history of Italy for which English readers are waiting.

He shows good judgment in selecting the points of greatest interest, and putting the emphasis there. These points are the papacy, the Renaissance, and the Risorgimento, reserving as much space as possible for the great men who brought these movements to pass. The publishers have made a very convenient and attractive volume.

General and special studies of the Italian Renaissance have long been the fashion, and continue to be so in our own times. The literature is already nearly boundless and fathomless. Studies of Dante alone, whose career was just at the beginning of the period, would, if collected,

¹² *A Short History of Italy*. By Henry Dwight Sedgwick. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co.; Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1905. 443 pages. \$2.

make a good-sized library, and almost every phase of the movement has had relatively equal attention. Yet hitherto there has been no monograph on the conspicuous women of the period. To fill this vacancy is the task that Mr. Hare has set for himself.¹³

He begins with a very interesting chapter, covering forty pages, on "The Daughters of the Renaissance," and the influences that surrounded them and contributed to the development of their various personalities. Then he arranges the noble ladies of the period geographically. The first class consists of two leading spirits of the house of Medici—Lucrezia Tornabuoni, wife of Piero dei Medici, and Clarice degli Orsini, wife of Lorenzo dei Medici. Then follow two queens of Naples, princesses of the house of Anjou—Giovanna I and Giovanna II. Then we have a group of four Lombard princesses, among whom are Beatrice d' Este, duchess of Milan, and Rénee of France, duchess of Ferrara. From among the "daughters of Venice" he selects Caterina Carnaro, queen of Cyprus, and Bianca Capello, grand duchess of Florence. The last group is of the "Great Ladies of Rome and Romagna." Of these Lucrezia Borgia attracts special attention. The author reviews the life of Lucrezia in the light of recent investigations of historians. Among these we note the "Justification" of Gregorovius. These investigations make it probable that Lucrezia does not deserve the hatred that was so justly due Alexander VI and his nefarious son, Cæsar. Nevertheless, he thinks that "the last word has not yet been spoken. The character of Lucrezia Borgia still awaits the final verdict of a broader knowledge."

There are ten portraits from such artists as Titian, Botticelli, Leonardo da Vinci, and Raphael. The volume is winsome and worthy a place in the literature of the Renaissance.

J. W. MONCRIEF.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE REFORMATION PERIOD

The well-known selection of the more important writings of Luther¹⁴ formerly published in Brunswick is now transferred to Schwetschke & Son, Berlin. It is one of the most critical of the many collections of his works. The two supplementary volumes which lie before us have just been added to the Berlin edition. They contain "Against the Heavenly Prophets," "Monastic Vows," and "Concerning the Bondage of the

¹³ *The Most Illustrious Ladies of the Italian Renaissance*. By Christopher Hare. New York: Scribner, 1904. 367 pages. \$3 net.

¹⁴ *Luthers Werke*. Ergänzungsbände I und II. Herausgegeben von Otto Scheel. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. 376 and 550 pages. M. 8.

Will." The treatise on "Monastic Vows" has given rise in recent times to a vigorous controversy, owing to the attack of Denifle, and the editor therefore appends to it a series of notes extending through more than two hundred pages, and ably repelling the assault. These supplementary volumes are in every way worthy of their distinguished predecessors.

Two republications of Luther's small Catechism are before us, each containing excellent peculiarities.

One¹⁵ reproduces it in its oldest form, and is provided with abundant critical annotations and twenty of the original illustrations by Hans Behaim.

While the first of these republications gives us the Catechism in its oldest form, the second¹⁶ gives it to us in the form in which Luther finally left it. It was in the edition of 1536 that the Small Catechism reached its highest state, and represented best the thought of the Reformer, who had improved it greatly by many minor changes. To this exact reprint is prefixed an introduction of 132 pages. The curious and copious learning of this preface is exceeded in interest only by the Catechism itself, with its coarse but powerful engravings illustrating the Ten Commandments, the Lord's prayer, and baptism.

Köhler gives us a survey of the recent literature on the German Reformation produced by Roman Catholic writers.¹⁷ The output is somewhat extensive. The larger part of it is popular, rather than critical, and scarcely worthy of serious attention. A smaller part, however, is characterized by adequate learning and controversial skill, and gives some trouble to its Protestant opponents. Here Köhler places the books of "Denifle, the Luther-killer," who comes into the battle "club in hand and covered with the Dominican hood;" Janssen, the author of the *History of the German People*, and the scholars engaged upon the splendid publications of the Görres Society. Occasionally he pauses to break a theological lance with such champions as these. His survey of the field

¹⁵ *Dr. Martin Luthers Kleiner Katechismus nach den ältesten Ausgaben, in hochdeutscher, niederdeutscher und lateinischer Sprache.* Herausgegeben und mit kritischen und sprachlichen Anmerkungen versehen. Von Karl Knoke. Mit 20 Abbildungen nach Hans Behaim. Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1904. vii + 133 pages.

¹⁶ *Enchiridion: Der kleine Katechismus für die gemeine Pfarher und Prediger.* D. Martin Luther, Wittenberg: gedruckt Nick. Schir, 1536. Facsimile-Neudruck herausgegeben von O. Albrecht. Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1905.

¹⁷ *Katholizismus und Reformation: Kritisches Referat über die wissenschaftlichen Leistungen der neueren katholischen Theologie auf dem Gebiete der Reformationsgeschichte.* Von Walther Köhler. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. 88 pages. M. 1.80.

of literary battle, on the whole, is fair, and it is eminently breezy, popular, and readable.

A slight but real contribution to the history of the Counter-Reformation is made by Dr. Karl Holl in his lecture on the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola.¹⁸ The *Spiritual Exercises* is now attracting a more sympathetic study on the part of Protestants than it has heretofore received. It is no longer the fashion to treat it with ridicule. Its power is recognized, and Protestant writers are seeking to understand it. To the stream of books written with this purpose in view Holl adds one which, though small, is well worthy of attention.

A study for which the world has been waiting many generations is at last accomplished by Henry Charles Lea, LL.D. His *History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages* treated of the institution throughout Europe in its earlier development. He now gives us a *History of the Inquisition in Spain*.¹⁹ He takes up the story in 1480, pursues it through four volumes, and brings it down to the latest times. All that Lea has thus far published has been everywhere received as authoritative, and there is no doubt that the present work will be welcomed as warmly and given a place of final authority. Only the first volume has appeared, but it gives the highest promise for the others. The documents on which this history is based are only too abundant, and the author modestly confesses that he has not been able to master all the vast accumulation. Yet he has gone far enough into it to be able to present an accurate and complete survey of the subject. The later volumes will be awaited with eager interest.

The authorship of "The Epistles of Obscure Men" has never before received such a searching study as that which Brecht has just published.²⁰ His chief argument is derived from style. But his judgment of the style is by no means a subjective impression. It proceeds from a careful and detailed analysis. While the chief emphasis is placed upon the argument from style, the historical evidence receives attention, and it is shown that the two tell the same story. The author concludes that Part I was written by Crotus Rubeanus, and Part II by Von Hutten.

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¹⁸ *Die geistlichen Übungen des Ignatius von Loyola: Eine psychologische Studie.* Von Karl Holl. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 35 pages. M. 0.60.

¹⁹ *A History of the Inquisition in Spain.* By Henry Charles Lea. In 4 vols. Vol. I. New York: Macmillan, 1906. xii+620 pages. \$2.50.

²⁰ *Die Verfasser der Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum.* Von Walther Brecht. Strassburg: Trübner, 1904. xxv+383 pages.

ENGLISH AND SCOTCH CHURCH HISTORY

*English Church History: From the Death of King Henry VII. to the Death of Archbishop Parker*²¹ is a companion piece to *English Church History: From the Death of Archbishop Parker to the Death of Charles I.*, a notice of which appeared in this *Journal* a year ago. (Vol. IX, No. 2, April, 1905.) In both volumes the object of the lectures "was, and is, to stimulate interest in the fortunes of the Church of England at very critical periods of its history." Doubtless readers whose sympathies are strongly enlisted in behalf of the Anglican church will find their interest stimulated, but perhaps their bias would be corrected by reading books written in a less partisan spirit. In the Anglican church itself there are many who cannot assent to Professor Plummer's judgment. Wolsey was not as good and great as he is painted, nor was Thomas Cromwell as mean and bad. Edward VI, Somerset, and Cranmer deserve better treatment than they get, and Elizabeth gets better than she deserves. All, of whatever type, who opposed Anglicanism receive scant courtesy. Papists and Puritans who wanted less or more doctrinal and ceremonial change were tipping viciously the even Anglican scale of primitive tradition. The Calvinists come in for the hardest epithets, the Lutherans for the milder, and the Papists for the mildest. The grave fault of the Church of Rome was the intolerance and insolence with which it made the wholly unwarranted claim to be the church of God in England, thereby causing English Christians to separate from the Church of England and to incur the guilt of schism. From Augustine's time the English church was wholly independent of Rome, and Rome's interference and encroachment were illegal and outrageous. Our author asserts, "with perfect confidence, that the Church of England since the Reformation is simply the old Church of England, with its face washed and dried with a very rough towel."

We are quite willing that Professor Plummer should write a book from the standpoint of a member of the Church of England, but we regret that he is so swayed by ecclesiastical prepossessions as to descend to the arts of the special pleader. It can hardly be that the real interests of his church will be served by such methods.

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Cranmer is "the most mysterious and, after Henry VIII, the most influential factor in the Anglican Reformation." Professor Pollard

²¹*English Church History: From the Death of King Henry VII. to the Death of Archbishop Potter.* By Alfred Plummer. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner 1905. xv + 194 pages. \$1 net.

resolves the mystery of the great Protestant archbishop by trying to understand the age in which he lived; he justifies his influence by giving us in flesh and blood, as we have not before met him, a great, kindly, honest, moderate man. The book is written to extenuate Cranmer, to mitigate any harsh judgment that superficial acquaintance with the facts of his life would pronounce against him. Yet it is with a historian's knowledge and fairness that the estimate is made; the partisan spirit is not detected.

Pollard has no all-governing church theory, no ecclesiastical *motif* for strangely misreading events. The book²² is good in its delineation of character; Cranmer and his contemporaries alike stand out with great clearness. It is good in its treatment of the events of the stirring times of Henry, Edward, and Mary, and some of the footnotes throw new light on long controverted points. Pollard's biography is fuller than that of Canon Mason, and it is very fortunately, for the ordinary reader, free from the High Church prejudices of Jenkyns and Dixon.

JOHN McLAUGHLAN.

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The year 1505 has generally been accepted as the year of the birth of John Knox. The year 1905 was observed throughout the Presbyterian world as its four-hundredth anniversary. This quarter-centenary commemoration called out a long list of biographies. Some of these are superficial and ephemeral; others are learned and enduring. Some are savagely denunciatory, having the set purpose to blast the reformer's reputation; others are excessively laudatory, extenuating, and even justifying, his most patent shortcomings and sins. The two biographies by Cowan²³ and Macmillan²⁴ aim to avoid extremes. Both writers see in Knox a hero of the first order, but neither ranks him as a demigod. They award to him a place second to none in Scottish annals, but his faults are not condoned. Both authors rely chiefly on the *Lives* by McCrie and Brown, and Laing's Edition of *Knox's Works*. Cowan is an Aberdeen professor, and has produced the more learned work; Macmillan is a Glasgow pastor, and has written to meet the wants of the less exacting public. Cowan contends that the traditional date, 1505, is wrong, and marshals the proofs for a date eight or nine years later; Macmillan devotes an appendix to

²² *Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation, 1489-1556*. By A. F. Pollard. New York and London: Putnam, 1904. xv + 399 pages. \$1.35.

²³ *John Knox, the Hero of the Scottish Reformation*. By Henry Cowan. New York and London: Putnam, 1905. xxxiii + 404 pages. \$1.35 net.

²⁴ *John Knox: A Biography*. By D. Macmillan. With an Appreciation of the Reformer by Principal Story. London: Melrose, 1905. vii + 317 pages. \$1.50.

the arguments which defend the year usually accepted. Many writers have charged Knox with cowardice in quitting Scotland in a time of special need and danger in answer to the call of his English congregation in Geneva. Cowan frees him from the charge and vindicates his conduct; Macmillan handles the case lightly, merely noting that "he did not feel at liberty to resist the appeal." Cowan's mind is more open to the serious defects in the character of his hero, and he says plainly that with his "intolerant zeal" against the Romanists, his "uncharitable judgments regarding the actions and motives of his opponents," and "his condonation of Beaton's and Rizzio's assassinations," it is "impossible for us to sympathize;" Macmillan does not find it in his way to animadvert upon any of these things. Both authors narrate the leading events in the life of Knox, and dwell at length on his *Confession of Faith* and *Book of Discipline*, his relations with Mary Stuart, his political and doctrinal writings, and his great rôle in the Scottish Reformation. In Cowan on almost every page are footnotes which cite the authorities and elucidate the text; in Macmillan footnotes are absent. Cowan has given a full bibliography; Macmillan barely names five or six authors in his preface. The illustrations in Cowan are finer and more numerous than those in Macmillan. The index in Cowan is admirable; that in Macmillan is almost worthless. The work by Cowan is the more scholarly, the more unbiased, and the more valuable.

There is a fascinating but rather gruesome interest in the perusal of Rev. Mr. Henderson's²⁵ recital of the trials by the Scotch Ecclesiastical courts of a dozen men or more accused of teachings not in accord with the Westminster Standards. Among the culprits are John Simson, W. M'Gill, Edward Irving, John Macleod Campbell, James Morison, three or four authors of the *Scotch Sermons*, Robertson Smith, Marcus Dods, A. B. Bruce, and George Adam Smith. These men were brought to trial for heretical teachings of various sorts, such as affirming the true and complete human nature of Christ and the universality of his atonement, the salvation of all children dying in babyhood and the possibility of the salvation of heathen who follow the light they have, the legitimacy of biblical criticism and the validity of many of its findings. They were arraigned before the courts of the church for denying the doctrine of verbal inspiration, the historicity of the early chapters of Genesis, the creation of the world and man six thousand years ago, the lapse of the race from a state of paradisaic innocence, the transmission of hereditary guilt, the objective character of the atonement as a satisfaction rendered to divine

²⁵ *The Religious Controversies of Scotland*. By Henry F. Henderson. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner, 1905. 274 pages. \$1.75, net.

justice, and "the everlasting punishment in eternal fire" of the non-elect because of Adam's transgression. These theological controversies and church trials reveal the conceptions of Christianity which Scotch orthodoxy, in the Nineteenth Century, felt itself bound to maintain, and also through what sharp and bitter conflicts more enlightened views of our religion have been forced to make their way. Many of these heretical opinions for which Scotch preachers and teachers lost their standing in the church are still in hot dispute, but many more, happily, have ceased to be heretical with the advancing intelligence and sanity and freedom of the Christian mind.

While the volume by Dr. Henderson explains the Scotch religious controversies in the last century, that by Principal Donaldson²⁶ deals with the still more momentous issues which emerge with the dawn of the present century. By the decision of the House of Lords the vast properties of the Free Church of Scotland pass over to the "Wee Frees," a little company of belated ministers who in 1900 refused to acquiesce in the union of the Free Church and the United Presbyterian. The ground of the verdict of the last court of appeal is that the Free Church has departed from the literal and rigid terms of the Confession of Faith, thereby forfeiting its belongings of whatever sort to the insignificant minority who still accept the Confession in its original bare, bald literalness. This, with its manifold implications, is the theme to which the principal of St. Andrews addresses himself. In his first chapter he cites passage after passage in the Westminster Confession of Faith, which it is impossible for an intelligent Christian in this day to believe. No Presbyterian the world over whose belief is worthy of respect can by any possibility subscribe to every article of the Confession in the sense its authors intended. In the second chapter the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England are treated in the same way. The Articles go less into details than the Confession, and so the difficulty is somewhat lessened, though in no essential respect is it removed. No honest and intelligent English churchman can possibly receive and teach the Articles in their evident and designed meaning. In the third chapter the legal aspects of subscription to these creeds are considered, and there is pointed out the perilous situation of every holder of a church living and the uncertainty of his tenure in view of the recent decision of the House of Lords. The fourth chapter deals with the moral and religious aspects of the subject, and compulsory subscription is reviewed

²⁶ *The Westminster Confession of Faith and the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England: The Legal, Moral, and Religious Aspects of Subscription to Them.* By James Donaldson. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. Pp. ix+168. 3s. 6d.

in the light of its disastrous consequences to clergymen themselves, and to the people to whom they minister. Both parties are morally debauched, and religion itself is discredited, when ministers and priests pose before the people, professing one thing and believing another. In the next chapter sundry remedies are proposed for these most baleful evils. In the final chapter the appointed teachers in the "Wee Free Church" and their teachings are taken in hand. First of all, the significant fact is noted that the "Wee Frees" among their thirty-three ministers could not find a single representative deemed fit for a professorship or a lectureship in their newly constituted college. They were obliged to muster their teaching staff from outside their own ranks. Then, secondly, from the writings of these teachers it is discovered that "they do not adhere rigidly to the Confession of Faith or to the dogmas of their predecessors," which strict adherence is the very ground on which the House of Lords adjudged the "Wee Frees" to be the genuine original church and entitled to all the property. Principal Donaldson's volume ought to awaken serious inquiry in the minds of all Christians who are fettered by creed subscriptions, for it all goes to show how unwise it is, and how dishonest and how morally ruinous, to cling to an outworn creed and outwardly to maintain religious tenets which the subscriber knows are no longer tenable.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Three volumes²⁷ lie on our table which are as unlike as three books can well be, except that all three treat of religious liberty. Three writers—a French Positivist, a French Romanist, and an American Protestant—animated by sentiments wholly unlike, pursue historical investigations in three distinct domains, and maintain with spirit three conflicting theses. All three center their thoughts on the rights of conscience, freedom of worship, separation of church and state, and the social, civil, and religious equality of all citizens before the law; but the events and principles under review in each case are marshaled and interpreted according to each writer's predetermination.

The History of Religious Toleration by the Comtist is really a

²⁷ *Histoire de la tolérance religieuse: Evolution d'un principe social.* Par Amédée Matagrin. Paris: Fischbacher, 1905. 447 pages.

L'histoire, le texte et la destinée du Concordat de 1801. Par Em. Sévestre. Paris: Lethielleux, 1905. xxiv+702 pages.

The Development of Religious Liberty in Connecticut. By M. Louise Greene. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. xiii+552 pages. \$2 net.

recital of shocking intolerance by the Christian church, chiefly the Roman church, through the centuries. A few pages at the beginning are devoted to the politico-religious régime among the Egyptians, the Israelites, the Greeks, and the Romans in pre-Christian times. It is maintained that these ancient peoples were not intolerant in the modern sense of the word. The bulk of the volume, however, is given to a historic review of the persecuting spirit and enactments of the Christians from the time of Jesus down to the French Revolution. Christ's followers departed from his spirit, and from the date of their ascendancy in the Roman empire intolerance characterized the Christian church. Through the Middle Ages all opposition to the papal hierarchy, whether by heretics, schismatics, Jews, or Mohammedans, was suppressed and destroyed to the limit of Catholic power. In the sixteenth century the Lutherans, the Calvinists, and the Romanists persecuted to the death those who differed from them in creed and worship. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europe continued to be the theater of religious fanaticism, bigotry, and persecution. So the horrible story unfolds itself through the centuries.

M. Matagrín's treatment of his theme is defective in at least three respects. In the first place, he omits all reference to the persecutions by the Anglicans and Presbyterians in England and Scotland, and by the Puritans in the early history of the New World. Here were exhibitions of an intolerant spirit and resorts to exterminating measures of precisely the same un-Christian quality as those in France and on the continent generally. In the second place, the attempt to minimize the persecutions to which the early Christians were subjected, and to exonerate the Roman emperors, is a piece of special pleading which reflects on the candor and open-mindedness of the author. In the third place, the glory of the advocacy of liberal sentiments, and of the condemnation of religious tyranny, is attributed too exclusively to free-thinkers who renounce the church and repudiate Christianity. With shame we confess that many of the most consistent and praiseworthy advocates of religious tolerance were men of this class, but our author is untrue to history when he passes by in silence that great company of Anabaptists and Baptists who in old and in New England and on the continent were the most unswerving and thorough-going champions of absolute religious liberty, and to whom more than to all others the credit of emancipation from ecclesiastical despotism is due.

The sentiments of L'Abbé Sévestre are as unlike those of Matagrín as it is possible to conceive. We pass from an author in whose pages men who repudiate Christianity and the church are the sole defenders

of liberty, through whom mankind has been redeemed from Christian bigotry and tyranny, to an author who is a blind devotee of everything for which the papacy stands. He is writing about the Concordat, in connection with which the papal church is always wholly right and all who differ with that church are always wholly wrong. It would be impossible to carry unreasoning party spirit to greater lengths. Here is a writer who believes that Catholicism alone is true; that it ought to continue to be the established religion of France; that its support ought to come from the state treasury; that enemies of the Concordat are enemies of God; that the divine vengeance will destroy the nation, if religious equality and freedom are allowed.

Notwithstanding this rampant papal spirit, the book is packed with information of the highest value. The treatment of the subject is thoroughgoing and exhaustive. In numerous notes reference is made to the original sources. First of all a minutely detailed history of the Concordat is given, beginning with the proposed reconciliation of Bonaparte with Rome. Then the text of the Concordat is printed in full, with comments on the various clauses. Finally the present-day prospects of the Concordat are reviewed, with the urging of every sort of argument the author knows how to marshal against its abrogation and in favor of the continued union of church and state. (When the book was published, the vote in the Senate had not been taken, but the law as formulated by the Chamber of Deputies is printed in full.) An appendix of more than 200 pages supplies a vast fund of information.

Since the author sent his history and protest and warning to the press, the enemies of God and religion have brought the dreaded catastrophe upon France. The state has totally severed its connection with the church and is now putting the provisions of the law into vigorous operation. The Holy See did everything possible to avoid the passage of the measure, and since its enactment there has been some rioting in Paris and elsewhere over the taking of inventories; but the Catholic church has forever lost its official union with France, and to the Pope there is left no other recourse than to bow to the inevitable. To republican France belongs the great honor of being the first nation of Europe to accomplish this great reform.

The third volume dealing with ecclesiastical despotism and the emergence of toleration, and the final separation of church and state, is by an American author, whose theme is the evolution of religious liberty in one of the New England states. We have long waited for an appreciative treatment of church affairs in Connecticut. Scores of laudatory books

have been written about Massachusetts, whose history is nevertheless in many respects far from praiseworthy, while the friends of Connecticut, whose history is far more creditable, have remained comparatively silent. It is with satisfaction, therefore, that we welcome this carefully elaborated account of the development of the idea of religious equality and freedom in a state which from the beginning was less intolerant, and more humane and Christian, than its stronger political neighbor.

The opening chapters repeat the oft-told story of Scrooby, Leyden, Plymouth, and Salem, and of the alliance of church and state when the Pilgrims and Puritans found a permanent home in the new world. Then follows a detailed account of ecclesiastical legislation in the colony and state of Connecticut with side reflections on the other confederated colonies. It is hard for the modern mind to realize the narrowness of the religionists of that early day, and their unwillingness to tolerate opinions and practices contrary to their own, and the rigor with which they sought to suppress and destroy every sort of dissent from the established order. For long they were able to overbear and beat down the opposition which threatened the integrity of their politico-ecclesiastical system; but little by little encroachments were made which finally severed religion from every manner of state support and control, and placed all citizens on a footing of complete equality before the law. At last the Episcopalians, the Quakers, the Baptists, the Separatists, and the other sects wrenched their civil and religious rights out of the grasp of the Presbyterio-Congregational Establishment, and all religious bodies were placed on a common basis. Not until 1818 was the constitution adopted by the terms of which the union of church and state was dissolved—"the best thing that ever happened to the state of Connecticut." Here in America since the Revolution every state has incorporated in its constitution a provision against the establishment of any particular religion, and giving all religions an exact parity in the presence of the law. Over in France our sister-republic in this year of grace has made the separation of church and state an accomplished fact. How strangely dissimilar are the processes by which the same results have been achieved in the two countries!

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MISCELLANEOUS

The small but active group of students especially interested in the oriental Christian denominations will welcome the contribution to the hymnology of the Armenians made by the Archimandrite of Edschmiatsin²⁸

²⁸ *Das Armenische Hymnarium: Studien zu seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung.* Von Nerses Ter-Mikaëlian. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 110 pages. M. 4.50.

He accomplishes well a threefold task. First, he tells us what the Armenian collection of hymns is; secondly, he discusses its age and its original form; and, lastly, he applies some of the methods of the higher criticism to the Armenian traditions concerning the authorship of the hymns.

A far more important work²⁹ in the same field has been done by Conybeare, already esteemed for his researches in the history of the oriental denominations. His volume is concerned chiefly with the Armenian liturgy in its oldest form, and it carries back our knowledge of this worship to about the year 700. It contains a translation of all the Armenian service-books of any considerable antiquity. Almost all these forms are taken over from Greek sources, as the author shows by placing side by side the Armenian and Greek rites of baptism and epiphany. The Armenian rite of baptism, however, differs from the Greek at a single point, in that it begins with trine pouring, and follows this with trine immersion in the Greek form. But it is the immersions that are regarded as the baptism proper, as is shown by "The Precepts of Wardan about Baptism," which the author places immediately after the ritual of the ordinance, and from which I quote: "And that the priest plunges the child three times successively into the water conveys the mystery of the three days' burial of Christ, as if the child was buried with Christ. And his bringing up out of the water is as if he ascended with Christ from the dead into heaven." There is a rite for infant baptism, and another for catechumen baptism. The latter is introduced by the statement that "this is the order for those of ripe age," "whether of full age or a child." The things which the catechumens must learn before baptism are then detailed, and constitute a somewhat formidable task. It is evident that about the year 700 infant baptism was only gradually extruding the older requirement of personal faith.

The work places all students of eastern Christianity under renewed obligations to the author, to whom they were already deeply indebted for his researches in a region hitherto but little known.

In recent church history we have two important books. Both relate to the Russian Stundists.

The first³⁰ has to do chiefly with Ivan Riaboschapka, to whom the

²⁹ *Rituale Armeniorum: Being the Administration of the Sacraments and the Breviary Rites of the Armenian Church; together with the Greek Rites of Baptism and Epiphany.* Edited from the Oldest MSS, by F. C. Conybeare. And the *East Syrian Epiphany Rites.* Translated by A. J. MacLean. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. xxxv + 536 pages. \$7.

³⁰ *Blatt aus der Geschichte des Stundismus in Russland.* Von Christophilos. Berlin: Deutsche Orient-Mission, 1904. With 3 illustrations. 20 pages. M. o. 20.

Stundists owe their origin and much of their progress. A peasant, he learned to read and write by the aid of a discharged soldier. He found the new life in Christ under the influence of a German pastor in Rohrbach, not far from his village residence. He soon began to talk of the change, and gradually became a preacher. He traveled on foot over all southern Russia, distributing the New Testament, winning hundreds of thousands to Christ, and organizing them in companies for the study of the Scriptures and other religious work. For forty years he was an evangelist, always refusing pay for his labors. He was arrested often, and often fined and imprisoned. Finally he was banished to the Caucasus, where he languished twelve years. Near the close of his life he made his way to Bulgaria, where he died in 1901. The writer of this biography derived the facts from Riaboschapka himself, and it is therefore of the highest authority.

The second of these books³¹ relating to the Stundists has to do, not with their history, but with their present condition. The writer of it is a missionary among them, and knows them thoroughly.

We are grateful to the German Orient-Mission for these publications. They constitute the very best sources of information concerning a people who seem destined soon to become the largest Protestant body in Russia. The German Orient-Mission is not only contributing to our knowledge of them, but is educating young Russians who wish to become evangelists among them.

Church history in the form of maps has not been altogether unknown, yet it is sufficiently rare to attract our interest. The volume which lies before us³² presents the subject from the beginning to 1900 in this manner. The work is helpful in many ways. The authors might improve it by adding a series of diagrams showing the recent gains of Christianity in non-Christian lands, and the gains and losses of the various Christian confessions at home.

FRANKLIN JOHNSON.

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This is the first adequate statement³³ of the history of the Disciples of Christ since the *Memoirs* of Alexander Campbell, published in 1868. Interest attaches to this denomination because of its remarkable growth,

³¹*Aus der Arbeit unter den Stundisten.* Von A. J. Stefanowitsch. Berlin: Deutsche Orient-Mission, 1904. 46 pages. M. 0.30.

³²*Atlas zur Kirchengeschichte: 66 Karten auf 12 Blättern.* Von Karl Heussi und Hermann Mulert. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. M. 4.

³³*The Disciples of Christ.* By Errett Gates. ["The Story of the Churches."] New York: Baker & Taylor, 1905. 346 pages. \$1.

it having reached more than one million communicants, and because of its plea for Christian union, which has characterized it from the first. This history deals with the religious conditions in Scotland and Ireland where Thomas and Alexander Campbell were educated, and where they received their first impressions of the weakness of a divided church and the desirability of co-operation. It traces their removal to America and their work in western Pennsylvania, where they undertook, upon the basis of the Scriptures, without the aid of any formulated creed, to establish a platform upon which Christians of all denominations could unite for the evangelization of the world. The relation of the Disciples with the Baptists is traced in a sympathetic and impartial spirit, and the conditions under which the Disciples came to an independent existence are clearly set forth. The character of Alexander Campbell, as a theologian and religious leader, is depicted in strong outline, and with an evident appreciation of the magnitude of the work which he so successfully guided.

The author does not hesitate to show the crudities into which the Disciples have been carried in many instances, by the logic of certain principles which they early adopted. In the chapter on "Recent Tendencies and Problems" the work may seem to lean toward one side of controversies which are still going on, and it may be questioned whether the rather personal and familiar statement of those discussions might not better have been left to the work of a later historian.

The work is well printed in usable size and form, and will be counted a distinct contribution, not merely to the understanding of the Disciples of Christ, but of the religious life of America as well.

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John Fletcher Hurst was a genial Christian gentleman who occupied an honorable place in the Methodist Episcopal church as pastor, teacher, author, and bishop. His friend, Albert Osborn, with loving hand, has given in his biography a full-length portrait.³⁴ To busy people, not denominationally interested, the delineation will seem overloaded with petty details; while to good Methodists who loved their good bishop it will seem that not a line could have been spared. He was a man of exalted Christian character, whose service and worth the volume fittingly commemorates.

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³⁴ *John Fletcher Hurst: A Biography*. By Albert Osborn. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1905. xiv + 509 pages. \$2 net.

THE USE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN THEOLOGY

Although prepared for a special occasion, and given before the Yale Divinity School, these lectures¹ were intended for and are admirably adapted to a larger audience. They are just what one would expect who has read the same author's *Outline of Christian Theology* and *Can I Believe in God the Father?* They will go far to correct false notions of the Bible, and to point out the true method of ascertaining and magnifying the eternal truth of God as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. The first lecture is given to the problem that has arisen by reason of the conflict between modern criticism and the old-time methods of treating all portions of the sacred volume as of equal value. Criticism, he declares, "is nothing but competent and candid examination;" and such honest examination finds in the Bible elements which are pre-Christian, and even un-Christian. He thinks that the New Testament has been disparaged by an undue exaltation of the Old.

The third chapter of Genesis has been more influential upon the doctrine of sin than all the words and attitude of Jesus. The book of Leviticus has done more to give form to the doctrine of salvation than any single book of the New Testament. The book of Daniel, with the Apocalypse, its companion in pre-Christian type, has influenced eschatology so profoundly that the opposing views of the fourth Gospel could not even be noticed. (P. 14.)

Accordingly, injurious consequences have resulted, and the author argues, in his second lecture, that the only clear, sound, self-evidencing principle in the construction of Christian theology is to determine the real Christian element in the Scriptures. To ascertain just what that element consists in is not so difficult as some may imagine. Christ is the great revealer of God, and his teachings about God and man, and the proper relation between the heavenly Father and the human child, are clear, unmistakable, fundamental, and essentially formative for Christian doctrine. Everything must be brought to this test, and in the main the result becomes as simple and authoritative as when Jesus sums up the whole law and the prophets in the two commandments of love. By the influence of the life and power of Jesus Christ men are brought into personal fellowship with God in just such life as Jesus lived. We must discern the Christian element by its intrinsic nature.

Not because it stands in some special place or bears some certifying mark may we call anything Christian, but only because it is what it is, and deserves

¹ *The Use of the Scriptures in Theology*. [The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1905, given before the Divinity School of Yale University.] By William Newton Clarke. New York: Scribner, 1905. viii + 170 pages.

the name. Evidence is to be in the thing itself, not in its locality or its label. (P. 64.)

The idea that this intrinsic witness of the spirit of Christ removes from us an objective standard of truth is met by a prompt denial. Rather do we in this way obtain our only true and trustworthy standard. That the Bible or the church is such a standard is disproved by the fact that radically conflicting systems of theology find their authority in the same external standard. Our leading question must therefore be, not, What is in the Bible? but, What is of Christ and like Christ? Christianity is not so small a thing as to require extraordinary search to find it. We should note that there is "the reality of large spiritual truth discernible by human powers divinely influenced" (p. 74). There is, in fact, no other way than by intelligent observation and judgment. But there must be spiritual vision. As deep calleth unto deep, so the spirit discerns that which is spiritual. "What is the proper function of a Christian man, if not to know a Christian truth when he sees it?" There is no presumption in declaring that Psalm 103 is Christian in its view of God, and that Psalm 109 is not Christian. Aside from all questions of rational criticism, there is the glorious body of living truth that Jesus has given us. It has its power in spirit and in life, and is no shadowy and elusive thing. So over and over again the author insists that the truly Christian element in the Scriptures and outside the Scriptures must be discerned by its intrinsic quality.

In all this, however, Dr. Clarke is farthest possible from ignoring the importance and value of the historical method in the use of the Scriptures. He "welcomes all worthy forms of study, historical, critical, devotional" (p. 83). His lectures give no special prominence to matters of critical research, but he emphasizes the necessity of passing frequent judgment upon the various contents of the biblical writings. We owe the construction of the canon to the godly judgment of those who were responsible for its formation. "It is because the Christian people judged what was Christian, and selected what was most Christian, that we have a New Testament at all" (p. 71). How many human judgments must have entered into a production of even a critical text of the New Testament like that of Westcott and Hort? All exegesis, all literary and historical criticism, and all work in biblical theology, is a work of human judgment. Furthermore, it is well to note that "new ideas never come into a vacant mind," and historical criticism must come in to help us determine what is old and what is new in our study of the New Testament. The process of critical separation is a work of time.

The synoptical gospels are not the precise transcript of Jesus' life that they were once thought to be; they embody the church's chief remembrances of him,

preserved in various ways, and nowhere attested as faultless remembrances. (P. 111.)

There is also the old and the new in the epistles of Paul. No apostle of Jesus should have been expected to expound the new revelation of Christ apart from language and conceptions long in common use. The second advent hope of the early church was, according to Dr. Clarke, a survival of Jewish expectations, mixed with the higher teachings of Jesus in regard to the glorious future of his spiritual kingdom which rose immeasurably above the notions of his time. So far from unsettling the intelligent Christian, this method of critical study turns his thought, first of all, to fundamental truths, and tends to establish him upon immovable foundations. Indeed, every lover of the Bible has been given to this kind of real criticism and analysis for himself.

Let the worn edges of any well-used Bible tell their own story. The four gospels, the Acts, most of the epistles, the finest of the Psalms, the latter part of Isaiah, passages here and there through the remainder of the book, differing in every case—these make up each one's personal edition of the Holy Scriptures. (P. 163.)

Thus the author clearly avows the necessity of employing a scientific historical method in expounding the Christian element in the biblical writings, and at the same time insists that the internal qualities of essential Christianity are to be spiritually discerned. Scientific criticism that is both devout and sane must needs be helpful in pointing out that which is permanent in the gospel.

The Scriptures are now being differentiated, so to speak, into their various layers of spiritual value and power. The criticism that is so distrusted is preparing for the hands of theology the real book, with the eternal light on its parts. When the passing and the permanent, the old and the new, the non-Christian and the Christian, have been well distinguished, theology will have the unmixed divine for its material. (P. 125.)

The last two lectures of the book are devoted to a statement of various positive and negative results which must follow a faithful application of this main principle. Much that has long been current in Christian doctrine must go into retirement, and the central truths of Christ's living message will stand forth in their own self-evidencing power and beauty. We believe the author's positions and arguments are in the main sound and irrefutable, and all should admit that "one who would rightly use the Scriptures for theology needs an interpreter's skill, a saint's insight, and a historian's judgment."

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RECENT BOOKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

In these latter days, when men have the fear of the *Zeitgeist* before their eyes, a man of independent judgment awakens a hopeful expectation. A virile discussion, like Professor Ladd's,¹ delights us by its failure to observe a servile attitude toward the *Zeitgeist* monster; and at the same time it is awake to living issues and to men's thoughts.

Most men who have essayed anything in psychology or philosophy or theology for the past decade have felt constrained to inform us—often explicitly in the preface—that they were following the "historic method." Bearing this stamp, almost any type of speculation might hope to become current coin for magazine circulation. Latterly, however, the phrase has but thinly disguised the assumption on the part of many writers that a recital of historic facts is the only kind of "explanation" that has value. Exegesis of the Bible becomes the sole method of producing theology. The natural history of mind, of religion, of morals, or of society is the last word, and constitutes the *science* of these things. Whoever goes beyond this modern positivist attitude is guilty of the heinous crime of "speculation." Let him be anathema, for the *Zeitgeist* has spoken! This is transcendental materialism.

For our part we see no reason why the eminent psychologist, Professor Ladd, should not be the dragon-slayer to dispose of this modern monster of rational method. A "cool British stare" ought to do a good deal to disarm the *Zeitgeist*; and Professor Ladd has had the nerve to ignore it to an extent that must be embarrassing to it, if not fatal to its assumptions. Which thing is a parable. Professor Ladd's study of mind has led him to explicit utterance on such doctrines as the reality of self, of religion, of rationality. He has two or three fixed points which are not dissolved away or explained away by the "historic method" of noting psychologic and historic development. He evidently believes in a self that is something more than "groups of consciousness." Religion for him is not "explained" by reciting the facts of the development. And even reason has rights of its own which he respects, and is no automatic echo of nerve-life. Here is a rationalist who keeps his feet on the earth, but feels no need of resting his head there.

In religion, particularly, where the data are so purely subjective and so elusive, the temptation is to choose between the speculative romancing of those who, spider-like, spin their material out of themselves, and those who eschew philosophy as intrinsically unassimilable to religious problems. Professor Ladd shows himself familiar with the endlessly

¹ *The Philosophy of Religion*. By George Trumbull Ladd. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1905. 616+590 pages. \$7 net.

rich and complex data of experience and history, and keeps close to these data. But his confidence that mind can think these data into a systematic and satisfying unity is a strong moving principle.

"No philosophy of religion can longer hope to claim the attention of well-informed minds which does not avail itself of all the resources now put at its disposal by the historical and comparative study of religions" (Vol. I, p. 8). With faithfulness to this principle, he has familiarized himself with the mass of data involved. But, "on the other hand, it cannot be admitted that the historical and comparative study of the world's religions is, of itself, sufficient to constitute a philosophy of religion; nor does such study satisfy fully the demands either of man's intellectual curiosity or of his practical and spiritual life" (Vol. I, p. 8). "The human mind is so constituted that it demands to know what the facts of man's religious history signify for our view of the ultimate realities which condition his existence and his evolution; and for the highest ideals and supreme values of life" (Vol. II, p. 5). He thus trusts the nature of mind as expressed in its own demands, and regards the systematizing intellect as working by laws which have a sanction and authority of their own in the act of interpretation. The logics and faiths of life have been obscured for a time, but they have always been the principle of real movement, and must again help us out of this motionless stare at history. We must at least grow speculative "wings" to counteract the leaden feet of pragmatism which plod so drearily.

A philosophy of religion cannot be worked from the side of the speculative intellect without falling into the unfruitful attitude of apriorism. But equally unfruitful and unsatisfying is it to deny the mind any rights save that of counting and tabulating facts. A philosophy, we repeat, is an attempt to exhibit the facts together in a speculative or theoretic system that will satisfy the reflective mind. The man who simply recites the facts by the "historic method" represents no real movement in philosophy. The man who simply speculates represents nothing but movement. We have "philosophies" of both types purporting to *explain* religion. The most significant thing to say about the present work is that the author has sailed a pretty clear course between wreck-strewn Scylla and Charybdis, in that the rights of history as well as the native demands of the mind have been reckoned with. His rudder—i. e., his theory of knowledge—seems to be workable; and this has been the weak place in most essays in religious philosophy.

Professor Ladd has been a vigorous thinker in the field of metaphysics and psychology, and this his most comprehensive attempt in philosophy

has been awaited with much interest by many thinkers. His general position on fundamental problems is well known. For the thoroughgoing thinker any new philosophical work is already pretty definitely evaluated, if we know the author's presuppositions and general type of philosophy. If he is logical, we know in general where his presuppositions will lead him; if he is not logical, neither his presuppositions nor his book will be of surpassing value. The strictly individual contribution must be worked out within the limits prescribed by the presupposition laid down. Professor Ladd's published essays in psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology exhibit the directive principles of his philosophy, and these principles can be most explicitly studied here. The general type of explanation presented in these two volumes on *The Philosophy of Religion* was anticipated; for the author works to a logical end. But his originality in working out the different aspects of the complex problem of religion constitutes a work of great value.

Here is a cautious, sane, painstaking attempt to view all the facts, to weigh their significance, and to construct a theory that shall "hang together" and satisfy the mind. The work is erudite and encyclopedic, even heavily so at times; but the vital dialectic of his discussions, and the living search for truth that dominates the whole work, will make it of intense interest to the student of the subject. We regard it as an enriching contribution to the developing science of religion. The apriorism of Edward Caird, the seductive one-sidedness of Sabatier, and the arbitrariness of Fairbairn will all find correction in this rather massive treatment, which will doubtless be criticised because of its attempt to give due proportion to all aspects of the truth, while justifying the place of each in the system. The author has avoided the fallacy of an over-simplification in the interests of a method—the method which unifies by forming class terms, or which makes a dominant interest to eclipse all other facts.

The plan in general of the work is to treat analytically in the first volume the data of religion, whether drawn from history or from psychology. The second volume treats these data by the synthetic laws of thought, and moves toward a "philosophy" of religion. Prof. Tiele's corresponding designation of the two volumes of his *Science of Religion* as respectively "Morphological" and "Ontological" does not fully express Professor Ladd's constructive interest and attention to detail. The problems of religion are perennially the same, and we need not tabulate them here. The limits of this review forbid the outline of the discussions. The root-thought is that the persistent religious ideals that develop in human life not only are constitutional—immanent laws of life—

but correspond to the objective fact. Religious faith in the objective truth of its ideals is analogous to the cognitive trust in the truth of its ideals. There is a kingdom of God demanded by the forms of our religious consciousness, just as there is a kingdom of truth demanded by our cognitive consciousness. Here again Tiele's position is recalled. Science rests on essentially the same basis as religion; and the latter has as secure psychological vindication as the former. This is the fruitful epistemological emphasis of modern times.

To trace these unfolding ideals of religion, to discriminate immanent laws and shaping environment, to reach central "essentials" of religion without falling into methods of academic abstraction which falsify the actual religious life—this involves the profound discussion of a variety of problems. Religion is described, in the phrase of Victor Branford, as "the great psychic uplift of the race" (Vol II, p. 444). Since the religious fact is universal and permanent and constitutional, it seems legitimate to affirm that "rationality is the ultimate test of the values of religion" (Vol. I, p. 80), where rationality is taken in the comprehensive sense. Theism and the ethical ultimate are the inevitable forms of rationality thus considered.

A soundly reasoned discussion of successive problems occupies the second volume, though the author protests his purpose to be "at the most an effort to contribute to the better understanding and higher appreciation of the ultimate meaning and supreme value of the religious experience and religious development of man." An early chapter on "The Standard of Religious Values" may be cited as among the specially significant discussions. Christianity is disclosed as the supreme expression of religious life, not by any syllogistic demonstration, but as realizing best the ideals that are native, and as satisfying the constitutional, i. e., the "rational." The permanent form of religion, "the future of religion," the destiny of the individual man and of the race—these problems are exhibited in the light of the principles in terms of which they must be thought. And though dogmatism utters no voice here, these problems which forever haunt the reflective mind are treated in a large way which ministers to confidence. Reason in the comprehensive sense—i. e., intelligence in possession of all its modes of insight—is shown to confirm the optimistic conviction concerning the world-problem.

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The problems of philosophy are four, Höffding says.² (1) The problem of consciousness. Psychology describes the actual development of consciousness. Even if the other problems of philosophy were to be declared insoluble, or to have arisen through a misunderstanding, the psychological problem, the question as to the nature and laws of life, would remain. (2) The problem of knowledge. The task here is the investigation of the forms and principles of thought, a task undertaken by formal logic. But these forms and principles only enable thought to be in harmony with itself, and do not lead out beyond thought itself. In every application of these forms and principles to phenomena the question arises: With what right does this application take place? Thus arises the possibility of a discipline which shall investigate the conditions for a knowledge of existence, and the limits of such a knowledge—epistemology. (3) The problem of existence. When we deduce the consequences of everything we know, what nature must we attribute to that existence of which we ourselves are members? What are the possibilities which display themselves to thought when it seeks to work up the data of experience into one general conception of the world? Idealism or materialism, pluralism or monism? This is the ontological problem. (4) The problem of value. Our attitude toward existence is not merely that of perceiving and understanding; existence excites our feeling so that we express judgments assigning or denying its worth. Certain judgments upon human actions are ethical; others upon life as a totality are religious. As the ultimate principle of science is faith in the conservation of energy, so analogously, the ultimate principle of religion is faith in the conservation of values—a conception which is the gist of the author's *Religionsphilosophie*, shortly to be translated into English.

One may well agree with Professor James's estimation of Höffding as "one of the wisest, as well as one of the most learned of living philosophers." James classifies him as pragmatist—straining a point to do so, it seems to me—but Höffding, who ought to know, calls himself "a critical monist." I think it should be added, to save misunderstanding, that the book, since it is so compact and profound, will be of more service as a résumé of philosophic theory for advanced students than as an introduction for beginners.

Flournoy³ modestly claims simply to rehearse the conclusions of

² *The Problems of Philosophy*. By Harald Höffding. Translated by Galen M. Fischer. With a Preface by William James. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 201 pages. \$1.25.

³ *Les principes de la psychologie religieuse*. Par Th. Flournoy. Paris: Schleicher, 1905.

specialists in psychology, but he really does more than this and adds suggestions of importance of his own. Judged by the few works for which we are already indebted, Flournoy finds that religious psychology suggests the two following principles: (1) The exclusion of transcendence. This principle is negative and interdictory, so to speak, by virtue of which psychology refrains from any judgment upon the objective import or bearing of religious phenomena; and declines to discuss the possible existence and the nature of an invisible world. The estimations of worth and of transcendent reality by which religious experiences are accompanied in the consciousness of the subject are treated as *mental data* pure and simple, leaving out of account the questions of truth and value. (2) The biological interpretation of religious phenomena. This principle is positive and heuristic, by virtue of which psychology envisages the phenomena as manifestation of a vital process. Thus psychology endeavors to determine the psycho-physiological nature of religion, the laws of belief and development, the normal and pathological variations, the conscious and sub-conscious dynamic, and in a general way, the relations of the religious with other functions, and the rôle in the entire life of the individual and, consequently, of the race.

Thus comprehended, if religious psychology does not settle the final questions which man has always put to himself with regard to his destiny and the mystery of things, it at least tends to throw light upon the philosophical speculation by its contribution of all the knowledge accessible to scientific investigation as to the phenomena of the individual religious consciousness; and, from the practical point of view, it brings to the teacher, and to all those who have charge of souls, some valuable indications which enable them to do more good (or at least less evil!). It would be difficult to find a saner statement of the task, method, possibilities, and limits of the new science, than in this book.

GEORGE B. FOSTER.

WHAT IS THE CONTENT OF CHRISTIANITY WHICH MODERN APOLOGETICS UNDERTAKES TO DEFEND?

If the question were, What has apologetics sought to defend? the answer would be easily forthcoming in an appeal to history. When, however, one asks what it is in Christianity which modern apologetics undertakes to defend, the question becomes more serious. It might call first for a definition of Christianity, and then for the particular aspects of it which in our present intellectual environment make faith difficult. Or the question

might be what conceptions of Christianity are reflected in the apologetics of today, and how the defense of these is undertaken.

If we allow the latter form of statement to dominate our inquiry, then we are pointed to three different types of belief as to what Christianity is. The first may be designated as the traditional or common view. President Mullins¹ offers most of the customary forms of the arguments for Christianity. These center in the Christian view of the world, in Jesus Christ, in Christian experience, and in Christian history. The Christian doctrine of the world affirms evolution—not in the “strict sense,” but in the “Christian form”—the divine transcendence, and miracles. The argument concerning the personality of Jesus Christ includes both the ethical, religious and “living” Christ, and the earthly Christ regarded as supernatural and miraculous, e. g., the virgin-birth, the miraculous deeds—in the considerations of which no shadings appear—and the physical resurrection. In support of this interpretation is alleged the witness of the New Testament, including the synoptists and the primitive Christian community—a position confirmed by the break between Christ and the world-order. The analysis and verification of Christian experience, of which only one type—the individual, mystical, or cataclysmic—is adduced, disclose Christ as its source, but whether the historical or the living Christ is not clear. In the appeal to history, Christianity—the exact nature of which is nowhere defined, but taken for granted—is shown to be supernatural by the moral and religious changes taking place in Christendom, by the character and success of Christian missions, by the superiority of Christianity to Mohammedanism and Buddhism, and by its total adaptation to man’s religious need.

The second type presents Christianity as a wholly ethical reality, divorced from the metaphysical considerations which have given form and partly content to Christian doctrine. “Christianity,” says Professor Schultz² is “the religion of a God who is revealed in his Son Jesus as our Father, and who bears witness to himself in his Spirit as the power that rules the world.” As a religion, it postulates a unique consciousness of the living God evoked by divine action, of miracles in the “religious” sense wherever an unmistakable revelation of God appears, of inspiration as the illumination and enthusiasm of religious certainty, and of faith as the

¹ *Why is Christianity True? Christian Evidences.* By E. Y. Mullins. Chicago: Christian Culture Press, 1905. xx + 450 pages. \$1.50.

² *Outlines of Christian Apologetics.* By Hermann Schultz. Authorized Translation from the Second Enlarged Edition (1902), by Alfred Bull Nichols. New York: Macmillan. xi + 328 pages. \$1.75 net.

absolute surrender to God as disclosed in personal experience. Its truth is independent of Israelite and extra-Israelite wisdom and of the cosmological speculations of later ages. Excluded from it are all forms of external proof, whether historical, literary, scientific, or metaphysical. Its sufficient and final authentication rests on the religious impression of the personality of Jesus still active in humanity. It is therefore self-evidencing, and everyone can test it for himself. It is a personal matter, consisting in individual faith, forgiveness of sins, immediate assurance of divine grace, and walking in love. It is also social—the perfecting of human fellowship with God in an invisible community in which all moral relations are filled with an eternal content. It “can at every age and at every stage of culture take new forms and yet remain the same.” Its chief dangers are (1) confusion with theological system, (2) removal from the historic personal foundation and reduction to a rationalistic basis, and (3) identification of the content of any period of its development with the essential, complete reality itself.

A third type of Christianity is more difficult to classify. President Hall³ believes that the time is ripe for a fresh interpretation of the content of Christianity by reference to contemporary religious conditions. Hitherto this has been impracticable owing to several causes—an unconquered bias toward sectarianism, an erroneous ideal of confessional or ecclesiastical uniformity, and, more recently, resistance to scholastic and even apostolic theology, and an exaggerated emphasis upon the historical method of biblical study. A new era has, however, dawned. This is evident in the critical movement, the modern view of the Bible, longing for a more homogeneous church resulting in a reinterpretation of the idea of the church, an increased cosmopolitan spirit, and especially the impulse and conception of world-Christianization due in great part to sympathetic contact with the chief ethnic faiths. Thus the way is indicated to a fresh conception of the content of Christianity. For this we have to go backward to the New Testament Christology, and forward to the forms which Christianity is to assume in the final Christianization of the world. The New Testament Christianity is not to be identified simply with the religious ideals of Jesus of Nazareth; the synoptists present only a part of the truth. To satisfy the present-day needs of Christian experience, of the church in her ministry, and particularly of those in other lands to whom not historical but philosophical con-

³ *The Universal Elements of the Christian Religion: An Attempt to Interpret Contemporary Religious Conditions*. [The Cole Lectures for 1905, delivered before Vanderbilt University.] By Charles Cuthbert Hall. New York: Revell, 1905. 309 pages.

siderations are of cardinal concern, we are driven back to the content of the apostolic consciousness as disclosed in the fourth gospel and in the letters of St. Paul. This is both spiritual and metaphysical. The apostolic interpretation of Christ's person is the only adequate key to the meaning of Christianity, and this "was nothing if not metaphysical." Thus we must take account of the metaphysics of the Word, of sonship in the Godhead, of the atoning sacrifice of the cross, of resurrection and enthronement, and of Christian experience—all *sub specie aeternitatis*. On the other hand, the entire nature of Christianity can be fully revealed only when the world is completely Christianized; when, e. g., the Orient, not producing the exact type of western Christianity, shall have developed the Christian consciousness automatically, according to its peculiar genius, under the leadership of the spirit of Christ. Thus the oriental type of Christianity must supplement and fulfil that of the West.

We have here three leading types of modern apologetics. The first, accepting only in part the scientific doctrine of the world, plants itself squarely on the physical and the miraculous in its proof of the divinity of Christ, conceives of Christian experience from the point of view of one general type as "distinctive and characteristic," and, while not denying other types, regards them as "deviations from the ideal," and finds in Christ as traditionally conceived the whole secret of Christian civilization. In the second, attention is concentrated upon the ethical and religious in Christ and the Christian life, to the practical exclusion of scientific considerations, seeking and desiring no other quality in Christianity or proof of its reality than its own account which is open to any one in his own Christian experience. According to the third type, there is hearty acceptance of the evolutionary view of the world and of human life, and of the ethical and spiritual as the essence of Christianity; but in order that the full content of Christianity may become available for the rational as well as for the ethical and religious in man, appeal is made to the metaphysical element in the person of Christ and in Christian experience. Moreover, in this last apologetic a distinctive note is struck; an intelligent and profoundly sympathetic appreciation (1) of the historic forms of Christian belief, (2) of those who have not found in the historic forms of faith the complete satisfaction of their spiritual longings, and (3) of the great ethnic faiths which both wait for Christianity to fulfil them and are themselves the expression of the genius of peoples without whom Christianity cannot be perfect.

In view of this survey of modern apologetics, several things are to be said:

1. The content of Christianity must be so conceived as to be homo-

geneous with the modern view of the world. It may as well be frankly declared that it is a mistake of the first rank to offer as aid to faith that which makes faith still more difficult. Intelligence will be satisfied with nothing less than a unified view of reality, Christianity included; but this unity must be guaranteed by something other than a mechanical revelation or a shift of notion of "miracles" in which the principle of this unity is broken. The history of the conflict of theology with science should by this time have taught theologians that resistance to the spirit and results of science is worse than futile, and if they are still to command the respect of educated people, they must cease to require that faith be divorced from intelligence.

2. If it is true that Christ "himself is the apology of Christianity," then he must be so interpreted that that which is essential in him shall shine forth in its own clear light. If, moreover, that which is essential in him is his filial consciousness, and he would lead all men to a like consciousness, the apologist must first ascertain what this means, and then let it dominate his presentation. The issue must not be confused or divided. And there is no danger that this theme will ever be exhausted or overworked. Bushnell's famous chapter on "The Character of Jesus" shows that such a presentation will meet with instantaneous, universal, and ever-deepening assent.

3. Christian experience, if it is to be of service to apologetics, must be inclusive of all the forms it has assumed in human life—not merely the sudden and outstanding type, but that which results from Christian nurture, and that also whose beginning is even unnoticed in the maturing character of the adult. Christianity must not be narrowed down to a theory of conversion. The law it imposes on ideal human development can be no other than that to which man's nature witnesses.

4. In the argument for Christianity from history no permanent gain attends the assertion that Christianity is the whole secret and source of human progress. The spirit of democracy, philosophical inquiry, scientific advance, geographic expansion, and many other human activities have played their part. If these would not have been what they are without Christianity, we may also say that without these Christianity would have been something other than it is.

5. To deny the right of metaphysics in apologetics is to divide the house of consciousness against itself, to miss the identity between Greek and modern philosophical ideas, to stamp philosophy as hopelessly pagan, and to refuse to go as far as reason can go in the defense of faith. Metaphysics cannot lend a higher validity or a more imperative sanction to the

ethical and religious content of Christianity than already belongs to it; to suppose the contrary is to mistake the function of metaphysics, and to depreciate the spiritual power which inheres in Christianity. Even granting that there is no metaphysics in the consciousness or the teachings of Jesus, this fact would not preclude us, if the world is one, from using the highest categories of intelligence in the interpretation of faith.

6. Psychology is undoubtedly destined largely to supplement metaphysics in the endeavor to commend Christian faith to intelligence.

7. Apologetics will never rightly deal with Christianity until it becomes a genial, sympathetic, and appreciative interpreter of the ethnic faiths. This is, indeed, a reversal of the historic policy of the church; but this matters not. President Hall's book is one among many which have in recent times stood for this principle, but never before have the ethnic faiths appealed with such force to the Christian consciousness, nor has the need of Christianity for the completing influence of these faiths upon itself hitherto found so convinced and rational a defender or so persuasive a voice.

If now we turn from the theoretical to the practical in Christianity, we have by the author of *Doctrine and Development*, written from the Broad Church point of view, a model apologetic.⁴ The "object is to explain in a rational manner . . . the institutional side of Christianity." The principal subjects treated are the church, the sacraments, priesthood, prayer, Sunday, revelation and the Bible, the church and the state, and the Broad Church party. One rises from the reading of these sermons with a profounder estimate of the spiritual, quickening nature of that which has been the organizing principle of so many differing beliefs, institutions, and customs of the Christian church, and which ever and again as here calls these back to a consciousness of the deeper, indissoluble unity which underlies their outward divergence.

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Much interest will be aroused by the Barrows Lectures⁵ which were delivered by Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall in the season of 1902-3 in the Far East. The title-page states that they were given in India, Ceylon, and Japan; and from other sources we have learned of the wide and deep impression which they made upon their oriental hearers. It is natural, when this volume

⁴ *Christus in Ecclesia: Sermons on the Church and its Institutions*. By Hastings Rashdell. New York: Scribner. xii + 364 pages. \$1.50 net.

⁵ *Christian Belief Interpreted by Christian Experience*. By Charles Cuthbert Hall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 255 pages. \$1.60.

is before us, to ask ourselves what it was in Dr. Hall's manner of presenting the Christian truth which made his work so full of significance, and made all leaders of the church in those regions long for his return. The secret is writ large upon every page of these six long and comprehensive lectures. Throughout we find that there is a most thorough adaptation of the preacher, in his mood and manner, and of his material, in its range and exposition, to the needs and spirit of his audience. Dr. Hall in addressing these large audiences of cultivated and earnest orientals, most of whom understand English as well as our audiences do, avoided with great care all signs of condescension. With almost too frequent redundancy he reminds them that he comes as a fellow-seeker after the truth, as one who has read much in their religious literature, and who is in deepest sympathy with their passion to find the secret of existence, the meaning of God, the way of the holy life. All earnestness in their religious spirit, all truth discovered by their philosophers, all consecration of will in their devotees, he gladly and enthusiastically recognizes. But this attitude, which has been assumed and exaggerated by others, is saved from its dangers by the equal candor and fervor with which Dr. Hall states, expounds, illustrates, and presses home the central elements of the gospel of Christ. His acknowledgment of truth in oriental thought and faith does not prevent him either from criticising its inadequacy, or from stating finally and clearly the full power and blessing of the Christian message, on the basis of the revelation and redemption made and wrought in Jesus Christ. One idea is worth noting here from the frequency and air of conviction with which it is uttered. It is expressed in the following sentence: "Firmly, I believe that the greatness of essential Christianity not yet has been adequately expressed, and never can be, until the East co-operates in that expression, and, as the teacher of the West, contributes elements of thought and feeling comparatively lacking there" (p. 121).

In the first lecture, entitled "The Nature of Religion," our author aims at describing his own attitude toward oriental religions, and the attitude in which it would be suitable and necessary that intelligent minds of those regions should approach the consideration of the claims of Christianity. This is all most skillfully done. The next lecture deals with "The Christian Idea of God and Its Relation to Experience." Very firmly the lecturer insists that the distinguishing marks of the Christian faith are its grasp upon the reality of a personal God and the infinite value of the individual man. Thus two of the chief defects of oriental thought are met and opposed with the richness and power of the Christian ideas. The emptiness of the mystic conception of God as the vast negation,

which so baffles the real yearnings of the worshiper, and the sheer horror of the corresponding view of man as the victim of immeasurable woe and inevitable wrong, are set over against the view of God as the home and fountain-head of all being, eternal and immanent, and yet possessed of character and capable of self-manifestation, and of man as "God's fulfilment of himself," and the destined heir of his own blessedness. In the third lecture, on "The Lord Jesus Christ the Supreme Manifestation of God," and in the fourth, on "The Sin of Man and the Sacrifice of Christ," we come to themes which tax the sure skill of our lecturer and find it on the whole triumphant. There is much space given to the atmosphere, as it were, of these topics, and not much direct discussion to the theory of them. As dogmatic problems, the incarnation and atonement are not closely expounded. But this was probably the best—or even the only—thing to do. It was the range of influence of these great truths which had to be stated. It was their glory as facts that faith must seize and the heart experience, which these audiences most needed to see. The next lecture, on "The Idea of Holiness and Immortality Interpreted by Christian Experience," is perhaps the most powerful and persuasive of all. Dr. Hall is most at home and most successful when dealing with the substance of the Christian life. His description of the notes of a holy life is one of the finest passages in this most interesting presentation of Christian experience and the Christian faith. The last chapter gives some "Reasons for Regarding Christianity as the Absolute Religion." The deepest reasons are not given, but those selected are real and true, and perhaps most likely to convince his audiences. Here as elsewhere the skill of the lecturer is very great. Even as a study in homiletics no minister should lose sight of this volume.

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A NOTEWORTHY ATTEMPT TO POPULARIZE MODERN THEOLOGY

The series of popular books edited by Professor Weinl under the general title "Lebensfragen," presents an admirable attempt to write theology in terms which can readily be understood by intelligent laymen, and with special reference to the problems which such intelligent laymen are meeting, not only in Germany, but in every country. Two volumes of this series, Weinl's Paulus and Meyer's little treatise on the resurrection of Christ have already received notice in this *Journal*.¹

¹Vol. IX (July 1905), p. 540 and Vol. X (January, 1906), p. 124.

Three other volumes lie before us, all dealing with topics of vital interest to men who are asking earnest questions concerning the nature and significance of Christianity. Pastor Herrmann, in a little pamphlet of forty-three pages,² asks the question: What do we mean by redemption? The answer is not given, as would have been the case fifty years ago, on the basis of dogmatic principles, but by sympathetic historical study of the ideals of redemption which have actually had power over men. He describes briefly, but sympathetically, the emotional and ascetic attempt to penetrate to the mystery of the infinite as found in the Dionysian and the Orphic cults in Greece, the Platonic ideal of intellectual emancipation from the world of sense, the Persian dualistic ideal of a cosmic drama in which a good god will help men to overcome the power of an evil god, and the Buddhist ideal of quenching all assertive impulses. The exposition serves to disclose both the points of positive efficiency and the defects in each ideal. The discussion closes with an exposition of the Christian ideal of redemption through the personal power of Jesus Christ. This section might well have been enlarged so as to include the various historical conceptions of redemption which have been held in Christianity. The author, however, contents himself with presenting, on the basis of the gospel narratives, a picture of the inner life of Jesus, which he then sets forth as the source of human redemption much after the fashion of Herrmann in his *Communion with God*. Inasmuch as the author relates each conception of redemption to the actual spiritual needs of men, the book is one of unusual significance for one who is earnestly seeking to know whether the thought of religious redemption contains any vital reality.

Paul Jaeger publishes in the same series a pamphlet entitled "On the Overcoming of Doubt."³ One may undertake in either of the two ways to meet the characteristic doubt of today. One very prevalent method consists in the attempt to give objective evidence for the truth of such elements of Christianity as have been doubted—e. g., the doctrine of inspiration, the resurrection of Christ, the deity of Christ, etc. The other method consists in a critical examination of the nature of human thinking with a view to showing in what way one may attain certainty in any realm of experience. The first method usually fails today, for the simple reason that it ignores the grounds upon which a modern mind doubts many of the traditional elements of Christianity. Any attempt to bolster up these

² *Erlösung*. Von R. Herrmann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. 43 pages. M. o. 50.

³ *Zur Ueberwindung des Zweifels*. Von Paul Jaeger. Tübingen: Mohr 1906. 75 pages. M. o. 90.

beliefs by external means leaves entirely untouched the fundamental reason for doubt which lies in the influence of modern scientific method over the minds of men. Jaeger proceeds to show just what this scientific method involves, and finds that at bottom it consists in a determined will to know the exact truth. But what is the truth? Jaeger shows that the fact that we make a distinction between truth and error reveals the existence of a personal criterion superior [to the bare facts of the outer world. There a fact is a fact. Apart from the man who is investigating facts, there can be no such thing as truth or error. The fundamental element underlying modern science therefore is faith in the existence of truth. "You cannot prove that there must be such a thing as truth. This belief is purely an act of faith." Thus the search for truth even in modern science proceeds upon the assumption of a world of reality other than the bare facts which can be observed. From this observation Jaeger proceeds to elaborate the content of the world of values and ideals which are inevitably personal creations. The spiritual life of man depends upon the possession of such ideals. But since the source of these ideals is necessarily personal life, we shall discover the deepest truth in this realm by contact with great personalities. Religion springs from such personal activity, and we are enabled through contact with the great religious personalities in history to arrive at a vital faith in a personal God.

Professor Krüger⁴ has given in a volume of 300 pages an admirably concise and suggestive history of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the incarnation. Its significance, like the significance of the books above mentioned, lies in the fact that the history of the doctrine is elaborated with constant reference to the question: What spiritual needs of men were met by this or that form of the doctrine? Beginning with the Christology of Paul, which he sets forth in relation to Paul's conception of what was necessary for man's redemption, Krüger traces the combination of this Pauline Christology with the Logos philosophy of current Greek thought until the elements are present which entered into the Nicene controversy. He shows clearly that the history of christological controversy in the Greek church was occasioned by two fundamentally different ideals of salvation. Do we require for our salvation the mysterious introduction into human nature of the divine essence in order to transform it physically? In that case we must have a Savior who is of like essence

⁴ *Das Dogma von der Dreieinigkeit und Gottmenschheit in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt.* Von Gustav Krüger. Tübingen: Mohr, 1905, 312 pages. M. 3.

with God himself. On the other hand, does salvation consist in the stimulation of man's moral ideas and capacities? In that case we need a Savior who shall be a great personality, possessing in the highest degree those qualities of moral insight and will which we need. The divinity of the Savior, then, would consist in his moral excellence and in his unity of will with the will of God. The Nicene theology meant that the first conception of salvation, with its corresponding emphasis upon essence rather than upon personality, came to prevail in the Greek church. But this ideal of salvation is inevitably bound up with the sacramental ideal; therefore we find it retained as a vital element of Christianity only in a sacramental church such as the Greek church. When we come to western Christianity, we find questions of personality coming to the front. Salvation is to consist in the reinforcement of moral personality through divine power. The result is that the Nicene conception of the Trinity fills no vital place in western Christianity. In both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology it has been set forth and elaborated on a scholastic basis; that is, it has been accepted, *a priori*, as dogma which must be believed and expounded. It has not been an element of theology growing out of actual religious experience. Krüger holds that our modern conception of the nature of man and of his spiritual needs makes it certain that this Nicene doctrine will drop out of Protestant theology in the near future. In its place there will come, as representing a vital interest in Protestantism, an appreciation of the inner life of Jesus as the embodiment of that divine ideal and that divine personal help which man needs in his struggle upward.

All three of the books are characterized by great lucidity, by a keen appreciation of the questions which men today are asking, and by a scientific method which is entirely free from such trace of dogmatism as would repel the interest of an honest inquirer. The purpose of the editor is to be highly commended, and the success of the individual authors of the series in carrying out his purpose deserves high praise. It is true that the conclusions reached are characteristic of a specific school of modern thought. But this very fact that the authors are missionaries for their convictions, rather than indifferent expounders of current views, gives to the series a power and vigor which will go far toward rendering them useful to our age. The succeeding volumes in the series will be awaited with great interest.

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THE FIELD OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY

Now that we have lost within a brief period so many of the great explorers of society—Spencer, Schäffle, Tarde, and Ratzehofer—the present seems a peculiarly opportune time to pause and, as it were, take stock of the condition of sociology. Only two of the *Anakim*—Gumplowicz and Ward—are left, and it is clear that more and more the tillage of the field must be committed to the joint efforts of a numerous second generation of workers that shall avail itself to the utmost of the surveys made by the great pioneering minds.

To the task of reviewing and valuing what has so far been accomplished Professor Small brings unusual qualifications. He has no system of his own to project, and therefore does not assail the work of other men with a devastating criticism. A long experience in teaching, editing, and reviewing sociology has brought him into frequent contact with every point of view, so that his book breathes that urbane catholicity which has characterized the conduct of the *American Journal of Sociology*. Furthermore, he rests under no illusions as to the still precarious standing of sociology and the serious interval that continues to divide it from the confidence of the representatives of the older sciences. He is therefore proof against the temptation to set a too sanguine and enthusiastic appraisal upon the systems he examines.

The book falls into nine parts. After an introductory part dealing at length with the definition, impulse, history, and problems of sociology, the author takes up Spencer's system under the caption, "Society Considered as a Whole Composed of Definitely Arranged Parts (Structure)." He accepts Spencer's sociology so far as it goes, but points out that the English philosopher centered his attention on products rather than on the processes out of which they arise. Strange to say, it is precisely in dealing with the *becoming* of institutions that the great apostle of evolution falls short. The eagerness to classify and label human institutions without duly considering the forces that engender and maintain them is happily characterized by Professor Small as "the herbarium method."

After an interpretation of Schäffle's system, equally just and discriminating, the author sets forth the sociology of Ratzehofer under the captions, "Society Considered as a Process of Adjustment by Conflict between Associated Individuals," "Society Considered as a Process of Adjustment by Co-operation between Associated Individuals." Professor Small finds

¹ *General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main Development in Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzehofer*. By Albion W. Small. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1905. xiii + 739 pages. \$4.

satisfaction in the Austrian thinker's system, and his two hundred odd pages are mostly given up to sympathetic interpretation. This is the first adequate presentment of the system in English, and for his labor of love Professor Small deserves the thanks of all students of society. The kernel of the volume is, in fact, the section dealing with Ratzenhofer, and one pressed for time might well center his attention upon it alone.

Part VI discusses, with perhaps unnecessary fulness, the various concepts derived by analysis of the social process. Part VII considers the psychical problems; Part VIII, the ethical problems; and the last part, the technical problems, presented by the social process. Of these, Part VIII is the most valuable. It is a convincing demonstration that moral problems have their roots deep down in the life of society; that the social process, just because it is an ongoing, must continually call in question and invalidate moral standards it precipitated in some earlier phase; and that no lasting solution of a moral problem can be got by looking within the heart and ignoring the social situation we confront.

The big word of Professor Small's book is "process," and hence there is no better antidote for the brain rheumatism that creeps upon us near the close of our thirties and makes us pass the rest of our days in battling for positions taken up in youth. The "process" idea is a great dissolvent of transmitted thought. It presents everything in flux, shows the relativity of our most cherished mental furniture, our moral standards, social theories, political philosophies, and party programs. It is a thaw-wind clearing away the ice-gorges of dogma that clog the current of the intellect. It teaches us to impeach yesterday's thought, not as in itself unsound, but as unfit for today's occasions. It pictures society as the theater of incessant change which relentlessly antiquates, not only our fathers' wisdom, but even the conclusions of our youth. This is why one rises from Professor Small's book with the feeling that it is still forenoon and not too late to think. He is silent and neutral on all practical or burning questions; he does not assail particular doctrines; yet his demonstration that all our thinking that has practical value refers to a social situation and that the social situation is ever being transformed by the changing play of men's interests, cannot fail to leave a dent on the most indurated dogmatist. The book may be recommended to all who are not afraid to trust their today's thinking as against their yesterday's thought.

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THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY OF TODAY

*Studies in Homiletics*¹ is a book intended, as the author says, for beginners in preaching. "And for this reason," to quote his own words, "to the experienced preacher the contents will appear elementary and perhaps mechanical." His estimate is correct. "The book is essentially a book of short sermons, with a description of the conscious mental processes by which they have been produced."

Mr. Wardell's methods and processes may be suggestive to inexperienced preachers and to those of small inventive energy. But they are of the traditional sort, and would not be quickening to ministers of large mold and independent and fruitful quality of mind. These men wish to make their sermons in their own way.

*The Christian Ministry*² is a book of a much higher order. In 1903 the numbers attending church in the Borough of Manhattan in the City of New York for four Sundays were carefully counted, and it was found "that about one-half of the adult population were in the churches on these Sundays." Dr. Abbott says that his book is intended to furnish an answer to the question why so many people are regularly found in the churches. What is the motive that brings them together? The ten chapters of the book have a more or less direct bearing upon his central inquiry.

He first considers "The Fundamental Faiths of the Ministry." Here he gives two definitions of religion. The first is that of Henry Scougal, a minister of the seventeenth century: "Religion is the life of God in the soul of man." The second is Max Müller's: "Religion consists in the perception of the Infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man." In the light of these definitions which Dr. Abbott accepts as essentially correct, he affirms that the main message of the ministry is to life. It brings God to man in Christ. It is concerned with character rather than with opinion.

The minister with such a message speaks with authority. For he has an experience of the life of God in his own soul, and can appeal to a sense of reality in the hearts of men in their hunger for God and the life he can bestow. Men go to church because there they find their deepest yearnings for the Father and his love satisfied.

The Christian minister has a message to the individual which differs from that of the journalist, the teacher, the reformer, the theologian. He

¹ *Studies in Homiletics*. By Robert J. Wardell. London: Kelly. xxiv + 204 pages. 2s. 6d.

² *The Christian Ministry*. By Lyman Abbott. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. xix + 317 pages. \$1.50.

is a prophet of God and speaks to the moral personality as they in their spheres cannot. "He is a minister of religion, that is, of the life of God in the soul of man."

The ministry has also a social message; Christ preached the kingdom, which has a social content. It is the business, then, of his ministers to get the Christian temper diffused among those who have industrial and other social difficulties, rather than to make and to administer specific programs for settling industrial differences. The prevalence of the spirit of Christ will inevitably issue in their right settlement. There is imperative call in our time for the preaching of the moral principles that underlie a true social and industrial order.

The chapter on "Some Ministers of the Olden Time" and the "Ministry of Jesus Christ" are in line with the preceding chapters on the fundamental function of an authoritative ministry, which is the drawing and helpful ministry. The Old Testament prophets had vital experience of God, and out of their personal experience they spoke for God to the deepest ethical nature of their contemporaries. The methods of Christ's ministry were attractive; the form of his discourse was concrete and interesting; his message was the expression of his own life; he thereby became a true and helpful example for men. The substance of his preaching was concerned with men in their relation to God, with whom they could hold fellowship and find peace and power, and with the mutual relations of men. He preached righteousness, brotherhood, stewardship, service, love. He emphasized the intrinsic value of the inner life, its superiority to possessions of all sorts. He measured all things by their spiritual values.

The minister must possess certain qualifications for securing and holding congregations. He must be a man of pronounced spiritual life, and have ability to express it. He must have a definite purpose in all his preaching. He must thoroughly prepare himself to preach. He must be a man of candor, courage, hopefulness, patience. He must respect the opinions of others, and sympathize with all classes of people. He must thoroughly know men.


The minister is not only a preacher; he is also a priest. The Puritans and their descendants have relatively over-magnified preaching. The minister speaks both to men for God and to God for men. He is the leader of public worship. As such he interprets men to themselves and to God; he opens the heavens that the people may have vision of God, fall down before him in adoration, and find satisfaction in communion with him. The minister must, therefore, know the members of the congre-

gation in their varied needs, that he may present them to God. Theological seminaries should give increased attention to public prayer, hymnology, and music. To pray well is at least as important as to preach well. Dr. Abbott sounds a true and much-needed note in the chapter on the minister as priest.

While the contents of the book are not formally organized about the central idea with which the author starts out, they are vitally related to it. People are drawn to the churches because there they hear the message of life. They are brought into vital acquaintance with God. Their deepest natures are reached and nourished. They are turned toward repentance, love, service. The book is a valuable one for the modern ministry. It is full of reality, of suggestion, and of inspiration.

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CHANGES IN THE THEOLOGY OF AMERICAN PRESBYTERIANISM

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A reviewer of Professor Allen's interesting book entitled *The Continuity of Christian Thought* once remarked that its contents would have been more accurately described had the title read *The Lack of Continuity of Christian Thought*. A different comment might have suggested itself to the observer of Presbyterian history a decade ago, had his eye chanced to fall upon the phrase which I have chosen for the heading of this article. If there was one characteristic more than another by which the theology of Presbyterianism seemed to be characterized, it was *lack* of change. Individual variations there were, no doubt, here and there, in the conception of special doctrines and in men's attitude toward the doctrinal system as a whole; but the theology of Presbyterianism, judged by the utterances of its official representatives, was characterized in a high degree by conservatism, and the efforts of modern thought to gain lodgment seemed to have been repulsed all along the line.

Even at the time the judgment would have been a superficial one. Under the external agreements there were differences of conviction, and still more radical differences of temper; but it was not easy for one who looked on from without to measure their extent or significance. To estimate the theology of a particular denomination

is at best a difficult task. The currents of thought which take their rise in the wider social and intellectual life of humanity meet in the historic creeds and institutions of the different churches barriers which tend to deflect their course. Institutions are proverbially conservative, and in the case of the church this natural instinct is reinforced by considerations of reverence. The respect which divine revelation rightfully claims easily extends itself to the different historic forms in which from time to time it has clothed itself, and the innovator exposes himself to the charge of impiety, and of untruth.

The more highly organized the denomination, the greater the difficulty becomes. In a church like the Presbyterian, which combines an elaborate ecclesiastical organization with a highly articulated system of theology, the resistance to progress is very great. The forces of conservatism are so intrenched that it is the natural impulse of each new teacher to minimize the extent of his own departure from the recognized standards of orthodoxy, and even the changes which are recognized as such are treated as minor modifications easily consistent with the maintenance unchanged of the system as a whole. Under the circumstances, it is not always possible to estimate with accuracy what the real situation is, or to know how far the influences which make for progress have impressed themselves upon the denomination as a whole. It is only when these influences become strong enough to find official utterance in creed or liturgy that a standard of comparison is provided by which it is possible to estimate with any confidence the nature and extent of the changes.

Fortunately for our present purpose, we have such a standard in the case of American Presbyterianism. With the consummation of the revision movement by the Assembly of 1902, and the still more recent completion of the new book of Common Worship, prepared by a committee appointed for that purpose by the Assembly of 1903, the progressive tendencies which have long been at work within the denomination have found articulate expression. The time seems fitting, therefore, for the consideration of our theme. I propose, in what follows, using these official utterances as a guide, to give some account of the more important changes which have taken place during the last century in the theology of American Presbyterianism, to inquire into their causes, and to estimate their significance.

I

And first a word of historical retrospect. The official theology of Presbyterianism, as is well known, is that of Westminster. The influence of the Westminster theology has not, indeed, been confined to Presbyterianism. Through long periods of history it has molded the thought of Congregationalism, and its influence upon other bodies, if less direct, has been far-reaching and profound. Yet in a peculiar degree Presbyterianism has made it its own. The form of church government which is characteristic of the Presbyterian church finds its classical expression in the Westminster standards, and the relationship between sound doctrine and church discipline which those standards express and embody has dominated the ideal of Presbyterianism to a greater extent than that of any of the other leading Protestant bodies.

The theology of Westminster is the most perfect expression of English Puritanism. "Puritanism" is a word which denotes a type of life quite as much as a form of thought. It is a type characterized by a vivid sense of the immediate relationship between the individual soul and God combined with an exalted consciousness of responsibility for securing the recognition of God's revealed law in society. The Puritan is at once an individualist and a churchman, a mystic and a legalist. He is an individualist in all that has to do with personal religion, jealous of any mediator between the soul and God. The language in which he describes the divine activities in the soul, and the response of the soul thereto, is so intimate that it can be paralleled only in the literature of mysticism. Yet, at the same time, in his attitude toward the world at large, and toward the social problems which the world presents, he is cool, hard-headed, unadaptable, often tyrannous, bringing to bear upon the whole world of organized life the same standards of conduct and of faith which he himself has freely accepted for his own guidance. Individualist in his interpretation of his own religious life, he becomes an ecclesiastic in his attitude toward other men, often denying in practice the liberty which his theology admits in theory. This combination of freedom and tyranny, of law and of gospel, is the paradox of Puritanism.

To understand its origin, we have to go back to the beginnings

of Protestantism. Every great movement is of the nature of a compromise. Different tendencies, some more radical, some more conservative, meet and merge, and the fusion is more or less imperfect. This was the case at the Protestant Reformation. Some of those who joined Luther and the other reformers in the new movement were conservative in their theology. They took over reverently the older doctrines in the form in which the Fathers had handed them down, and were distrustful of human reason in all matters that had to do with divine revelation. Their interest was practical rather than doctrinal, a reformation of the church rather than the reconstitution of the idea of the church; and, while they rejected the principle of tradition in theory because of the abuses which it had developed in practice, and acquiesced in the new organization which it was found necessary to set up, their conception of the church itself, of its function and significance, was not essentially different from that of the Roman church which it had supplanted.

There were, on the other hand, men, like Luther himself, who came to the Reformation through a profound personal experience, in which they had been led to press back of all external authority to find certainty and assurance in immediate communion with God. Such men might be, as Luther was, very conservative in their attitude toward the older doctrines, but the significance of these doctrines had changed for them. They no longer rested upon external authority in any form, but upon the immediate witness of God to the soul of man; and they had significance and meaning because they voiced and expressed experimental realities. To those whose point of approach was such as this, the significance of the church was radically altered. It became the society of believers, founded upon and expressing the consensus of religious experience, and having its sole authority in that gospel which indeed it enshrined and preserved, but which evidenced itself as divine, with new power, in the experience of every fresh believer.

These two streams of thought and feeling, flowing side by side through the early history of Protestantism, meet and blend in the theology of Puritanism. The Westminster standards are the joint product of minds of different type. The cool, cautious statesman, the man of vital piety, the uncompromising reformer, conscious of

a mission to impose his higher insight into divine truth upon other men, each had a part in their making. Looked at from one point of view, the theology of Westminster is experimental through and through. The immediate contact between God and the soul is affirmed. The authority of the Scripture depends not upon any man or church, but upon the immediate witness of the Spirit of God to the spirit of man. Even the internal evidence derived from the contents of the Scripture itself, while emphasised by the Confession over against the external arguments on which Catholicism relies (Confession of Faith, I, 5), is not sufficient to produce a saving faith apart from this inner witness. So, when the experience of the redeemed soul is described, it is in language of similar immediacy. The effectual calling in which the new life begins is an activity of God, in which he is pleased "in his appointed and accepted time effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ" those, and those only, "whom he has predestinated unto life" (X, 1). This he does "by enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace" (*ibid.*). The marks of this new life are faith and repentance; its fruit, good works; its normal, though not its inevitable accompaniment, assurance (XVIII, 3). These graces are themselves the gifts of God, the evidences, not the grounds of salvation, which is due in the last analysis to the mere unmerited grace and favor of God.

Yet, side by side with these utterances, worthy in their immediacy of Luther himself, we find interwoven through the Confession another strand of thought, less personal and intimate. Here God is conceived not simply as the life-giver, following his gracious inclination whithersoever it may lead, but as the governor and judge, dealing with men on terms of law. The Bible, received by the individual because of its immediate answer to his own need, is treated as a lawbook, from which regulations can be derived of binding authority upon his fellows. The new life, rising mysteriously out of the soil of the

natural in response to the gracious drawing of the Spirit of God, is confined within the limits of a definite election by which God from all eternity has chosen some and rejected others in his inscrutable wisdom. The work of Jesus Christ which, from one point of view, is described in ethical terms as the offering up of an acceptable sacrifice to God by the man in whom he is well pleased (VIII, 3), is, from another, the working out of a store of merit which can be transferred by legal imputation to the credit of his elect (VIII, 5). Salvation is represented as purchased by Christ for the elect (VIII, 5), as a result of a covenant, or legal agreement, into which he had entered with the Father (VII, 3).

The presence of this legalistic element in the Puritan theology has often proved a perplexity to students. How does it come to pass that a theology so uncompromising in its polemic against salvation by works should slip so easily into legal phraseology in its description of the divine activity? The answer is a very simple one. From the first, a double interest has been at work in the theology of Calvinism. Like the Scotist theologians, with whom it is most natural to compare him, Calvin finds the essence of Deity in will, and his supreme glory in the power of unrestricted choice. Hence the agnostic element in his philosophy. The tone of affectionate intimacy in which Luther describes the relation between the soul and God gives place in the case of the French reformer to a sense of reverent awe in which the distance between the Creator and the creature is never forgotten. What God is in himself remains hidden. The causes of his action, so far as it affects his dealings with individual men, are unknown. His spirit is like the wind with which Jesus compares it, blowing where it listeth, and man hears the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth. It is enough to bow reverently before that which God has been pleased to reveal, without inquiring too curiously into the secret things which he has reserved unto himself.¹

Yet, on the other hand, there is a rational element in Calvinism which is equally prominent. Out of the darkness of the clouds by which the divine majesty is encompassed there shines one glorious fixed star. It is the star of the divine justice—deepest expression of

¹ *Institutes*, Book III, 2; Calv. Tr. Soc., Vol. II, p. 562.

the nature of God and the supreme law which governs all his dealings with man. To this law God and man alike must conform; and in the awful voice of conscience, witnessing to his guilty soul of the inevitable doom of sin, man finds the one clear trace still remaining of the glory of the divine image in which he was created.

Here is the root of the legalism of the Confession. It is the means by which the principle of sovereignty and the principle of justice find their reconciliation. Justice prescribes what God must do, if he chooses; sovereignty decides what God, choosing, will do; and the result is the covenant or contract, the form in which free choice becomes effective in a world of law. It is through God's covenant, or free promise legally ratified and established, that he makes known his gracious purpose, and reveals the terms by which it is conditioned. It is the covenant which marks off the island of his revealed will from the great ocean of the unknown by which it is encompassed. Within these bounds, but no farther, God's action may be confidently predicted. Loyalty to the covenant, therefore, is the one sure path of safety. It is through reverent submission to the divine law thus revealed that the individual enters upon that mysterious experience of personal salvation which the fathers of the Confession have described in language in which the devout of every name and age have found themselves at home.

This explains the large place given to the church in the theology of Puritanism. It is through the church that the principles of the divine law are made practically effective in the life of man. It is through the church that the contents of divine revelation in Bible and sacraments are made known to those who are otherwise without God and without hope in the world. It is upon the maintenance of the purity of the church, therefore, humanly speaking, that the integrity of vital religion depends. The more the agnostic element has gained the upper hand in Protestant theology, the greater the importance which the ecclesiastical organization has assumed, the larger the authority it has claimed, the more it has approximated, in ideals as in practice, to the Roman rival which it displaced. The *jure divino* theory, which played so great a rôle in the early days of Puritanism, and led so often to persecution and intolerance, was, therefore, no excrescence, but a natural inference from one side of the conception of God upon which it is based.

To minds of a different type, however, this High-Church Puritanism has always been foreign. They have been attracted to the Westminster theology partly by its mystic, partly by its rational elements. In the phrases in which the Confession describes the redeemed life they have found their own vital piety reflected. The stress laid upon the immediate contact between the soul and God, the denial of all human merit, the rejection of any human mediation, the carrying back to God of all that man is or that man may become, in thankful trust and utter self-effacement—all this has answered to their own experience. Such men have adopted the theology of the Confession because it has seemed to them inherently reasonable. They have been prone to regard the legalistic language as a mere form of speech to be interpreted in the light of those other passages which voice the freer and more flexible experience. In exercising for themselves the liberty of which the Confession so eloquently speaks (XX, 2), they have regarded themselves as true to its real meaning, and have not hesitated to recognize as brother anyone in whom they found evidences of vital religion, whatever the ecclesiastical name by which he might be labeled.

It is the strife of these two tendencies which explains in large part the controversies of the later history. Presbyterianism has always had its High-churchmen and its Low-churchmen; its men of unbending and legal theology, and its men of a warm and vital piety, gladly extending to others the liberty they claimed for themselves. If Scotland and Ireland perpetuated the High-church tradition, whose supremacy in England was overthrown by Parliament, the Presbyterianism of England and Wales² was of a freer order, and the colonists passing from these different sections of the mother-country to their new home in the West carried with them in each case the principles and ideals of their fathers. Thus it came to pass that in American Presbyterianism there existed from the first, side by side, two different

² English Presbyterianism perpetuated the tradition of the French Calvinism of the school of Saumur. This was represented in the Assembly by Calamy, and owed its wide currency among English Presbyterians to the powerful influence of Richard Baxter. In the theology of the French school not a few of the characteristic tenets of the New England theology may be found anticipated (e. g., the doctrine of mediate imputation). This explains the ready acceptance of the latter by the American Presbyterians.

types, each having its point of departure within the Confession; and it is the struggle of these two types, variously modified by the changing conditions of the changing environment, which gives the clue to the understanding of the subsequent history.

II

If we survey the history of American Presbyterianism as a whole, we are struck by its theological conservatism. We find within the limits of the Presbyterian church no such wide divergencies as meet us, for example, in Anglican history in the differences between the Tractarians on the one hand, and the Broad-churchmen on the other. The early controversies were, in a large measure, practical, growing out of the revival movement known as the Great Awakening. The opposition of the Old Side to the New, in the matters in dispute at the first division, had to do with such questions as the necessity and the nature of theological education, the test of true piety, and the like; and the causes which led to the expulsion of the Tennents and their friends did not touch any vital doctrine of the Presbyterian system. This is evident from the fact that when the New York Presbytery made common cause with the New Brunswick Presbytery and parted from their Philadelphia brethren, no charge was made against their doctrinal orthodoxy. In the few cases where matters of doctrine were brought to judicial decision, the attitude of the church was uniformly conservative, and there seems to have been general acquiescence in its decisions.³

It is otherwise when we pass into the nineteenth century. With the controversy between the Old and the New School we reach matters of distinctly theological interest. Old School historians, like Baird,⁴ insist that it was the doctrinal heresies of the New School which led to the division of 1837, and it was the fear of similar doctrinal unsoundness on the part of the members of the same party in 1870 which led many members of the Old School to protest against the reunion. With

³ Cf. the cases of Cowell and Harker, an account of which may be found in Baird, *History of the New School*, pp. 116 ff.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 1: "The New School controversy arose from the introduction into the church of new doctrines, which threatened the overthrow of the whole system of saving faith, contained in our standards. Strictly and fundamentally the issue was doctrinal."

the appearance of the New School, therefore, the history of theological change in American Presbyterianism may be said to begin.

To understand the New School theology we must go back to Congregational New England. From the first, Congregationalists and Presbyterians had been intimately associated. The similarity of the theology of the two denominations and their comparative agreement in matters of order and government early led to intimate and confidential relations between the New England churches and those of the General Synod. Jonathan Edwards himself was for four years the occupant of a Presbyterian pulpit, and expressed his approval of "the Presbyterian way" as "most agreeable to the word of God and the reason and nature of things."⁵ In the years that followed, ministers from one denomination passed easily to the other, and, under the Plan of Union of 1801, a system of church government was worked out for the new synods of the West in which the essential features of Presbyterianism were strikingly modified by Congregational usages.⁶ It was natural and easy, under such conditions, that whatever theological change affected one body should make itself felt in the other; and the system of thought which took its rise under Jonathan Edwards, and was developed by the series of strong men who succeeded him, found almost as ready acceptance among Presbyterian as among Congregational ministers. In reading contemporary literature of the time of the disruption, one finds discussion centered in such topics as the nature of virtue, the difference between natural and moral ability, the nature and limits of the atonement, and the like. The errors for which the leaders of the New School were tried were views which were, in substance, those of the New England theologians, and what is known in Presbyterianism as New School theology is simply the New England theology springing up upon Presbyterian soil.⁷

This is not the place to enter in detail into the New England the-

⁵ Dwight, *Life of Edwards*, p. 412.

⁶ The text is given in Thompson, *Presbyterians* ("American Church History" series, Vol. VI), pp. 353 ff.

⁷ This does not mean that it is to be regarded as an exotic. As we have shown above (p. 394, note 2), the New School theology had its antecedents in English Presbyterianism, and there is a sense in which Edwards himself may be regarded as carrying on an older Presbyterian tradition.

ology. The question how far the views of Taylor and his friends are a legitimate development of the thought of the older Edwards, and how far they were due to newer influences having their rise in the growing liberal movement which they sought to oppose, we need not attempt to determine.⁸ It is sufficient here to note the points at which the later representatives of this theology departed from the Old School Calvinism. These were chiefly four: first, in their definition of virtue as disinterested benevolence, and their consequent rejection of the principle of distributive justice as fundamental for the conception of Deity; secondly, in their restriction of sin to conscious choice, with the consequent distinction between natural and moral ability; thirdly, in their rejection of the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity; and, finally, in their substitution of the principle of public for private justice in the doctrine of the atonement.

These views found very general acceptance among New School Presbyterians. Albert Barnes has left on record the relief which he found from the difficulties of the older penal theory in the acceptance of the governmental theory of the atonement.⁹ Lyman Beecher and others found the distinction between natural and moral ability a welcome aid in their efforts to bring home to men's consciences their responsibility for sin.¹⁰ There is no doubt that, under the influence of Dr. Taylor, some New School men were led to a theory of the will far removed from that of the Old School Calvinism, and having affinities at least with Arminianism, if not with the Pelagianism with which the old School writers have often identified it. Their interest in the matter was, however, largely a practical one, and it was through the revivalist Finney that this type of theology received its clearest expression.

Yet, when all allowance has been made for the points at which

⁸ An interesting argument in favor of the first of these positions is made by Baird *op. cit.*, pp. 180 ff. He finds the distinctive thoughts upon which Taylor builds already implicitly presented in Hopkinsianism.

⁹ Barnes, *The Atonement*, p. 4. "It is no secret to you," he writes, "that my own mind was early skeptical on the whole subject of religion, and I may say to you now that in no doctrine of the Christian faith have I found that early skepticism gave me more embarrassment than on the doctrine of the atonement."

¹⁰ Cf. Beecher's discussion of this point at his trial (*Works*, Vol. III, pp. 208 ff.).

the New School men departed from the older orthodoxy, one wonders how it could have come to pass that they should have been thought sufficiently important to warrant the drastic action of 1837. Running one's eye over the sentences of the Auburn Declaration of the same year, the platform in which the New School men officially expressed their views immediately after the disruption,¹¹ one is impressed by the extreme conservatism of the language used. The theology is Calvinistic through and through, and its departure from the prevailing interpretation of the standards consists largely in a modification of some of the more offensive phraseology, which seems to make God directly and personally responsible for sin, and utterly to deny the moral agency of man. As to the introduction of sin, the Declaration affirms that God permitted this, "not because he was unable to prevent it, consistently with the moral freedom of his creatures, but for wise and benevolent reasons which he has not revealed" (I). Election is described in the language of the Confession as a sovereign act of God's mercy, "whereby, according to the counsel of his own will, he has chosen some to salvation," and it is explicitly denied that it is founded upon the foresight of faith and obedience (II). The headship of Adam is affirmed, and it is declared that as a consequence of his transgression, "all mankind become morally corrupt, and liable to death, temporal and eternal" (III). This is true even of infants who come into the world, not only destitute of that knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness wherewith Adam was created, but "with a nature inclined to evil and only evil" (IV). So far as the imputation of Adam's sin is concerned, it is declared that, while it is not "imputed to his posterity in the sense of a literal transfer of personal qualities, acts, and demerit," yet, "by reason of the sin of Adam, in his peculiar relation, the race are treated as if they had sinned" (VII). Of Christ's sufferings and death it is said that they are not "symbolical, governmental, and instructive only, but truly vicarious; that is, a substitute for the punishment due to transgressors. And while Christ did not suffer the literal penalty of the law, involving remorse of conscience and the pains of hell, he did offer a sacrifice which infinite Wisdom saw to be a full equivalent" (VIII). Repudiating the charge that they affirmed that God has

¹¹ The text may be found in Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 357 ff.

done all that he can do for the salvation of all men, and that man himself must do the rest, the New School men declare that "the reason that God does not save all is not that he wants the *power* to do it, but that in his wisdom he does not see fit to exert that power further than he actually does" (XIII).

No doubt, individuals in the New School went beyond the utterances of the Declaration. Reading the writings of men like Beecher and Barnes, one gets the impression of a spirit of greater liberty and breadth than breathes in the cautious utterances of a theologian like Richards, the guiding spirit in the production of the Declaration.¹² But, in general, it cannot be denied that the New School men were, as a whole, loyally devoted to the reformed type of doctrine, honestly persuaded that they stood within the historic traditions of the church, and desirous only to exercise that liberty which they believed was rightfully theirs within the bounds of the Confession.¹³

This being the case, it is difficult for the modern historian to understand the bitterness which animated the attacks upon these men, and the extraordinary radicalism, as it now seems to us, of the action by which they and all their adherents were cut off from the church. It is explicable only, I believe, as the expression of that fundamental difference of spirit which we have already seen to divide the two types of historic Presbyterianism. What the men of the Old School objected to in the men of the New was not so much their attitude toward any specific doctrine as the temper and spirit which animated them. It was the spirit of individualism and freedom, of flexibility and of change, or readiness to adapt old institutions to new conditions, and to co-operate with all types and conditions of men for the bringing in of the kingdom of God. It was the spirit which had manifested itself in the adoption of the Plan of Union, in hearty co-operation

¹² Rev. James Richards, D.D., first professor of theology at Auburn. On his part in the Auburn convention cf. the remarks of Dr. Shedd, quoted by Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

¹³ Cf. on this point, in addition to the remarks of Dr. Shedd just referred to, the interesting articles by Dr. George Duffield ("Doctrines of the New School in the Presbyterian Church") in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1863, Art. III, and of Henry B. Smith, in the *American Presbyterian and Theological Review* for 1867, pp. 624 ff. The latter, published anonymously in answer to an attack upon the New School by Dr. Charles Hodge in the *Princeton Review* for 1867, is one of the clearest statements of the position of the New School men at the time of the reunion.

in missionary enterprise, both on the home field and on the foreign, and in willingness to take over from any source those forms of presenting the historic truths of the gospel which experience had shown to be practically effective.¹⁴

Looked at from this point of view, it cannot be denied that there was reason for the protest. The New England theology, conservative as it seems to us today, was in truth the child and the expression of liberty. It was the work of great intellects, freely exercised upon great themes; and, if the results to which that theology attained depart less than might have been expected from the systems of the past, this was due, not to any unwillingness to receive new truth, but to the inner assent which those statements called forth from those who thus subjected them to new examination. To Edwards and his successors the great truths of the divine sovereignty and of human littleness and dependence were vital convictions in which they gloried and rejoiced. The doctrine of a double election, with its terrible outlook of doom for the impenitent, is accepted by Edwards not simply, as by many Calvinists, as a mystery before which the mind of man must bow in humble recognition of its impotence, however strong the natural shrinking of the spirit, but as a glorious outcome and manifestation of that righteousness which is supremely beautiful, and in which the human conscience itself, even here and now, can begin to take delight. It is the same æsthetic joy with which Edwards, while still a lad, finds God in the thunder as well as in the sunshine,¹⁵ which speaks to us again in the awful words of his "Sinners in the hands of an angry God." The doctrine is the old doctrine, and yet it is a new doctrine. The hands are the hands of Esau, but the voice is the voice of Jacob—the Jacob of the free human spirit, exulting in its power to apprehend the truths of God, and looking up fearlessly into the face of the Eternal, with whom it knows itself akin. It is this spirit, this sense of a divinely implanted reason and conscience within man, whose dictates one may follow confidently wherever they may lead, which breathes in the New England theology

¹⁴ No account of the causes of the disruption would be complete which did not recognize the important part played by questions of church polity and missionary administration. Without these the doctrinal differences alone would not have been sufficient to divide the church. Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 114.

¹⁵ Edwards, *Works* (New York, 1869), Vol. I, p. 17.

and gives it its charm; and it was this spirit manifesting itself within the Presbyterian church from which the men of the Old School shrank as an undue invasion of those secret things which God had reserved to himself.

But their fears, however natural, were not justified by the event. The course of the New School men after the separation was a conservative one. The energies of the party as a whole were given to the practical problems which confronted them, and they had little leisure for theological controversy. From the first their controlling interest had been practical. It is significant that the charter of Union Seminary, founded largely by New School men in 1836, just before the division, brackets "extremes of doctrinal speculation" with "ecclesiastical domination" and "practical radicalism" as among the evils to be avoided. Dr. George Duffield, explaining the doctrinal position of the New School in 1863,¹⁶ speaks of the unwillingness of its representatives to press beyond the positions of common-sense into the region of theological subtleties. While they kept in close touch with the developments across the sea, and were well acquainted with the course of theological thought in Germany and in Great Britain, the stimulus which they received was rather literary and critical than philosophical in the stricter sense of the term.¹⁷ During

¹⁶ In the article referred to, p. 575: "It is especially characteristic of New School Presbyterian apprehensions and statements of the radical, essential truths of Scripture, that they are those mainly of common-sense and less technical and scholastic than either of the theologies just named [i. e., the Scottish and the New England theologies]. The faith revealed to the saints, i. e., the simple truth as it is in Jesus and revealed to faith, is regarded as of more importance and value than as it is taught in systematic theology, whether it was a quarter of a century ago at Andover, New Haven, or Princeton, by Drs. Woods, Taylor, Alexander, and Hodge, or by Drs. Edwards, Hopkins, Bellamy, Emmons, and the other theologians of an earlier day."

¹⁷ An exception should be made in the case of Professor Henry B. Smith, the most original and philosophical of the New School theologians. Dr. Smith was one of the first Americans to gain an intelligent understanding of modern German theology, and his tribute to Schleiermacher in his well-known address on *Faith and Philosophy* (p. 37) deserves mention as a striking example of the clearness of his insight and the breath of his sympathy. It is unfortunate that the multiplicity of his duties prevented him from giving adequate literary expression to his latest and best thought. His posthumously printed *System of Christian Theology* is a compilation, based partly upon earlier unrevised drafts of his lectures, partly upon students' notes. The best account of his theological position is to be gained from the biography written by his pupil and friend, Professor Stearns.

the entire period from 1837 to 1870 no important treatise on systematic theology was published by a New School theologian.

If the course of the New School men tended toward greater conservatism, that of the Old School, on the other hand, was in the direction of liberty. The adhesion of Princeton to the Old School party, which was one of the results of the division, introduced a new element into the ranks of conservative Presbyterianism. The federal theology, which was championed by the Hodges, father and son, was attacked by advocates of the older Augustinian realism¹⁸ as a departure from the original doctrines of the Reformation.¹⁹ In his theory of the church also Dr. Hodge, on more than one occasion, departed from the stricter *jure divino* Presbyterianism of the earlier days.²⁰ Thus, in the course of the intervening period, the distance which at the outset had separated the two parties tended steadily to grow less.

It is from this point of view that we have to judge the significance of the reunion of 1870. It marks no distinct doctrinal advance in the Presbyterian church. Judged superficially, it might even be interpreted as a retrogression. The various proposals to embody in the terms of union for the reunited church the same liberty of doctrinal variation which had been tolerated in the separated churches were not accepted, and the reunion took place at last, as is well known, upon the basis of the standards pure and simple. New School men, like Henry B. Smith,²¹ vied with the leaders of the Old School, and quite sincerely and honestly so, in affirming their devotion to the historic doctrines of Presbyterianism. Yet here again the saying is true: "If two say the same thing, it is not the same thing." The spirit with which the two schools approached the same doctrines was a different spirit,²² and the significance of

¹⁸ E. g., Dr. Samuel R. Baird; cf. his *Elohim Revealed*.

¹⁹ Cf. the interesting volume of Dr. Landis, *The Doctrine of Original Sin, as Received and Taught by the Churches of the Reformation*, etc. (Richmond, 1884).

²⁰ E. g., in his view of the eldership, and of the boards of the church, as well as of the nature of subscription. Cf. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

²¹ Cf. the article already referred to, pp. 644 ff.

²² This difference of spirit may be well illustrated by a brief extract from the address delivered by Dr. William Adams, the chairman of the New School Committee on Reunion, before the Old School Assembly at their meeting in 1869: "I suppose," he said, addressing the Old School commissioners, "you will consider it as no affront

the reunion is to be found rather in the willingness of the church at large to make place within its borders for men of the two different types, than for any change of view on matters of specific doctrine on the part of the representatives of either. After thirty-three years of separation, representatives of both schools agreed that the work of Christ could be carried on better by a united than by a divided church, and that the differences which separated them were no longer sufficiently great to justify longer disunion.

III

Very different is the impression produced by a study of the development of American Presbyterianism during the generation which has succeeded the reunion. We see the same conflict between the different tendencies whose presence and struggle have marked each of the succeeding periods. The questions in controversy have aroused no less striking differences of conviction; but in the latter case, instead of a division of the church, the result has been a revision of the standards, carried through with practical unanimity and accepted with only sporadic protest, in which the principles for which the New School men had contended have found clearer expression than they could have ventured to hope.

For a time, indeed, it seemed as if this was not to be the case. The first result of the conflict seemed a victory for the forces of conservatism all along the line. Dr. Briggs and Dr. Smith were convicted by overwhelming majorities. Dr. McGiffert was forced to withdraw from the church. Successive Assemblies enunciated a doctrine of the Scriptures in which verbal inerrancy was predicated in the strongest terms, and a consistent, and for a time it seemed successful, effort was made through the Presbyteries to purge the church of all those who seemed infected with the new leaven.

But this condition was only temporary. When the first excitement if you are regarded as the special conservators of orthodoxy. Adopting the same confession of faith with yourselves in all honesty we will not shrink from being considered as the special advocates and representatives of liberty. You will not think it strange, while you hold steadfastly to your orthodoxy, that we should magnify and assert our liberty. We have found it necessary to emphasize the fact that, within the bounds of our common system of doctrine, there is room for liberty. As there always have been, so there always will be, differences of opinion in unessential particulars among those who are agreed heartily in the great essentials of the same historic system."

ment had died away, it became apparent that the causes which had produced the condemned utterances had been operating much more widely than had been supposed. The movement for the revision of the Confession which had been temporarily interrupted by the panic into which the church was thrown was renewed with increased force, and, in a shorter time than anyone could have expected ten years ago, was carried to a successful conclusion in the unanimous adoption of the new creed by the Assembly of 1902.

Many causes have contributed to bring about so unlooked-for a result. First among the differences which separate 1906 from 1870 must be mentioned the temper of the age itself. The years that have passed since the reunion have seen a wide diffusion of the scientific spirit. It is not so much that the views which have been put forth are new—though that is, no doubt, true in a measure—but that the temper of men's minds has been prepared to receive them as has never been the case in any preceding age. Acquaintance with the results of modern science is no longer confined to our universities and colleges; it has been spread broadcast through the country by the newspapers and through the daily press. When the views of the German critics were first made prominent by Dr. Briggs, conservative Presbyterians were disturbed; but as soon as the first alarm had worn off, and the method and spirit of the new criticism had been explained, they were seen to be only the application to the field of theology of principles which had long been taken as a matter of course in other departments of research. Men who had come to accept the universality of law as a good working principle in natural science, and the theory of evolution as the most satisfactory hypothesis to account for the origin of species, were not likely to be disturbed at the suggestion that law and progress might have their place in the spiritual realm as well.²³

The effect of this change of attitude is seen on all sides of modern theology. The old conception of an instantaneous change of nature on the part of our first parents, in which their original likeness to God was once for all and forever lost, is no longer accepted without ques-

²³ The remarkable reception accorded to Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* shows how widely such ideas had gained currency among thoughtful laymen at the time he wrote (1883).

tion. The principle of development, admitted in connection with the history of man's physical organism, is seen to have its bearing upon his spiritual ancestry as well. Not at once, as in the traditional doctrine of the primitive state, but by slow degrees, are being formed in man those godlike qualities in which his kinship to his Maker consists. The fall is conceived less as a single event than as the type of a universal experience. The Bible is seen to be at once the record and the summary of a long process of progressive revelation. It is not that modern Presbyterians have rejected the confessional doctrine of a race sin, or deny the need of redemption for every child of man, but that both sin and redemption are conceived more concretely than in the past, and that the variety introduced by a changing social environment receives fuller recognition. The individualistic categories of the older theology are seen to be inadequate to express the full content of the gospel. Instead of a particular election in which, out of his mere good pleasure, God chooses one here and another there for the praise of his sovereign mercy, modern thought centers in the kingdom of God as the redeemed society which God is forming for himself through the ages, and into which it is his purpose to gather all those who hear and heed the gospel message.²⁴

Side by side with the diffusion of the critical spirit practical motives have been at work. The present generation has witnessed a growing disposition to break down denominational lines. This has been, in large part, the result of the pressure of common need. At home our cities have witnessed the rise of new problems of a magnitude and intricacy so great that the existing denominational

²⁴ How far the divine forgiveness will extend; whether it will include all members of the human family; what processes God may have in his control in the life beyond the grave to complete that which he has here begun—these are matters on which American Presbyterians recognize the limitations of their knowledge. The speculations as to probation after death, which so exercised Congregationalists a few years ago, have met little response on Presbyterian soil. So far as Presbyterian thought has sought to reconstitute the older eschatology, it has been along other lines. Thoroughgoing universalism has found few advocates; yet, in general, it may be said that there has been a tendency to a larger hopefulness as to the future of mankind and to a more ethical conception of the life after death. Progressive sanctification after death owed its condemnation rather to a fear of more dangerous heresies lying back of it than to any disposition to deny to the life after death the elements of ethical progress and development.

machinery has proved inadequate to cope with them. At the same time, closer contact with the adherents of the other religions on the foreign field has forced upon our missionaries a more careful consideration of the question of the essentials of Christianity. It is becoming increasingly clear that much of our traditional denominational inheritance is of merely local and temporary significance, and that, if the world is to be won to Christianity, the basis of the appeal must be simplified and broadened. In different forms, now by the bishops at Lambeth in their famous quadrilateral, most recently through the organization in New York City of the Council of Federated Churches, the ideal of a united Christianity has been held before the imagination of men.

These influences have had their effect upon the conception of the church itself. With the passing of the *jure divino* theories of the older High-church Presbyterianism, the strongest support of the denominational spirit has been removed, and Presbyterians have been brought face to face with the question why they should require of candidates for their ministry a standard which, strictly applied, would exclude men whose Christian character, spiritual experience, and ministerial qualifications in other respects they are ready to admit.²⁵

²⁵ It is significant that as long ago as 1729, when subscription was first proposed by Thompson and the Newcastle Presbytery, Jonathan Dickinson, the leading Presbyterian of the time, strongly opposed it on the ground that "tho subscription may shut the door of the church communion against many serious and excellent servants of Christ who conscientiously scruple it; yet it's never like to detect hypocrites, nor keep concealed hereticks out of the church." "I believe," he says, "it will prove a difficult task to find so much as a proposal, much less an injunction of subscription, to any formula whatever in the primitive church, before Constantine the Great. They then found other means to detect heresies, to resist gainsayers, to propagate the truth; and to keep the church not only a garden enclosed, but a garden of peace. The Synod of Nice did indeed impose subscription; but what was the consequence, but horrible schisms, convulsions, and confusions, until the church was crumbled into parts and parties, each uncharitably anathematizing one another." "The Presbyterian church in Ireland," he continues, "subsisted some ages in peace and purity, to the honour of their profession and envy of their malignant enemies; and thus might they probably have continued, had not the fire of subscription consumed their glory; and this engine of division broke them in pieces, disunited them in interest, in communion and in charity; and rendered them the grief of their friends and the scorn of their enemies. And on the other hand, the churches of New England have all continued from their first foundation *nonsubscribers*; and yet they retain their first faith and love." Cf. Briggs, *American Presbyterianism*, pp. 212, 213.

Underlying these changes, partly their result and partly their cause, is the widespread change in the conception of God. This change appears both in the method of approach to the idea and in its positive content. The older theology gained its conception of God largely by a method of negation; it magnified the distance between the Creator and the creature, and held that those attributes were most characteristically divine which most completely expressed the difference between God and man. Modern philosophy, on the other hand, finds the ultimate reality revealed through the concrete. Its Absolute is a teleological conception, to which it rises through the discovery of the permanent and worthwhile elements in experience. To discover the nature of God, therefore, it looks forward rather than back, to the end of the world-process rather than to its beginning. The ultimate is defined in terms of thought and of purpose rather than of being, and those attributes are regarded as most characteristically divine which most completely express that moral ideal which is the bond of kinship between God and man.

No doubt there is danger of exaggeration at this point. The doctrine of a kinship between God and man has never been absent from Protestant theology. Luther's gospel gained its power largely from the fact that it was a rediscovery of the forgotten truth of the Fatherhood of God. But in the development of Protestant theology other considerations crowded in and robbed this earlier insight of its legitimate development. In Calvinism, as we have seen, the community of nature which unites man and God is found in the principle of distributive justice. In conscience we have the one inalienable bond between the creature and the Creator, the one star in the heaven of man's natural endowment which was not extinguished at the fall. But conscience, since Adam's transgression, exists only as a lurid light illuminating the black gulf which separates man from his God. Whatever fellowship the Christian experience may hold comes in afterward as a matter of grace. It is the result of a divine adoption by which God for Christ's sake agrees henceforth to treat as a son one who is not so by nature.

Compared with this view of the relation of God and man, Jonathan Edwards' conception of God as disinterested benevolence marks a real step forward. Here, for the double principle of the older Cal-

vinism, we have a single principle governing all spiritual life and valid for all the relations both of God and of man. It is God's nature to love that which has the most being; hence his glory must be his own supreme self-end. It is man's nature to love that which has the most being; therefore it is his supreme duty to love God. All sin consists in the preference of a lower for a higher order of being, and to be willing to be lost oneself for the glory of God is the mark of a true faith.

The difficulty with Edwards' principle is that it is abstract; it establishes a quantitative rather than a qualitative standard. The God who contains within himself the maximum of being, and who is therefore to be loved, reminds us more of the all-embracing Substance of Spinoza than of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The emotions which he arouses are æsthetic rather than moral, and in the interest of unity conscience seems dethroned. It is not surprising therefore, that in its later development the New England theology should have broken away from this construction, and found in a doctrine of the will which puts real limitations upon God after Arminian fashion an escape from the awful consequences to which Edwards' logic irresistibly led.

Modern thought finds a way of escape from the dilemma thus raised by its clearer insight into the nature and significance of personality. It is not being in general which is the real unifying conception, but personality which is the scene of those values and relations which bring order and unity into life. Personality, as we are coming more and more to see, is essentially a social conception. It is that in which all the multifarious threads of our complex life are woven into the pattern of order and reason and beauty. The older theology was quite in the right in gaining its thought of God by abstracting that which was most worthful in man, but it was in error in that the basis of its abstraction was too narrow. It is not a single attribute of personality, least of all is it those attributes which express the general categories of being, which are most characteristically divine. It is from personality, as a whole—the affections no less than the will, the reason no less than the conscience—that we must rise to our idea of God. So our standard becomes qualitative rather than quantitative, and the God whom we worship is thought of as one who most worthily realizes the true attitude to

all persons, rather than the one who includes all their substance within himself.

This tendency to a more concrete and ethical conception of God has been reinforced by modern study of the life of Christ. From the point of view of the older theology, the Jesus of the gospels in his limitation and suffering, bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, presents a puzzle and contradiction only to be escaped by such unphilosophical theories as the kenosis, or such unpsychological conceits as the conception of an alternating consciousness, now divine and now human.²⁶ But if character be that which is central in Deity, the difficulty vanishes, and there is no reason why we should not find in the human Jesus our supreme revelation of God. Jesus is not simply, as to our fathers, the revelation of one side of God, but of God himself in his completeness. He is the one in whom, to use Dr. van Dyke's striking phrase, we see "the human life of God."²⁷ The suggestion made long ago by such New School Presbyterians as Henry B. Smith²⁸ and William Adams,²⁹ that the true method of theology was christological, is being taken up and given new currency in the light of our better acquaintance with the historic

²⁶ Cf. Shedd, *Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 319.

²⁷ *Gospel for an Age of Doubt*, chap. 3.

²⁸ In his inaugural address, reprinted in *Faith and Philosophy*, pp. 125 ff.

²⁹ It may be of interest to note that as early as the year 1863, in a series of sermons preached in the Madison Square Church, the manuscripts of which are still preserved in the library of the Union Theological Seminary, Dr. Adams worked out an outline of theology in which the christological method was actually applied. The order of the topics is given below:

1. Introduction to a course in systematic theology.
2. Moral disposition and spiritual help necessary to the study of Christian theology.
3. Christian theology.
4. The person of Jesus Christ.
5. The person of Christ, continued: his divinity.
6. Moral character of God as taught in the person of Christ.
7. Mercy of God in Christ.
8. Decrees of God.
9. The purpose of God in the kingdom of Christ.
10. Christian doctrine concerning man.
11. Race-unity of mankind.
12. Sin.
13. Piacular work of Christ.
14. Sin—a violation of law.
15. Penal consequences of sin.
16. Disability induced by sin.
17. Work of Christ as defining a new probation.
18. Power of Christ within us.

Jesus. The old conception of a divided God, choosing some to everlasting life for the praise of his mercy, but condemning others to everlasting death for the praise of his justice, is no longer satisfying. The doctrine of reprobation is being banished from the theology, as it has long ago been banished from the preaching, of the church, and in its place has come the new doctrine of the love of God for all mankind, and the new emphasis upon Christian missions as the true expression of the church's understanding of the purpose of God.

The changes which we have thus briefly passed in review find their most signal illustration in the new creed.³⁰ Comparing this creed with the Confession of Faith, we are struck both by its omissions and by its additions. The doctrine of reprobation disappears altogether, and is replaced by the doctrine of God's "great love for the world" and "his all-sufficient salvation freely offered to all men in the gospel." The doctrine of non-elect infants is removed, and in its place we find the positive statement that all who die in infancy "are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit who works when and where and how he pleases."³¹ While the connection between our sinful nature and our first parents is affirmed, and it is declared that the sole ground of our forgiveness is the "perfect obedience and sacrifice of Christ received by faith alone," room is left for each who chooses to conceive the nature of the connection in his own way. Of the Holy Spirit it is said that he "moves everywhere upon the hearts of men to restrain them from evil and incite them unto good," and

³⁰ It is, no doubt, true that the brief statement forms no part of the legal standards of the Presbyterian church, but this fact, however important for the student of Presbyterian law, does not concern us here. It is sufficient to know that it represents the present temper of the church and the type of theological thought which has become controlling. We have, moreover, an unquestioned test of the significance of the change which has come over the church in the amendments of the Confession which were adopted in the same Assembly, and especially in the new chapter which was added concerning the love of God and Christian missions. The significance of these changes appears in the successful issue of the negotiations for union with the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.

³¹ From the point of view of theological science the insertion of this paragraph is open to criticism, but as an indication of the temper of the church it is of the highest significance. The conviction that children as such belong to God, and that those who have passed away from this life before the sinful tendencies that lie hidden in each one of us have had time to ripen into act, pass into a better environment where the good within them will develop to full fruition, is the most signal expression of the difference which separates the view-point of modern Presbyterians from those of an earlier day.

that the Father is ever willing to give him unto all who ask him. The law of God is summed up in the well-known language of Micah, that God requires of every man to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with his God; and it is declared that "only through this harmony with the will of God shall be fulfilled that brotherhood of man wherein the kingdom of God is to be made manifest."

Even more striking than these changes in specific statements is the change in the temper of the Confession as a whole. Its tone is religious rather than speculative, its spirit constructive rather than controversial. Legal phrases and terminology are, so far as possible, avoided. The language is vital and spiritual, and, while the sterner truths of Christianity receive their due recognition, they are subordinated to the great unifying purpose of love which runs through and conditions all. The duty and the privilege of world-wide evangelization receives confessional expression, and the thought in which the Confession culminates is a prayer for the coming of that day when "the kingdoms of this world shall be made the kingdom of our God and of his Christ."

Scarcely less significant, in the light which it sheds upon the present temper of American Presbyterianism, is the new book of Common Worship, whose issue, for voluntary use, has recently been authorized by the Assembly of 1906. In this book we see the most serious effort which has been made for many years to enrich the worship and to dignify the service of Presbyterianism. It is true that many of the forms which the new book takes over are inheritances from an older Presbyterianism, which had been suffered to fall into disuse. It is further true that it has been the effort of the committee in the preparation of the book to prepare a type of service which should express the genius of Presbyterianism in its faith as well as in its feeling. None the less, it is true that the book marks a long step forward toward that broader catholicity which finds itself at home in all things beautiful and true which bear the Christian name. By its preparation the Presbyterian church has not only enriched the possibilities of its own service; it has provided a new evidence of that community of spirit which is the true bond of Christian union in every age, and upon whose presence and increasing strength among the churches of today the promise of the future depends.

THE OLD TESTAMENT THEORY OF ATONEMENT

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The abundant literature of this subject has recently been enriched by several treatises, of which the most important is the monograph of Herrmann.¹ This work is a distinct advance on its predecessors. Its exegesis is careful, and its theory of the order of the documents is sound. Nevertheless it does not make further discussion superfluous. The author is perhaps more influenced by traditional views than he himself realizes. He makes his theory too complicated by endeavoring to combine several elements. The matter is really more simple than he or any of his predecessors suppose. The present paper will endeavor to show the true state of the case.

The Hebrew verb כָּפַר, usually translated "make atonement," occurs about a hundred times in the Old Testament, and nouns apparently derived from the same root occur about fifty times. It will be thought that we have here material enough for an induction. But on examination it is seen that by far the largest number of instances are in the priestly sections of the Pentateuch. Here, as is now generally recognized, the meaning is a technical one. But the technical meaning of liturgical terms is often remote from their original meaning, and to base our induction upon the priestly documents would be to begin at the wrong end. For a purely historical inquiry we must leave the ritual meaning out of view, at least at first. It may be needless to remark also that we should rid ourselves of any preconceptions which we may have got from the extensive dogmatic discussions over the idea of atonement. But it is fair to call attention to the fact of present consensus on one point. This is the point that our verb, so far as Hebrew usage is known to us, is denominative, and that any fruitful inquiry must begin with the noun כָּפָר.

¹ Johannes Herrmann, *Die Idee der Sühne im Alten Testament*, noticed in the *American Journal of Theology*, 1905, p. 747. See also Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade im religiösen Leben des Volkes Israel bis Christum*, noticed in this *Journal*, 1906, p. 140 ff., and Stade, *Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Band I.

Fortunately this noun is quite transparent in meaning. The earliest passage in which it occurs is decisive. This is a part of the ancient code of civil law, and commands that when a vicious bull kills a human being the owner is to be put to death, if he be aware of the disposition of the animal. The law, however, allows an alternative in these words: "But if a כֶּפֶר be laid upon him he shall give the ransom of his life, according to what is laid upon him."² We have here a well-known legal device by which one may escape the full penalty of his crime on payment of a blood-wit. It is evident that the guilt is regarded as a debt. The kin of the man who has been slain have a claim which normally would be settled by taking the life of the murderer. But they may be willing to take something else—to compromise the claim, as we say—and it is this which the law specifically allows. A later law forbids the taking of such a payment in case of manslaughter, the reason being that an asylum has been provided for such cases. But this passage confirms the meaning of the word. In fact, there can be no question on this point.

Now, it is of importance to notice that there is here no idea of substitution. The emphasis is on the payment of something of value in settlement of the claim. Euphemistically the thing given over might be spoken of as a gift, and it is as a gift that it has potency. In case a slave were the object transferred, as might well be the case, it is conceivable that the vengeance of the clan would be wreaked upon him. But even in this case, or in the slaying of an animal, the idea would be to make sacrifice to the manes of the dead man rather than to punish the murderer in the person of his substitute. In modern Arab custom the blood-wit is usually a certain number of camels. These become the property of the injured clan, and it is their property value which is had in view in the whole transaction. We have no reason to interpret the Hebrew view any differently. And that the Hebrew mind saw in the כֶּפֶר a gift is clear from those passages in which we give the word the meaning "bribe." Amos accuses the oppressive nobles of taking כֶּפֶר. We must suppose that they exacted gifts from their poor neighbors on some trumped-up charge of crime. Samuel in his repudiation of the charge

² Exod. 21:30.

of taking כֶּסֶף has some such procedure in mind, the judge easily becoming party to such oppression of the poor by the rich. Even the very late passage which speaks of the census tax as a כֶּסֶף shows that a money payment was intended by the word.³

Right here is the place to raise the question of the original meaning of the root from which this word is derived. Two hypotheses are advanced. One derives the noun from a verb meaning "to wipe off," a meaning which is still found in Syriac. The other assigns to the verb the meaning "to cover," supposedly based on Arabic analogies. As between the two there can be no doubt that the probabilities are in favor of the former. It is natural to speak of wiping out a debt, as our own usage testifies; not so to speak of covering it. And inquiry seems to show that the supposed Arabic analogy is precarious. The Arabic lexicons do, indeed, assert that *kajara* means "to cover." This is based on the statement of the Arabic lexicographers, and it may be thought bold to question their knowledge of their own language. But examination shows that they were conjecturing when they gave this as the root-meaning of the word. Their interest, as we see everywhere, was to account in the first place for the theological usage based on the Koran. In the Koran a *kāfir* is an unbeliever, and the verb means simply "to be unbelieving." The lexicographers thought of the unbeliever as a hypocrite who hides his true thought in his heart. But this was not Mohammed's conception. To him the true believer was a man who followed the leadings of divine grace. The genuine desert parable of the man who is saved by following the right path was always with him, and to his mind the unbeliever was the man, who when he received signs by which he ought to be led aright, obliterated them so far as he was concerned; that is, who ignored them and deliberately chose some other path. Or, as it is put in some passages, the unbeliever is the man who is ungrateful. Having received the benefits which God gives, he refuses to let their impression remain on his heart; he erases them. If the original meaning of the verb had been "to cover," Mohammed would have betrayed his knowledge of this fact. But careful examination fails to show any instance in which this meaning is hinted at. On

³ Exod. 30:12. The other passages to which allusion has been made are Numb 35:31 f.; 1 Sam. 12:3; Amos 5:12.

the other hand, the infidels are said to be those who desire to extinguish the light of God, and who throw his book behind their back, as well as those who deny the truth or accuse it of falsehood. All these phrases indicate a process of obliterating that which ought to be plain rather than covering what is open to view.

The Koran word *kaffara* is probably borrowed from Judaism, and we should be cautious of using it in our present inquiry. Yet it is interesting to note that Lane cannot define the word better than by saying that it is an action or quality which has the effect of effacing a wrong action or sin or crime. And some of the examples of the verb taken by the lexicographers from other sources than the Koran are equally instructive. It is said that the wind *kajara* a footprint, and the scholars say that it covers the footprint with sand. But it should be clear that this is only half right. The wind effaces a footprint by filling in the depressions and by blowing away the elevations. The word we need for a good definition is not "cover, but "obliterate." Even more striking is the instance where the ashes of a deserted campfire are said to be *makjur*. The wind, in this instance, certainly carries away rather than covers the ashes. Even where the lexicographers give their word the meaning "cover," they are obliged to add "in such a way as to destroy," showing that the main idea was that of obliteration.⁴

Since the noun means a payment or gift in settlement of a claim, the verb naturally means to make such a payment or gift. But as he who thus settles a claim appeases the anger of his enemy, the transition to the significance "appease" is almost a matter of course. A case in point is that of Jacob and Esau. The patriarch sends a lavish present, or rather series of presents, to his brother and says: "I will appease him with the present that goes before me; afterwards I will see his face."⁵ His expression is *אֶכְפֶּרֶה פָּנָיו*, and for our purpose it makes little difference whether we take the face to be equivalent to the person, or whether we think of it specifically as an angry face. To translate the word "cover" in this instance is par-

⁴ If this hypothesis is correct, Arabic usage was originally in line with Assyrian as well as Syriac. See Haupt, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1900, p. 61, and Zimmern in *Keilinschriften und Altes Testament*, ed. 3, p. 601.

⁵ Gen. 32:20.

ticularly unfortunate, because the passage itself intimates that the object of the present is to enable the giver to look with comfort upon the face of his brother. We are irresistibly reminded of another expression for the pacifying of anger, which describes the process as a *smoothing* of the face—smoothing away the frown is evidently in the mind of the speaker.

The transition to liturgical usage is made by thinking of any transgression of the rights of God as a debt which must be satisfied. The compensation is made most naturally by a gift. When the Philistines were convinced that they had made a mistake in subjecting the ark to humiliation, they consulted their priests to learn how to make compensation. On their advice reparation was made by golden votive offerings, and with these the ark was sent back.⁶ The incident is significant in more than one way. Most obviously it shows the spontaneous tendency to make reparation by a gift. But it also shows how the man in doubt as to a proper mode of reparation had recourse to the priests. The gift in this instance is not called a *kopher*, but an *asham*; but the idea is the same.

The whole series of sacrifices is looked at as a gift to God. This is obvious from the striking declaration that the guilt of Eli's house shall not be compensated (יְחַכֵּפֶר) by sacrifice or offering forever.⁷ It has often been remarked that the terms used here ("sacrifice" and "offering") are not the ones designating the sin-offerings of the Law, but the general ones used for bloody and unbloody offerings. Even the priestly legislation, although it lays an emphasis before unheard-of on sin-offerings, gives it as the object of all the offerings "to render the offerer acceptable before Yahweh." This is immediately explained by our verb—"to make *compensation* on his behalf." Farther on in the same passage we learn that the compensation or appeasement is effected by the offerings, because they are a satisfying savor to Yahweh.⁸ In view of this we have no hesitation in interpreting Ezekiel's directions in the same sense. In his new commonwealth he ordains that the prince shall see to the performance of the whole temple service "in order to appease on behalf of the people."

⁶ 1 Sam. 6; 1-18.

⁷ 1 Sam. 3:14.

⁸ Lev. 1:3, 4, 9.

It will be asked perhaps, with some surprise, whether it was thought by the authors or compilers of the priestly tradition that Yahweh was constantly in a frame of mind that needed appeasement. The answer to this question is, "Yes and no." The effect of the fall of Jerusalem was to emphasize the priestly tradition, and this tradition centered in the thought of sacred and profane as two opposed provinces. In one class was Yahweh and all that belonged to him; in the other was everything else, including all the things of daily life. To intrude what was not consecrated into the presence of Yahweh was to arouse his wrath. To be sure of acceptance with him, it was best to be on the safe side and placate him at every approach. His mind might be gracious toward his people, and yet the individual who came near might be in a state of defilement that would rouse his wrath. The anxiety of the post-exilic believer to be protected from unwitting sins shows how constant was the danger of giving offense, and it explains the desire to placate the divinity in all the ways prescribed by tradition. In the earlier time the priests seem to have had the power of exacting a fine in case a man came to the sanctuary in a state of ritual unfitness. This was now done away with, and definite regulations were formulated for all cases. Instead of the fines we have the sin-offerings and trespass-offerings.

- But the point of view is the same; all are payments in compensation of some supposed or suspected violation of the rights of Yahweh.

That it is the gift which is effectual in these cases, and not some substitutional or piacular taking of life, will be evident from one or two considerations. Even where the bloody offering is enjoined, the poor man is allowed to bring some flour as his gift, and its efficacy is described in the same terms as the efficacy of the sacrifice. Equally suggestive is the fact that an offering of incense is efficacious in appeasing the wrath of Yahweh. When the people murmured against Moses and Aaron in the affair of Korah, the anger of Yahweh was kindled and the plague broke out. At Moses' command Aaron took a censer, and when the incense was ignited the plague was stayed. Undoubtedly the main lesson of the story is the efficacy of the priestly mediation. But this does not hinder us from seeing that it is the pleasing gift which appeases the wrath. It is only one step

farther when the intercession of a chosen man effects the placation without gift or incense.⁹

It will be thought that the discussion so far has not done justice to the asserted efficacy of the blood in such a passage as the following: "Any man, of the house of Israel or of the clients who sojourn among you, who eats any blood—I will set my face against that soul, which eats blood, and will cut it off from the midst of its people. For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you on the altar to make appeasement for your lives; for the blood makes appeasement by virtue of the life therein." The primary object of the verses is to warn against eating blood. The reason given is that the blood is brought to the altar, and this in turn is accounted for by the value of the blood as containing the life. In other words, the author thinks the value of the gift determined by the fact that it is the gift of a life. But all this is a refinement of speculation not found in any other passage. Even this does not invalidate the contention that the sacrifice is first and last a gift. And if we go back to Hebrew antiquity, we shall find another reason for the employment of the blood on the altar, a reason which is indicated in some passages of the Old Testament. Another prohibition of eating blood is preserved to us, and this joins the fat and the blood. Now, the reason why the fat was not eaten was that it was the best part of the sacrifice and was reserved for Yahweh. It is easy to see that the prohibition of blood, found in close connection with the other, was originally based on the same reason. And that we might not be in doubt Ezekiel says in so many words that the food of Yahweh is fat and blood.¹⁰ This is in accord with primitive Semitic usage, in which the blood was poured upon the stone which was regarded as the dwelling of the god, or else allowed to run into a pit at its base, evidently as nourishment grateful to the divinity.

This shows that the blood is the chief gift, or the most valuable

⁹ As is the case in the incident of the golden calf. It is a mistake to suppose that Moses here offers himself as a sin-offering. His willingness to be blotted out of the book is the strongest expression of his love for his people, but it is not the cause of the change of mind on the part of Yahweh. See Exod. 32:11-14, 30-35; 33:11-17. The other examples cited are recorded in Numb. 16:41-48; Ezek. 45:17.

¹⁰ Ezek. 44:7; cf. Lev. 3:17; 17:10 f.

part of the gift, to Yahweh. When Ezekiel ordains that the blood be applied to the altar and to the doorposts of the new temple, we might suppose him thinking only of the assurance thus given that the sacrifice has been duly performed. But more careful consideration shows that we have here a point of view different from the one we have discovered heretofore. The emphasis of the distinction between sacred and profane gave new importance to those substances which traditionally had power to remove persons or things from one sphere to the other. Blood was one of these substances. Perhaps it was the blood of a sacrificial animal only that had this power; being itself sacred by the presentation of the animal to God, it was able to communicate the same quality to other things. Of its efficacy there can be no question. And when the dread of being ritually unclean became so marked a feature of the religious mind as was the case in Judaism, it was natural that the blood should be thought of as wiping off the defilement. We thus have a return to the primitive meaning of our verb. Blood was employed as a consecrating medium for the sanctuary, for the sacred vessels, for the people as a whole, for the priesthood, and for individuals who had lost their ritual purity.

It must be clear that there is in all this no question of sin in our sense of the word. When the leper is fortunately healed of his disease, he must be purified by the rite appointed for the purpose. No doubt the original idea was that he had been in the power of the demon of disease and could not come before Yahweh with that contagion upon him. The purification is accomplished by an offering of three lambs, fine flour, and oil. The blood of one of the lambs is applied to the right ear, right thumb, and right great toe of the convalescent. Some of the oil is applied in the same way. Both the blood and the oil owe their efficacy to the fact that they have been consecrated to Yahweh, a portion of both having been sprinkled before him. The demon of disease is banished by the sacred substances, or the marks of his possession are wiped off by them. The primitive idea is even more distinctly brought out by the case of an infected house. Here it is ordered that the priest bring two birds to a stream of running water. One of these is slain, and the other, after being dipped in the blood, is allowed to go free. The blood of the slain bird is

then sprinkled on the house. Here one idea is presented in two forms: the bird which is set free carries the contagion away; the blood sprinkled counteracts it. The obliteration of the uncleanness is the thing accomplished.¹¹ The verb *kipper*, which is used in both cases, has evidently come to mean "purify." What interests us here is that the purification is accomplished by application of the blood or of some other sacred substance to the infected person. The idea in thus applying it is exactly the same idea which lies at the basis of the sin-offering. This is clear if we compare the case of the woman who has given birth to a child. Here quite certainly there is no question of sin, in our sense of the term. So far from being a sinner, the woman has received special grace from God. Yet by tradition she is regarded as unclean; that is, she is not fit to approach the sanctuary without some rite which will remove the disability. The primitive idea was no doubt that she had been under the patronage of a divinity of fruitfulness whose worship was incompatible with that of Yahweh. But in the period in which the law was recorded for us this idea had long ceased to have any vitality. It had left only the conception of ritual unfitness. Hence the requirement of a sin-offering. This is offered by her, and the result is just the same as in the case of the leper. Here there is no direction to apply the blood to the person, but the significance of the rite is unmistakable—it purges away the contagion.¹²

As has already been indicated, the significance of our verb in these passages is not very remote from its earliest meaning. But the emphasis of the idea of purification made an important change, in that it brought a new subject into view. Where a debt was wiped out by a payment, the agent was the debtor. In cases where blood-money was paid we may suppose it often went through the hands of a mediator. The sacrifice at the sanctuary must be brought by the priest. Now the mediator may act for either party, and when emphasis came to be laid upon the efficacy of a purifying rite, the actual subject of the verb came to be regarded as Yahweh himself. This is clear from some passages in which we do not always appreciate the full meaning of the verb. Thus in the song of Moses

¹¹ Lev. 14:10-18, 49-53.

¹² Lev. 12:6-8.

it is said: "Shout aloud, ye nations, his people, for he avenges the blood of his servants; he repays his enemies with vengeance and purifies the land of his people."¹³ The idea is that the land is defiled by the innocent blood shed upon it. We are even tempted to see in this passage the original meaning "compensate," and to translate so here and in another case: "No compensation shall be made to the land for blood shed upon it, except by the blood of the one who shed it."¹⁴ But as in this case it is specifically asserted that the blood defiles the land, it is clear that the meaning is "purify." What interests us in the deuteronomic passage is that Yahweh is the subject. It is he who purifies the land from its defilement. This is also the interpretation we must put on the prayer that he will *kapper* his people and lay no innocent blood upon them. This prayer comes in connection with the curious rite performed when a man has been murdered and the murderer is not known.¹⁵ In this case a heifer has its neck broken, probably to placate the spirit of the murdered man. But Yahweh must himself intervene if the stain upon the people is to be effectively wiped away. When Isaiah is terrified by the thought that he is a man of unclean lips, the live coal is applied to his lips and he is told that his sin is *purged away*.¹⁶

From this point of view we understand the following from Ezekiel: "And thou shalt be ashamed and shalt not be able to open thy mouth because of thy confusion when I purify thee for all that thou hast done."¹⁷ The adulterous Jerusalem who is here addressed has been guilty of all sorts of abominations which have defiled her so that she is unfit for approach to God. Before she can even present her prayer for forgiveness she needs to be cleansed, and this is what is promised. Yahweh will by his power intervene and remove the defilement. The phrase used in the passage is the same which describes the act by which the priest cleanses the people from ritual defilement. To translate our word in this place "forgive" is to give a turn to the verse quite foreign to the author's intention. And we may say the same of several passages in which we are tempted to make the word mean "forgive." To one brought up in ritual ideas cleansing is quite as important as forgiveness, and when the

¹³ Deut. 32:43.¹⁵ Deut. 21:1-9.¹⁷ Ezek. 16:63.¹⁴ Numb. 35:33.¹⁶ Isa. 6:7.

psalmists pray for the removal of that stain which is contracted by unwitting sins, they ask that God will purge the stain away.

The prayer for purification does not necessarily imply that the external rite was a condition essential to the divine grace. The psalmists certainly were conscious that the Spirit of God worketh when and where and how he pleaseth. The Chronicler, attached though he was to the ritual, conceived of Yahweh's making up by his grace for any ceremonial shortcomings. In his narrative Hezekiah prays for those who were not able to purify themselves for the Passover, in these words: "May the good Yahweh purify (כִּפֹּר כִּפֹּר) every one who sets his mind on seeking Yahweh, the God of his fathers."¹⁸ The phrase here used is the one employed both by Leviticus and by Ezekiel for the act of the priest in cleansing himself or the temple from ritual defilement. The Chronicler evidently believes that the purification may be effected by God himself without the use of external means. And in the few cases where our word is translated "forgive" or "pardon", the conception is the same. Purification is needed, but sacrifice and offering are not necessary means to this end.

The path along which we have traced our word seems to be a tolerably straight one. The verb means "to wipe out"; then "to compensate" for an injury by a payment of some kind; then "to appease" the anger of an offended person; lastly "to purify" from ritual defilement by the required offerings, or (where God is the subject) without these. There seems to be no case where the word may not be rendered in one of these ways.

¹⁸ 2 Chron. 30:18 f.; cf. Lev. 9:7; Ezek. 45:17.

THEOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF RITSCHL

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I

The material for theology is given in the revelation of God in the historical person of Jesus Christ.

We can understand God only when we know him through Christ. . . . Not only are God and all his operations of grace to be construed through the revelation of Christ, but even sin can be appreciated only in the virtue of the forgiveness of sins, which is Christ's especial gift.¹

This perfect knowledge of God Christianity claims to have, because the community originates in Jesus Christ, who as Son of God ascribes to himself perfect knowledge of the Father.²

Kattenbusch thinks³ it is the characteristic of Ritschl that he taught that the Christian system of dogmatics is to be formed from this idea, namely,

that concerning God, is to be thought as concerning Christ. God's historical self-testification is the beginning and not the conclusion of dogmatic reflection. To have brought this up is Ritschl's significance, and this will abide though individual ideas of his thought fall away.

For Ritschl the whole historical revelation is to be understood in the light of the historical person of Jesus Christ. The revelation of the Old Testament, especially that of the prophets, was a preparation for him and finds its culmination in him. The early Christian community sprang from his person; they shared his revelation, and preached his message to the world.

To get the full significance of the revelation of Christ, it is necessary to know how the early community viewed him.

For even if his statements seem perfectly clear, their significance becomes completely intelligible only when we see how they are reflected in the consciousness

¹ Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (translated by H. R. MacKintosh), Vol. III, p. 7; referred to in this essay as J. R.

² *Instruction in the Christian Religion* (translated by Alice Mead Swing), p. 172.

³ *Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl*, p. 82.

of those who believe in him, and how the members of the Christian community trace back their consciousness of pardon to the person and the action and passion of Jesus.⁴

It is necessary, in order to understand a historical religion, that we know the formative epoch of its history.

For Christianity in particular the correctness of this observation results especially from its character as the religion of reconciliation with God. The epoch of its foundation includes not merely the personal work of Christ, but also the first generation of this community, since without this definite result the view of the founder could not be recognized as effective.⁵

It is because the New Testament presents the teaching and work of Jesus, and his effect upon the first community, that the material of dogmatics should be derived from it and from it alone. Ritschl does not hold to any mechanical inspiration theory. He recognizes the historical growth of the Scriptures, and he advocates a historical and grammatical interpretation. But the New Testament contains the purest deposit of the revelation of God as manifested in the historical person of Jesus Christ and appropriated by the early community. As a historical critic Ritschl takes a conservative position. The New Testament books are separated from all other works in that they interpret the teachings of Jesus in line with the Old Testament thought, and do not reflect the heresies which arose a little later in the history of the community.

The theology which aims to present the authentic content of the Christian religion in positive form must draw the same from the books of the New Testament and from no other source.⁶

But the theologian does not have his material presented in the New Testament in as objective a manner as the scientist would find his in a collection of insects; and they do not proceed by the same method. If it be remembered that the living revelation is in the community and that the community still exists, while the Scriptures are the literary deposit of the formative period of that community, then one can see that it is absolutely necessary, in order to appropriate the revelation of God and to deal with the data of theology, that one be a living member of that community. The revelation of God is

⁴ *J. R.*, sec. 1.

⁵ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. II, Introduction.

⁶ *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Vol. II, "Introduction to Biblical Theology."

in Jesus Christ, and one shares it as one lives in the community established by Jesus, "and shares in the forgiveness of sins which is his gift to the community."

Only he who has this relation to the founder of our religion will be interested to discover the value and significance of Jesus, and it is only in this relation that his inner life can be experienced and valued.

Authentic and complete knowledge of Jesus' significance—his significance, that is, as a founder of religion—depends then on one's reckoning oneself part of the community which he founded, and this precisely in so far as it believes itself to have received the forgiveness of sins as his peculiar gift. This religious faith does not take an unhistorical view of Jesus. It is quite possible to reach a historical estimate of him without first divesting oneself of this faith, this religious valuation of his person. The opposite view is one of the characteristics which mark the great untruth which exerts a deceptive and confusing influence under the name of a historical absence of presuppositions. . . . We can discover the full compass of his historical activity solely from the faith in the Christian community. . . . We are able to know and understand God, sin, conversion and eternal life in the Christian sense, only so far as we consciously and intentionally reckon ourselves members of the community which Christ has founded.⁷

The theologian then must stand within the redeemed community of Christ to interpret his material which he derives from the New Testament. It is from this position that he is enabled to construct a system of dogmatics. From this attitude he is enabled to decide whether to incorporate or reject certain parts of New Testament teaching. Dogmatics is not mere biblical theology. There are parts of the New Testament teaching which are local and temporal, and have no place in dogmatics. The theologian, as member of the Christian community sharing the forgiveness of sins, must value his material. All that makes more real and clear the revelation of God in Jesus Christ has a place in his system. All that serves to obscure or adulterate that revelation must be excluded. It matters not whether it comes from science, metaphysics, or the Scriptures. "The person of Christ must be regarded as the ground of knowledge to be used in the definition of every doctrine."

Inasmuch as the central fact of this revelation is the forgiveness of sins, all parts of a system of theology must center around this

⁷ *J. R.*, Vol. III, sec. 1.

truth. Only truths of salvation have a place in theology. All propositions of dogmatics are truths of faith. "Even sin can be appreciated only in virtue of the forgiveness of sins." Theology is intensely practical. "We must not admit into dogmatics anything which cannot be employed in preaching and in the intercourse of Christians with one another."⁸

From this religious point of view one can see why Ritschl is so positive in his rejection of natural theology. There can be no mixture of the rich truths of salvation with the barren and alien results of natural speculation. Such a result is detrimental to the practical and saving character of theological knowledge. But in the second place—and this is the more important—the method of natural theology is so opposed to the method of the Christian theologian that when one takes the position which the former as a science requires, one is unable to appropriate and value the Christian revelation itself. To attain religious knowledge of God, one must be a Christian. One is morally and religiously interested in the truths he seeks. His blessedness and salvation depend on them, and his attitude must be one of unconditional trust, if he would know God as revealed in Christ.

But now natural theology would follow quite another method and place one in the same relation to the objects of religion that one occupies in relation to those of science. One would seek as objective an attitude as possible. But this leaves all that is distinctly valuable in the Christian religion, all that has redemptive power, out of consideration. This method does for natural science, because its data are more or less objective and open to all. But the data of theology are so much richer, so much more subjective and personal, that the ordinary categories of science are not adequate to it at all. The method of natural science misses the material of theology.

Traub expresses more clearly than Ritschl himself the position of the latter, when he says that science as science has to do with truth apart from its objective applicability. In that sense theology can lay claim to be science. But the reality with which it deals is of the highest worth, and can be experienced only by those who know its worth for them. Personal conviction is necessary to attain its

⁸ *J. R.*, p. 606.

truth, and to take this attitude is to follow a method adequate to the object. On this account our interest in truth is not lessened, but the more valuable the material, the greater is the necessity for an impartial ascertaining of its reality.⁹ This is the real meaning of Ritschl when he calls religious knowledge "interested knowledge," and declares that the "scientific worker must so far keep this degree of interest in sight as to conserve all those characteristics of the conception of God which render possible the trust described above." And yet Ritschl affirms again that "theology" as a science, "is disinterested cognition." We have already seen that Ritschl excludes the metaphysical content and method from theology. We now see why he excludes the natural-science method, and will not allow theology to become the general science of religion.

II

It is from the point of view already taken that we can best approach Ritschl's philosophical statement concerning the nature of religious knowledge and its differentiation from scientific knowledge. Ritschl says that the Christian theologian may make a regulative use of other religions. When the Christian religion is compared with other religions and its knowledge with the knowledge of other religions, one finds that all religious knowledge is of a kind, and that it differs from scientific knowledge. Every religion may be regarded as a revelation. All religious knowledge is that in which we are profoundly interested and satisfies practical needs. It is knowledge of redemption. A peculiar attitude on the part of the recipient is always necessary to share this knowledge.

In every religion what is sought with the help of supernatural spiritual powers, revered by man, is a solution of the contradiction in which man finds himself as both a part of the world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate nature. For in the former rôle he is part of nature, dependent upon her, subject to and confined by other things; but as a spirit he is moved by an impulse to maintain his independence against it. In this juncture religion springs up as faith in a superhuman spiritual power, by whose help the power which man possesses of himself is in some way supplanted and elevated into a unity of its own kind, which is a match for the pressure of the natural world.¹⁰

It is this intensely personal character of religious knowledge which

⁹ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, January, 1903.

¹⁰ *J. R.*, secs. 27-30; for following discussion and quotations.

differentiates it from the more disinterested and scientific knowledge. Indeed, Ritschl tells us that

religious and theoretical knowledge are different functions of the human spirit, which, while they deal with the same objects, are not even partially coincident, but wholly diverge.

In order to bring out the characteristic of religious knowledge, let us first present Ritschl's view of scientific knowledge.

Scientific knowledge includes the knowledge of the natural sciences. Ritschl calls it theoretic, scientific, or even philosophic knowledge. Philosophic knowledge then, for Ritschl, is scientific knowledge. Or, if they differ at all, philosophic knowledge is the more general form of scientific knowledge. Philosophic knowledge is theoretic knowledge, and does not include the knowledge that comes from religion. To determine the difference between scientific and religious knowledge,

it is necessary to recall the twofold manner in which the mind further appropriates the sensations aroused within it. The sensations are determined according to their value for the self by the feeling of pleasure and pain. In the feeling of pleasure and pain, the self decides whether a sensation which touches the feeling of self serves to heighten or depress it. On the other hand, through the idea the sensation is judged according to its cause, the nature of the latter, and its connection with other causes; and by means of observation, etc., the knowledge of things thus gained is extended till it becomes scientific. . . . Scientific knowledge seeks to discover the laws of nature and spirit through observation, and is based on the presumption that both the observations and their arrangement are carried out according to the ascertained laws of human cognition.

Scientific knowledge, then, deals with the content of sensations as these are united together in the association of ideas, with these ideas as they are brought under the categories of causation, etc., to form an objective world, and with the whole scientific ordering and arrangement of the objective world. By the process of induction, by observation and experiment, science aims to bring the whole world under a general law. If one wished to be convinced of the truth of a scientific statement, one would examine the processes by which the statement had been made. One would see that the observations had been carefully and accurately made, and that every step in the process was in accordance with the ascertained laws of thought. Or, to know a fact for science is to articulate it in the causal process.

This is the proof for theoretic knowledge. Of course, in the last analysis it rests upon our faith in the processes of cognition, but, in general, science does not take account of this fundamental presupposition.

Now, this scientific knowledge is, when contrasted with religious knowledge, what we may term "disinterested knowledge." But certainly we have some interest in the matter, or we would not carry on the process of cognition at all.

It must not be forgotten that all continuous cognition of things which excite sensation is not only accompanied, but is likewise guided, by feeling. For, in so far as attention is necessary to attain the end of knowledge, will, as representing the desire for accurate cognition, comes in between; the proximate cause of will, however, is feeling, as expressing the consciousness that a thing or activity is worth desiring, or that something ought to be put away. Value-judgments, therefore, are determinative in all connected knowledge of the world, even when carried out in the most objective fashion. . . . Without interest we do not trouble ourselves about anything.

What we may, therefore, call concomitant value-judgments are "operative and necessary in all theoretical cognition." And especially is this true "in prolonged technical observation and combination, where attention is concentrated for a long period of time." Even scientific knowledge is interested knowledge in the sense that it arises because we think it is valuable to construct it; because, without this originating and accompanying feeling of value for us, we would never waste the necessary energy to create it. Ritschl even seems to admit that scientific knowledge grows to supply a practical need, and that it calls up a certain amount of pleasure and pain in so far as it succeeds or fails. It is only then in contrast with the more personal and practical character of religious knowledge that we can call the latter disinterested knowledge.

It is because scientific knowledge advances by experience and observation that it cannot comprehend the world as a whole. There is always new material; and its work is never complete. It can, to be sure, discover the general laws of nature and spirit, and philosophic knowledge holds before it the ambition to comprehend the world as a whole. At one time Ritschl seems to concede that philosophy might do this, and in that case would have a common object with religion; but, in general, he sees in this desire of philosophy something in addition to "disinterested science" and the work of

an "intuitive imagination." This is a religious impulse and should have no place in scientific knowledge.

While philosophy or scientific knowledge cannot comprehend the world as a whole, it has no right to deny this power to religious faith. In fact, science to attain its ideal as knowledge, must acknowledge the Christian conception of God.

For knowledge has laid on it the task of comprehending the coexistence of the natural and spiritual life. If so, nothing remains but to accept the Christian idea of God, and that, too, as an indispensable truth, in order that we find both the ground and law of the real world in that creative will which includes as the final end of the world the destination of mankind for the kingdom of God.

If now we turn to religious knowledge, we see that it arises out of the attitude which the self takes to the sensations, or out of the feelings of value which the presented object excites in the self.

The ego decides in a feeling of pleasure and pain whether the sensation which touches the feeling of self serves to heighten or to depress it.

These judgments of the self concerning the value of the sensation to arouse pleasure or pain, to advance or hinder its purposes, may be called independent value-judgments, in contrast with the accompanying value-judgments which go along with every process of cognition.

Independent value-judgments are all perceptions of moral ends or hindrances, in so far as they excite moral pleasure or pain, or, it may be, set in motion the will to appropriate what is good or repel the opposite.

Of these independent value-judgments there are two classes, namely, moral and religious value-judgments. Religious judgments cannot be traced back to the condition which marks the knowledge belonging to moral will, for there exists religion which goes on without any relation whatever to the moral conduct of life. Religious knowledge moves in independent value-judgments, which relate to man's attitude to the world and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys dominion over the world, vouchsafed him by God, or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end. . . . In Christianity religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with his final end.

In terms of the value-judgment Ritschl expresses all that was

brought out in the previous section concerning the practical and personal character of religious knowledge. All religious knowledge runs in value-judgments. One knows the nature of God and Christ in their worth for us, in their saving activity in creating our blessedness. "Only in their saving worth for us are we able to know rightly God, Christ, the communion of believers, our conversion and regeneration." Even sin is known as the measure of its unworth as presented in the light of the blessedness of the kingdom of God. This was the position of Luther when he taught that God and faith are inseparable correlates.

Knowledge of God can be demonstrated as religious knowledge only when he is conceived of as securing to the believer a position in the world which more than counterbalances his restrictions.

If we ask after the psychological formation of religious ideas, Ritschl answers that they are the work of the intuitive imagination. The religious representations of God and the world present themselves as an object of the perceiving imagination (*anschauenden Phantasie*). But the idea of God is no accidental or lawless work of the imagination, nor can we speak of it as "mere imagination;" but the religious view of God and the world spring from the practical law of the human spirit. The certainty of religious truth is not established by an examination of the processes of cognition—that is, by logical proof—but by the assurance of the feeling, willing side of the self. It is by the function of the objects of religion, by the fact that it assures our blessedness, that we are certain of its reality. As in the case of scientific reasoning the certainty lodges finally in the intellectual processes themselves, so here the certainty is found in the feeling-willing side of our nature.

But religious knowledge conveys a knowledge of reality just as truly as scientific knowledge does. The method of attainment is different, and each is suited to attain genuine knowledge of the reality in question. Ritschl uses value-judgments interchangeably with faith. And he says that Luther

seems to reduce the religious character of the knowledge of God to the arbitrary feelings of the subject, and we seem to be furnished with the corroboration that a man's God varies as his faith. But Luther distinguishes between two kinds of faith, that which is sincere and that which is infected with illusions. If he

reduced everything to arbitrary caprice, he would not make this distinction, which depends on whether one takes, or does not take, the right way of knowledge to God, namely, through Christ. For faith which is genuine and sincere can be experienced only in response to the true revelation of God.

When one asks concerning the relation of scientific knowledge to religious knowledge, Ritschl replies that, while scientific knowledge can never deal with the world as a whole, it is the very nature of religious knowledge to deal with the world as a whole. For it is the world-whole from which man has been redeemed and over which he is preserved by God. Then, too, science has to accept the Christian ideal of God if it is to attain its goal. But we may go even farther than this; we see the necessity of, and even prove, or at least postulate, the Christian idea of God apart from the religious judgments of value. Kant did this in his moral argument for the existence of God. One can scarcely say that this proof, since it rests on the difference in value between nature and spirit, rests on scientific or philosophical knowledge, but rather upon moral value-judgments. Theological or religious knowledge is scientific, because it follows a method adequate to its object, and because it furnishes a view of the world which science must accept.

III

Wendland claims that in the first edition of his work Ritschl made the difference between religious and world-knowledge lie in the different objects of each.¹¹ Religion relates to the world as a whole, and philosophic knowledge seeks to discover the general laws of nature and spirit. But in his later edition Ritschl contradicts this statement, for he tells us that metaphysics gives us very elementary knowledge, and the difference now is to be found in the functions of the subject. To explain this two-fold function of the ego, Ritschl introduces his value-judgments. Pfeiderer also presses this criticism and says that in the two editions of Ritschl we have a clear contradiction.¹² In the first edition Ritschl claims that if philosophy could view the world as a whole, it would clash with religion. In the last edition he admits that it may; but even here he mixes the two positions and is inconsistent. We are told that phil-

¹¹ *Albrecht Ritschl und seine Schüler*, chap. 2.

¹² *Ritschl'sche Theologie*, chap. 2.

osophy can give a view of the world as a whole, and again that this attempt on the part of philosophy comes from the religious impulse and signifies an abandonment of the scientific method.

Wendland has been unable to see that Ritschl identifies philosophic knowledge with scientific, and differentiates both from the *a priori* and elementary knowledge of metaphysics.

The philosophic knowledge of nature and spirit surpasses in worth metaphysical knowledge, which investigates both magnitudes only under the conception of things in general, therefore superficially.¹³

One may reject Ritschl's view of metaphysics. One may claim that metaphysics does not even give a world-ground, or one may hold that it gives even more; but since Ritschl defines it as he does, and excludes it from theology because the latter has a richer content, it is not fair to say that by the exclusion of metaphysics he has shut out reality. Kaftan tells us¹⁴ that the term "metaphysics" is ambiguous. If one understands by its use in theology an attempt to make intelligible the objects of faith by cosmological speculation, then he would reject it. But if one means that faith has not to do with mere subjective conditions of consciousness, but with eternal supersensual realities which actually condition and give a true understanding of all reality, then he agrees with him.

In regard to the second criticism of Wendland also urged by Pfeiderer, we answer that it is only partially correct. The position that philosophy cannot give a world-whole is the general position of Ritschl throughout the last edition, while the concept of worth of which the value-judgment is only a fuller expression is prominent in his first edition. It is true that in his last edition Ritschl does concede that philosophy aims to know the world as a whole; but when he comes into closer relation with his problem, his position is precisely that of his first edition; and on this matter Reischle, a pupil of Ritschl, tells us¹⁵ that he never changed his view. He always held that the honor belonged to Christianity to present a view of the world as a whole.

Ritschl did not give to philosophy the knowledge that results

¹³ *Theologie und Metaphysik*, sec. 1.

¹⁴ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1893.

¹⁵ *Welturteile und Glaubensurteile*.

from value-judgment. It is for this reason that he would scarcely concede to it the right to know the world as a whole. In the world of science, as Ritschl understood it, there would be no place for morality or freedom. Moreover, science or philosophy can never give a final or exhaustive statement of reality, because experience is still in progress. But philosophy today would claim that it is just its task to make some statement concerning the world as a whole, because the individual has to act with reference to the world-whole.

While Ritschl does not use the term "value-judgment" in his first edition, Reischle shows very clearly that the position he takes there is in harmony with that of his later work. In the first edition he claims that religious and world-knowledge represent "opposed activities of the human spirit." In the second edition he says "different functions of the spirit." He tells us also that science and religion attain their results by different methods—the one by observation and experiment, while the other is practical and its ideas are the work of the imagination. Moreover, he gives the same statement of the origin of religion. It arises out of the conflict of man as a part of nature, and yet as a spirit opposing himself to nature. The whole idea, then, of value is present in the first edition, though the term "value-judgment" is not used.

Pfleiderer,¹⁶ Schoen,¹⁷ and Traub¹⁸ point out that in the first edition of his work Ritschl concluded his examination of Kant's moral proof with this judgment: "This acceptance of the idea of God is not an act of practical faith, but an idea of theoretical reason." In the last edition he follows much the same argument; he chides Kant because he fails to estimate the practical reason at its proper worth, and claims that "if exertion of the moral will is a reality, then the practical reason is a branch of theoretical cognition;" and he points out that Kant's failure was in the fact that "for him sensibility was a characteristic mark of reality." Yet he concludes his argument with these words: "The assumption of the idea of God is, as Kant remarks, practical faith, and not an act of theoretical knowledge." In the first edition Ritschl thought that theoretic

¹⁶ *Ritschl'sche Theologie*, chap. 2.

¹⁷ *Origines historiques de la theologie de Ritschl*.

¹⁸ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1894.

reason must establish the existence of God in order that theology may be scientific, while in the last edition theology is a science because it follows a method adequate to its means.

Pfeiderer affirms that in his last edition Ritschl claims that the idea of God cannot be proved outside of religious faith. But Ritschl says:

This argument is based upon necessary data of the spiritual life of man, which is outside of the religious view of the world, and must be explained either by recognizing the Christian idea of God or not at all.

Ritschl denies, then, that theoretic reason can prove the existence of God, but he adds that moral value-judgments must postulate his existence. Ritschl does not make a clear discrimination between what morality demands and what religious faith affirms on this point. Again, Ritschl does not seem to have made clear to himself whether moral value-judgments can be included in the theoretic reason or not. In the first edition he gave this to the theoretic reason and recognized the proof as established by scientific knowledge, while in the last edition he closes with the recognition that such a process of reasoning is a value-judgment. The proof is demonstrative in either case; it is merely a question of method, and it shows conclusively that Ritschl never doubted the reality of the object which the value-judgment affirmed. In general, religious knowledge, as knowledge which runs in value-judgments, is contrasted with scientific, which is mechanical and causal; and the moral value-judgments are left out of consideration. Here, though he mixes at times the moral value-judgments with the religious judgments of faith, still the inference is that the existence of God is a postulate of the moral life and does not have to support itself on revelation. The exact relation between moral and religious value-judgments is not quite clear. Does Ritschl mean to affirm that morality solves the problem of religion?

Traub thinks that Ritschl's statements in his last edition regarding the moral argument are not consistent with his propositions that religious knowledge "runs in value-judgments." For when theoretic science recognizes the moral consciousness as a reality, it has in mind the psychological activity, while Ritschl includes its valuation. With the recognition of the former there might still go the judgment

that its ideals are illusions. When you affirm them as a reality, your judgment is a practical valuation. The whole view that nature is a means for spirit is a value-judgment.

In his doctrine of the personality of God, where Ritschl attempts to prove that the idea of personality and of the Absolute are not contradictory, Pfeiderer, Traub, and Ecke find a speculative task which is inconsistent with the practical character of religious knowledge. The criticism is in part just. Ritschl shows the influence of Lotze's philosophy, and indulges in speculations which have no place in dogmatics. Yet apologetics must treat some of these questions. And when the proposition that religious knowledge runs in value-judgments is not interpreted too narrowly; when it is understood that a proposition does not rest upon an immediate feeling, but that it rests finally on the ground of the conviction of the worth of the truth for our personal life, some of these so-called speculative discussions will then ground themselves indirectly on value-judgments.

Ritschl's doctrine of value-judgments has led to much criticism and discussion by his critics and disciples. The former have charged him with reducing religion to mere subjectivity and with erecting an irreconcilable dualism in the human mind. Luthardt says¹⁹ that for Ritschl religion does not deal with existences, but with values. The value-judgment is severed from existence and left hanging in the air. He does not realize that the significance of the fact must have its foundation in the fact itself.

Stählin thinks ²⁰ that if Ritschl "meant by value-judgments" that the knowledge which has no value relative to salvation is not to be regarded as religious, and that much which the scholastics regarded as important is to be excluded, then the church will probably raise no objection to him. But this is not his meaning. For him there is no deity of Christ objectively considered. "If religious knowledge consists in value-judgments, it lacks objectivity."

Orr admits²¹ that religion has its "roots deep in the immediate consciousness of God;" that it has its own modes of "apprehension

¹⁹ *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben*, 1881.

²⁰ *Kant, Lotze, und Ritschl*.

²¹ *The Ritschlian Theology*, chap. 8.

and expression;" that there is a "strong practical tendency in religion;" that its "modes of representation are figurative and pictorial;" and that this element of truth is expressed in Ritschl's view. But Ritschl's statement lands us in subjectivity, and presents a dualism in the human mind.

Pfleiderer finds²² an element of truth in Ritschl's statement which has been recognized since Schleiermacher, but he detects also two great errors. For, according to Ritschl, the feeling of worth not only forms the motive of investigation, but actually dictates the result. The first is true, but the latter is absolutely fatal to any scientific work. Then, again, according to Ritschl's own statement, religious knowledge ought not to run in value-judgments alone. For he distinctly states that "the two functions of spirit mentioned are always in operation simultaneously, and always also in some degree mutually related, even though it be in the inverse ratio of prominence." If theoretic judgments are accompanied by value-judgments, then the latter are, or ought to be, accompanied by the former. But Ritschl says that religious knowledge runs in independent value-judgments. Then they are purely subjective and have not the slightest guarantee for the objective worth of their knowledge. Ritschl comes to the position of Lange, who would tell us that religious ideas are practically useful and worthful, but are groundless imaginations. But religious ideas can be worthful only when one is convinced of their truth.

Wendland says²³ that no one will deny that religious knowledge rests on the inner experience of the pious soul, and that its religious ideas have peculiar interest for the religious subject. But the term "value-judgment" is not a proper designation of the character of religious knowledge.

Kattenbusch affirms²⁴ that Ritschl never meant that we can have a system of pure value-judgments in differentiation from judgments of existence. Ritschl means that dogmatics as a science must not pass beyond the knowledge which is given in value-judgments. He does not affirm that the realities are not in existence apart from

²² See reference, footnote, p. 423.

²³ *Albrecht Ritschl und seine Schüler*.

²⁴ *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1882.

value-judgments, but that they are not in existence for us. Ritschl's proposition that what we know of God comes from his operations upon us is made without reference to the difference between value and theoretic judgments.

Garvie considers²⁵ that Ritschl meant the value-judgment to be as true as a scientific judgment. He says that when Dr. Denney affirms that Jesus has, according to Ritschl, for the religious consciousness the religious value of God, but has for the scientific knowledge the common real value of man, and that it is only the subjective, pious estimate of the Christian which gives him the value of God, he is guilty of a double misconception. For Ritschl holds that the scientific consciousness cannot affirm or deny anything about the divinity of Christ. The truth is not in the realm of scientific consciousness, and cannot be reached by its methods. Ritschl would also affirm that the considerations of science do not correspond with truth more closely than the estimate of the pious Christian.

Traub contends²⁶ that Pfeiderer has not interpreted Ritschl correctly. For the latter never claims that the interest of the investigator should determine the result. Ritschl merely means that knowledge arises because of a feeling of its worth, and he makes this clear when he tells us that this feeling is necessary to arouse and sustain attention. He distinctly points out that the validity of scientific knowledge is to be assured by careful observation and by investigation according to the "ascertained laws of human cognition." Further, Traub urges that those who charge Ritschl with subjectivity ought to realize the significance of the charge. For Ritschl knew as well as his critics that to bring the actual reality of the object of religion in question meant the death of all religion. The question is one of method, and Ritschl claims that one can be certain of the objective reality only in the religious experience. The facts of salvation prove themselves as real facts to him who experiences them in his inner life. Ritschl means by his term "value-judgment" that the certainty of faith is not a theoretical conclusion, but a personal conviction. If one calls this Feuerbachianism, then he bases his assertion on the ungrounded assumption that only theoretical knowledge is real.

²⁵ *The Ritschlian Theology*.

²⁶ See reference, footnote, p. 434.

In the doctrine of the value-judgment Ritschl and his school mean to give philosophical expression to the personal and practical character of religious knowledge. Herrmann, on the philosophical basis of Kant, affirms²⁷ the dignity of man and the practical character of all knowledge. He is the first to apply the term "value-judgment" to religious knowledge, which, he holds, has a postulate nature and rests on the basis of the moral feeling of worth. The method by which it is obtained is not that of scientific knowledge, but it is none the less knowledge of reality.

The first use of this term by Ritschl was in his criticism of the work of Kaftan.²⁸ The latter starts out with the twofold activity of consciousness, which both presents an object and takes an attitude to it. From this we have the two classes of judgments, one of which deals with the content and expresses a fact, and so makes up the sum of our scientific knowledge; and the other deals with the attitude and is a judgment of value. "Value-judgments express our position to the world, and they add nothing more to the facts on which they relate themselves than what they mean for us." Of these value-judgments there are three kinds: the natural, the moral, and the æsthetic. Religious knowledge rests on the natural value-judgments, since it seeks to preserve the Supreme Good. Religious judgments are judgments of existence based on value-judgments. We have, then, two classes of theoretical judgments, one class of which depends for its validity on observation and the laws of thought, and the other is practically conditioned.

Lipsius²⁹ and Scheibe³⁰ hold positions similar to that of Kaftan. According to both, theoretic judgments may not only be based on scientific observation, but they may assert the existence of a fact on the basis of some practical necessity. That is, theoretical judgments may rest on value-judgments. They distinguish between accidental and necessary value-judgments, and define the latter as those which stand in inseparable connection with the self-certainty of our personal existence. Religion rests on the basis of necessary value-judgments and gives a knowledge of objective reality.

²⁷ *Die Religion in Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit.*

²⁸ *Das Wesen der christlichen Religion.*

²⁹ *Philosophie und Religion*, 1885.

³⁰ *Die Bedeutung der Werturteile für das religiöse Erkennen.*

Otto Ritschl,³¹ in defending the thesis of his father, starts out from the unity of consciousness, which means that no function of the soul can be carried on in complete isolation from the other activities. There must be in every conscious act a certain element of feeling, willing, and ideation. But scientific knowledge demands the isolation of feeling and willing from the intellectual processes as far as possible. This abstraction is obtained by long and careful education, and is never complete, since most men, women especially, and all children think in value-judgments; that is, their ideas are inseparably united with feeling and desire. The element of feeling and willing is present in all religious knowledge, so that one can never sever the religious emotion or the feeling of personal interest from the intellectual element in religious knowledge. But such value-judgments give objective reality and meet the needs of practical life. The presence or absence of an experience of worth in the act of judging has nothing to do with the reality of the object; so that we cannot oppose existential to value-judgments as if the former alone gave us reality. Religious knowledge is not, as Kaftan affirms, based on value-judgments, but it runs in value-judgments. It is personal conviction and must always keep this form.

Reischle in his *Werturteile und Glaubensurteile* gives us the most satisfactory and thorough treatment of this subject in the Ritschlian school, and virtually defends the position of his master. He affirms that worth means a relation, not to the activity of ideation, but to the feeling-willing self. A certain amount of reflection is necessary to pass a value-judgment. The immediate feeling of pain or pleasure may deceive us. The worth of an object is the property of an object to guarantee satisfaction through its existence directly or indirectly to my whole feeling-willing self. There are certain value-judgments, such as the æsthetic, intellectual, moral, and religious, which rest on an ideal valid for the human spirit and can claim universal validity. Inasmuch as the chief aim of knowledge is to decide by careful observation and by attention to the laws of thought concerning the truth or falsity of a matter, the intellectual value-judgment is generally overlooked; and yet all judgments of knowledge are accompanied by a feeling of the worth of knowledge which accompanies the process

³¹ *Ueber Werturteile.*

of knowing and arouses and sustains attention. This is what Ritschl called an accompanying value-judgment; but it is more correct to say that it is an accompanying feeling of value, which only under certain conditions comes to expression as a value-judgment, and in that case as an independent value-judgment.

If we define a value-judgment according to the ordinary use of language, then we must affirm it to be a judgment in which "worth is predicated of any object fixed in presentation." This definition is imperfect, since it both includes many degenerate value-judgments and excludes the moral and intellectual postulates which ought to be regarded as value-judgments. Then, too, the object may not present a reality apart from the presenting consciousness. In this sense the propositions of faith cannot be called value-judgments, for they can have significance only when the spiritual magnitude affirmed by them is a reality; and the Ritschlian school has always held that the judgments of faith are *Seinsurtheile*. Nor is it wise to say that the propositions of faith are theoretic judgments based on value-judgments, as Kaftan and Lipsius; for by theoretic judgments one understands those judgments which rest on the necessity of perception and the laws of thought. The inner experience which is at the basis of religious knowledge is not a judgment of value, but a feeling of value. From a psychological point of view, then, we might define a value-judgment as a judgment brought about on the ground of personal appreciation or valuation. This excludes all judgments which rest on mere custom or authority. Otto Ritschl is wrong when he defines value-judgments as those immediately connected with feelings of worth, since all early judgments are so connected; but value-judgments include only those which grow up on the ground of personal valuation. From this definition we might say that religious knowledge consists or runs in value-judgments, for even the propositions which rest on authority are indirectly grounded in the "value" which the individual ascribes to the person or church.

From a more critical point of view we may define a value-judgment as a judgment whose validity does not rest on the necessity of perception and of logical thinking, but on the position of the feeling-willing self to the object of presentation. From this view we can

see that children do not think in value-judgments, as Otto Ritschl maintained, since the validity of their judgment is grounded in perception and in the laws of thought. Albrecht Ritschl did not clearly distinguish between the psychological and this critical point of view; for though all activity of knowledge is guided by a feeling of worth, still this does not always come to expression as a value-judgment. From this definition Ritschl was right when he held that knowledge runs, or consists in, value-judgments.

The religious propositions of faith are judgments, the validity of which cannot be made certain on grounds of perception and the laws of thought, but only on the ground of living conviction in the believed truth for the personal life.

Thus, though Reischle concedes to the critics of his master the ambiguity of the term "value-judgment," he yet defends the position which means to affirm the personal and practical character of religious knowledge. His agreement with Ritschl goes farther when he denies the postulate character of these judgments, but virtually identifies them with faith, since they are the correlate of the revelation of God as it impresses us in the person of Jesus Christ. He is sure that metaphysics cannot give more than a unitary world-ground, and therefore has nothing to make possible the personal trust of supreme importance to religion. He does not think that metaphysics can even give such a world-ground, and falls back upon the position of Kant.

IV

In view of Ritschl's whole teaching and of the position of his disciples, no unbiased historical student will judge that Ritschl for a moment meant to deny the reality of the object of religion. We have seen already that Ritschl held that one could give a historical estimate of Jesus only when one exercised faith in him. He makes the value-judgment virtually equivalent to faith, and it has as its correlate the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. This, Ritschl says, saves Luther's position from subjectivity. All this shows that Ritschl's term "value-judgment" is an attempt to express in philosophical language the personal character of religious knowledge. The moral proof for God's existence is in one edition called the theoretic proof, and in another a practical proof. It is not then a question of fact,

but a question of how we attain the knowledge of fact. His reply to materialism and pantheism, and his whole seriousness and earnestness, forbid the student to believe that Ritschl ever doubted the reality of the object of religion. Ritschl emphatically denies the position of Feuerbach.

The Hegelians made the mistake of supposing that the theoretical is not merely the most valuable function of the spirit, but likewise the function which has to take up the problem of religion and solve it.³²

Now, Feuerbach pointed out that in religion the chief stress falls upon "the needs and wishes of the human heart." In this Feuerbach is correct, but he also held the Hegelian illusion concerning theoretical knowledge, and so claimed that religion represented an individual and egoistic interest, and was "a delusion in regard to its object" and was "worthless as knowledge." Ritschl denies the egoism which is here affirmed, and claims that the needs, feelings, and values of the human spirit may be as universal in their nature as the laws of thought, and may convey as true a revelation of reality. In the light of this it is mere dogmatism to assert that Ritschl held to the position of Feuerbach.

But the critic may say that Ritschl did not see the logical issue of his position. Accordingly, we raise the question: Does Ritschl's philosophic position concerning the nature of religious knowledge lead logically to a denial of the reality of the object of that knowledge? To answer this question it may be wise to discover the genesis of his statement and to relate this to his metaphysical position. The fact that we have discussed the nature of religious knowledge under his theological presuppositions shows that we hold that Ritschl's view here has a religious rather than a metaphysical source. As a Christian, and as a student of religion, Ritschl was led to affirm the peculiar nature of religious knowledge. But at the same time his form of statement was without doubt influenced by the position of Lotze and by the work of Kaftan.

In his psychology³³ Lotze teaches us that in every activity of the soul the whole soul is active.

³² *J. R.*, sec. 28.

³³ For what follows see *Outlines of Psychology*, chap. 6; *Outlines of Metaphysics*, secs. 93-97; *Philosophy of Religion*, secs. 65-70; *Microcosmos*, Vol. I, Book II, chap. 5; Book V, chap. 5.

In ideation the soul is active because it cannot respond to a definite excitation save by a definite form of expression. . . . It is an original peculiarity of the mind that it not only presents changes to itself, but becomes aware of their value in terms of pleasure and pain. . . . No mental presentation is completely indifferent, and the pleasure and pain attached to it escapes our attention only because in educated life the meaning and the significance which the impressions have for our purposes in life has become more important to us than the consideration of the impression itself.

The recognition of the value of a thing is bound up with the feeling of pleasure or pain. The value of a thing is in its power to produce pleasure or pain in a spiritual being. There can be no worth or unworth in a thing-in-itself.

An idea of an object possessing worth which does not show its worth for someone by its capacity to produce pleasure or pain shoots beyond the mark.

If we now turn from the psychology of worth to its evaluation, Lotze informs us that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. "We are to seek in that which should be, the ground of that which is." But that which should be is the Highest-Good-personal. The Moral Being capable of feeling pleasure and pain with finite moral beings of like capacity is what should be, and what is, as real. The highest good consists in blessedness, in well-being. Things exist to produce values. It is because there are moral beings with feeling, capable of pleasure or pain, that there can be an obligatory moral law. Drop out the element of feeling in God and man, and consider them as pure intellect and volition, and it is difficult to find a place for moral obligation. This does not mean that pleasure is the moral ideal. There is no such thing as pleasure in general, just as there is no color in general. One cannot feel without "feeling in a particular way, and the specific feeling is in every case rather the immediate individual transference into the language of sensibility of the peculiar worth to this peculiar case of excitation." Pleasure is rather the light in which existing reality shows forth all "its objective essence and beauty."

In our own feelings for the value of things and their relation our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principle of logical investigation, it has an indispensable instrument of experience. . . . Every real cause of pleasure is indeed only recognition and enjoyment of a specific worth which has its own occasioning cause different from the cause of every other pleasure. There

is an ideal according to which we may measure worths. Supreme pleasure is in the satisfaction of conscience itself. Pleasure in the agreement of any individual pleasure and this supreme legislation is a standard exempt from fluctuation. . . . That which corresponds to a momentary and accidental condition of some individual peculiarity of the mind which it affects is of less worth, and that is of more worth which harmonizes with the general and normal features for organization, by which the mind is fitted for the fulfilment of its destiny. That would be of supreme worth which caused satisfaction to an ideal mind in its normal condition, a mind which had been purified from all tendency to divert from its proper path of development.

This, in brief, is what Lotze teaches concerning values, and it is the key to his whole philosophical system. The whole world of forms, the whole mechanism of nature, exists for the creation of values. Values, then, are not purely subjective or arbitrary, for Lotze. The desires of men as well as thought may contain a universal element and possess objectivity in the sense of universality. Since man is a part of reality, he neither thinks nor values in a purely subjective way. Our valuation conforms to a perfect valuation as our knowledge conforms to a perfect knowledge. In both we have an interpretation of reality. It is not difficult to discover the influence of Lotze upon the philosophical statement of Ritschl. For Ritschl tells us that ideation is accompanied by feeling and willing, and that the worth of an object is in its capacity to arouse pleasure and pain. For him, too, the highest good is blessedness. Our valuation gives us a true valuation of reality. Values are not purely arbitrary, but feeling as well as thought may possess a universal element. If theoretic knowledge is a knowledge of reality, then valuation is also an interpretation of reality. Unless one can show that Ritschl's metaphysical position is solipsism, he cannot charge him with subjectivity. But that is not the case, for we have seen that he accepts the ontology of Lotze. Let us take the example so often urged against Ritschl, namely, the divinity of Christ. This is a value-judgment. Ritschl tells us that the divinity of Christ expresses the value of Christ for us. It represents the power of Christ to secure our blessedness. The man who has not experienced this blessedness which Christ gives can pass no valuation on him. He is in the position of a blind man before a work of art. But is the valuation of the Christian correct? The more perfect the Christian, the more perfect is his

valuation. God's valuation is the perfect one. He knows Jesus as he is in himself—that is, as he is for God—and we know him as he is for us. We have a true, but not a complete, knowledge or valuation of reality.

But while Ritschl's philosophical statement, taken as a whole, does not lead to subjectivity, yet the term "value-judgment" itself is indefinite and unclear. Ritschl's first statement of the value-judgment was made in a review of Kaftan's work. We have already pointed out Kaftan's position. The mind both presents an object and values it, and from this twofold activity he derives the two forms of judgment. In criticism Ritschl says that every theoretic judgment contains in itself a value-judgment. The fact that we give attentive observation shows the action of the will, which in its turn is influenced by feeling. Ritschl weakens the dualism of Kaftan. In both cases we are moved by valuation, but in the one case it is a direct valuation of a thing for our lives, and in the other it is a valuation of the knowledge itself through which we present the fact of the thing. This position is virtually taken up in the third edition of his large work, and a statement of it has already been given. There is some ground for the criticism of Pfeiderer that, if theoretical judgments are accompanied by value-judgments, then, according to Ritschl's position that both activities are always present, value-judgments are accompanied by theoretic judgments. There must be the ideational content in the religious judgment. It is in this way that Otto Ritschl defends his father's thesis. He tells us that all experience begins in value-judgments. But as the content side is developed, the feeling and will element drop out. In this case science and theology are alike. They both as sciences must move in theoretical judgments. And theology can run in value-judgments only so long as it is crude, naïve, and unscientific. This is the logical issue of Otto Ritschl's position. Reischle's position is closer to the real meaning of Ritschl. It is the accompanying feeling of value which Ritschl has in mind when he speaks of accompanying value-judgments.

In every concrete experience there are, as Ritschl claims, both the content-phase and the value-phase. And the psychology of Ritschl is perfectly correct, when he says that one cannot have a fact and then

value it, or that one cannot know God apart from his value for us. The content cannot be presented irrespective of any attitude on the part of the subject. And the value of an object is not a secondary or derived thing, but every content falls within the process of valuation. We may abstract the content side of experience and develop this as a means of controlling further experiences. This is the world of science. We may abstract the side of valuation and arrange attitudes or values and develop a world of ends, and this gives us a system of morals. This, too, is objectively real, for it helps us to control further experiences. But the reality is just the whole experience with its content and value. It is just the whole world of means and ends with their interrelations. To charge Ritschl with subjectivity is to assume that the abstract world of science is the whole reality. And the logical issue of this is materialism.

Moreover, Ritschl is to be recommended in that he emphasizes the intensely personal and practical character of religious knowledge. Religious knowledge is the knowledge that accrues to faith, and it moves in the realm of personal conviction. The Christian view of the world is a reasonable faith, but it is a faith and can never be demonstrated in such a way as to compel universal recognition. Metaphysics does not prove God, and it does not give us freedom or immortality. When one builds on it, he builds not on the solid rock whereon Christ stood, but on the sand which cannot withstand the storms. It was Ritschl's profound spiritual insight which led him to reject so unsafe a foundation. Science and philosophy have rejected metaphysics, as that term has been understood, and it was Ritschl's merit that he demanded for theology that it stand on its own basis of divine revelation, and not on the tottering foundation of metaphysics. Metaphysics is not to give reality. God must be experienced. The richer one makes one's own life, the better can one interpret reality. Knowledge grows out of experience, and knowledge of God and faith in immortality grow out of an experience of the revelation of God in one's own soul mediated through the inner life of Jesus Christ. Knowledge cannot take the place of faith, thought the place of loving service, or metaphysics the place of religion. Ritschl tells us that, to know God, we must surrender our lives to the spirit of Jesus and find our vocation within his kingdom.

In all this Ritschl is in harmony with the teaching of Jesus, Paul, and Luther, and with the psychological thought and practical needs of today. Christianity by its functions in the individual life and in society must prove both its right to be, and to be what it claims.

But Ritschl does not seem to see clearly and state plainly the practical and functional character of all knowledge. Over against speculative idealism he affirms the practical character of religious knowledge, but he never completely emancipates himself from the speculative ideal, he never accepts the functional character of thought in experience. There are not two criterions of knowledge. The one test of reality is its power to appeal to the feelings, and to further or hinder the purposes of the will. Ritschl seems to view thought apart from its origin and function in experience. We are to test reality for theoretic thought by asking if it conforms to the forms of perception and the categories of thought. But just how did we come to have these forms and categories, and why do we rely upon them? They have arisen as means of reaction under practical needs for the preservation of life. There is even no mere mechanical association of ideas. The forms of perception and the categories of thought represent our modes of corresponding successfully to problematic situations. The category of causation would not arise in life if there were not purposes to realize. So long as life is under habit, so long as there is no problem, there is no necessity for thought. The *real* is just what functions properly, and our thought-life exists for the purpose of securing the proper functioning or action. If, then, we test a plan of thought by an examination of the thought-process involved in its reconstruction, that simply means that we know these thought-processes have been evolved in experience and have been tested by past experience. The real is always that which will allow the will to attain its purpose, which will bring a unification and harmony of feeling into experience. The final test of reality is just this feeling.

Again, if we turn to that phase of experience which is peculiarly designated as the process of valuation, we must recognize that the whole elaboration of values is a process of judgment, is attained by the use of ideas, and, according to the laws of thought, is, in fact, a logical process. In a certain sense we may call every judg-

ment a value-judgment, since judgment is a process of evolving values, and it is just the meaning or value of an idea that is of use in the reasoning process. But experience not only elaborates a physical world, a world of means, but to meet the needs of the moral and religious life it must evolve new categories, posit a world of ends; and the process by which this is attained is peculiarly the process of valuation, and these judgments may be called value-judgments in differentiation from the judgments involved in the construction of the mere physical world. There is a cognitive element present in each desire as truly as in each sensation, and these value-judgments prove their objectivity in the same manner as the other judgments; that is, they are necessary for the attainment of the richest experience. At the same time, since the religious valuation arises only out of the religious experience, a subjective element is always characteristic of its judgments, and they cannot expect to attain the universality of the scientific or less personal judgments.

V

In a previous article I pointed out what I considered to be the metaphysical presuppositions of Ritschl. It now remains to ask whether the metaphysical or religious principle was primary with Ritschl, and what relation they hold to each other in his system. If we turn again to the students of Ritschl, we find a variety of opinions. Esslinger and Stählin regard the metaphysical as fundamental, and with the rejection of that the whole theological system is discredited. Orr and Steinbeck think Ritschl's metaphysical principles hold a vital place in his system and vitiate to a large degree his entire teaching, but especially his doctrine of God and the person and deity of Christ. Garvie thinks Ritschl's method may be characterized as biblo-spheric, christo-centric, and pisto-basic, and his metaphysical principles are not an organic part of his system. Wendland believes Ritschl's interests to be entirely historical, and he accepted the neo-Kantian philosophy because it seemed to give him support. All the disciples of Ritschl regard his theory of knowledge of very little importance in his theological thinking. Ecke holds the fundamental principles of Ritschl to be his return to the confessions of the early community as the fundamental norm for theo-

logical knowledge, his christo-centric method of treating dogmatics, and the characterization of the propositions of dogmatics as truths of salvation.

Traub regards Ritschl's interest as a historical one. He was profoundly impressed by his studies of the gospel and the works of Luther. It was here that he learned the peculiar character of religious knowledge, and then he sought for a theory of knowledge that would protect it from other knowledge. With this judgment Otto Ritschl³⁴ agrees. He tells us that the real foundation for his father's work is in his biblical and historical theology, and it was not till after he had formed his view of life and the world that he sought a justification for the formal side of his method. His theory of knowledge was really abstracted from his large work as the method which he actually, though perhaps unconsciously, pursued.

There is no question that the practical and ethical character of the philosophy of Lotze appealed strongly to Ritschl. And if Lotze's philosophy of religion is constructed on a purely rational basis, yet emphasis is placed on the knowledge that comes from values, and values are found in the historical. Though Ritschl makes all-important the supernatural revelation, it is a revelation of values which are possessed by the community and appropriated by the individual through faith. The very character of the neo-Kantian philosophy was such as to appeal to the historical student, and would in turn encourage the historical study. On the theological side Ritschl entered into that great heritage of Schleiermacher, and he learned from him that religion is *sui generis*, and its knowledge is not to be mixed with other knowledge. The religious, scientific, and philosophic thought of the age meet in Ritschl, and they all move in the practical direction.

Moreover, Ritschl himself was pre-eminently practical, and it was this bent that sent him to historical study; and his system is held together by the practical interests. The practical interest explains the influence of Ritschl. Professor James,³⁵ speaking of the metaphysical attributes of God, says:

From the point of view of practical religion, the metaphysical monster which they offer to our worship is an absolutely worthless invention of the scholarly

³⁴ *Life of his father.*

³⁵ *Varieties of Religious Experience.*

mind. The moral attributes stand on an entirely different footing; they positively determine fear and hope and expectation, and are the foundation for the saintly life.

It matters not whether we say the metaphysical or religious principle is primary for Ritschl, since the result is the same. For the metaphysical principle is a formal and regulative statement of the positive religious principle. The metaphysical principle excludes all the elementary knowledge of metaphysics from the field of theology, and forbids the method of metaphysics to the realm of theology. And the religious principle states that theological knowledge must be derived from historical revelation alone, and that one must be a member of the religious community in order to appropriate and interpret this revelation. The metaphysical principle possesses a critical function in theology, since it wards off ideas that grow on alien soil, and opposes any false claims of scientific knowledge or of a false metaphysics which seek to deny the validity of religious knowledge. Thus both the metaphysical and the religious principle work together for a practical and historical theology, and the religious world is indebted to Ritschl for a dogmatics which is a science of faith.

THE CHURCH AND DIVORCE

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Augustine called divorce *quaestio difficillima*. Then for a thousand years it was treated as *quaestio actualis*. At the present time it is a burning question in the state and in the church, though the state and the church do not view it in the same light, and that because the state defines marriage as a civil contract, and views it as a civil institution, while the church holds that marriage is a divine institution, and defines it as a "holy estate."

But the state and the church agree in the conception that marriage is for life, and that it cannot be dissolved at will by either of the married parties, nor by the mutual agreement of both parties; and that, when for good and sufficient reasons husband and wife ought to be separated, whether relatively or absolutely, such separation can be legitimately made only by the supreme will—that is, by the law of the state. The state and the church agree in the judgment that at the present time divorces are unjustifiably numerous, and in most cases are obtained on inadequate grounds. They are not agreed, however, as to the proper methods to be employed for the abolition of an abuse that is threatening to undermine the foundations of the social and civil fabric. The difference at this point results mainly from the fact that there is not in the church as a whole a uniform doctrine or sentiment as to the nature of marriage in all of its features, nor as to the lawfulness of divorce. What some regard as the teaching of the Scriptures on these subjects is repudiated by others as unscriptural. The state must be impartial. She dare not favor one party or one dogma at the expense of another. Hence she can enact and enforce divorce laws only with a view to civil and social interests. Actual co-operation of state and church to any large extent is impracticable. But *rapprochement* ought to be sought by both, since both are divine institutions, and since the legitimate functions of the one do not conflict with the legitimate functions of

the other. In the abolition of a great social, ethical, and religious abuse they should strive to understand each other, at least in those points in which it can be said that there is practically *consensus ecclesiae*.

It cannot therefore be regarded as untimely, in view of the present agitation in the state and in the church over the divorce question, to present briefly and objectively the teaching of different churches on the subject of divorce, and on the cognate subject of the marriage of persons whom the state has divorced *a vinculo matrimonii*; though this cannot be done intelligently without making some reference to the teaching of the churches on the subject of matrimony, since the doctrine of a church in regard to divorce is generally a logical deduction from its doctrine on matrimony.

I. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

The *Catechismus Romanus* defines "matrimony as the conjugal conjunction of a man and a woman, between two lawful persons, holding an individual nearness of life."¹ The same high authority declares that matrimony has two aspects:

It is to be considered as it is natural (for wedlock was not invented by man, but by nature); or as it is a sacrament, the force whereof excels the condition of natural things, and because grace perfects nature.²

This second and more important aspect of matrimony is based on Eph. 5:28-32, more particularly on the words of the Vulgate, *Sacramentum hoc magnum est*, in vs. 32:

For in that he [the apostle] saith, *this is a great sacrament*, no one ought to doubt that it ought to be referred to marriage. To wit, because the conjunction of the man, and of the woman, whereof God is the author, is a sacrament, that is, a sacred sign of the most holy bond wherewith Christ our Lord is joined with his church.³

The Council of Trent, to which the *Catechismus* constantly appeals, declares that matrimony excels the ancient marriages, and that the holy Fathers, and the councils and the tradition of the universal church "have always taught that matrimony is to be numbered among the sacraments of the new law;" and it pronounces an anathema

¹ *De Sacramento Matrimonii*, V.

² *Ibid.*, XI.

³ *Ibid.*, XIX.

on anyone who shall say that "matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ our Lord; but that it has been invented by men in the church."⁴

It is this, its sacramental character, that makes marriage inviolate and absolutely indissoluble in the eyes of the Roman Catholic church:

For though it were convenient that matrimony, as it is an office of nature, might not be dissolved; yet more so now, as it is a sacrament; for which cause it gains the highest perfections, even in all things which are proper to it by the law of nature.

Again:

The third good of matrimony is called the sacrament, the bond of marriage, from which they can never be dissolved. For as the apostle has it: *The Lord has commanded that the wife depart not from her own husband*. But if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband, and that the husband put not away his wife. For if matrimony, as it is a sacrament, signify the conjunction of Christ with his church, it must needs be that, as Christ never separates himself from his church, so a wife, as to the bond of matrimony, can never be separated from her husband.⁵

The passages of Scripture on which this doctrine of the indissolubility of matrimony is based are the following: "This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh" (Gen. 2:23, 24); "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder" (Matt. 19:6). But neither the Council of Trent nor the *Catechismus* quotes or applies the following passages: "Whosoever putteth away his wife, except for fornication," etc., (Matt. 19:9); and: "Yet if the unbeliever departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not under bondage in such cases" (1 Cor. 7:15).

The *Catechismus* says: "The bond of matrimony can be dissolved by no divorce;" and: "Nor did God institute matrimony only, but, as the Holy Synod of Trent says, he added to it a perpetual and indissoluble knot." And the Council of Trent, evidently in allusion to the teaching of Protestants, pronounces an anathema on anyone who shall say "that on account of heresy, or irksome cohabitation,

⁴ *Doctrina de Sacramento Matrimonii*, Twenty-fourth Session.

⁵ *Catechismus Romanus*, *ut supra*, XIII, XXX.

or affected absence of one of the parties, the bond of matrimony may be dissolved;" and upon him who saith

that the church has erred, in that she hath taught, in accordance with the evangelical and apostolical doctrine, that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the married parties; and that both, or even the innocent one who gave not occasion to the adultery, cannot contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other.⁶

Roman Catholic theologians maintain that the practice of the church has been absolutely uniform and in full accord with this doctrine, and that not a single instance can be found where the Holy See has ever for an instant entertained any question involving the dissolution of a consummated Christian marriage; though the Holy See has often issued a decree of nullity, whereby it has been authentically declared that there had never been a true Christian marriage.⁷

Now whatever may be the facts in regard to the *practice* of the Roman Catholic church, it is certain that she *teaches* the absolute indissolubility of the marriage bond; but she declared at the Council of Trent, November 11, 1563, "that, for many causes, a separation may take place between husband and wife, in regard of bed, or in regard of cohabitation, for a determinate or for an indeterminate period;" which is known as separation *a mensa et thoro*, or "judicial separation," and must be distinguished from a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*, which the Roman Catholic church does not permit, and from nullity, which she does permit, and which sets the parties free, and gives them liberty to act as though there were no bond between them. But where the Roman Catholic church has ascertained and decided that there has been true Christian marriage—that is, where the sacrament of marriage has been duly administered—she declares that "the bond of wedlock is broken by nothing else but death."⁸ Hence the sacrament is the principal thing in Christian marriage. It covers the whole pact with an inviolable sanctity. It makes absolute the words of Christ: "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder;" for a sacrament cannot be inval-

⁶ Canons, V, VII, VIII.

⁷ Hunter, *Outlines of Dogmatic Theology*, Vol. III, pp. 312, 313.

⁸ *Catechismus*, XXVII. Says Perrone: "Indissolubilitas Matrimonii Christiani est sacramenti effectus" (*Praelectiones, De Matrimonio*).

idated by any act of man. It also elevates the natural into the realm of the supernatural.

In this sacrament also grace is figured and given, in which thing especially the nature of a sacrament consists, these words of the synod declare: But the grace which perfects natural love, and confirms that indissoluble unity, Christ himself, the author and finisher of the memorable sacraments, has merited for us by his passion.⁹

Says Hunter, in the chapter on "Matrimony" in his *Outlines of Theology*—a book published under the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Vaughan—Vol. III, p. 423:

This chapter has indicated the Catholic doctrine concerning Christian marriage, which is wholly based on the elevation of the natural contract to the dignity of a sacrament. It is this circumstance that gives the church exclusive jurisdiction over all questions relating to the marriage bond; it also enables us to speak on certain points relating to the unity and absolute indissolubility of Christian wedlock with greater certainty than can be attained with reference to natural marriage.

From this it results logically that in the estimation of the Roman Catholic church the state has no power to make or to unmake Christian marriage. Matrimony is a sacrament. The state can have no jurisdiction over a sacrament. She may regulate the affairs of Christian married people on the civil and social side, because they are citizens, and are amenable to the state; but the state cannot lay her hand on marriage itself, "a sign of a holy thing."

II. THE LUTHERAN CHURCH

The Lutheran Reformation was a revolt from certain doctrines and practices of the Roman Catholic church. In the matter of marriage and of divorce it was a radical revolution, having its foundation in the rejection of the doctrine that matrimony is a sacrament. And yet radical as this revolution was, no Lutheran confession contains an article on marriage and divorce. Incidentally it is stated that marriage is "a divine ordinance," that it is "a necessary estate solemnly commanded by God;" that its "promises pertain to this life;" that "unjust is the tradition which forbids an innocent person to marry after divorce." Nor does the Lutheran church have any canon to regulate the conduct of her clergy in the matter of marrying persons who have been divorced. But the standard Lutheran theo-

⁹ *Catechismus, ut supra, XX.*

logians and the Lutheran church orders (*Kirchenordnungen*) express themselves with fulness and clearness, and with essential unanimity, on the subject of divorce, and in regard to the marriage of persons who have been lawfully divorced.

In *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church* (1520) Luther denies that there is any warrant of Scripture for considering matrimony a sacrament. He says that matrimony "has been turned into a mockery by the very same traditions that vaunt it as a sacrament." He says that

Christ permits divorce only in the case of fornication, . . . and if Paul bids us rather to marry than to burn, this seems plainly to allow of a man's marrying another in place of her whom he has put away.

And in regard to 1 Cor. 7:15, "But if the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases," he says:

Hence the apostle permits that the unbelieving one who departs should be let go, and leaves it free to the believer to take another.¹⁰

Thus Luther sees scriptural grounds for divorce in fornication and in desertion, and he concedes to the innocent party, in both cases, the right to marry again. These two principles he steadfastly maintained. In his *Exposition* of 1 Cor. 7:15 (1523) he says:

The apostle absolves and declares the husband or wife free where an unchristian husband or wife has departed, or will not allow the other to live a Christian life, and he grants such a one the right and privilege to marry again. What Paul says here in regard to a heathen husband or wife is to be understood also in regard to a false Christian, that is, where such a one would force the other to unchristian conduct, or will not allow the other to lead a Christian life, or departs. The Christian husband or wife is absolved and is free to marry another.¹¹

In 1530 he published a volume on marriage. Here several pages are devoted to the discussion of divorce, and to the right of the innocent party to marry again. Quoting Matt. 19:6 he says:

Accordingly, when a husband or wife has committed adultery, and it can be proved, I cannot deny that the other is free, and may be divorced, and may marry another person; though it were better, if possible, to effect reconciliation, and that they remain together. But if the innocent party will not do that, then he may avail himself of his right in God's name.¹²

¹⁰ Jena Latin edition of *Works*, Vol. II, fol. 295.

¹¹ St. Louis edition of *Works*, Vol. VIII., pp. 1062, 1063.

¹² Erlangen edition of *Works*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 91-162.

This book is a classic in the Lutheran church on the subjects of which it treats. It was republished in 1540 by Bugenhagen in connection with his own tractate on *Adultery and Divorce*, and in the same year by Melanchthon in his *De Arbore Consanguinitatis*. It is copiously quoted by Lutheran theologians. And that Luther's views prevailed at Wittenberg, and were carried into practical effect, is shown by the fact that in the year 1535 the entire theological faculty—Luther, Cruciger, Major, and Melanchthon—prepared and subscribed an *Opinion* on a concrete case of desertion. They recommend that the authorities shall cite the deserting husband to return. If he does not return within three months, they know well how to proceed. The deserted wife is to establish her character.

If she can show that H. has been in ill-repute with others, then the case is all the clearer. Even if she cannot prove adultery, but if only on account of malicious and final desertion she seeks to be absolved, then, according to the rule given by Paul, 1 Cor., chap. 7, she shall be declared free from H., since he has wantonly abandoned her, and for three years has not shown that he desires to live with her, and therefore confesses that he has left her finally. By virtue of Paul's declaration, M. shall be permitted to marry in a Christian manner, as has been the case heretofore in the Christian church, as Eusebius and Justin cite a case in *lib.* 4, and as is shown by the case of Fabiola.¹³

In the year 1551 Melanchthon added an appendix to his *Loci Theologici*, in which he says:

In the matter of divorce the Divine Word frees the innocent person when the husband or the wife has dissolved the bond of marriage by adultery, and it concedes to the innocent person, when the case has been decided judicially, the right to contract another marriage; and such is the practice in our consistories. The same is held in regard to a person who is unrighteously deserted (1 Cor. 7:15). . . . By no means is the halter to be placed on the innocent person on account of divorce. It is understood that liberty is not a mere sound. To the liberated person marriage is conceded.

But Melanchthon goes further than Luther, and approves *Lex Theodosii*, which concedes divorce "on account of cruelty, poisoning, and plots laid against life." He does not concede divorce on account of contagious and incurable diseases, which may have come upon either party after marriage.

From Luther (1546) and Melanchthon (1560) we turn to the Lutheran dogmaticians, who extend in unbroken line from Chemnitz

¹³ *Luthers Werke*, St. Louis edition, Vol. X, pp. 744, 745.

(1522-86) to Hollazius (1648-1713). With little or no deviation, these standard teachers follow in the footsteps of their illustrious predecessors in the matter of divorce and the marriage of innocent divorced persons. They know of only two generic causes for dissolving the bond of marriage, "so that husband and wife may be separated, not as by man, but by God himself" (Chemnitz); these two causes are adultery and malicious desertion. Some of the dogmaticians follow Luther more closely, and name only adultery and malicious desertion as causes. Others take the more liberal view of Melancthon, and group certain offenses under one or the other of the generic causes. "Sodomy and bestiality destroy the substance of marriage, and are to be referred to adultery." Persistent ill-usage, cruelty, plotting against life, stubborn refusal of the *debitum conjugale* (Luther and some others), are subsumed under the head of malicious desertion, inasmuch as they conflict with the nature and design of marriage. But in all cases of what they regard as scriptural divorce they concede the right of marriage to the innocent party, on the ground that the innocent party must not be exposed to temptation and must not be allowed to burn because of the sin of the guilty.

The Lutheran dogmaticians also maintain that there is no contradiction between the rule of Christ (Matt. 19:9) and that of Paul (1 Cor. 7:15). The former, they say, speaks of the cause of *effecting* divorce. On account of adultery the injured party may bring an action against the guilty party, and obtain a decree dissolving the bond of marriage. Paul speaks of him who has taken the law in his own hand, and by his desertion has disrupted the conjugal bond, has declared that he will not have the other to wife, or to husband, as the case may be. Or, to state the matter in the language of Gerhard (1582-1637):

Christ speaks of him who turns from his wife; Paul of him from whom the wife has turned. Christ speaks of voluntary separation; Paul, of separation against the will of one. Much less can it be shown from the words of the apostle that the civil power can introduce other causes of effecting divorce, because the apostle, moved by such an inspiration as we do not recognize in other men, cannot adduce any misdemeanor that so affects the substance of marriage as adultery. Hence some of our theologians mention only one cause. Some mention two, but in reality there is no contradiction.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Loci Theologici*, Vol. XVI, p. 184.

Quenstedt, who represents the middle period of the dogmatic era, and who has been called "the bookkeeper of the Wittenberg orthodoxy," writes thus:

Malicious Desertion.—The bond of marriage is indissoluble. Hence the wife ought not to depart from the husband, nor he from her. But when the malicious deserter has departed, marriage is not denied the innocent party or person, who has been deserted *sine causa*. Here we must observe that not only is he guilty of malicious desertion who abandons his wife, but he who drives her away by cruelty and tyranny. Nor is the view of Luther to be rejected, who, to malicious desertion, adds persistent refusal of that which is due, mentioned by Paul, 1 Cor. 7:3.

Adultery.—By adultery the bond of marriage is dissolved, so that it is allowed to the innocent party to enter a second marriage.¹⁵

And Hollazius, "whose *Examen Theologicum* recapitulates with great clearness and compactness the results attained by his predecessors," states the Lutheran dogmatic view, and gives the reason for it as follows:

There are two just causes of divorce, adultery and malicious desertion. The only cause of active divorce is adultery; malicious desertion is cause for passive divorce. The former goes against the very nature of marriage, and therefore dissolves marriage and opens the way for the injured party to marry again (Matt. 19:9).

That malicious desertion frees the innocent party is proved (1) by 1 Cor. 7:15: "If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart: the brother or the sister is not subject to bondage in such cases;" so that neither he nor she may marry another, but he or she is free from the bond and from the obligation to conjugal intercourse with the deserter or the desertrix. (2) From the nature of divorce. Whatever directly injures conjugal faith and the *usus thori* dissolves the marriage bond, and therefore *jure ipso* opens the doors to a second marriage to the innocent party, etc. Therefore (3) *ex absurdo*. Unless the right of a new marriage be conceded to the deserted person, he is deprived of his right without any fault of his, and is exposed to perpetual burnings and to the peril of harlotry and pollution, and this conflicts with justice and with the divine law. Now, for the purpose of avoiding fornication, let each one have his own wife.¹⁶

Such is a fair sample of the dogmatic teaching of the Lutheran church on divorce and the marriage of the innocent divorced, in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. This teaching found place also in the church orders of those centuries, and was

¹⁵ *Theologia Didactico-Polemica*, Pars IV, c. 14.

¹⁶ Pp. 1380, 1381.

carried out in practice, as we learn from the ecclesiastical jurists like Benedict Carpzov, and from the recorded acts of the consistories, and from the official opinions of theological faculties in concrete cases submitted. The views of Luther and Melancthon and the dogmaticians were universally followed. Adultery and malicious desertion were held to be the scriptural causes of divorce. A few other causes which were supposed to defeat the very design of marriage, and which in consequence imperiled the salvation of the soul, or endangered life, or exposed the innocent party to harlotry, were subsumed under one or the other of the generic causes. Those old Lutheran theologians had a profound detestation of sin, and a supreme interest in the salvation of souls, and a sacred regard for the practice of chastity. They did not believe that the innocent ought to suffer for the sins of the guilty. They believed that the gospel was given to save men from sin, as well as from the penalties of sin.

The Lutheran theologians of the nineteenth century support the old Lutheran doctrine of divorce; as, for instance, Harless, in *Christian Ethics* (English translation, p. 440); Luthardt, in *Moral Truths of Christianity* (English translation, p. 133); Wüttke, in *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre* (Vol. II, p. 481); Martensen, in *Social Ethics* (English translation, pp. 38 ff.), who says:

The Lutheran church decrees the lawfulness of actual divorce, and allows the innocent party to remarry. Holy Scripture names two cases in which divorce and remarriage are allowable. It says: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for the cause of adultery; and whoso marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery" (Matt. 5:25). And again (19:9): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, *except it be for fornication*, and shall marry another, committeth adultery." The apostle Paul adds another case, namely, that of malicious desertion (*desertio malitiosa*), when one leaves and of his own accord forsakes the other: "If the unbelieving departeth, let him depart. A brother or sister [i. e., the Christian partner] is not under bondage in such cases" (1 Cor. 7:15). He concedes to the forsaken, the suffering one, the privilege of remarriage. . . . And we cannot but acknowledge that Lutheran divines are fully justified in including among valid reasons for divorce continued cruelty, personal ill-usage (*saevitiae*), and plotting against one another's lives (*insidiae*). So Melancthon, and after him the Danish theologian N. Hemmingsen. To these reasons others were subsequently added, e. g., refusal of the *debitum conjugale*.¹⁷

¹⁷ Pp. 41, 42.

In this country the historic Lutheran doctrine of divorce prevails in the Lutheran church, and few, if any, Lutheran clergymen would hesitate to solemnize the marriage of an innocent person who had obtained from a civil court a divorce on account of adultery or malicious desertion, provided the case is clear in fact and free from complicity.

Here, in conclusion, it may be said that the Lutheran doctrine proceeds on the principle that adultery destroys the oneness of the flesh enunciated in the original institution of marriage: "And they shall be one flesh" (Gen. 2:24). He that is joined with a harlot has become one flesh with the harlot (1 Cor. 6:16). He cannot, therefore, be one flesh with his wife, for the union is of twain, not of three. Thus adultery does *eo ipso* disrupt the *vinculum matrimonii*. In regard to 1 Cor. 7:15, the "not subject to bondage in such cases" is held to be absolute. Final desertion vacates marriage in every one of its features. Where it exists there is no conjugal conjunction, no *individuum vitae consuetudinem*, no spiritual fellowship, no moral sustentation. The deserter has renounced possession. The deserted has suffered deprivation. Mutuality, which is of the very life and essence of the conjugal bond, has ceased to exist. The deserter and the deserted are not one body, but two. The person deserted "is not subject to bondage," but has recovered possession of the body, and therefore possesses the *facultas ad contrahendum matrimonium*.

III. THE CONTINENTAL REFORMED CHURCH

The continental Reformed church sprang out of the reforming activities of Ulrich Zwingli at Zürich, followed by those of John Calvin at Geneva. Both were organizers as well as theologians and reformers. All in all, the Swiss movement in the matter of divorce was substantially identical with that of the Lutherans, perhaps a little more radical at Zürich, perhaps a little less so at Geneva.

In his commentary on Matt. 5:32 Zwingli says:

Adultery is not the only, but the primary, cause of divorce. For why should Christ exclude those things which exceed adulteries, as treasons, poisonings, parricides, and the like?

In commenting on Matt. 19:6 he declares that impotence is a just cause of divorce, by which probably he means (as the Lutherans

also taught) that impotence is a reason why a marriage should be declared null, inasmuch as an impotent is neither man nor woman in the sense contemplated by marriage. He says also: "Yea, in unequal marriages Paul permits divorce if one should dismiss the other on account of the profession of the faith;" and in expounding 1 Cor. 7:15, he says that Paul does not compel the believing wife to live with an unbelieving husband, but permits her

to use her liberty, especially if the unbelieving husband blaspheme Christ, whom she has embraced by faith, and on account of Christ exasperates and insults her with constant altercations.

The Zürich Church Order, composed by Zwingli in 1525, sanctions divorce for adultery and malicious desertion. Cruelty, madness, and leprosy are turned over to the civil judge.¹⁸

It is well known that Henry Bullinger, Zwingli's successor, approved and defended the Zwinglian doctrine of divorce; and Peter Martyr, who spent the last two years of his life as professor of theology in Zürich, declares that fornication is not the only cause of divorce. He says that the apostle adds difference of religion, where an unbeliever effectually interferes with the religion of the believer. In regard to the marriage of the innocent divorced party he says: "I know of no divorce except that which gives to the injured party the right to new marriage."¹⁹

Calvin, who developed and systematized the thoughts of Zwingli, and organized the continental Reformed church, gave a practical expression of his views on divorce in the Geneva Church Order. Here he holds that adultery and desertion are both causes of divorce, and that the innocent party has the right to marry. He sees no conflict between Christ and Paul. He also regards extreme violence, cruelty, and crimes subject to imprisonment, as causes of divorce. He holds that in matters of divorce man and woman are on an equality, since, according to the apostle "there is reciprocal and equal obligation to fidelity."²⁰ But Calvin denies that leprosy is a cause of divorce. In explaining 1 Cor. 7:15, "If the unbeliever departeth let him depart," etc., he says:

¹⁸ *Werke*, 2, Vol. II, pp. 358, 359.

¹⁹ *Works*, pp. 306, 307, 292.

²⁰ *Opera* (Strassburg ed.), Vol. X, pp. 110 ff.

This is the second department of the statement, in which he sets at liberty a believing husband, who is prepared to dwell with an unbelieving wife, but is rejected by her; and in like manner a woman, who is, without any fault on her part, repudiated by her husband; for in that case the unbelieving party makes a divorce with God, rather than with his or her partner. There is in this case a special reason, inasmuch as the first and chief bond is not merely loosed, but even utterly broken through.

Theodore Beza, Calvin's colleague and successor, says:

We refer divorces to the Word of God, and none are allowed except for causes declared in the Word of God (Matt. 19:9; 1 Cor. 7:15), and that after the civil court has decided. Even after the legal divorce has been granted we do not cease to exhort the parties to a reconciliation. But if this cannot be effected within a prescribed period, we concede the right of a new marriage, especially to the one who was not the cause of the divorce.²¹

Martin Bucer, first at Strassburg and then at Cambridge, places Matt. 19:9 and 1 Cor. 7:15 exactly on an equality as authority for divorce and marriage after divorce. He says:

But some perhaps will object that, although it be yielded that our Lord granted divorce not only for adultery, yet it is not certain that he permitted marriage after divorce, unless for only that cause. I answer, first, that the sentence of divorce and second marriage is one and the same. So that when the right of divorce is evinced to belong not only to the cause of fornication, the power also of second marriage is also proved to be not limited to that cause only; and that most evidently whereas the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. 7, so frees the deserted party from bondage as that he may not only send a just divorce in case of desertion, but may seek another marriage.

Also:

These two things conflict with themselves, to enforce the innocent and faultless to endure the pain and misery of another's perverseness, and also to live in unavoidable temptation, and to affirm elsewhere that he [God] lays on no man the burden of another man's sin, nor doth constrain any man to the endangering of his soul.²²

Bucer approves of divorce also for violation of sepulchers, for sacrilege, for "favoring thieves and robbers," "or if he beat her," or "if she frequent theaters and sights, he forbidding;" "with this difference, that the man after divorce might forthwith marry again; the woman not till a year after, lest she might chance to have con-

²¹ *Confessio Christianae Fidei*, p. 235. Anno 1563.

²² "Judgment of Martin Bucer concerning Divorce," written to Edward VI, etc. Translated by John Milton, and found in Milton's *Prose Works* (London: George Bell & Sons). See Vol. III, pp. 303, 311 *et passim*.

ceived." That is, Bucer was perhaps the most radical of all the Reformers on the subject of divorce. He is much used by Milton in his *Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, addressed "to the Parliament of England with the Assembly"—a "great work," says Mr. J. A. St. John.

Still it produced no sensible effect on the laws and manners of the country, the Roman Catholic theory of marriage, namely, that it is a sacrament, having prevailed ever since, though now at length repudiated by perhaps a majority of those who are able to think for themselves,²³

a remark that must be taken in connection with the fact that two years after Milton published his work, the Westminster Confession (1647) declared that "adultery, or such wilful desertion as can in no way be remedied by the church or civil magistrate, is cause sufficient of dissolving the bond of marriage;" and after divorce in the case of adultery it is lawful for the innocent party to marry another.²⁴ The confession does not speak of the remarriage of the innocent deserted party, but it seems to imply that such a one is free to marry again, inasmuch as it declares that desertion equally with adultery is a just cause of divorce. Dr. Charles Hodge, who was a loyal adherent of the Westminster Confession, so understands 1 Cor. 7:15, and says that such is the interpretation given "also by the leading modern commentators, as De Wette, Meyer, Alford, and Wordsworth, and in the confessions of the Lutheran and Reformed churches."²⁵ And the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church in the United States has recently authorized any minister under its jurisdiction to marry "an innocent person who has been divorced for scriptural reasons." But desertion is a scriptural reason for divorce—*therefore*.

IV. THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

The English Reformation borrowed much from the reforming movements on the continent—chiefly from Germany during the reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, and from Switzerland, during the early part of the reign of Elizabeth, through the Marian refugees, who for the most part came under the influence of Zürich and Geneva.

²³ Editor's preliminary remarks, Milton's *Prose Works*, *ut supra*, Vol. III, p. 169.

²⁴ Chap. xix, secs. v, vi.

²⁵ *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III, pp. 395 ff.

No doubt the English divines were much influenced by Bucer and Peter Martyr, both of whom taught at Cambridge. But in the *Formularies of Faith Put Forth by Authority during the Reign of Henry VIII, viz., in The Institution of a Christian Man* (1537), and in *A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for Any Christian Man* (1543), the Roman Catholic doctrine of matrimony as a sacrament, and as indissoluble, is unequivocally maintained. It was different, however, with influential individuals and sentiment moved rapidly in the direction of the Protestant views that had been promulgated on the continent. Tyndal (1536) held that adultery and desertion are just causes of divorce, and that in either case the innocent party has the right to marry again. In commenting on Matt. 5:32 he at first seems to limit the right of remarriage to the man who has obtained divorce from an adulterous wife, "for her sin ought of no right to bind him." But a little farther along he writes:

What if the man run from his wife and leave her desolate? Verily, the rulers ought to make a law, if any do so and come not again by a certain time as within the space of a year or so, that then he be banished the country; and if he come again, to come on his head, and let the wife be free to marry where she will. For what right is it that a lewd wretch should take his goods and run from his wife without a cause, and sit by a whore, yea, and come again after a year or two (as I have known it), and rob his wife of that she hath gathered in the meantime and go again to his whore? Paul saith to the Corinthians that if a man or woman be coupled with an infidel, and the infidel depart, the other is free to marry where they lust. . . . In like manner, if the woman depart causeless and will not be reconciled, though she commit none adultery, the man ought of right to be free to marry again. And in all other cases, if they separate themselves of impatience, that one cannot suffer the others, they must remain unmarried.²⁶

Hooper, bishop of Gloucester (1555), writes:

Mark 10, Christ saith there is no lawful cause to dissolve matrimony, but adultery. . . . Wherever this fault happens and can be proved by certain signs and testimonies, the persons may by the authority of God's word and ministry of the magistrate be separated so one from the other that it shall be lawful for the man to marry another wife and the wife to marry another husband, as Christ saith, Matt. 5 and 19.

But Hooper does not stop with the words of Christ:

St. Paul, 1 Cor. 7, sheweth another cause of divorcement, when the one of the persons being married is an infidel, and of a contrary faith. If this person

²⁶*Expositions*, pp. 49, 54.

will not dwell with the other, that is his fellow in matrimony, and a Christian; it is lawful to break the faith of matrimony and marry with another.

He supports his position by a quotation from St. Ambrose: "Thou seest the Lord, Matt. 10:19, giveth license for adultery to divorce and marry again, and Paul for infidelity."²⁷

Thomas Becon (1567), chaplain to Archbishop Cranmer, wrote an exceedingly polemical tract, entitled *The Law of Christ and the Law of Antichrist*, in which he indicates the right of a man to put away his wife for adultery and marry again, according to Matt. 9:19, as against the law of Antichrist which separates from bed and board. He also says:

Christ also by his Holy Apostle giveth liberty to the faithful man or woman, being coupled in marriage to such an idolater or infidel as will by no means forsake his idolatry or infidelity, but rather goeth about not only to defend it, but also to bring his faithful yokefellow unto it, so that the faithful cannot live with the unfaithful with a good conscience and according to the word of God, to marry again. These be the words: "If the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or sister is not in subjection to such. But God hath called us in peace." Antichrist will by no means suffer any divorcement so to be made, although the guiltless person burn never so greatly, and be never so much encumbered both in body and in conscience. Take the whore again if ye will, other wife ye get none.²⁸

There is no doubt also that the matrimonial caprices and adventures of Henry VIII helped to mold sentiment against the then existing canon law of matrimony, so that its complete abolition was contemplated.

A commission was issued by Henry VIII, and renewed by his son, Edward VI, authorizing Archbishop Cranmer and other leading ecclesiastics to inquire into the subject, and report to the crown the result of their deliberations. These commissioners embodied their opinions and suggestions in the form of a work which was subsequently published, under the title of *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum*.

This commission, which in its final form "consisted of eight bishops, eight divines, eight civilians, and eight common lawyers," finished its work in 1552. On the subject of divorce and remarriage, as compared with the canon law, it was absolutely revolutionary.

The tenth [article] was about adultery. A clergyman guilty of it was to forfeit all his goods and estate to his wife and children; or, if he had none, to the

²⁷ *Early Writings*, pp. 379-85.

²⁸ *Prayers*, p. 532.

poor, or some pious use; and to lose his benefice, and be either banished, or imprisoned during life. A laymen was to restore his wife's portion, and to give her the half of his goods, and be imprisoned, or banished, during life. Wives that were guilty were to be in like manner punished. But the innocent party might marry again; yet such were rather exhorted, if they saw hope of amendment, to be reconciled to the offending party. No marriage was to be dissolved without a sentence of divorce. Desertion, long absence, capital enmities, where either party was in hazard of their life, or the constant perverseness, or fierceness of a husband against his wife, might induce divorce; but little quarrels might not do it; nor a perpetual disease, relief in such a misery being one of the ends of marriage. But all separation from bed and board, except during a trial, was to be taken away.²⁹

Very properly does Mr. Edmund Robertson, barrister at law, say of this proposed code: "The leaders of the Reformation sanctioned principles which would even now be considered liberal."³⁰ But the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum* was never enacted.

A series of misfortunes, the principal one of which was the death of the king, not any want of confidence in the utility of the plan, prevented its being carried into effect.³¹

The law remained unchanged. The constitution of marriage belonged to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. The tie was indissoluble. The marriage, indeed, might be declared null and void in certain cases, e. g., where the parties were within prohibited degrees of consanguinity. The proceeding was not a dissolution of marriage so much as a declaration that no real marriage had taken place between the parties. Divorce *a mensa et thoro* was granted for adultery and cruelty. Here the marriage, being originally good, was not dissolved, but a separation was ordered for a limited or indefinite time. The spouses were not permitted to marry again. But while the law remained unchanged, the practice of getting complete divorce by private acts of Parliament had come into existence. The legislature did in particular cases that which it refused to do by a general law.³²

But these "particular cases" were of infrequent occurrence. The sentiment of the church was opposed to divorce, and the parliamentary process was tedious and expensive. "Three suits—ecclesiastical, civil, and parliamentary—were necessary." Hence, as

²⁹ Burnet, *History of the Reformation*, Vol. II, Book I, pp. 312 ff.; Bishop, *Marriage and Divorce*, sec. 30; Reeves, *History of English Law*, Vol. V, pp. 74 ff.

³⁰ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article "Divorce."

³¹ Bishop, *ut supra*.

³² *Encyclopædia Britannica*, *ut supra*.

Mr. Robertson says, "divorce became a remedy for the rich. The poor were driven to bigamy."

But the *Reformatio*, which was printed in the year 1571, acted as a leaven. It helped to keep the Protestant sentiment alive, until, after more than three hundred years, its spirit and many of its recommendations were embodied in the English statutes of 1858, which have taken the matter of divorce out of the hands of the church and have lodged it with "The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes." These statutes make the following provision for the dissolution of marriage in sec. 27:

It shall be lawful for any husband to present a petition to the said court, praying that his marriage may be dissolved, on the ground that his wife has since the celebration thereof been guilty of adultery; and it shall be lawful for any wife to present a petition to the said court, praying that her marriage be dissolved, on the ground that since the celebration thereof her husband has been guilty of incestuous adultery, or of bigamy with adultery, or of rape, or of sodomy or bestiality, or of adultery coupled with such cruelty as without adultery would have entitled her to a divorce *a mensa et thoro*, or of adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years or upwards.

By sec. 57, after a dissolution of marriage, "it shall be lawful for the respective parties thereto to marry again, as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death." But no clergyman of the United Church of England and Ireland shall be compelled to solemnize the marriage of any person whose former marriage has been dissolved on the ground of his or her adultery, or shall be liable to any penalty for refusing.³³

Thus after more than three hundred years (we repeat it for the sake of emphasis) the essential principles relating to divorce and the marriage of divorced persons, enunciated by the Reformers, have been legislatively established in England, and have become a part of the statutory law of the land. Several principal causes of absolute divorce are named, and husband and wife are placed on an equality before the law. A second marriage is allowed to both parties divorced without distinction of being innocent or guilty. Separation *a mensa et thoro* is abolished in name, but "judicial separation," having the same effect, is introduced, which no doubt was done out

³³ See Bishop, *ut supra*, sec. 65, note; and *Encyclopædia Britannica*, article "Divorce."

of deference to the Roman Catholic church, since it does not appear in the recommendations of the Reformers. And certainly it cannot be justified by any teaching of the Scriptures, nor by sound principles of morality and law. Neither the Council of Trent nor the *Catechismus* quotes Scripture in its favor, and the English Bishop Cosin declares:

The distinction betwixt bed and board and the bond is new, never mentioned in the Scripture, and unknown to the ancient church; devised only by the casuists and schoolmen in the Latin church.³⁴

Lord Stowell characterized it as casting the parties out "in the undefined and dangerous characters of a wife without a husband, and a husband without a wife;" and Judge Swift, as "placing them in a situation where there is an irresistible temptation to the commission of adultery, unless they possess more frigidity or more virtue than usually falls to the share of human beings;" and Bishop declares it to be

one of the most corrupting devices ever imposed by serious natures on blindness and credulity; destitute of justice; this ill-begotten monster of divorce *a mensa et thoro*, made up of pious doctrine and worldly stupidity; this nuisance in law; in almost every place where marriage is known, this Folly walks with her—the queen and the slut, the pure and the foul, the bright and the dark, dwell together.³⁵

And yet this social and legal abomination, this child of asceticism and sophistry, begotten in an age when chastity was as little respected as it was practiced, when woman was held chiefly to be the slave and ministress of the passions of man—"this ill-begotten monster" is still upheld by the laws of England and of most of the states of the American Union, in its mission of insult, exasperation, and degradation; and that, too, without a single protest from those ecclesiastical bodies that have promulgated resolutions and canons on the divorce question. They have all aimed only to regulate the conduct of their clergy in the matter of marrying persons who have been divorced by the laws of the state, and they all show a disposition or a tendency to contract the principles enunciated by the Reformers, Luther (who declared in regard to the *debitum conjugale*: "If the wife will not, call the maid"), Melancthon, Zwingli, Calvin, the *Reformatio*. And in some Protestant ecclesiastical bodies there is, it is believed, a hark-

³⁴ See Cosin's *Works*, Vol. IV, p. 492.

³⁵ Bishop, *ut supra*, sec. 29.

ing back to the position of the Roman Catholic church. For instance: In the General Convocation of the Episcopal church, held in Boston in 1904, "upon a vote taken in committee of the whole," it was resolved:

No minister knowingly, after due inquiry, shall solemnize the marriage of any person who has a divorced husband or wife still living, if such husband or wife has been put away for any cause arising after marriage.³⁶

And Bishop Doane has declared, in the *North American Review* for April, 1905, that

all the Protestant churches are drawing toward the position that no marriage ought to be solemnized by any ecclesiastical body, or sanctioned by civil law, except to the innocent party in a suit for adultery.

Now it is exactly this harking-back to Rome, this contraction of the principles enunciated by the Reformation, that makes it impossible to have *rapprochement* of state and church in dealing with the question of divorce. The Reformers believed that Christ and Paul enunciated principles rather than laid down canons, and that Matt. 19:9 and 1 Cor. 7:15 must be interpreted in the spirit rather than in the letter—that there is adultery and desertion that are not of the letter; that there are acts not specifically named by Christ and Paul that effectually contravene the purpose and office of marriage, and make it a minister of outrage and a seminary of vice and crime, injurious to the church and dangerous to the state. Shall the church by a rigorous interpretation of Scripture place herself on the side of cruelty, oppression, and degradation? Shall the church refuse release from a bond that binds twenty thousand wives in the state of New York to the support of twenty thousand drunkard husbands, and to participation in procreating broods of children, born heirs of poverty and vicious instincts, and placed from the hour of birth on the road that in thousands of instances leads to the almshouse, the penitentiary, the gallows? Will the church refuse surcease to such sorrow? Is not an incurably, brutishly inebriate husband a deserter of his wife? Does not such a one endanger the salvation of his wife's soul? Has not such a one violated before God and man the solemn compact of marriage? Has he not profaned God's holy institution?

Read in the foregoing pages the answer that Martin Luther,

³⁶ This resolution was subsequently lost in a vote by dioceses.

Philip Melancthon, John Calvin, the English Reformers, would give to these questions. They all saw a principle involved in 1 Cor. 7:15. And shall they be now cast out of the synagogue as heretical, unchristian despisers of God's institution, enemies of righteousness, promoters of unchastity, overthrowers of the civil order? Are they not rather to be regarded as the heralds of a better morality and as the prophets of a higher civil order? Were they not such in fact? Does not every civilized state the world over live and move in the light of their wisdom? Alas that in the matter of divorce the state should so licentiously and indiscriminatingly apply the principle they saw in 1 Cor. 7:15, and should make divorce so easy, as is the case in many of the states of the American Union!

But the time has come when the state and the church, to the behoof of both, should seek to stand on common ground in the abolition of a great abuse. In the attainment of this end, principles, not impulses, the spirit, not the letter, must have the right of way. Divorce should be made difficult. Only those acts should be justified by the state and sanctioned by the church as causes for divorce which *per se* destroy the essence of marriage, or defeat its divine purpose, or menace the civil and political interests, or make marriage a seminary of vice and crime. Narrowness, rigorism, on the part of the church will beget license on the part of the state. But *rapprochement* will be difficult. The Roman Catholic church has her dogma, and the Protestant churches are in confusion. And the difficulty is increased by the fact that we do not know where and what the church is. A Catholic or a Protestant can easily name the notes of the church, but in neither case does the thing *noted* correspond to a concrete object. A highly honored Episcopalian clergyman has recently written:

It is plain that Christ had in mind a church; it is plain that the thing which we call the church is not the thing he had in mind. The difficulty which one confronts at the outset is to find the thing at all.

To speak exactly, there is no objective reality to which the title "Christian church" can be applied There are not one-half as many separate governments in the world today as there were even a century ago. So far as one can see, there is a much more immediate prospect of a Catholic state than of a Catholic church. It is a startling fact that the most potent divisive force at work in human society is the church. There are churches in plenty, but there is no church.³⁷

And the same writer credits the late Professor Bruce with saying:

I am disposed to think that a great and increasing portion of the moral worth of society lies outside the Christian church, separated from it, not by godlessness, but rather by exceptionally intense moral earnestness. Many, in fact, have left the church in order to be Christians.

No candid person of observation and experience can deny that these strictures contain a large volume of truth. We do not know exactly what or where the church is; and it is certain that church members do not have a monopoly of the domestic, social, civil, political, or commercial virtues. Hence it is presumptuous for the church to set herself forward as the exclusive censor of morals, or as the only conservator of the matrimonial institution, or as the sole divinely chartered corrector of the abuses of the right of divorce. In all these spheres the church has her function. But it may be justly charged that her delinquency has been great. It is the primary, the paramount, duty of the church—that is, of the churches; that is, of all those organizations that take the Divine Word as their law in regard to marriage—to get men and women ready “to marry in the Lord;” which is a very different function from that of enacting canons for the government of the clergy in the matter of marrying or not marrying “a person who has a divorced husband or wife still living.” It is the primary and paramount duty of the church in affairs matrimonial to tell the young what marriage is; what its duties, obligations, aims, and purposes are. The ignorance of most young people on these subjects is lamentable. Hence multitudes look on marriage, not so much as a moral, intellectual, religious union, as rather a bodily conjunction, whose end is carnal gratification and material gain. As a result of such false conceptions, in a vast number of instances “holy wedlock” is contracted under the inspiration of erotic poetry, or under the impulse of “the lust of the flesh,” or at the solicitation of a flourishing bank account. In the case of such marriages disappointment is inevitable; divorce and separation are probable. It is now too late for the churches to pass resolutions and enact canons. The mischief has been done. The breach cannot be repaired. The clergy have missed their opportunity. They have not taught the boys and young men that God intends them to be husbands, and that on becoming husbands they “so ought to love their own wives as their own bodies” (Eph. 5:28); and the

³⁷ Dr. S. D. McConnell, in *Christ*, pp. 157, 159.

young women, that God formed them to be wives, and that on becoming wives they are to be "chaste, workers at home, kind, being in subjection to their own husbands." It is the mission of the church to teach, *inter alia*, the divine economy of marriage in its ethical and religious principles as the foundation and the means of that personal and spiritual communion which human nature craves, and which only marriage can yield.

Now on this point the Protestant churches have been almost criminally delinquent. The Protestant catechisms make little or no provisions for instruction on the subject of marriage and on the duties of husbands and wives; and the Protestant pulpit is almost dumb on the subjects of marriage and divorce. Indeed, inquiry reveals the fact that very few English-speaking American ministers ever preach on these subjects. As a consequence of such delinquencies, very few young men and women of Protestant affiliations enter into "holy wedlock" clearly understanding that it is a divine institution, and that it has its root in the *ethos* as well as in the *pathos* of human nature, and that it is indissoluble, except as the result of the commission of crimes that degrade humanity and imperil the salvation of souls.

But the Protestant conscience is being aroused on the question of divorce. The danger now is that its activity will lead to what Bishop Martensen calls "a non-evangelical partiality," which cannot command the respect of the saner portion of the community, and which will tend to the secularization—that is, to the degradation—of marriage by turning over its official ratification to aldermen and justices of the peace. Place must be left for discrimination, and possibly for concessions. Evangelical principles, rather than ecclesiastical inhibitions, must be allowed to decide. Consciences must not be burdened. The salvation of souls must not be imperiled. "For it is better to marry than to burn" (1 Cor. 7:9); "God hath called us in peace" (1 Cor. 7:15). The pre-eminent function of the church in these matters is didactic, not legislative and judicial. Her duty is to strive to elevate the public conscience, and to hold up the moral and religious features of marriage. When she shall have served faithfully in her educational function, she may then promulgate appropriate resolutions and canons.

THE CATHOLIC CULTUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY¹

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The beliefs and practices of the Roman and Greek Catholic churches with regard to the virgin Mary are, of course, the result of growth, rather than original inheritances from the days of Christ and his apostles. They exhibit traceable stages of development, covering all Christian history from the Nicene age to the Vatican Council of 1870. In treating the facts in the present article it seems advisable, for purposes of clearness and literary coherence, to make the following arrangement:

I. The causative factors which resulted, during the Nicene and post-Nicene periods, in an apotheosis of Mary.

II. The position of Mary in the mediæval age, leading to the Festival of the Conception, first celebrated at Lyons in 1139.

III. The Francisco-Dominico-Jesuitical battle over the immaculate conception, from the time of Duns Scotus to the promulgation of that dogma by Pius IX, 1854, and the correlative decision on infallibility in 1870.

I

In the origin and early development of the Marian apotheosis we may distinguish six causative factors:

1. The religious tendencies of the people among whom Christianity was primarily propagated.

The Palestinian recipients of the new faith were mainly Semites. As the church extended beyond the borders of the Holy Land, it came into contact with the Aryan race, particularly its melano-chroic branches. These two distinct races possessed a common

¹ BIBLIOGRAPHY: General histories of the Christian church: Augustus Neander, Philip Schaff, Henry C. Sheldon. Hefele, *History of the Councils*. Monographs: Felix Bungener, *The Council of Trent, Rome and the Council (Vatican)*; Theodore A. Buckley, *The Council of Trent*; Edward Preuss, *The Immaculate Conception*, Berlin; Charles Morris, *The Aryan Race, Its Origin and Achievements*; George W. Cox, *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*. Articles in ecclesiastical encyclopædias.

tendency in family religion—that of ancestor- and hero-worship. Even the Hebrew nation, trained through long centuries in the worship of Jehovah, exhibits striking marks of this tendency in its sacred records—the Old Testament Scriptures. The peculiarity of this ancestor- and hero-cult was that, among the Aryans, it never became, save in isolated instances, the formal religion of the people. It was often so much a family matter as to be secret, strangers being rigidly excluded from its observances and the ritual sacredly preserved as an esoteric mystery. Nor, prior to Christianity, did formal religion, when introduced from without or developed as civilization advanced, ever gain a strong hold on these peoples, except in so far as it strictly embodied the ancestor- and hero-worship. The real gods of Greece were not the mighty dwellers on Olympus, but the heroes, demigods, and household deities. The *lares* and *penates* of Rome were even more powerful than the gods of the Pantheon. Persecution of the Christians under the pagan empire, where it was not generated by local hatreds of a political, social, or commercial character, largely grew out of the feeling that the genius of the empire, embodied in the person of the emperor—in other words, the patron deity of the combined Roman clans—was insulted in the Christian refusal to bow before him. In the homes of our Teutonic forefathers the hearth-fire was closer to their real faith than Odin or Thor, since it represented the spirits of departed heroes and giants of the family or clan. Robin Goodfellow, sprites, fairies, gnomes, trolls, etc., are the still existing remnants in folklore of a racial tendency which centuries of Christian training have not entirely eradicated.

The Christian church came into contact with this tendency before it had been weakened. There were abstract ideas inseparably connected with the concept of a purely spiritual, non-material God which proved difficult of comprehension to the common man of post-apostolic days. He wanted something concrete. This Christianity furnished him, in a measure, in its presentation of Christ, the God-Man. But generations of heredity impelled him to believe in the necessity of many and multiform intermediaries between the Absolute Deity and himself. Greek philosophy, with its rationalistic deism, fostered this view. Therefore, even in Pauline and Johannean times, it was found that the true faith had to contend with

the embodiments of this race-faith as exhibited in embryonic Ebionism and Gnosticism. Such a tendency could adequately be overcome only by a slow process of education and enlightenment. Persecution helped to purify the church for a time; but a sharp, sudden, and startling change was at hand.

2. The abrupt transformation, due to the accession of Constantine, of the Christians from contemptuously tolerated or fiercely persecuted sectaries into favored exponents of the state religion, and, often, into officials of authority and power.

The heathen, never scrupulous as to real faith, readily flocked into the church, and there was a consequent lowering of the moral and spiritual tone of Christianity. Illustrative of the pagan attitude is the famous gibe of a prominent Roman senator: "Make me bishop of Rome and I will turn Christian tomorrow." The bishops and presbyters, rejoicing in their new peace and honor, zealous for the greater glory of the church, welcomed the thousands who came seeking baptism; but, while endeavoring to correct and elevate the spiritual understanding of their converts, they unconsciously accommodated themselves to the lower standard. It was inevitable that the vast multitude of superstitious, illiterate, often degenerate heathen who pressed within the fold would not lose their ingrained notions and racial religious tendencies by a short course in the catechism. They looked upon the martyrs of past persecutions much as, before their conversion, they regarded the *manes*, *lares*, *penates*, and heroic dead. That natural and proper feeling which showed respect to the death days of the martyrs as the birthdays of their heavenly nativity, was easily perverted into a matter of processions, feasts, night vigils—in which both sexes participated, with the result of frequent immorality—and the like. The pagan rites after which these ceremonies were modeled had just died, or were perhaps only moribund. It was in the Aryan blood to pay some sort of worship to heroes and martyred ancestors, whether of spiritual or material genealogy. It was in the Greek and Latin blood dearly to love spectacles and shows. Therefore it was certain that such peoples would fail to distinguish between honor paid to the God of the martyr, at the grave of the martyr, through the martyr, and honor to the martyr himself as a sort of subsidiary god. Hence arose

a veneration of saints. The church fathers clearly differentiated this veneration from the worship of God, but it is doubtful if the masses ever grasped such a distinction. Augustine, with his keen intellect, either originated or gave the weight of his name to the three varieties of worship taught by the Greek and Roman churches of today: *latreia*, as the worship due to the Trinity alone; *douleia*, as the honor or veneration to be paid to the saints; *hyper-douleia*, as the unusual and unique honor or veneration to be paid to the virgin.

3. Man's instinctive adoration of the feminine ideal.

Impure man admires purity. Selfish man admires unselfishness. Gross man admires daintiness and refinement. In the midst of an age as impure as any history records, there was not lacking an ideal of cold, beautiful, unwavering chastity, personified in the Greek Artemis. No period of human residence on the earth, so far as observed, is without traces of the influence of this ideal. Christianity emphasized sexual morality as no other religion had ever done. The chastity of its female converts was no small element in the forces which account for its wonderful progress during the first four centuries. It was not strange, rather it was inevitable, that the mother of Jesus, the highly favored among women, the one who stood closest to Christ in his worldly relationships, the lovely model of sweet, gracious, modest womanhood, should be accounted worthy of prime distinction among the growing category of saints.

Further, the tremendous influence of hereditary sensuality in the constitution of the peoples about whom we are writing, an influence hardly comprehensible to us at this day, made them peculiarly liable to speculate about and delight in the mysteries attendant upon the purely physical side of the incarnation, and to emphasize its human instrument above its divine cause.

But the word of God does not teach any such worship of the saints or of Mary. How, then, could the church, which held to the authority of the Bible, fall into so grievous error? The answer is found in the fourth factor in the apotheosis of Mary.

4. The influence of tradition.

Absence of books, or their tremendous cost, reduced the mass of the people, even those not illiterate, to the necessity of getting their knowledge of the Scriptures from the public reading of them.

Also, the view which the people would take of any given dogma, mode of worship, or law of conduct, instead of being based upon a careful and independent study of the Bible, was necessarily colored by the interpretation and teaching of the few men who could and did examine the sacred Word. Thus the clergy were given an unusual power. It was virtually unchecked by any intelligent criticism, save from clerical sources.

Even among the clergy there was developed a servitude to tradition. The Scriptures were the source of authority, the norm of truth; but by whom were they authoritatively to be interpreted? Manifestly, the greatest heed would be given to such teachers as could claim a direct apostolic sanction for their hermeneutics. If, for instance, after the death of John the Beloved, a question of interpretation arose, what more natural than that Polycarp, the intimate and disciple of John, should be considered most competent to answer? He would know, most likely, what John thought about the scripture in question, or would, at least, give his verdict in accord with Johannine principles of exposition. When Polycarp was dead, his successor Irenæus would be tendered, or would claim, a special accuracy in exegesis, because of his acquaintance with Polycarp, who was the direct disciple of John. And so on, through Hippolytus, to endless generations of apostolic succession, so called. Thus, while it was undoubtedly true that many of the real and valuable traditions of the apostles were handed down orally, and helped to prevent and refute numerous errors, it was also of equal certainty that, in the decision of the countless questions concerning Scripture interpretation, and involving faith and practice in points upon which the Bible did not declare definitely, the disciples of the apostles and sub-apostolic fathers, being but fallible, mortal men, would make many mistakes.

The bishops and teachers of the church who had, by virtue of superior piety, administrative ability, or learning, gained great influence among the people, were soon appealed to as possessing an authority little short of plenary inspiration. By the time of the first ecumenical council, held at Nicæa in 325, the authority of tradition had almost superceded, at least in the popular mind, that of the Word of God. Not confessedly so, it must clearly be remem-

bered; for the Nicene fathers expressly affirm the Scriptures to be the ultimate norm of truth; but, since tradition was the norm of hermeneutic, the Scriptures would teach what tradition said they taught.

Nor were there wanting instances in which the weight of a great name, or the claim of direct apostolic sanction, were unrighteously used to bolster the errors of the unscrupulous.

It is plain that the tendency to sail with the popular wind, which existed in church dignitaries of that age as well as in this, easily prevailed on many who held ecclesiastical office, so that they approved or winked at beliefs and practices which more independent clergymen considered erroneous. The people carried the clergy along with them. Even the fearless and powerful Augustine, and with him such strenuous men as John Chrysostom and the two Gregories of Nazianzen and Nyssa, were unable to stem the tide in some matters of which they disapproved. The worship of Mary and the saints met the popular mood and pleased the popular fancy; so the great leaders, confronted by an enthusiasm they were really powerless to curb, endeavored to point out and maintain a distinction between the worship of God and the veneration of the saints; between *latreia* and *douleia*. But, once having given way, even partially, to the prevailing opinion, these same great men were afterward quoted as conservators and expounders of the tradition which, through them, thus received the more impressive authority.

The course, in short, was this: If the people, through superstition, or racial tendency, or semi-heathen perversion of the truth, believed a certain thing or practiced it, the time was not long ere someone in place of power was found to declare it a true dogma. As he was a successor of the apostles, he spoke with authority. Thenceforth, in ever-increasing volume, the weight of tradition was added to amplify and perpetuate the error.

5. Asceticism and monachism.

People and clergy both were thrown under the spell of asceticism and monachism. Enthusiasm in the early church manifested itself in martyrdom, or "confession," as it was technically termed. The confessors were heroes. Long before Constantine put an end to persecution, there were many whose view of martyrdom was not

much removed from that fanaticism which causes the Mohammedan to court death in battle with the infidels, that he may go straight and swiftly to the houris in Paradise. Constantine's accession produced a sort of renaissance in enthusiasm through the introduction of a multitude of converts, and this intensity of earnestness, since the civil power no longer oppressed the faith, sought an outlet in the vagaries and absurdities of such ascetics as Simon Stylites and hosts of similar saints. The influence of these men was boundless. Monachism, the cloister form of asceticism, spread with almost incredible rapidity. Both of these phases of religious activity regarded the body as evil, or the source of evil, and therefore to be mortified unnaturally in all its desires and passions. Men starved, mutilated themselves, assumed postures and modes of living involving the most awful hardship. How much of Persian theosophy, of neo-Platonism, of Gnosticism was involved in these excesses, it is difficult to determine. But the greatest and most lasting evil flowing from asceticism in its various forms was its degradation of the married state. Celibacy and virginity were exalted above all that is called God. Men left their wives, women left their husbands, cloisters were filled with devotees of both sexes, all despising as utterly incompatible with real holiness that union of husband and wife which Christ approved and which God had provided when he set the solitary in families. The whole Catholic world went mad. Great fathers of the church, Jerome particularly, wrote and preached against marriage and in favor of celibacy.

Racial tendencies and heathen modifications of the pure Christian doctrine had led to veneration of saints; the adoration of the feminine ideal, together with the peculiar relationship of Mary to Christ, had designated her as "queen of saints;" tradition, ever complaisant, had placed the Virgin in the position of the "natural" intermediary between the suppliant and the Son. But Mary had given birth to Jesus and had married Joseph. How were the ascetics to get over this concrete contradiction of their celibate argument? The answer was easy. They "went into the enemy's country" and appropriated his ammunition. Mary's marriage was simply eliminated by the process of inventing legends, which the people believed and tradition verified. By twists of Scripture, too fallacious and absurd to examine

here in detail, Joseph was declared an aged man when he married the Virgin, and the union made merely one of protection to the mother of Jesus. The brothers of Christ were either made sons of Joseph by a former marriage, or called cousins. Mary's perpetual virginity was vehemently asserted.

Some of the myths and legends go to obscene and disgusting lengths. Our Lord's birth, as well as his conception, was declared miraculous; he was born *ex clauso utero*. So Ambrose of Milan, Tertullian, Jerome, Gregory the Great. It was but a step to say that Mary was sinless; and Augustine took it. He regarded the Virgin as exempt from actual sin, *propter honorem Domini*. This train of reasoning, from the holiness of Christ to the holiness of his mother, was the germ of later evils. It was practically the argument followed, because of the weight of Augustine's name, in the scholastic campaign for the immaculate conception.

A considerable portion of the apocryphal literature regarding Mary was denounced by the more sensible bishops, and even condemned by Pope Gelasius, about 496; but the condemnation did not avail to prevent much of it from entering and abiding in Catholic tradition.

6. Christological controversies.

The belief and praxis hereinbefore sketched had now reached the stage where opportunity only was needed to secure the sanction of formal theological definition and authority. This chance came at the Council of Ephesus, in 431, when Cyril of Alexandria, by methods which an American municipal "boss" might well envy, secured the condemnation of Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, because of the latter's opposition to the term *theotokos*, "mother of God," as applied to Mary. Cyril was not primarily concerned with the honor to be assigned to Mary; but with the question of the real nature of Christ. Nestorius leaned toward the Antiochan view, which pressed the completeness of the two natures in Christ almost, if not quite, to the point of giving him a double personality. Athanasius and the Alexandrians went equally far in the direction of Monophysitism. Cyril's victory in honor of Christ was also a victory for Mariolatry. Thenceforward the name *theotokos*, in distinction from *christotokos*, was the shibboleth of orthodoxy. Throughout the great

christological controversies of Nestorianism, Eutychianism, Monophysitism, and Monothelitism there was the same reflection of glory from the Son to the mother.

II

The theory of the church with regard to Mary had now received the form it retained down to the twelfth century; but the practice of Mariolatry gained a tremendous impulse, along with the worship of the saints, especially in the post-Nicene period, by the introduction of images and pictures. The iconoclastic controversies, in the eighth century, only served to bring out the defense that it was not the image which was worshiped, but the God or saint represented by the image. As if any idolatry ever began with the image itself!

Semi-iconoclasm gained an ascendancy in the Eastern church, which was in process of rapid congelation; and, save for an increased blindness in the matter of relic- and picture-worship, its dogma and practice with regard to the Virgin have remained fixed in post-Nicene form down to the present time. We may, therefore, virtually dismiss the Greek church from further consideration.²

Odoacer overthrew the Western Empire in the fifth century. Mohammedanism gained mighty sway in the seventh. Great, successive waves of pagan or semi-pagan barbarism swept over Europe. By these means the understanding of the church was still more effectually darkened and its doctrine debased. In such a period those elements of the faith which most readily lent themselves to idolatry naturally suffered most in purity and gained most in practice. Saints, relics, images, with Mary, as queen of heaven, at their head, almost completely absorbed the worship of the people. Scott's picture of Louis XI, given us in *Quentin Durward*, is a faithful one. The shrewd, far-seeing, unscrupulous monarch, with a hatband stuck full of images, at frequent intervals withdrawing one and bowing before it, is no exaggeration. No legend was too foolish to be believed. no miracle too absurd to gain instant credence, no extravagance too great to catch and hold the popular superstition. Feasts and festivals multiplied. The festivals of Mary were great events. Those of her birth, annunciation, purification, and assumption to heaven,

² Joannes Damascenus, *Hom. in annuntiationem Mariæ Virginis*.

about which endless tales were told, led naturally, in the year 1139, to the celebration of a Festival of the Conception of Mary.

The Chapter of St. Stephen and John the Baptist, assembled at Lyons in consequence of the death of their archbishop, did not immediately set about the election of his successor; but, under the leadership of one of their canons, instituted the new festival. Calculating back from the date of the Festival of the Nativity of the Virgin—according to legend, September 8—they decided upon December 8 as the date of her conception.

The jubilant celebrants were roundly censured by Bernard of Clairvaux, in a letter addressed to the chapter. Bernard believed in a *sanctificatio in utero* of the Virgin, so that she was sinless from her birth, but strenuously objected to celebrating her conception. The great churchman said, in his letter to the chapter:

Even I heartily hold the birth of Mary to be holy, and worthy of a festival within the pale, and through the interposition, of the church; for I believe firmly, with the church, that she was sanctified in the womb of her mother, so that she came to light sinless. What shall we do more? Celebrate the conception which preceded the birth already celebrated, because, if it had not been for the former, that which we do honor would not have taken place? Why, if desired, we might upon the same grounds appoint special festivals to the honor of both the parents of Mary; and anyone who wished it could demand them in like manner for their grandparents and great-grandparents; and so on without end—festivals without number.³

Bernard further remarks that a solemn feast always involves the idea that the thing celebrated is holy. "Was such the case with the conception of the Virgin?" he asks. "He who maintains that must yield to the belief that Mary had been sanctified before she had existed."⁴

These words of the abbot of Clairvaux, and the section from which they are taken, would seem to indicate that the dogma of immaculate conception was not intentionally taught by the festival at Lyons. Bernard seems to point out the immaculacy as a necessary and reprehensible deduction from the festival, but a deduction which the celebrants had not hitherto grasped. He treats the immaculate conception as the *reductio ad absurdum* which utterly demolishes

³ Cited by Edward Preuss, *The Immaculate Conception* (Berlin).

⁴ *Ibid.*

the conception festival, so far as its theological basis was concerned.

But, as often in the early history of Mariolatry, the voice of a great teacher of the church was not sufficient to stem the tide of popular approval of this latest extravagance of superstition. Cloister after cloister took up the festival. In 1146 the abbot of St. Albans, in England, introduced the observance into his monastery and defended it against the views of Bernard. In France Bernard's influence was greater, and, after his death, the University of Paris entered the fray against the festival. The Lyonesse view became a *cause célèbre*. Peter Lombard, father of Scholasticism, taught, in 1150, that the Holy Spirit first purified Mary from sin when he overshadowed her, and supported his statements by copious quotations from the early fathers. A hundred years later, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas, friends and fellow-students, agreed in attributing original sin to the Virgin. The Dominican order, to which Thomas belonged, has ever since followed him in this view, until compelled by papal authority, in 1854, to acquiesce in the contrary.

III

The criticisms of Bernard, Thomas, and Cardinal Bonaventura, while they could not prevent the celebration of the Festival of the Conception, which, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, had captured a third of France and nearly all of England, at least effected a caution about drawing from the festival any dogma of Mary's freedom from original sin. But the temper of the populace, and of most clergymen, was such that a keen, powerful mind only was needed to lead them to this inference. Such an intellect was found in John Duns Scotus, born 1265 at Dunston, Northumberland. He studied first at Merton College, Oxford, under William de Warra, who was an earnest supporter of the conception festival. Then John spent seven years in Paris, where his success as a lecturer was so great that it aroused the jealousy of his colleague and senior, Reginald, who prevailed on the general of the Franciscans, to which order both belonged, to transfer John to Cologne. This was a serious reverse, as the University of Paris was the greatest of its day and the only theater of real world-power in scholasticism. The blow was too much for Scotus, and he died a few weeks after his transfer.

Duns Scotus was a fearless critic, and did not hesitate to oppose the opinions of any of the church fathers or schoolmen, when they differed from him. In this he was a marked contrast to Aquinas, to whom tradition was the breath of life. Philosophical sequence was more to Scotus. He must be logical, not traditional. So the seeming inconsistency in saying that the birth of Mary was holy, while her conception was in sin, resulted in his final promulgation of the immaculate conception. The schoolmen taught that the soul and body are independent creations of God, not a simultaneous result of procreation. On this view, Scotus reasoned that it was easy for the Lord to have created the soul of Mary without sin. His attitude toward the views of Aquinas—and we are here giving practically an epitome of the theological and philosophical aspects of the whole Francisco-Dominican war—may be given in the words of Preuss.

The first consideration of Aquinas had been: If Mary were conceived without original sin, she would not have stood in need of redemption through Christ. Scotus replies: To be preserved altogether from contact with sin is a much higher and more precious kind of redemption; and Christ would not have been by any means a plenary Redeemer, had he not enfolded in absolute purity at least one of his sheep. "But," says Thomas, "she is begotten of sinful seed, and therefore sinful." Scotus answers: "Are not all sins, and especially original sin, blotted out by baptism in the case of every child of God? What God practically accomplishes every day in baptism, he could have wrought without any difficulty in the first moment of the conception." Thomas says: "Did not Mary suffer pain like all others, and even death? All pain is the punishment of sin." "Yes," says Scotus, "for all other people, but not in the case of Mary. This temporal punishment is laid on her, on no other ground than for the purpose of giving her an opportunity of acquiring merit before God."⁵

Thus did John Duns Scotus earn for himself the title "Doctor Subtilis." He taught the new doctrine in his lectures, published it in his Oxford commentary on the sentences of Peter Lombard and in his reports from Paris, but always with a subtle suggestion and some reserve. However, two hundred years later, Bernardino de Basti told a devout assemblage in his cloister a legend that there was a great debate, under the authority of the pope, at Paris, in which hundreds of Dominicans appeared, while Scotus stood alone for the Franciscans. Another added to the yarn that Scotus, relying purely

⁵ *Op. cit.*

on his memory, consecutively and categorically overthrew exactly two hundred arguments of the Dominicans and converted the University of Paris to the dogma. Of course, no such disputation ever took place, and the University of Paris opposed the immaculate conception many years after the death of Scotus. But such fictions were easy of invention and credence in that day. The Franciscans believed the story and embroidered it with all kinds of lace.

Two men of the disciples of Scotus alone had the courage to advance the new teaching—Peter Oriol and Francis Mayron. The former naïvely took advantage of an invitation to preach at the Dominican church of Toulouse at the Festival of the Conception in 1314. The black friars had no idea that the immaculate conception would be taught. But Oriol, who was a fine orator, calmly stuffed the whole doctrine down their throats in the course of his sermon. Then the row arose, which did not end until the Franciscan, Pius IX, was in the papal chair.

The battle raged intermittently until the University of Paris, in consequence of a dispute as to how many Dominicans should be allowed in the theological faculty, got into ecclesiastical politics and took the Franciscan side of the controversy. The pope had interfered to reinstate certain deposed Dominican professors, and the University had resisted, but surrendered finally to Alexander IV. This humiliating submission engendered in the great college an intense hatred of the Dominican order. Thenceforward the struggle took a political cast, the immaculate conception being merely a handy vehicle with which to override opposition.

In 1384 John of Montesono, a Dominican, preached a sermon in Paris which called forth a censure of the university, and, on its representations, the bishop of Paris condemned fourteen heresies, drawn from Montesono's writings, principal among which, of course, was the doctrine of Mary's original sin. Montesono appealed to the pope. Clement VII, the French captive at Avignon, anxious for his tiara, hastened to approve the sentence of the bishop and, though only inferentially, to approve the doctrine of immaculate conception. John Vital, a noisy, half-educated Franciscan, vehemently asserted that the pope had approved the dogma, and told all kinds of legends of divine judgments on the Dominicans for their opposition to "the

truth;" events which, it is almost needless to say, always happened at some place far distant from the locality of narration. But the people swallowed the stories, and the doctrine became more firmly implanted in their minds.

Its acceptance grew rapidly until the Council of Basle, in 1431. This council, among other matters, took up the dogma and, suitably with the custom of the times, appointed four debaters, two for each side. John of Montenegro and John de Torquemada represented the Dominicans; the Franciscans had John Aymerici and the Asturian, John of Segovia, archdeacon of Villaviciosa. Torquemada and John of Segovia were the giants. The latter was pitted against Montenegro, and the Dominican was no match for him. Torquemada, however, was made of better stuff. In preparing his brief,

he searched through all the ecclesiastical traditions, from the times of the apostles downward, with unheard-of zeal; he wandered through archive after archive he levied toll upon every ecclesiastical library in Europe, either personally or by letter, and thus accumulated at length a treatise against the immaculate conception, which is certainly the most remarkable that any man has ever produced.⁶

But the French party had no intention of giving Torquemada a chance at its champions. On appearing to present his thesis, he was put off with the plea that another, and more important, subject was under discussion, and it was not the time to take up that of the conception. Torquemada waited five months, but never got a hearing. Then, after this modest council had suspended the pope and affirmed its authority over the whole world, it passed a decree in favor of the immaculate conception, and forbade the teaching of contrary doctrine in pulpit or professional chair. Eugene IV thundered bulls and anathemas from Florence, but the dogma was acknowledged wherever the Council of Basle had weight.

The next step came through the accession of Sixtus IV in 1471. Sixtus had been general of the Franciscan order, and required little persuasion to issue a deliverance upon a subject he had always advocated with frantic zeal. Nogaroli, a Veronese fanatic of the order, prepared a new mass and order for the celebration of the Feast of the Conception. Sixtus commended it officially. This new ritual was most extravagant in praise of the doctrine. It contained garbled

⁶ Preuss, *The Immaculate Conception*.

Scripture quotations and invented extracts from the Fathers. For instance, the Song of Solomon 4:7 is referred to Mary and quoted thus: "Thou art altogether beautiful, my love; and there is no spot of original sin in thee."

But the Dominicans opposed Sixtus, as they had stood by Eugene. Vincenzo Bandelli, general of the black-robed order, one of the ablest orators and dialecticians of his time, took up the gauntlet, and spoke to the point so effectively that the tiara and Franciscan order both trembled. Duke Hercules of Este cited Bandelli and the leading Franciscans before him for a public disputation, at which Bandelli was more than victor. The able Dominican followed up the discussion with a book, in which he gives two hundred and sixty patristic and traditional witnesses against the immaculatists. Nogaroli and his tool, Sixtus, were virtually pilloried before all Europe. Sixtus was induced to issue a bull which anathematized all who should declare the dogma of the sinless conception a heresy, but he also condemned those who should say heresy to Bandelli's views. Succeeding popes, however, and most of the bishops, even the scholars of Leipzig and Frankfort, continued to favor the Franciscan teaching. Then dawned the Reformation.

Luther and his fellow-Protestants were too busy with the positive work of actually reforming and converting themselves and their followers to make the immaculate conception a major issue. None of the reformers apparently paid more than incidental attention to it. Luther simply said that the Scriptures did not specifically teach anything concerning the holiness of Mary or her relation to the Godhead, save in the fact of the incarnation; therefore it was unsafe to dogmatize about it. He did, however, in his sermons charge Mary with actual and original sin. The Protestant position on the Scriptures, in any event, carried with it the ultimate rejection of Mariolatry and all saint-worship. It is incidentally interesting to note that Cardinal Cajetan agreed with Luther on one point at least—he thundered against the immaculate conception.

The Council of Trent, in 1545-46, was besieged, of course, with demands for a settlement of the dogma as an article of faith along with its consensus of Catholic doctrine. It came upon the vexing question in the sessions where original sin was discussed and defined.

Cardinal Pacheco appeared as the immaculalist champion. But the council, confronted by a united Lutheranism, concretely expressed in the Augsburg Confession, felt the necessity of condemning heresy without and of presenting a united Catholicism within, to oppose the Protestants. They were therefore very loath to take up a doctrine which had convulsed the Roman church for four centuries. Which-ever way it was decided, it would prove a weapon in the hands of the Lutherans. So a compromise was agreed upon. The deliverance, after much deliberation, ran as follows: "The synod declares that it is not its purpose to include the virgin Mary in its decree upon original sin, further than to revive the bull of Sixtus IV relating thereto, together with the penalties therein." This simply left the *status quo ante*.

There now came upon the scene a new and powerful factor, that of the Society of Jesus. The shrewd leaders of this order soon perceived that to espouse the cause of Mary was to win the Catholic populace. They therefore espoused it. About 1577 Peter de Hondt, a Dutch Jesuit, issued a work on the immaculate conception, directed primarily against the Lutheran centuriators of Magdeburg. Bellarmino, the great Jesuit of Italy, also wrote a powerful book. In 1593 the fifth general assembly of Loyola's followers officially committed the order to the Franciscan view, instructing its members to accept the opinions of Duns Scotus. This marks an epoch in immaculalist progress. Approximately at this time the Carmelites, Benedictines, and other monastic orders formally joined the movement. The Dominicans were left alone. To Spain itself, the country of Dominic de Guzman, the area of action was soon transferred. Here the fiercest and most characteristic battles were fought. We can but briefly sketch them.

Throughout the reign of Philip II the immaculate-conception doctrine had steadily been advancing in his kingdom. Spain's real lords were the Dominicans, to whom were committed the inquisitorial powers, of which the Franciscans were naturally very jealous. These latter, seeing that only a spark was needed to set afire popular zeal for Mary, promptly proceeded to furnish a whole shower of sparks.

In the midst of the Alhambra, at Granada, stands the hill Valpa-

raiso. Here, in 1588, workmen found, under the ruins of a tower, a tin box; and it proved to contain a sheet of parchment, written on both sides, a piece of linen cloth, and a small bone. The vellum was a narrative of St. Patricius, who had concealed the box there in apostolic days. St. Cecilius also testified on the parchment that the bone was from the body of St. Stephen the Martyr, and that the piece of linen was half of the handkerchief used by the Virgin at the Cross. The hill, during the next eight years, proved a veritable mine of apostolic finds, such as lead tablets marking the ashes of no less than nine martyrs of Neronian and early persecutions, numerous tin boxes, and lots of books. Of these latter, the one by St. Cecilius, entitled *Of the Home of Glory and of the Habitation of Woe*, contained the following sentences:

This Virgin Mary, this Holy One, this Elect One, has been preserved from original sin. This truth is established by a council of the apostles. Whosoever denies it is excommunicated and accursed, and will not be saved; but, on the contrary, lost forever.⁷

The archbishop ordered a *Te Deum*, sent a detailed story of the finds to Pope Clement VIII, and asked for an assembly to declare upon the genuineness of the discoveries. The Dominicans, to whom the clumsiness of this series of forgeries and spurious relics was as nuts and raisins, lost no time in exposing the colossal fraud. But the august commission, composed of a noble, two bishops, an abbot, and thirty-three doctors of theology, pronounced the relics genuine. They did not, it is true, declare the manuscripts authentic, but a little omission of that kind in no way retarded the people's acceptance of them.

About this time the Jesuit Louis of Molina published a book on divine grace and free will which was anti-Augustinian in character. This the Dominicans made a *casus belli*. The Jesuits, Franciscans, Benedictines, and Carmelites united against their enemies, and sought the aid of court and king. Philip III was ignorant and bigoted. His wife was of the Austrian house, and had with her as friend and adviser one of the most intense conception fanatics of the day, in the person of her cousin, Margaret of Austria, a Franciscan nun. During the reigns of Philip III and his son every ounce of influence

⁷ Preuss, *op. cit.*

was exerted to secure the condemnation and expulsion of the hated Dominicans. Spurious letters and chronicles dating from apostolic times were freely fabricated. Mistresses of kings and popes were bought up. Spanish embassies, headed by proud Andalusian nobles, and ecclesiastics, were kept for years in Rome, endeavoring to secure papal deliverances in favor of the immaculate conception and against the Dominicans. Results: Paul V, 1616, renewed the bulls of Sixtus IV and Pius V. In 1617 the Congregation of the Inquisition, with papal approbation, commanded that the Dominican view should not henceforth openly be taught, in the pulpit, professorial chair, or elsewhere. Gregory XV, 1622, issued a bull forbidding the assertion or the writing, even in private, that the Virgin was conceived in sin. This was supposed to have settled the Dominicans. But, when the time came for celebrating the Conception Festival, the black friars shrewdly celebrated the conception of the immaculate Mary, not the immaculate conception of Mary. The next pope, Urban VIII, withstood the Spanish political influence and favored the Dominicans. Shortly after Urban's death, King Philip IV visited a cataleptic nun who lived at Agreda, in the mountains of Aragon. This nun, Maria de Jesus, seems to have been a sort of mediæval spiritualistic medium, or auto-hypnotic psychic, whose business it was to receive revelations from the Virgin. So copious were the appearances to Maria de Jesus of Mary the mother of Jesus that the nun was able to write a very full and complete history of the Virgin. Philip, impressed with the catalept's piety, read the book and adopted its teachings. This was the signal for another coalition of the immaculatists against the Dominicans. This time they were able to prevail. A few years later Alexander VII, on December 8, 1661, issued his bull "*Sollicitudo*," which expressed the dogma of the immaculate conception almost as fully as Pius IX did later. He threatened the penalties of the church on all who celebrated the Festival of the Conception with any other view, or who differed in any other way from his decision. By this time the machinery of the Inquisition had passed from the hands of the Dominicans to the hands of the Jesuits. A royal ordinance followed in Spain and added to the penalties of the pope. The struggle of the black friars was virtually over, and the theology of Aquinas had given way to that of Scotus.

In 1676 John de Launoy, a Jansenist and a most brilliant analyst, wrote against the immaculate conception, but his work had no lasting effect. Pope Clement XI, 1708, enjoined as obligatory the Festival of the Conception, which had been free hitherto. Muratori, the famous librarian to the duke of Modena, wrote a powerful book *Against Superstition*, in 1741, in which he ably reviewed all the arguments against the immaculatists. Benedict XIV protected the writer, but ignored his doctrine. Alfonso de Liguori, 1696-1787, produced *The Glory of Mary*, the most fulsome and idolatrous work on the immaculate conception of post-Reformation times. It is reported to have been a favorite book of Pius IX.

The Napoleonic wars and subsequent turmoil prevented theological questions from being discussed to any great extent during the periods of conflict. Not until Pius IX ascended the papal throne, in 1846, was a new move made. This pope, soured by the loss of the papal territory in the wars of 1848, with melancholy superstition turned to the Virgin as his only help. In 1849 he sent out his well-known encyclical on the immaculate conception, asking the opinions of his bishops concerning it, and whether it was advisable formally to pronounce the dogma as an article of the faith. Many prelates preferred cowardly silence to negative answer, but of the six hundred replies received, all save about fifty were favorable. Some of the opposing bishops urged the fallacy of stirring up the question at an inopportune time; some thought a church council should be called; others considered the whole subject so uncertain as to render any definition unwise. Pius, however, was determined. On the festival day in 1854, before a solemn convocation, he formally proclaimed:

The doctrine that the Most Blessed Virgin Mary was preserved from all original sin, in the very first moments of her conception, by a special grace of Almighty God, conferred upon her in view of the services to be rendered by our Redeemer Christ Jesus, is revealed by God, and must therefore be firmly and certainly believed by all the faithful. Henceforth whoever dares (which God forbid) to think in his heart otherwise than is defined by us, is, as we hereby notify publicly, condemned by his own judgment, has made shipwreck of faith, and is fallen from the unity of the church. Whoever, amongst such, dares to publish by word of mouth, or in writing, or in any other way, what he thinks in his heart, subjects himself to the penalties provided in such cases.

This deliverance was followed by the bull "Ineffabilis Deus,"

in which the dogma is declared to accord with the Scriptures and tradition. Let us examine, for a moment, the position of this deliverance with relation to well-recognized principles of Catholic dogmatism.

The Fathers declared the Scriptures to be the norm of truth, the source of dogma. Post-Nicene and mediæval scholasticism exalted tradition. It was repeatedly determined that no dogma should be laid upon the faithful as an article of faith, unless it had the foundation of Scripture and the authority of tradition; that is, apostolic or patristic tradition. But the Scriptures, as several bishops pointed out in 1854, do not teach the immaculate conception. Nor is there to be found a really great church father, down to the tenth century, who, when speaking soberly of doctrinal matters, does not teach that Mary was conceived in original sin. Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Athanasius, the two Gregories, Cyril, Tertullian, Gregory the Great, with other early fathers and the bulk of the schoolmen, are all against the dogma of Pío Nono. How, then, could he proclaim it as he does in the bull "*Ineffabilis Deus*"? The answer is partly to be found in Jesuitical casuistry, partly in the growth of the doctrine of papal infallibility.

The commission which, in 1852-53, deliberated on the immaculate conception, decided, under the leadership of the Jesuit Perrone, that

In order to make a certain opinion into a dogma, there is no need of any testimony out of Holy Scripture. Tradition alone, without any written witness, is sufficient of itself. In order to constitute tradition, it is necessary to have an unbroken line of witnesses leading back to the apostles; but the Catholic tradition is established if it can be proved that the general opinion of the church has at any time publicly declared itself upon the thesis in question.⁸

This mixture of illogical contradictions is manifestly based on Bellarmine's test of valid tradition, and amounts practically to a declaration that what commands the general assent of the church in the present must always have been at least implicitly believed by it, and so must rest back on apostolic teaching. Sheldon rightly observes: "Anyone ought to see that it is transparent hypocrisy to pretend that tradition is a real authority where such a rule prevails."

⁸ Malou, *Die Consultoren*, Vol. II, p. 352.

Did the dogma, however, command the general assent of the Roman church? More than half the six hundred replies to the pope's encyclical of inquiry were from Italy, a good share of the remainder from Spain, less from France, and the rest sparsely sprinkled over the great Catholic world outside these countries. Opposition or silence dictated the replies from Ireland, England, Germany, America, and parts of France.

Every appeal, since the time of Duns Scotus, for papal decision on the dogma of immaculate conception strengthened that of infallibility. The two doctrines grew together, and each reached its majority about the same time. Logically, infallibility should have come first; but, when immaculacy had been declared, without council or tradition or Bible to back it, it was necessary for the Francisco-Jesuitical coalition to cement their capstone at the Vatican Council. This they proceeded to do, despite the courageous and scholarly opposition of such men as Döllinger and Hefele, the great historians of the councils.

These are facts within the memory of living men. They occurred in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century, in the face of all scientific, historical, and biblical learning. They present a sad commentary on the passions and prejudices of men under the compulsion of the *rabies theologorum*.

DOCUMENT

THE SCORN OF THE WORLD: A POEM IN THREE BOOKS

TRANSLATED BY HENRY PREBLE FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN OF BERNARD, A MONK OF THE BENEDICTINE MONASTERY OF CLUNY,
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BOOK III

A lost age, jealous of good character, has got the upper hand. They are nameless who try to live without sin. The golden age and kiss of peace have perished. It is now a really faithless, ill-smelling age. An ill-smelling age, I call it not filthy, but the incarnation of filth; reeking with filth, I call it not dead, but death itself.

O evil days! The faithless heart is made a theme of praise, that which is without fraud and innocent of sin is called stupid and dull. Fraud is in honor, is prominent in craft, and is master of craft; scarcely one man in four is found without cleverness in fraud. Fraud with frank face, fraud made up with double complexion, wears two cloaks, bears wickedness in its heart, honey on its tongue. It wears a double cloak, for it bears a sting within, a smile on the surface, a scorpion of inward guile and outward smiles.

Ah me! What am I at? I lament and shall continue to lament these times subject to lamentation, and shall continue to attack these sores shut off from healing. My flesh burns, and I am forced to bring out not any too nicely things partly full of madness, partly of nastiness, altogether of pestilence. Now passion boils, wrath rages, money rules, standards are abandoned, unity cleft in twain, order put to flight. Wantonness stands erect, reverence is dead, luxury floods the world, the worthy man needs, hypocrisy flourishes, error overflows. Money is to the fore, wealth holds sway, poverty serves, sluggishness blooms, pious grace weeps, honor mourns, the sacred law weeps, the chasuble is sold, Simon beloved, falsehood is judge, gold brandishes its club, the money-box threatens. Pride shines out, piety wanes, impiety gleams brightly; poverty topples, the rich man grows richer, the poor man poorer. Right is crucified, vengeance sought, arms flash; the specially righteous man is banished, the needy

man wails, wickedness smiles. Grace is dead, and shame defunct, order has perished. Order is abandoned, and the music of sin sounded upon the ten-stringed lyre.

The pious soul is scourged, the salutary one banished, that which is salutary goes to decay; looseness drives out right, pretense reality, cunning justice. To yield to sin and live basely is what brings gain now. Men rush into sin, the salutary is thrown away, and the honorable dries up. The school of crime flourishes, of order is dead; evil is the thing. The impious man is fêted, the pious man tormented and stoned. The brother bestows false kisses and real damage upon his friend. The sacred law is broken and justice made subject to injustice. An evil age is here, with sin, gluttony, fraud, while manliness is gone. The rich man stands erect, the poor man lies prostrate, alas! The wise man holds his peace, and the innocent man is tormented. Everyone is eager to get that which passes away, no one that which endures. None desires to look at the salutary and spiritual.

An envious race flourishes, gleaming of raiment, a race of darkness, for whom it counts as fine to hide one's own, to take what does not belong to one, to give nothing. It is as varied of heart as of raiment—variable, reprehensible, reprobate. Cold of heart, moreover, jealous, full of gall, it is quarrelsome, tyrannical, envious, and rebellious. The world inclines to all wickedness, and bristles with filth. Crime rears its horrid head, and virtue alone falls to the ground. Numberless, feeble, and unstable is the offspring of Eve. Speak, my pipe, take up the mournful tragedy—woe, woe!

A race that knows no restraint is going by a disastrous path to hell. All is lamentable, all is feeble under the sun. The word of God is silent, order dead, men delight in the die of fate. Every man is ashamed to be pious and strives for impiety. This man swears freely by that man's head, that man by his, and flippantly denies all that he drags out.²²

The robber, ah me! raises his unshackled arms to heaven, swears anything to clear himself of crimes against the sacred law. He denies that the money has been intrusted to him, and plunges into crime to cover crime. The villain fears not to make away with money or even to touch sacred things. The man of guilty conscience flies swiftly, seizes the altar, denies that he has made away with what you thought intrusted in safety to him. He swears glibly by his own eyes, by the holy Godhead, by the Crucified, and impudently persists in it. Alas, the false man perjures himself lightly, and so wins short-lived gain, and no avenging thunder-

²² The Latin is very obscure.—H. P.

bolt falls upon his guilty head. Nor does lameness seize his foot; favoring portents usually attend his steps. God prospers all things to the villain, and brings no disaster upon him.

Standing up to get your own, you also get a single combat, and see a double-headed Goliath rise up before you. The monster comes down upon you, and stops your tongue and hand. He wins, your fight is vain, your case and justice naught. You get a taste of both cold water and hot, he will put forth this also, he will not suffer such a serious charge to rest against him. All that he owes you is restored in words, nothing in fact. He holds on to what you are laying claim to, holds on to the money. I pass over the incantations and the visited thresholds of the soothsayers, the incantations or observations of the necromancers. O weighty wrong! A man thinks one's fate can be learned from a bird, and declares that an augur's omen can be got from the wing of a kite. The right wing directs us to rejoice, the left wing to mourn. A jackdaw meets one, he returns home; a heron, he goes on. A comet appears; he goes quickly back to his camp. All ignorant, he knows the fates, the birds and stars his book. So much for that; let my raft go on, my voice castigate the things that are evil, guilty, and dark.

The soul that knows fraud and the soul that knows it not have now the same lot. The bad man is good, and goodness is a burden, oh, road of blindness! The love of one's neighbor is dead, of God is dead, of the belly survives, and the utmost care is given to the body, none to the soul. The school of sin and the thirst of loin and palate flourish. Shame trembles at loss, and virtue obeys vice. A man without sin and strife and lust and wrath is rarer—and this is no lie—than a three-tongued ox. A goat with wings, a black swan, were sooner found, a three-headed sheep or two-headed horse will appear first. The just falls under the sin and ban of the unjust, right measure of excess, the upright of the reprobate, true order of the false. A race of Belial who seek their own without law or order; they are not the Lord's, and shame is far from them; they have fallen all together. There never was more wickedness, more sluggishness. He that seeks roses finds, alas, innumerable thistles. No one takes thought to pluck out all this wickedness, none devotes himself to sowing good seed and blasting sin. The man of sober life is a weight upon everybody, is an incumbrance like a dead man, like a corpse. There stands scarcely a man in line who does one bit of the law, reproving the wrong, doing even one jot of his duty. Terrible wounds are there, and not one arm, or almost none, uplifted to smite the evil or stablish the good. The crowd weeps right bitterly, and there is hardly an active worker in the crowd.

The high place of the pontiffs is given over to destruction; they have become misers. Spread destruction abroad while your necks are safe, ye false teachers; look out for yourselves first. That is the command of piety and the gain of Christ. Sluggishness, luxury, and ease corrupt the clergy with the flock; now is the gullet lord, the holy word and truth a myth. You try to say good words, and you are said to be putting forth strange novelties, become a laughing-stock unto all men, like a she-goat with horns. Justice²³ is dead and money rules. We are ashamed and disgusted at the idea of being chaste. He that dares wickedness is loaded with honors and aboundeth in all things. He that dares wild deeds and knows no rest is thought a man. He that shows a rough and savage spirit is a Hector. You get halls and titles and estates if you shrink not from crime; fraudulent schemes give honied cups and fill your granaries. If you want to climb, heap up crimes, seem keen, give, plunder, steal, oppress, break, thunder, rage, talk, threaten. Crime is said to be fraught with power, and power with crime. Put on a bold front, aim for the heights of power, and you will get them. You will be called a wise head, and win a scepter if you seek evil. If you prefer evil and scorn good, you will have the foremost place. You live in obscurity and count as a Dromo if you live a good life; if a bad life, you will be a king and ranked with the gods. Tisiphone rages, alas! It is a weight and an injury to be kind. My scheme blesses you and makes you a leader as one worthy to lead. You shall be raised aloft; you were alone, you shall be high and rich, exalted in the honors of the world and in the front rank. If you are early in going into wickedness, you shall walk at the side of the chief; you shall walk at the side of the chief and be the bulwark of your friends, a terror to your foes. You shall be called the counselor, vicegerent, confidential agent of the king, and be sheltered under his wings. He that would live a good life falls from his place, he that does otherwise is king. Manliness and shame are dead; wrath flourishes and shame; order and law are in tears.

Rebelliousness brings schisms, fraud aims at usury, wantonness burns the brazen heart, death runs so fast. Right rule dies in tears for the wickedness of life, falseness covers the frivolous heart, the drunken drives away the sober, right so runs to waste.

He that hesitates not to scorn the good and beat it back, giving the preference to evil, he reaps gain and piles up money. Hear; he is a third son to you, is approved, who scorns good and prefers evil, and speaks evil. He who swears by the divine arms and all the parts of the cross outstrips himself and is wiser than an old man in evil. For the rest of your

²³ Surely *sus* must be a mistake for *jus*.—H. P.

children you grieve as if they were dead; the one to whom God is nothing, he is mine, you say, he shall be my heir.

He who desires to show no horns, no teeth, no fierce desires, chooses the lowest part of all; he that rages and smites gets glory, he is the man. He that fears and speaks not, weeps and wants and lies like the shadow of ashes. I weep as I say this, and go grieving, and wailing, and groaning. I weep that one thing is smeared with the birdlime of ambition, another with that of lust. The passion of ambition shoots its arrows into this age from one side, the passion of lust from the other. The fire of Venus glows, and no man shuns the bonds of the flesh. Alas for the glory of today! What wickedness, what abomination, is wrought by this impious race, this drunken crowd, this crowd fit for the burning! It burns and defiles its members with lust, its heart with sin, and rushes unrestrained into all sorts of unnatural sin. The race swears all oaths for all kinds of baseness. Every man wishes to shine in carnal things, to get carnal things. Close your eyes, ye ranks of order, and your ears. Believe not, I ask you, abstain from believing things that belong in the stable. Abstain from believing things shameful to utter, which yet I will utter. There are some sins of awful name, sins worse than sin. Alas! The fire and heat of Sodom is spread abroad. No one tries to crush out the crime or hide it, or groans at his criminality. Close your eyes to the wild sins, all ye who are here. Impious madness arises when you hear and know of them.

Unnaturally and madly he becomes she, Juno is abandoned, and Petronilla herself rejected.

Bewail the age, bewail its separate parts, so filled with crime. The man forgets his manhood, O madness, O terror, and becomes as a hyena. See the numbers buried in unnatural filth—crime of what order, what known name? The horror of that crime, ah me, resounds to the stars, the deed is open and noised abroad; groan, chaste soul! This man knows it of that and that man of this; thy law is almost dead, thy word, thy part, O Christ! The law of Sodom obtains, and the world teems with a countless brood of Ganymedes, alack! Showing forth crime, this beast may be found dwelling in any house. The chief seats and every couch are Ganymedes'. Juno is abandoned, and the she-goat, Oh madness, surrenders to the kid.

If you ask the number of that flock, I will tell it quickly, proclaim it quickly, unfold it readily with tragic speech: "As many as the grains of barley in the harvest, oysters in the sea, sands on the shore, Cyclades in the Adriatic,³⁴ bits of incense in India, oats at Tivoli." The castles, villas,

³⁴ A mistake for *Ægean*.—H. P.

sanctuary abound in them, and all things, O shame, overflow with this filthy pest. The world is going to pieces in sluggishness, desires horrible things and does yet more horrible, feeds upon brimstone, and appears to be one Gomorrha.

The race is to be likened to the silly brutes, is to be censured more than the silly brutes. The animal has no sense, and yet it follows reason here; the man has sense, and by no means follows reason here.

Ye ranks of heaven and heights above, when ye see such crimes, why, why do ye hold back your thunderbolts? Ye rank of heaven and gods on high, are ye asleep? Why do ye endure such crimes, so many abominations? O God, O God, why is thy world so guilty? Why is it lost to thee and given over to itself thus diseased? Why are thy creatures given to such mad crime? Why are thy creatures lost in sin, and such sin? Weep, my eyes, that such wild sins exist; weep and mourn utterly with tears, all ye who have a conscience. Luxury and idleness that nourish sin, O woe, abound; most wickednesses, not to say all, now overflow. All goodness falls, and every man slides weakly into wrong. All his glory falls, and man is become a brute among brutes. Death crushes down all things, and the life of soberness cries: "I am done for. Guilt flourishes, my law is dead, spare us, ye gods." Pious love cries: "O wild image of the world, alas, what vast, what countless wickedness, what chaos now!" So many crimes, such dreadful crimes, are abroad, not known before, not told before, not done before. It pollutes the air to tell of things so wild, so low, so mad; things that should be struck down, and not spoken of. I am ashamed to tell more, I cease to open my lips to such things. I have told much here, and know nothing worse than these things. Let my page henceforth be silent as to such sins. To show forth slippery things breaks down the feeble heart, and allures it. Who can endure to proclaim such sin, such abominations, so many poisons? Not I with my poor pipe. Vergil would fail here, and even the tongue of Cicero not suffice. Ovid's keenness would be blunted, and the waters of the Xalon dried up. Give me three tongues, loud ones, a hundred, yet could I not proclaim all the impious deeds of the wicked. Yet my Muse shall pass them in review, and try to show their rottenness; if she cannot put a stop to the wickedness that exists, she shall at least castigate it. For who now is not stamped with the image of death? Is age serious? It is frivolous, and wishes not to set bounds in its guilt to things forbidden. Is boyhood? Boyhood is swift to vice and without coercion. Is strong youth? Youth is on fire with the heat of passion. Is the grown man? Every man puts to flight all deeds that mark the man.

Let the pious heart weep. Why? Because the way of perdition stands open in all its breadth, the field of wickedness in all its extent, while all men rush into all sin, and knock under to evil. Slippery joys and fleeting gains are thought the only ones; all things are stirred by the waves of destruction, like the sea by its billows. The storm-wind strikes the sails, the glorious ship of the church is rushing to its doom, intrusted to fathers slow toward good and active in evil, plunged in sin, bereft of steersmen, driven by the blast, overwhelmed with fraud, overwhelmed with strife, overwhelmed with war. She lies helpless on the deep and the hand of heaven scorns to come to her aid, while the brethren make scandal within and the foe without. There is no oar or anchor for the ship on all the sea; she is plunged in guilt, parted from order, filled with the foe. Sinking in so many evils; in such vast wrongs, she is gaping open; the wind drives on the sea, persistently struggles to conquer, has conquered her. Let the anxious voice sound forth: "O Power on high, arise, we perish. Bear us and lift us up, lest thy people be without an oarsman." Let the holy congregation, the holy generation, kindle itself once more. Let the pious soul, free from guilt, cry, cry to heaven: "Arise, All-pious One, keep down the floods, break the force of the blasts; give us pious hearts, give us good days, drive out the guilt. Be mindful of the flock, rule it, thou who rulest the courts of heaven. Keep down the floods, and reduce these mighty gales to a gentle breeze. Let the north wind fleeing from the southwest wind have peace. Be it inviolate outside, and planted in the secret chamber of the heart. Rise, why dost thou sleep, alas! while all men are perishing in sin?"

All are living without laws and without rules. The frugal hand is dead, the orphan goes hungry, the enemy abounds. You give me, I you; everyone takes care not to lavish his own. Everyone strives to lay up gain of great weight, the race of adamant keeps and worships money as a god. Everyone desires danger jealous of good morals—lucre I mean—strength that fails and lilies of withered bloom. The strength and vigor and warmth of order have melted; O utter madness, we sell our tongues, our hearts, our deeds for lucre. We are lame as to good, sell our tongues and hands for evil. The crowd buys silly and foolish dangers, sells both, foolish cleverness knows impious gains, and no others. Everyone is proud of the look of a prophet, of the keenness of the flesh. Who now toils to learn the divine writings as the heathen? Who toils to give forth the songs of truth from his lips and store them in his heart? He that is good at argument and quick at skilful reckoning seeks not by his deeds, but by his clever tricks, to be made abbot. He that babbles Socrates and has the

sinuous utterances of the sophists at his fingers' end boasts of his acuteness, and aims at sacred heights, way above him. Through letters and sophistry men are made pontiffs, and become, not a pontoon to heaven, but a gateway to hell. He that reads the brief and feeble dogmas of the Three Roads or Four Roads aims high, walks erect, stalks like a lion. A fierce heart he bears who knows Agenor and Melibœus, Sapphic verse, civic ills, Capaneus. The letters of old, the poems of old, the Muse of old, are now highly prized and thought the cream of wisdom. My Gregory,²⁵ nay, God thundering through his mouth, is tardily taken up, soon closed and out of favor, but his glory shall be without end through all the ages. The world shall sing of him, and his praise abides and shall abide. His golden words of fire shall not die, his golden page be ever renewed through its inward power. While the Platos and Ciceros have been carried off to the Styx, he has been carried off to heaven, and draws life from the udders of the Godhead. He should be read and re-read carefully and faithfully, but the writings and poetry of the heathen be cast away. Jupiter and the followers of Christ barely kiss each other, Christ's glory dies, and Jove's shines forth, the honors given to him.

O evil age! Why? Because the mythical now prevails over the true; the people and the clergy are going to destruction in evil living. The pleasures of loin and lust alone are out in force, while shame slips and has a hard road to travel. Desire now hurls not only leaden but golden darts, pride and lust have laid waste all things with strife and foulness. These two nets hold almost all captive now, united as closely by sin as by flesh and blood. These the serpent suggests, the flesh digests, the heart obeys. The thought wills them, the hand works them, the tongue proclaims them. Thus the enemy instils sin; man sets it forth, and woman carries it out; while the soul lies scorched by fires visible or concealed. The base is what all men choose, show forth, display, and dare, dare, love, achieve, exhibit, carry out, and delight in doing. O madness, O trembling! What shall I do? Shall I keep silent, trembling within? Shall I boil silently in my heart? Shall I speak out all these abominations or keep them back? Shall I put them in verse? Then I become a subject of mirth unto many. Shall I speak them to men's ears? Then shall I be hated of the wicked. It is a fierce thing to speak, but a sin to pass sins by in silence. I am determined to speak, I am determined not to pass by sin in silence. All kinds of sin are flourishing now, sin is everywhere. Passion and gluttony draw not in upon the reins, but both apply the spur. Anyone is free to do it, and everyone is in a hurry to show forth wickedness. The people

²⁵ Pope Gregory I, the Great.—H. P.

and their priests march into evil, both under error. The vigor of the pontiffs is dried up, their firmness gone, their hands sin-stained, their hearts meditate evil, their mouths instigate sin, within and without. The bishop is sluggish, and the house of God without honor, the fiery zeal and bow of bronze without force. The bow twangs against the evils of garlands and offerings, and quickly spares them that swell with pride of race and flow with money. It is easily turned in the case of the sins of the highborn and lavish criminals; the money of one, the birth of the other successfully resist. No man's weak spots are pierced by the harsh voice of fiery zeal. Sins are great and wickedness manifold, and there is many an Eli. He destroyed himself because he would not restrain his children; the father is dead and has lost the blessings of the good. Impious Jesebel leads you into the byways, and there is no Elijah to make you become more righteous under his guidance, and richer in having him as guest. The fathers of the church cultivate only what is lowest, and inmost death rages,²⁶ the worst death, the death of the soul. The way of the bishop is lamentable, like the way of the people. You will find the age bare of a consul, bare of a bishop. If we are to bring out the good and brush aside the rest in the bishop, the episcopal character is fled, the miter remains, the work is lacking, the miter preferred to it. If it is the part of a leader to lead well those placed under him, none is a leader now. But it is the part of a leader to lead well those under him, hence a leader is a thing of the past. The fact lacks an exponent, the leader a flock, the flock a leader. the priest a people, the people a father. The people perish, and suffer the sins of their lords proud in their fortress. You drive the ignorant ranks into wickedness, you drive them, O serpent, while these teachers encourage and abet the sin. O black tears, they devour all the best things of the flock, dogs that have no anxiety at night, but bark by day. As they are highest in position, so are they often foremost in sin. They beguile the heart with their wit, enfeeble the character with schisms, and their blind eyes become leaders of the blind, and go to destruction, falling into the ditch of sin. I say they are not watchful guards, and not I, but their own doings, condemn them. They are afraid to show forth righteousness, to attack wrong, sweep away dross, destroy rottenness, remove defects, seek out the fallen, give over to Satan those that are clearly rushing into the sea of death; to utter threatening words and restrain rapacious deeds, struggle against the tide, and stand up in defense of the flock.

The pious flock is an hungered, and utmost famine of the word prevails, wicked servants give small harvest without fruit. The tongues of the

²⁶ *Furit*, as in P, seems much more satisfactory than the *fuil* of the text.—H. P.

fathers speak fair, their deeds are reprehensible; the door is closed, and they hear not the words, "Hail, blessed one." The famishing crowd is rarely taught the heavenly doctrines, and is admonished, not of enduring, but of perishable gains. Neglecting the good, the impious body of rulers chooses to bury its talent in the dunghill rather than bring it heavily laden with interest.

Often a neophyte or a boy besieged by the hordes of guilt, his brow without sight, heart black with sin and full of cunning, sits in the seat of honor, and young as he is becomes father over all, unskilled to restrain loose hearts or heads with the wisdom and protecting care of years. Is he, pray, one to strive to be bread to the needy and drink to the thirsty, an ornament, yea a groomsman to the church, who gathers gain and distributes it to his assistants, who savors of boyishness, gives to one, snatches from another, is altogether taken up with this? Does he know what is good and profitable for you, who knows not for himself, whose face is hardly beginning to show the first sign of manhood's beard? A neophyte crowd performs the sacred offices bought for a price, so evil a thing is the palace now, tomorrow has the power of a pontiff. A courtier in the morning, see, is now become a tonsured priest; bishop of the belly, he is the suitor, not the bridegroom, of the church. In a word, sin is raised to the sacred high places, serious hearts and hoary temples are cast aside. I shudder to tell, I will refrain from uncovering, will avoid proclaiming many of the things I know, and knowing cannot weep for enough.

Foul youth occupies the papal halls, slippery of body and volatile of heart as the wind. Illustrious of race or birth, illustrious of ancestry, it aspires to the papal halls through force, not life. Noble of blood and of character unprofitable for sacred things, it fights for and lays claim to the office through its blood. Any villain starts up as a bishop, is made an abbot; a man who ought to be put to death gains the scepter by force, or gold, or entreaty. He feels no trembling, and, having no thought for his own, becomes leader of other souls, not without Simon, but without canon. Presently he teaches without knowledge and, unknowing how to command himself, is a way unto others, but is so only because he is called so. He is a refuge and prop for trouble and sin; a fatted fowl fills the useless sepulcher of his belly in the morning.

This fine bishop goes forth to hunt hares, the leash is loose, the game pursued and roused up. Hence a sleek horse gives him glory, nay beauty, than which nor Greece nor Thrace produces a better. A soldier marches beside him as attendant, and there happens to be not a single clerical companion beside him.

The bugle sounds, the wood resounds, the echo responds; a doe runs into the net and suffers for her flight. Late they come back from the hunt, the dogs leaping about them. Night comes on cold, and a gorgeous banquet is prepared. The butler pours out Falernian or Mareotic wine, the banquet is rich, and the pastor reclines on high cushions. Food is on all sides; then finally the pastor appears, the well-fed gullet proclaims the fact under the true name of pastor or feeder. But his feeding is nothing but the mouth's mind, funerals, and the celebration of the first fruits. Enough—he feeds, he is because so called and to himself a pastor.

The game is roasted, the butler prepares the wine, the confectioner the rest, the cook goes to work, the fire gleams, and all things smile; the halls shine with light and company. Cut glass is there and golden vessels, dainties here, the wine-cups there, a brave show for an hour.²⁷ The doe is brought, a fat fowl added, a fowl is added, and the table is loaded with roasted birds. Wine flows, the evening waxes, the poor man weeps, the bishop of the belly, apostate to order, is filled with the feast. The man rises filled, and they return to the wine. A new drink is taken, for which a new blessing is invoked. He puffs with full throat and stomach, tells of strenuous deeds, and reveals high spirit. Epicurus is pretty full of nectar, pretty well filled with feasting. He is worried by this trouble when about to pray for the flock and their leader.

He goes late to his chamber and downy couch; a golden lamp and wax lights are placed there for him. The servant turns over the silken covering and downy pillows; this ball of flesh, this fine reprobate, snores like a good one. In the morning the house is filled with bustle, the suitor of the church enters the temple; he goes to church, and, having stood but a moment, takes a seat. He pours out loud thundering pontifical words; his guilty heart feels the bite of the serpent, his hand plays with the jasper of his ring. Then he goes before the flock, wearing Aaron and the diadem. The mitre decks his head, an Indian gem shines upon his finger. He does not busy himself with prayers for the father bishop, for the reigning prince, for his flock and himself, nor snatches them from destruction, weeping for his own and himself. Scanty is his notion, still scantier his doing of the jaw. He praises God with his voice, disgraces him by his deeds, himself a disgrace. Words need action, actions words, order labor. Let him live as he preaches, his words be in harmony with his deeds, and his deeds with his words. Let the sacred law which the chasuble of the pontiff defends prop up the weak, and nourish all in the nest under its wings. Let guilt know its father, justice perceive its ministrant, order know its father, dis-

²⁷ The text seems to be corrupt.—H. P.

order perceive its master. Let the castigation of the wicked be thy praise, their approval thy suffering. Build shelter for the flock, and cast out sin, not shelter sins. He is a ladder to the skies, the ark of the covenant, the living sacrifice; let him follow up in the spirit of an avenger them that he rouses outside, an olive branch within. Let peace flourish under him as father, fraud be banished with him as judge, pride fall at his attack, the flock walk in holiness under the guidance of such a great father. Let him be a rod of iron threatening to break vessels of clay; let him reprimand, upbraid, beseech, instruct, assist. Let him avoid setting the unprofitable above the right and salutary. Let him bear cold at night and heat by day, like Jacob; let his eyes be watchful and know not slumber. Let his heart be sound, and his hand innocent of any gifts; let his words bring him the stole and toil give him the humerale. Let him prove a good cock, with resounding throat and wing. Let him not benumb himself with vain meditation on what one ought to let rest, what eat, and why and where and when. Let him sow with lavish hand, and let his acts not show a miserly spirit; let him bring the spices and incense of the heart to the altar. Let the bishop be a sacred trumpet and a living page; let him rejoice in his flock, shine in his flock, helper and helped.

The painter is known by his picture, the standard-bearer by his battalion, the leader by his flock. The leader is acceptable according to his flock, the flock is thrown or firmly established according to its leader. A good daughter is the ideal, the glory, the jewel of her mother, a good flock of a bishop, a good city of a mayor, good practices of the soul.

The early ages not only did not snatch the high places, but refused to accept them when offered and not due them. The Right Hand of the Father who ruleth the heavens, when asked, refused to be king, as the Book teaches and proclaims; he would not have an external kingdom who as God governs the kingdom within. Let man the sinner scorn what man the God scorned, and do it really. Let him place external below internal honors; let him not buy, but put behind him the sterile honors of the world.

But who does put them behind him? Everyone buys them, is eager to buy them, is eager, and rushes about in bustling excitement after them. Hence wild schisms, as men aim at the sacred diadems, not duly offered but snatched for a price. The hand of the palace, the command of the law bestows ecclesiastical honors; the sacred commands are abandoned, the impious orders of kings are sought. The hand of the layman bestows the heavenly gifts—O the shame of it! The voice of the palace first and only afterward of the council gives the heavenly gifts. Vast abuses, royal orders, have the upper hand; thus a man attains the summit by force,

if not by right. Everyone can get the heavenly gifts for gifts now. The giver and the receiver tarnish them, and both are wrong. Sacred grace bids that they be given freely without secular authority, that there be not a seller and a broker in piety. Ah me! The serpent scatters his thunderbolts everywhere through the high places of holiness; first he catches the fathers, then snatches the flock, making his attack upon both. When he sees the sheepfolds of peace and the sacred thousands of thy flock, O Christ, he is filled with envy, and enviously lays siege to their band. Mammon stands erect, I mourn Simon and his works. The gains of Simon flourish, the stake of the devil on the flock of the fathers. The Sorcerer sways the scepter, and smites all things with death. The Sorcerer still lives and roams abroad in his world. He lives, and ceases not to sow evil seed and pluck up the good, to draw men into the by-ways, instil wickedness into them, and drive out the right. Lo, the voice of Simon is held effective, that of the canon void. The dead enemy seems to live and stalks abroad. A tomb is given to Simon's bones among the elders; grace is sold, and the true dove bought for money. Madness stands with head uplifted, and order is dead, aye buried. Many are the vendors of the sheep and of the sacred ox. Simple-mindedness is typified by the sheep, the word of God by the ox. All the vendors of the one and the other are being driven from the temple. The vendor is a sinner; God himself says to him, "Withdraw;" drives him from his place, casts him from the ranks, ejects him from the temple. You sell both for empty praise and gifts; the gain you aim at beyond these you reap with the ear and put in your mouth. O devious way, grace is not had freely now, but is taken by force, demanded for money, and got for money. Grace is sold, grace is bestowed through force and violence. Not grace but violence is shown by deeds. Grace, grace, which is got for a paltry sum of money, now stands only in name; its fountainhead and ark lie overthrown. Grace is sought with money, is acquired by money. It cannot be what it is, when the Gehazite demands money in bestowing it. The Sorcerer demands it for money, Gehazi takes money, both impious. One is driven away, another retires with a great sore. Death awaits the one, the color of the other clings to all whose guilty souls seek to rise through earthly gains. Here is the rise of evil, hence comes deep downfall quickly; here is the throne hard, the office a burden, the rose a thorn. Thou hast a load who scornest to clear away thy sins and the sins of thy people, and lookest not to gains of character. Thou hast glory who art steadfast to clear away thine own evil-doing and that of thy flock with repentance and prayer night and day.

O evil age, the chasuble of the pontiff is sold, the law is lost, the pathway leads astray, and such a pathway! Grace is sold, the purchase of churches sought; yet this purchase is called their holy redemption. A covetous race calls the worst sins right, coloring Simon-like doings with words, forsooth.

So says the sacred voice, on this side and on that the wolf seizes the lambs; no one stands up to drive off the tyrants while the poor flock weeps. Let him that ought to feed the spiritual fold, that feeds himself, takes for himself, snatches good things from them, make these acceptable to them. The pontiff delights in the reed, not in regulating; dried up, he dries up the sheep, and tightly bound, binds the undeserving, votes dead things living and sound things dead; trembles before the wolf on one side, and rages and raves against the band of the clergy on the other; has a feeble heart, not the stout heart of a lion; hesitates to raise his arm against the foe and save the prostrate. Falling, he drags down with him them that stand, drags them down in jealousy, and slipping sees them slip; is most sensitive to popular favor and the popular tongue, ready to evil and rich in lucre; controls himself ill, and takes no good care for his repute, being tepid toward the right and enveloped in the fires of lust. He oppresses one, favors another, and guards not against falling into evil; has the first greeting, the highest seat, a high scepter, the first cup, the first dainties, the first chair. Crime falls not before his vengeance nor sin at his judgment; he feathers his nest from the flock, and sheds crocodile tears for them. The milk is taken for him and the fleece from the flock. He grieves not for the pains of the flock and their death.

Fear shuts his mouth, the wolf rushes down and gets into the fold; the wolf rages, he flees, it is nothing to him. The shepherd enters by the door, the thief otherwise; with these thieves enter evil ways in abundance.

O evil age, the chasuble of the pontiff is sold, the chasuble is sold, and this commerce goes unrebuked. The ring is sold, and hence Romulus increases his gains.

Overflowing Rome is dead now. When will she rise again? Rome overflowed, and collapsed in her affluence, withering in her fulness. She cries out and is still, rises up and lies prostrate, and gives in need.

Rome gives all things to all who give all things to Rome, for a price, because there is the way of justice and all justice is dead. She wobbles like a rolling wheel, hence shall Rome be called a wheel, who is want to burn like incense with rich praises. Rome the baleful begets harm and herself teaches the way to do harm; abandons the right, demands gain, sells the pallium. Often is a clerk bought there rather dearly to write

out what you wish and furnish it with the sacred seal. If your messenger of money goes before, rise and follow, approach the threshold; you have nothing serious to fear. The peace that wisdom cannot, money gives you. Money makes agreements, and restrains the threatener. A bit of gold blindfolds the eyes of the citizens for you, gives you open doors, speech like Cicero's, assurance of heart. If money is given, pontifical favor stands near; if not, that is afar off—that is the law and teaching obtaining there. Thus is this right hand of old shown to be dead, Rome. Extended abroad thy right hand is called left. Though rich, thou art poor; though flourishing, thou art withered; though free, thou art a slave. Though free, thou art subdued, and art sold for money to the wanton. Again and again art thou sold, and rebuked by the mouth of Jugurtha; a voice that is gone and a distant tale pursue thee. A voracious Scylla, thou seizest and covetest and takest and drawest to thyself. Rome, thou art a wobbling wheel, a foul enough mark brands thee. Thou art a deep whirlpool, a devouring receptacle, a deep pool, selfish, insatiable, alike to all. The more thou drinkest, the wider dost thou open thy mouth and cry, "Give here." Say, "It is enough," I demand, but you cry, "I want more." If Cræsus should give you his wealth, it would not fill thy maw; money or gold is henceforth thy God, not Jesus.

City, the head of cities, exalted through the Catos, made famous by the Scauri, city most covetous, why dost thou unceasingly drink in vast gains? More than Cæsar has the Crucified King been able to give thee. Cæsar gave thee foreign realms, but Christ now gives thee heaven. Exalted and mighty wast thou in thy Catos and Scipios; thou art broken in strength, but art mightier under the rule of Christ. Under Jove wast thou blooming, and shining and rich; under the cross thou livest wasted and ruined and weak. Yet art thou at the gift of the cross more affluent, though poor, than when rich; stronger and higher, though feeble, than when sound; though ruined, than when standing solid. Under the cross thou layest low the walls of hell, under Jove of the stranger; under Jove art thou lost, under the cross art thou merged with the immortals. Within thou art glorious, without is thy dominion fallen, city without a peer under Cæsar and under the Senate. Now is thy leader indifferent, the one only light of the cross is thine, Peter is exalted above the Cæsars, and God above the gods. The cross is the guide of thy way and thy glory, the gem on thy brow. sure redemption, not the punishment of guilt. Now is the cross no cross, but thy guide to the blessings of heaven. Death was thine, glory is thine; Satan is afraid, for thou hast put on the armor of faith. Rome given to Peter, born of the word of Peter, made subject to Christ, why

dost thou throw away through such sin the blessings I note in my verse? Thou doest ill in that thou wilt give almost nothing except to one who gives, and bestowest holy names and holy heights upon him who brings lucre. Why dost thou regard lucre and not look to deeds, O mistress? Peter the apostle, not a wily man, abominated such things, abominated them utterly, and overwhelmed their worshipers. Bear Peter in thy heart, O Rome, and tread the path of right. This ignorant man has conferred more upon thee, brought thee greater good through his sacred net, than all thy Greece, thy learned Greece. That net has profited thee more, has given thee more, than the Capitol mighty in Cæsar and filled with the voice of the orator. Julius with his sword and Tully with his tongue gave thee not so much as Peter with his cross and those who have cherished thee under Peter's guidance. Thou hast lilies and many thousands of roses. Choose these or those, Rome, shining with the flock of the remnant. The schools teach thee eloquence, thou art clothed with the robes of martyrdom and adorned with the branch of peace, and all the charm has fallen from these. The sacred numbers of thy children encompass thee, Rome; the blood-red rose and lily virgin-white bedeck thee. Now the sacred heights make vain to thee the names of the Catos; Peter has raised thee up, and made himself thy champion. Thou stoodst a lost name, Rome, betrayed by sin; now thou seekest heaven, and art made free in thy service to it. High enough and more through the Cornelii and three hundred Fabii, thou art become higher through Peter's example alone. That thou mightest not fall, he fell, for thou hadst also another in Paul. Thou hast another, a man very small in his own eyes. Why? Because he had been Saul. Finally he carried through what he took upon himself on account of the evils of Saul. Saul spread fierce destruction; Paul became a subject of atonement and washed him clean. These are two lights, two streams of paradise; they were sent to thy threshold to wipe away thy sins. They were enabled to make thy walls stronger than those who built them in the first place and added to them later, of whom Romulus in his jealousy bade wicked arms be turned against his own flesh and savage orders to be carried out.

Rise, Rome, restore thee to thyself, restore Rome. Show forth the beauty of that order which thou hadst before. As thou didst rule the body then, so rule the conquered heart now. Gather up the fallen, guide the wandering, help the feeble. By fierce warfare didst thou subdue everything that resisted. Thou offeredst thy children to slaughter and thy chiefs to the sword. Do now as before, let piety crush out impiety, the rod suppress sin, right rule crime, the law wantonness. First choose, then

cultivate them that love the right, not them that work for great gains, but for the right of the council, who shall cry thy message through the perishing age, and kindle again our cold hearts with their own warmth. But thou doest otherwise; thou sendest abroad men who tarnish the glory of the church and are eager only to lift its perquisites. He whom thy hand directs hither, raises tribute, not desiring good times, but good viands and soft cushions. Accustomed ever since he was weaned to go afoot, he goes out to traverse the fields of France with chariot and horses. He that but now walked with glad step unattended, rides high with horsemen about him. He is counselor, nuncio, legate *a latere*; thy bishop is of no more account—he brings here the decrees of the book of the council. The palace groans, filled with such a guest or his satellites; the clergy can scarce supply the horses with oats. In France he clothes himself with silken cloak, in Rome with goatskin; there he walks on foot, here he rides on horseback over the fallen. The people flock to meet him, he seems to them a glorious and beautiful sight. The city is all excitement, the trumpet sounds, and the band of the clergy takes up the tune. He is conducted into the pontifical halls, reclines on soft couch, orders wine, receives the company, bestows kisses. He calls the Council, takes his place on his raised seat. His ambition becomes more lordly, and he aims for higher advancement. He listens with kind attention to wickedness, turns a rather deaf ear to the right, for a case of guilt prepares the way to earthly gain, a case of right closes it.

Rome, what shall I say more, what predict or promise for thee? 'Tis money that moves thee, money that marks thy downfall. Thou didst subdue the nations to thyself; red gold has subdued thee. For thy brood ever wants and pursues gain, and has done so. While thy Crassus coveted, thirsted for, gazed upon Parthian lucre, the enemy's wealth, alas, he fell, caught by his own greed. This drunken thirst is thy very own in war and peace, burns, roasts, defiles, intoxicates, and tortures thee. Thou givest the sacred high places, sacred guidance to the wicked, stingy to the humble, lavish to the rich and ambitious. 'Tis right for me to say, to write: "Rome, thou art no more." Lo, thou totterest, nay, goest to pieces in melancholy fashion. Thou art crippled in thy strength without, in justice within, irretrievable in one, tottering in the other, unknowing the right. Thou wastest in ruins, city without laws, without fathers. Gold lays low the citadel of Troy, buys that of Ansonia. 'Tis right for me to say, to write: "Rome, thou art no more." Thou liest buried under the ruins of thy walls and thy morals. Thou art fallen, famous city, sunk as low as thou wast high before, the higher thou wast, the more utterly

art thou shattered and cast down. 'Tis right for me to write, to say: "Rome, thou hast perished." Thy walls cry out: "Rome, thou art fallen." Thou, the head, art become the tail; thou, the high, liest prostrate before the Omnipotent. Thine own sluggishness proclaims that thou liest prostrate. Thou seest the times a prey to desire, foul with sin; thou scornest to rescue the prey, and wipe away the foulness from the times. Throughout the length and breadth of thy extended domain, law lies invalid, spiritual grace is dead. Where the Po has its source, and where the sea washes Ultima Thule, grace is cleft in twain and all manly vigor is melted away. The grace once lent is dead and gone, the dear grace, that knew not how to yield to lash or prison bars, that knew how to look for sweet calm beneath the open sky or else to endure it when filled with the blasts of the whirlwind, that evil seemed unable to break or happiness to destroy, that bore prosperity well, and adversity bravely.

An evil race teems, and demands wickedness, and is full of wickedness. An evil offspring is born of evil fathers, an offspring full of vice. Lo, stronger in body, and more fierce, the hydra is born anew, a second hydra appearing whenever a head is cut off. A wild race with the heart of a viper dies, and a doubly wild comes forth, in its evil conscience hating and hacking at all the works of light. An utterly sterile race, that crushes all inward promptings in sin, destroys in deed all the good it professed with its lips. It is pious of speech and heathen in the impiety of its character. Orthodox and good are the words of its mouth, but deeds are wanting.

O grief, O madness, O crime, O shame, all things are foul; hearts with no conscience are the prey of all the works of guilt. Shame weeps that all base things grow and fair things dwindle. Hypocrisy shines and assigns white sepulchers to Satan. The pious soul is scourged, honor is banished, and right is banished. Everyone is dying for lucre, devotes himself to that, and makes it all his care. Everyone struggles for rivers and floods of earthly gain, and no one puts away fleshly advantages and earthly gain. The man rich in revenues is high and famous now, acceptable for his riches, the unshorn miser is not without his vices. His voice is free, for he has a weight of wealth. Lowest and last stands care for the soul; nay, hardly lowest and last, but practically naught. Stronger in force and more esteemed in rank is the ball of gold. Everyone sweats to get wealth and lay it up for himself. A golden scale deprives the public eye of sight, makes the fallen equal with the standing, the high with the low, blinds the regal and the pontifical eye. Money alone ruins all things, poisons everything, knows the heart, takes down the load, gives arms, buys speech, smooths the brow. It is the poultice of sin, the stealer of

the heart, the thief of the eye, a shield to the guilty, and a heavy lash to the rich.

Death smites all things, the crowd mixes up and confuses all things. To be ahead consists in having more of this world's goods in this age. The gleam of money corrupts all things, makes all things a deceit, alas! Your hand offers great sums, and you are considered great. The man low of birth and lower of condition rises to the height of Otho if he can give enough. The sober man is made drunken by pelf, and he whose words man, whose heart God, approves becomes a sinner before one and the other. Though dumb from birth, if rich you will be considered a second Cicero. If rich, you will be loved; if poor, treated as a poor man is. The only thing that is worthless and a hindrance is abundance of heart, the only thing that knows the depths and gives all things is abundance of revenue.

Alas! The broad way is trodden, the narrow, abandoned by all. All have a full gullet and babbling tongue and loaded stomach. Whose, I ask, is it to live on mean husks now? Love's. Who refuses himself sparkling cups and rich dainties? How many do you see standing without sin in the ranks of the faithful? Who now attacks the base and impious with the spear of holy zeal? Who blushes for vice or strives to be of pure heart? To subdue himself? To conquer vicious tendencies? To say: "I have conquered?" Where now is grace that knoweth not sin? Who is upright? Who has a heart not turned by wealth or driven in the general whirl? Whom can you show me without keenness to deceive? Whom without foulness? Who cherishes the salutary and avoids the unprofitable of body or soul? Who demands the good? Nay, who walks without lamentation. Whose life is serious, meditation secure, speech pure? Who has a true soul, not lips at variance with the heart, the face? In whom does the pious tear burn with hope, the heart beat within with love? What can order, moderation, soberness of life do now? What is pious now? I will say more: what is not impious now? The golden age and chaste heart are gone by, the terrible days, the last to wit, have taken their place.

Now flourish lucre, pride, peace without peace, fraud, passion, sloth, and the theft that knoweth the darkness of night; schisms, wars, violence, murder, treachery, wrath, wantonness, envy, sluggishness, sedition. Pretense of religion flourishes, its practice is dead. Alas, the king of Babylon thinks all things his own.

Peace, patience, regularity, moderation, justice, and right are empty names; falseness brings high position, villainy profit. The fire of love is cold to good and hot for evil. Law lies abandoned, the flame of madness

towers high. Drunken passion makes promiscuous unions, after the manner of the beasts. Be still my tongue; it is not good form to tell these things.

What shall I speak, O God? Behold, my pen faints. I am beaten and do not speak of all the wickedness, the evil side will win. All things are encompassed by darkness without a single light. All things seem prostrate, nothing to have any life. One vast chaos seizes and possesses all things, one shadow of death is over the slippery age. I grieve to see nothing without a scar, believe the truth. Everyone chooses the wrong, deep night broods over all things. We see dark silence cover nearly all things, and crime without an opposer, all sin without an avenger. The fathers of the churches have fallen out of line, its firmness and vigor and theirs have collapsed. Money holds sway over the crowd and the elders. Men tend to evil, rush to the market, pursue lucre. O reckless race, abominable troop, O crime-stained race, evil race, guilty race, why is earthly gain pleasing to you? O ye of blinded inner-sight, why do ye live in evil, and give arms to drunkenness? O ye who see not with the inner eye, ye blind, what does it profit to give, to surrender your guilty hearts to dross? Race of wandering hearts, sad toward the good and glad before evil, why do ye lie prostrate without light, not without sin? Paul is at hand and cries in tones of thunder: "Wake up!" Stand manfully and well together in line. Let the soul foul with guilt, benumbed by sin, and given to things perishable, cast off dishonor, put on honor and the armor of light. Rise, rise, guilty race, cleanse away your worse defects. The last day comes, the final hour is believed to be upon us. The terrible Judge is at hand to put an end to evil, sweet to them that love him, terrible to them that revere him not. The day of judgment that knows not mercy and is full of wrath now comes; the present course of things is its fore-runner. The seventh trump, the last stroke, are getting ready; God is at hand to judge. Let the sinner be shaken from his drowsiness and wake up.

Guilty heart, strive to rise from sin; if thou wilt cleanse thy evils, thou shalt rise to take the reward of unending blessings at last. I am sure of what I say; human flesh shall rise from the dead at length, and there is something which can educate and instruct the doubter in this. There is an Indian bird only one of which lives, called the phoenix. Trustworthy report says that he turns to ashes and rises in this way. He becomes a worm and then a bird, ceases to be weighed down and flies away with wings. Thus he is born again and seen to be as before. This shows that your limbs can rise again from death. Thy dead flesh shall rise then;

man, doubt not! The meek shall go to heaven; those that now swell with pride, to hell. The solid shall melt, the lofty fall, the lowest rise. The race of Babylon, living now in sinister freedom, shall go to hell, an abominable mass, the true portion of perdition. The glory of heaven shall rest on the saints forever and ever, and all who look upon the face of the Thunderer shall find peace. What shall I say more, how soar higher or go farther? Be closed, my page, and cease to disclose many things. Be closed, my page; my songs, farewell! Reckless race, abominable crowd and lamentable, lament! I have desired to castigate you, and to tell your sins. I have not been able to castigate you duly and tell your sins. "Alas, lamentable, woe, pitiable," say, children of Eve. Reckless race, now you rejoice; hereafter woe, woe to you. In hell it is woe to you, wild race, mad crowd. Here also it is woe to you, for here you toil and there you get the penalty of your toil.

You, holy concourse, holy generation, go on, stand firm, stand firm in goodness with hearts burning for the skies. You, sacred lilies, living necklace, vessels of honor, bands of light, pray with your hearts and lips. That God will save us from destruction, beg of him in holy prayer, that he will put to flight all this impiety, this evil, this stench in the nostrils. Let your prayers, your tongues, hearts, deeds, chaste souls, and lives set free cry to the heavens, cry to the stars. Weep that sin increases, and right, honor, justice are lukewarm. Weep, groan, and say, say with me: "Thou who rulest all things, drive away all this wickedness. Rise, we perish. Look upon us, God, that we may not be without a single light. Crush down all this sin and evil and scandal, thou who rulest the stars. Spare the downtrodden, inspire them that stand, be with us all. Christ of piety, crush out the scandals, forgive the sins; build up the good, destroy the rest, blessed King. Save them that are caught in the toils of the demon, virgin-born King, redeemed by thy cross, thy blood, thy death, O King! Have regard, have regard unto us, Only-Begotten Son of the Father. Grant us to mourn the bad, and take the good; grant us of thine, grant us thyself. Give us back the golden age and primeval strength, we pray. Direct us now, take us to thyself hereafter, lest we perish."

Book III of Bernard of Morlaix's work on Scorn of the World comes to a happy conclusion.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

FUNDAMENTAL REALITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY

The problem of the relation of mind and body stands at the entrance to the world of systematic reflection. The transition from the view of the plain man to that of the critical theist is apt to occur at this point. The deeper questions of theistic philosophy all involve this relation, and philosophic discussion is wont to return to it again and again. Two of the most notable books on the subject of recent years are those of Ludwig Busse¹ and C. A. Strong.² They illustrate a difference in philosophical methods characteristic of our time, the former being devoted chiefly to the analysis of metaphysical concepts, while the latter is a criticism of the facts of experience supplemented by a constructive theory of the relation of the body to the mind. Differing thus in method, they differ also in results. Busse, in the end, is a spiritualistic idealist; and although he holds the interaction view that the mind causes bodily processes and the body causes mental processes, still it is not interactionism of the old type—interactionism between brute matter on the one hand, and non-material mind or spirit on the other. Busse views the entire material world as a manifestation of mind. Body and mind are two different spiritual syntheses, and their interaction resembles the contrast and fusion of differing ideas within the same mind. Busse is an idealistic monist.

Strong asserts at last the reality of a plurality of mental (or spiritual) things-in-themselves. As with Busse, so with Strong, the material world is the appearance or phenomenon of spirit, which is real. The two men do not, however, teach the same view of spirit. Strong is a pluralist so far as the theory of the relations of body and mind is concerned. Let us analyze the two books somewhat more closely.

Busse's work is a critical investigation of (1) materialism; (2) the controversy between the view that neural processes and mental processes merely accompany, without influencing, each other, and the view that they interact; and (3) the spiritualistic view according to which mind and body

¹ *Geist und Körper, Leib und Seele*. Von Ludwig Busse. Leipzig: Dürr, 1903. Pp. x+488. M. 8. 50.

² *Why has the Mind a Body?* By C. A. Strong. New York: Macmillan, 1903. Pp. vii+355. \$2.50.

are two interacting spiritual syntheses. The author proceeds to analyze these different conceptions of the relation of body to mind, in order to compare them with the facts of experience and the fundamental laws of science.

Three types of materialism, according to Busse, represent the psychical or mental as (1) itself material, (2) as a product of material change, and (3) as a mere aspect or accompaniment of material change.

Against all three the idealistic objection holds that matter is known only through mind, as part of the content of consciousness, and as presupposing consciousness. It is meaningless to say either that mind is matter or that it is a product of material changes, when we are wholly unable to conceive or represent to ourselves in thought a world of matter existing prior to all mind and in absolute independence of it. Such a "matter" is inconceivable and unknown. The only matter we know exists as part of the content of consciousness in such a way that its very existence presupposes consciousness. The argument is perfect from the logical point of view. It fails to convince the plain man, and even the special scientist, because it seems to contradict the immediate deliverances of perception and memory. The author therefore proceeds to criticise the three types of materialism *seriatim*.

1. The view that the mental is itself matter takes three forms. The mental is represented (a) as a sort of stuff, (b) as a condition or state of matter, and (c) as a property of matter. (a) Karl Vogt maintains that the brain secretes thought, impulse, and emotion as the kidneys secrete urine; but this is refuted by specific and fundamental differences between the mental and the physical. The physical has hardness, extension, motion through space, etc., while the mental lacks all these attributes. (b) (c) The other two forms of this type of materialism reduce to the proposition that the mental is a form of motion or a system of motions of material particles; and this proposition the author regards as irrefutable because it is absurd. One may as well say that wood is iron. You can "tongue" the words, but not "brain" them, not think them.

2. The view that the mental, although different from the physical, is yet a product of physical changes, is supported by a very large range of facts. Moreover, the wide abyss between the mental and the physical, while it makes a causal relation between them hard to understand, is not in itself a sufficient reason for denying all causal relation between them. The production of heat, electricity, light, etc., by motion is hard to understand, but it seems to be a fact. Wherever we find invariable sequences in nature, we suspect the presence of causal relations, and between

neural and mental processes invariable sequence certainly obtains. Any such causal relation, however, as could produce the mental *de novo* from the physical would reduce the former to a mere determination of the latter, and this is forbidden by the disparity between them. Finally, it is altogether impossible that the unity of consciousness should arise from the interaction of the parts of the brain.

3. Busse regards parallelistic materialism, the view that the mental is a mere aspect or accompaniment of the physical, as an impossible halting-place between genuine materialism and genuine parallelism (psychophysical parallelism), to the discussion of which he turns.

The discussion of the relative claims of parallelism and interactionism occupies the second and main portion of Busse's book. Both are metaphysical conceptions, and the issue between them is only postponed by the neo-Spinozism that mind and matter are two "aspects" of one and the same reality (the "double-aspect" theory); for the question immediately arises how one and the same reality can be both mental and physical. We are not at liberty to hold that the two are at once identical and different.

Idealistic monism, says Busse, does not teach a genuine parallelism, because in this metaphysic the physical side of the parallelism is less real, less ultimate, than the mental. Hartmann calls it subordination-parallelism. Something to which there is no physical analogue always remains over on the mental side—the *ego*, self, pure spirit. Genuine parallelism is, therefore, not only not a necessary consequence of idealism; it is not consistent with it. Genuine parallelism and thoroughgoing idealism are incompatible. Interactionism and idealism, Busse holds, go together. (We have already seen that it is not interactionism of the old, naïve sort.) The causal conception of interactionism is a much more natural interpretation of the interdependence which everywhere seems to obtain between mental and bodily processes. There is, moreover, in the principle of causation itself nothing to prevent its application here. Causation only means a thoroughgoing unity and interrelatedness of all that is actual; while parallelism divides the actual into two worlds with no interrelations, and tries to explain the wonder of their uniform correspondence by the still greater wonder of their hidden identity.

Moreover, parallelism does not accord with the facts of experience. There is no physical analogue for the relating consciousness and its syntheses. There is no physical analogue for the unity of consciousness as a whole. Parallelism presupposes two closed systems of change, a physical and a mental (closed in the sense that neither influences the other), and on the physical side this presupposition is not borne out by the facts. This

presupposition means that all organisms are automata, and the automaton view of plants and animals has been abandoned as untenable. Among psychic organisms, parallelism means a pluralistic doctrine of the soul; and here the author criticises some modern forms of psychological pluralism.

For interactionism Busse claims that it is the natural way of construing the relation of the mental to the physical; that it answers better than parallelism the logical need of the mind to conceive the world as a whole; that it avoids the paradoxical and absurd consequences of parallelism; that it tallies with the nature of mental processes; and that it harmonizes better than parallelism with idealistic views of the world.

The final chapter of this book outlines an idealistic theory of interaction. What Busse has said of idealistic parallelism may, however, be said of his own idealistic interactionism. It is interactionism "with a modification." We are no longer dealing with the old relation of a mind and a body which are essentially different from each other, but with a relation between one mental synthesis and another. Busse seems to assume that monistic idealism is true, and spends himself to show that interactionism is more consistent with this metaphysic than parallelism. For this reason, the concluding chapter of this book is not convincing. What if one be neither a materialist, an idealist, nor a dualist? What if one hold that both body and mind are abstractions from the content of experience where alone they have significance? It means nothing, to such a thinker, to ask after the interrelations of abstractions apart from the content of experience; while the question of their relation to each other in experience is a question of facts and their meanings—a question to be settled by an analysis of experience and a history of these particular abstract conceptions.

With respect to method Strong's work is less at fault. He does not set up two questionable metaphysical entities and try by analysis to decide which is real and which is phenomenal. He leaves open the view that both are real as syntheses within experience, although he inclines at last to say that the material synthesis (the body) is a function of the mental, that the body is an appearance of a thing-in-itself which is at bottom identical with consciousness. Consciousness is real, and the brain-process is its phenomenon, its perception. Not that the individual consciousness precipitates or projects its own brain and material world. Far from it. In reality there are many consciousnesses (or things-in-themselves), and the body with the entire physical world is an ideal construction resulting from the interaction and intercourse of minds. Contact and intercourse of mind with mind gives rise to the perception of a material world. The

real causal relation, however, does not lie between the mind and its brain, but between my mind and minds lying outside of my mind, between my mind and extra-mental things-in-themselves. As a product of that causal relation there arises in my mind a material world in which bodies and brains are parts. This material world remains, however, to the end a phenomenon or appearance. It is not real or ultimate as the mind is real and ultimate.

Before commenting on Strong's conclusions, let us look more closely into the method of his book. "The problem of the relation of mind and body takes, for contemporary thought, the form of the issue between interactionism and automatism," the latter term including both the materialism and the parallelism of Busse's discussion. Interactionism, automatism, and parallelism are all "causal" theories; the first holding that each produces changes in the other; the second, that the body produces changes in the mind, but not *vice versa*; and the third, that neither influences the other. Strong's book is a discussion of these three views. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first is empirical and the second metaphysical. Each part is divided into two books. Book I deals with "The Facts;" Book II, with "The Question of Causal Relations;" Book III, with "Metaphysical Principles;" Book IV is an "Application of the Foregoing Principles to the Problem"—a criticism of the causal theories. In Book I, after a "general survey" of the known facts about the relations of mind and body, the author discusses the question as to "the immediate correlate of consciousness," and concludes that it is the brain. In a third chapter in this first book we take up the "extent of the correlation on the mental side," and find "that consciousness as a whole never occurs except in connection with a brain-process," and "that particular mental states never occur except in connection with particular brain-events" (p. 66). In Book II "the question of causal relations" is discussed by stating and criticising the three causal theories mentioned above. We may quote Strong's conclusion:

The result of our study of the empirical arguments is that they seem insufficient to justify a decision. Several of them have been shown to be fallacious. Of the sound ones, the causal argument proves the parallelist thesis, but its validity is hypothetical, resting on the assumption that mental events are simultaneous with their cerebral correlates. [Whether they are simultaneous or successive the author regards as an unsettled question, one which probably cannot be settled by experiment.] We may therefore dismiss it from consideration. The argument from the principles of biology appears to prove the mind efficient; but it is subject to the difficulty regarding the origin of consciousness. The argument from the principle of the conservation of energy raises a strong pre-

sumption, not amounting to demonstrative proof, that the contrary is the case. Thus two great branches of natural science seem arrayed against each other. Physics and biology appear to authorize opposite conclusions concerning the efficiency of mind. And it does not appear who is to be the arbiter between them. (Pp. 159 f.)

It may be well to remark just here that, according to Busse, the law of conservation is not a sufficient refutation of interactionism. This law means (1) the quantitative equivalence of cause and effect, and (2) the quantitative constancy of the material universe as a whole. The former rests upon experimental investigation; the latter is an undemonstrable postulate of the physical sciences. The former is in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of interactionism; and to use the latter to disprove the efficiency of mind is to reason in a circle.

In Book III, the first book of the second part of his work, the author takes up the metaphysical principles involved in this whole discussion, and first of all the physical world. In treating the relations of mind and body, most writers "spend their time in discussing the relation of two things of whose nature they have no clear conception." To avoid this mistake, we now inquire: "(1) whether the objects we see and touch exist independently of our minds, or only as modifications of our minds; (2) assuming the latter to be the case, whether these modifications stand for real existences external to our minds" (p. 165). As to the first question there is no possibility of doubt. That *esse* is *percipi*, all agree. "This, I think, is a doctrine all but universally accepted by philosophers." This is the critical feature of Berkeley's philosophy—"material objects exist as modifications of the mind" (p. 166)—and here we stand together. The parting of the ways begins with the question "whether the mental states of which alone we are immediately conscious stand for realities outside the mind." Such realities, the author calls "things-in-themselves."

We first take up naïve realism, the doctrine that the mind immediately knows objects which exist independently. The argument of physiology, that between the object and our consciousness of it a series of physical and physiological events intervene as the necessary condition of our being aware of the object (in the case of vision, for example, light-waves, retinal excitation, nerve impulse along the optic nerves and tracts, cortical excitation in the occipital lobe of the brain)—this argument is valid. The object in itself cannot be the same as the consciousness of it. The latter is a resultant of this series of physical and physiological events. Neither can our consciousness of the object be an immediate knowledge of it. On the other hand, this physiological argument seems to indicate a difference

between two groups of attributes in the object—a group which the object as it is in itself possesses, and a group which it possesses only by virtue of the action of the former upon the sense-organs and brain; in other words, primary and secondary qualities (p. 175). The ordinary scientific view of the world is built on this distinction. The world of physics is a world of impenetrable, extended, measurable objects possessing the power of motion only. Color, sound, odor, etc., are effects produced in us by this world of hard and moving things.

Naïve realism is untenable, and the author proceeds to show that this scientific realism is nothing but naïve realism in another form. The “object” of scientific realism lies just as far beyond our powers of touch and sight as the “object” of naïve realism. Our knowledge of the object is in both cases purely representative, not presentative or immediate. The hardness, extension, and motion of the “object” are dependent upon the same sort of physical contacts and physiological processes as color and sound. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a distinction *within* the realm of sensation and consciousness—not a distinction between that realm and a world which transcends it. “Our world consists of nothing but actual and possible perceptions; that is, it contains nothing essentially non-phenomenal” (p. 182). We are cut off from the extra-bodily object by the whole intervening chain of causes and effects, and the necessary result is that we cannot know that object immediately, but only our subjective image of it.

Here the metaphysician steps in and observes that we have no evidence derived from immediate experience that extra-mental objects exist.

Suppose everything outside the mind to be annihilated, but our perceptions to succeed each other exactly as before. We should never suspect the disappearance of things extra-mental, and should have as much reason to assume their existence as we have at present. Now, suppose extra-mental things to continue, but no perceptions of them to arise in our minds. They would be for us as good as non-existent. These corollaries do not, of course, disprove the existence of an extra-mental world; but I think they bring forcibly home to us how true it is that *our* world is the world of our perceptions. (P. 186.)

It was just at this point that Berkeley assumed the existence of a divine Mind to account for the succession of perceptions in our minds. For Berkeley there exists no external world outside the mind, but the divine Mind so orders our perceptions that we seem to see an external world which is independent of our perception of it. When the plain man asks what becomes of the setting sun, the North Pole, the other side of the moon, the objects behind my back, etc., when I am not looking at them

or thinking about them, Berkeley answers that they exist as possibilities of perception in the thought and purpose of God. Thus two interpretations of the external world of naïve realism are before us. The extra-mental realities of scientific realism seem necessary to science, although they are metaphysically indefensible. The extra-mental divine Mind of Berkeley answers every demand of experience, and offers us another and a different interpretation of the same facts.

But, although the very objects we perceive cannot continue to exist when we no longer perceive them, it is consistent with idealism that they should have extra-mental causes which continue to exist, and of which the perceived objects are symbolic (p. 191).

At this point Strong takes up the nature of consciousness, the other term in the relation of body to mind. He discusses the view that consciousness is merely a manifold of mental states, and also the view that beneath or behind consciousness there is a soul or transcendental ego. The former view is refuted by the arguments for the latter. There is a felt need of an ego. As there cannot be motion without an object to move, so there cannot be thought without a thinker. And, again, the manifold of mental states is so mutable and transitory that we cannot conceive it except as supported by some more durable, underlying being. Our choice lies between making it dependent on the brain and on the soul. The latter view is, however, at fault in asserting the existence of a spiritual principle which transcends experience. The ego which transcends experience is really the ego of immediate experience, the actual ego which is immediately known and cannot be adequately represented. The ego is not a thing. In no ordinary sense is it an agent. It is rather knowledge and experience in their immediacy.

If we reject both the above theories, the stream of consciousness with its empirical characters enters on the reality now vacated by the Soul or Subject. In this reality every thought and feeling shares.

Thus, having reduced matter to our perceptions and the mind to the stream of immediate experiences, we seem headed straight for a doctrine of universal phenomenalism. We have, however, left open the question of the existence of things-in-themselves, and universal phenomenalism is untenable because it

makes no provision for knowledge of the minds of other men and animals. They do not exist in its world. So serious is this omission that phenomenalism cannot be adjusted to it without admitting extra-mental realities in principle, and so ceasing to be thoroughgoing (p. 215).

The existence of other minds is not immediately known. It is an

inference, but an inference as to the truth of which it is impossible for us to entertain doubt. If we try to prove it, all proof breaks down.

It is in the nature of the case impossible that consciousness should supply rational grounds for the inference of realities beyond itself. We can only find ourselves as a matter of fact inferring such realities, and continue to infer them in the absence of positive reasons to the contrary. Now, it is surely a striking fact, and one whose importance for epistemology can hardly be overestimated, that something to which neither the external nor the internal senses lend the slightest testimony may yet be with perfect certainty known to exist.

Philosophers have always assumed that knowledge must rest either on reason or on experience, and

it never occurred to them that we might have a kind of knowledge less rational than either, a kind founded neither on reason nor experience, but solely on instinct. It never occurred to them that neither experience nor reason can fully account for the knowledge of other minds.

In the present writer's opinion, here is the *crux* of Strong's argument, but—a word later on.

Strong takes "our indisputable knowledge of other minds" to be the refutation of "the current dogma about the unknowability and consequent irrationality of non-empirical existences." Other minds are things-in-themselves whose existence is established by neither reason nor experience. Perception and memory, and hence all knowledge, involve the existence of other minds, of a reality which transcends my consciousness. This reality is no sort of possible experience for me; it is actual experience for other minds than my own. The discussion proceeds to refute the Kantian arguments against things-in-themselves, and then advances to the proofs for the existence of things-in-themselves. The last chapter in the third book of the work discusses the nature of things-in-themselves, and concludes that "since consciousness is the only reality of which we have immediate knowledge," "we have no other conception of reality." We must regard things-in-themselves, therefore, as mental in their nature. "This is the more necessary, that individual minds arise out of them by evolution" (p. 295).

Following this discussion comes Book IV, in which an application of these metaphysical principles to the main problem is made. Strong is an interactionist, but he does not teach the interaction of mind and body. The primary interaction is between these mental things-in-themselves, out of which, in the process of evolution, minds develop. The interaction of things-in-themselves takes the form of competitive struggle and rivalry (as the author maintains in an article³ published about a year later than

³ *Archives de psychologie*, November, 1904.

the book we are discussing). Those things-in-themselves which vary in the direction of a consciousness of an external world, having an advantage over their fellows, survive; and so the consciousness of an external world gradually evolves.

This work is so well conceived and written that one is borne on to the end without consciousness of difficulty. Then one awakes and rubs his eyes. One is so thoroughly convinced by all the first part, and by chaps. 8 and 9 of Book III in the second part, that the final outcome of the discussion is a surprise. For the possibility of extra-mental things-in-themselves seemed to be refuted by the earlier argument, while here at the close they have become the explanatory principle in the body-mind relationship. The argument moves steadily and swiftly in the direction of what the author calls "thoroughgoing phenomenism." Matter is reduced to perception, and mind to a stream of mental states. But thoroughgoing phenomenism makes no provision for the existence of other minds than my own! We know by instinct (not by reason or experience) that other minds exist. We are more certain of them than of the external world. Indeed, given other minds as naked things-in-themselves, the world of matter can be accounted for as a pure phenomenon. We should be phenomenists as to matter, but not as to mind. Let us look more closely at a few points in this argument.

1. By "thoroughgoing phenomenism" we here understand a solipsistic subjectivism, the skeptical doctrine that nothing can be known to exist but the immediate content of my own consciousness. It reduces everything to terms of content in my own consciousness, and hence makes no provision for the existence of other minds than my own. But is this the necessary outcome of the author's reduction of matter to terms of perception, and of mind to mental states? Has the argument shown that matter and mind have no existence except as elements in the immediate content of my present moment of consciousness? On the contrary, it has shown that my ego, the individuality of my mind, and the limits of my consciousness exist only as I think them. He has not shown that everything exists in me, so much as that I, along with everything else, am a determination within a continuum of pure experience. If mind is reducible to mental states along with the external world, what can it mean to say that my mind excludes all others in such a way as to make the inference that they exist impossible? My separate individuality is one mental synthesis within a stream of mental syntheses: it is simply one among many mental states. To put this criticism in other words, the author's demonstration that whatever exists exists *for* conscious-

ness is not new, and it is certainly true; but to assume that this is equivalent to the position that whatever exists exists only *in* my private consciousness is gratuitous. The thoroughgoing phenomenalist cannot accept the limitation of his own private consciousness as real without ceasing to be thoroughgoing. This is saying that everything is reducible to terms of mental content except the reduction process, which is real and excludes other similar reduction processes going on at other centers of consciousness. Lurking behind the author's "thoroughgoing phenomenism" is a metaphysical assumption that perception and mental states are always somebody's, and that this somebody is no phenomenon, but a reality; and this is just what the author's argument seems to refute.

If we strip the argument of this assumption, we may then recognize the fact of experience that the whole distinction between mine and thine is a development within experience. Experience is a broader term than my-consciousness, and more ultimate. No doubt experience is here a metaphysical real. The conception of pure or immediate experience which figures so largely in the philosophy of Wundt and in the logical discussions of recent years has many of the traits of a metaphysical postulate.⁴ I do not see how we are to think at all without some reality, even if it be nothing more than the fact of change itself, the flux of Heraclitus.

Once more, the knowledge that I am a mind or have a mind presupposes a knowledge that there are other minds. And this is no mere logical quibble. Psychologically speaking, the consciousness of self is a consciousness of ego-alter relationships. The concept of a pure ego is a metaphysical abstraction. In point of fact, I am not first conscious of my own mind, and then by inference or otherwise conscious that you too have a mind. In both the child and the race intelligence develops by discovering similarities and differences among the things entering into experience, and the differences which count are always differences of behavior.⁵ Persons are thus distinguished from impersonal things, and by assimilation processes we put ourselves into the class called persons or selves. In all this there is never a time when my mind excludes without, from other points of view, including other minds.

Consequently the author's statement that we know "by instinct" (not by reason or experience) that other minds exist appears to be an attempt to readjust with a word a difficulty which he has himself unconsciously

⁴ See John Dewey, "The Postulate of Pure Experience," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, Vol. II, No. 15, July 20, 1905.

⁵ Baldwin, *Origin of Thing and Its Nature* (Princeton Contributions to Psychology).

created. Suppose a man walking along the shore of a large body of water were to ask himself how he came by his knowledge that the body of water has another shore. The other shore is no mere possibility of future experience to him, but an actuality which excludes his present actual experience. It is also an actuality which his present actual experience in a sense includes. He need not resort to instinct to find a basis for his belief that the other shore is real. Instinct is a tendency to act, and all knowledge presupposes and rests upon congenital motor tendencies of this sort. Surely the author cannot mean that the knowledge of the existence of other minds is innate.

2. Another difficulty presented by the latter part of this work is the very problem which the author is here trying to solve, namely, the genesis of matter from mind, assuming a manifold of mental things-in-themselves to be real. We are dealing with the evolution of a material world, or (what amounts to the same thing) with the evolution of the perception of a material world. This is not synonymous with the evolution of the illusion of a material world; because the illusion of a material world which did not exist would be a hindrance rather than an advantage in the struggle for existence. There must *be* a material world, if perception is to have any functional significance or constitute fitness for survival.

Nor do I see how there could be a consciousness of itself in a mental thing-in-itself without a consciousness of a not-self. In assuming a consciousness of self in these metaphysical minds, is not the author really assuming all that he seems to derive? In other words, is not the author's thesis that the material is the phenomenon of mental things-in-themselves really a mere restatement of Berkeley's problem under the rubrics of the Darwinian biology? After a masterly review of facts familiar to every psychologist, and a lucid statement and discussion of existing theories of causal dependence between mind and body, he takes up the metaphysical problem, and once more rearranges the facts so as to give concreteness and definiteness to a new formulation of the idealist's problem, for the solution of which we must look to further works from the author's pen.

Finally, we note the tendency of both of these works to make the spiritual primary in the world in which body and mind must both be considered factors. In this respect these books are characteristic of the time. Psychology and philosophy are turning away from the materialistic view which held a place of fundamental importance in the discussions of a quarter of a century ago. Differing in method and results, Busse and Strong agree in this, that the mental life is real, and that the material world of mechanical categories is its phenomenon. Just how it is so they

have not told us. From many points of view, the most significant result of their investigations is their idealism; and one can say this even while frankly confessing that their results are not in all respects satisfying.

Perhaps a more careful criticism of the facts and metaphysical conceptions involved in this question may lead to a doctrine which is neither materialism nor idealism. Perhaps the time has come when we should abandon the impossible task of either reducing mind to terms of matter or matter to terms of mind. Perhaps mind in the sense of a private world, a closed universe with no open windows and no fresh breezes, is a metaphysical fiction, just as matter was long since found to be. May it not be that the principle of abstract individuality has been, in our efforts to maintain the separate existence, freedom, and responsibility of the soul, carried to the extent of logical anarchy and nihilism? The more the present writer reflects upon this problem, the more he feels that both mind and matter are necessary factors in an experience which comprehends both. The doctrine of this experience may be called realism or radical empiricism; but we may be sure the practical and the moral will be vindicated by it.

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THE FINALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

Professor Foster tells us, with exemplary modesty, that he has no new message to bring through this book;¹ that, in fact, all that is contained in it has been told by others. This may be true. It would be true in some sense of any serious book that might be published today. And yet Professor Foster's work has succeeded in commanding the attention of a very large section, if not of the whole, of the theological world in the English-speaking countries as no other of its class published in the last decade has done. The question which naturally and inevitably presents itself is: How has this result been achieved? What are the distinctive peculiarities of a book which has awakened into life the dormant energies of the science of theology, so long supposed to be bereft of vitality? As far as form is concerned, the work does not offer much that will explain its success. It begins with an introductory section of fifty pages, comprising a general "Introduction" and a "Historical Survey," and is from that point onward divided into two parts; i. e., Part I, "Authority-Religion (Super-

¹*The Finality of the Christian Religion*. By George Burman Foster. [The Decennial Publications, Second Series, Vol. XVI.] Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1906. xv + 518 pages. \$4.

naturalism) and Naturalism," including chapters on "The Formation of Authority-Religion," "The Dissolution of Authority-Religion," "The Changed View of the World and of Life;" and Part II, "The Finality of Christianity, and the Idea of Development," comprising chapters on "The Essence of the Christian Religion," "The Problem and Method," "The Sources of the Life of Jesus," and "Jesus." These chapters are long, especially 6 and 9; they are difficult to follow, owing to the lack of plan and arrangement, and the thought frequently recurs to the same starting-point, producing an impression, which is not always correct and yet quite unavoidable, that there is unnecessary reiteration. Professor Foster's style, too, is distinctly technical, and in many cases his choice of words is absolutely his own, so that it is with great effort that the reader is enabled to realize just what his meaning is. It would be unfair to call this, as has been done, a Germanizing style, for both in the choice of words and in the use of idioms, when duly analyzed, it conforms to English usage. In fact, Professor Foster shows noteworthy reserve in the use of the stock phrases of German philosophical theology, employing these but sparingly. Yet, taken altogether, his style has so little in common with the ordinary usage of British and American theologians that it is not transparent enough to make the reading of the book a pleasure, unless it be to the narrowest specialist. What, then, to return to the inquiry, is the secret of Professor Foster's success? Plainly, it is the vitality of his constructive idea, and the earnest, almost passionate, manner in which he works out its legitimate outline. Professor Foster speaks as one who has spent much, and suffered not a little, in the process of coming to his present view-point, and therefore fully appreciates what he has earned, and endeavors to bring others to it. To be sure, this is not a unique experience; but wherever it occurs it is bound to arrest attention and command respect, in some cases also to induce, or at any rate, assist, persuasion.

But, passing from the form to the subject-matter of Professor Foster's views, it would be easy to affiliate it with the late Professor Sabatier's views or with Ritschlianism. With the Ritschlians Professor Foster has, at least, this in common, that he works from the point of view of the value-judgment or the ultimate reality of values. No matter what may not exist, no matter what may exist, Professor Foster does not doubt that values do exist, and it is only as things may be reduced to values that they are worthy of consideration in a theological system. With Sabatier he has more particularly this in common, that he totally repudiates authority-religion in both its Catholic and Protestant forms. But to dismiss this work by showing its affinities with these systems is only a superficial way of dealing with it. It has enough distinctiveness to stand by itself.

The question to which Professor Foster addresses himself is: Can Christianity maintain its claim to be the final religion in the light of the revolution of thought which has taken place since the opening of the nineteenth century in the realms of science, history, and philosophy? In answering the question he naturally aims to distinguish between that which is essential and that which is not essential in Christianity. Supernaturalism is not essential. Just what he means by supernaturalism we shall presently inquire, but, defining it in his sense, he regards it as altogether a dispensable element. Therefore, the passing of belief in it does not antiquate the Christian religion. The stripping of the person of Jesus himself of all that has been considered extraordinary and unique; the elimination from the accounts of his life of the stories of the nativity and the resurrection as legendary; the reduction of his personality to a mere manhood, fallible and mistaken with reference to such matters as the existence of demons and the apocalyptic coming of the kingdom of God—this does not affect the essence of the religion he founded. Given the absolute overthrow and exclusion of all these elements as impossible and incredible, there is still left all that is of permanent value in the Christian religion. The most radical criticism of the sources of the life of Jesus still leaves a portrait of him such that we are bound to find in him "the home of all values." In other words, Professor Foster makes a strenuous effort at a final and impregnable apologetic for Christianity.

This is a rather meager summary, and must necessarily have all the unsatisfactoriness of every attempt to express in two or three sentences what a painstaking author has found it necessary to set forth in a large volume. Nevertheless, we trust we have indicated the gist of Professor Foster's main contention. It may be proper to add, in passing, that he works out his idea, not only with masterly skill as a philosophical analyst, but also with marvelous erudition as a reader of history and literature. He has evidently spent years of patient study in mastering the subject of Christian apologetics. At least, he has neglected no important work upon any phase of his subject.

It must be clear, even from the sketch above given, that the most sensitive point in Professor Foster's work is the effort to find the irreducible minimum of Christianity. From the nature of the case, this is a delicate task. But it will not take much reflection to make it clear that Professor Foster has planted himself upon solid ground at this point. The irreducible minimum of Christianity must either be what he says it is, or it must be a fully fledged Roman Catholicism. To make it anything else would be to lose sight of the distinction between essential Christianity and

historic Christianity. The irreducible minimum must be identical with the former and not with the latter. Otherwise we are driven to the position that there was a time when man existed without any knowledge of God. But even from the biblicist or historic Protestant point of view, this is not to be thought of. There was an essential Christianity under the Old Testament. And of this the teachings of Jesus and the New Testament in general are both the historic continuation and the complete revelation.

We may say, as we do, that Christ's Christianity is for us a fuller, richer, more vital, and more effective form; that it supersedes for apologetic purposes, as it does for ethical ones, all that went before. We may rejoice that we have the latest and best. But if Professor Foster will not see as we do, we have no right to deprive him of his place in the great body of those who have recognized Jesus Christ as the revelation of God and as their leader and way to God. For Professor Foster Christianity is the presentation of God to the world as Jesus presented him, especially in his life and character. "God is like Jesus." This is vague and rudimentary. It is no more than may be found in the concept of God as present in the saintly minds of all ages and all places. But it is the kernel—or perhaps we would do better to say, the germ—of Christianity, and to contend that it is beyond possibility of successful assault is worth while.

And yet, in doing this we think Professor Foster has laid himself open to much unnecessary misunderstanding. He has first of all been unfortunate in classifying himself with those progressive thinkers who are so overwhelmingly impressed with the necessity of intellectual honesty that in their effort to attain it they fall into the very snare they were striving to avoid, because they clothe their thoughts in forms too easily—we had almost said, inevitably—mistaken for other than they were intended to be. It is his ambition to give "no orthodoxy under the mask of liberalism, no liberalism under the mask of orthodoxy," but to say, "yea, yea and nay, nay." To this sentiment we all say "Amen." He mistakes, however, the case of those who may not do as he does, when he suggests that one might "sometimes hold back the truth for prudential reasons," and thus leave his "fellow-pilgrims at a loss to know when he is telling what he believes to be the truth and when he is holding the truth back for reasons of policy." We do not believe that there are any with whom Professor Foster has to do that would resort to such a course. If there were, we should say that they had forfeited their right to be listened to. The question of intellectual honesty is not as simple as Professor Foster seems to think it. Perfect freedom and fulness of expression are quite compatible with at least a measure of affiliation with the current of

thought in one's environment. In fact, they are conditioned upon such affiliation; otherwise one is misunderstood, and is misunderstood in consequence of his own way of presenting himself. That is, he misrepresents himself.

Perhaps what we wish to point out may be best illustrated by citing Professor Foster's attitude on the question of the supernatural. He plainly and unqualifiedly declares himself a disbeliever in the supernatural. But presently he is found to reject naturalism even more vehemently. Yet these two are logically the two hemispheres which constitute the whole sphere of thought. There is no middle ground between them. They are contiguous territories, with no neutral zone into which one may take refuge when he is chased out of both. The philosopher is not at liberty to repudiate both naturalism and supernaturalism. He may take his choice between them; he may undertake to fuse them into one; he may discover a secret harmony between them, where others see nothing but contradiction; but he cannot reject both, seeking for a third something unrelated to them which he may hold at peace. Such a region is an unutterable, unthinkable nothing. Do we, then, charge Professor Foster with entertaining this absurdity? By no means. Professor Foster distinctly puts himself on the supernaturalist side of the line. Otherwise, what shall we make of an expression like this: "Natural science itself announces a *plus over and above* sensible nature" (p. 226); or what is the meaning of "will" or "energy" whose discovery in the world gives rise to the evolutionary or dynamic theory, and overthrows and does away with all static theories of the universe? No! Professor Foster has just missed a distinction—the distinction between the supernatural and the preternatural. What he wishes to repudiate is the mechanical view of the universe according to which the world is a closed structure, moving either undisturbed, or only occasionally disturbed, by a power from without itself. Naturalism assumes that nature is never broken into by a force from without; preternaturalism that it is occasionally interfered with. The dynamic view, for which Professor Foster contends, posits the supernatural within and yet above nature, working uniformly, steadily, constantly, and yet not always in accordance with a method, all of whose intricacies are known or can be made known to the finite understanding. It is a source of amazement that one of Professor Foster's powers of analysis should have failed to see this distinction, or, if he saw it, that he should have failed to present it in a form recognizable by the open-minded and intelligent reader. The point of his argument is directed against a form of thought which prevailed before the dawn of the scientific era, but we think

prevails no longer. The word "supernatural" has in the transition to the scientific stage undergone a process of *intussusceptio*, whereby it has taken to itself another content, casting out, not all, but much of its older connotation and retaining the kernel of its essential meaning. This process has further necessitated the invention of other terms, such as "unnatural," "contra-natural," and, best of all, "preternatural," to designate what has been expelled from it. Of all this Professor Foster takes no account.

But Professor Foster succeeds no better with his task as a historian. As has already been pointed out, in dealing with this side of the subject he goes the whole length with those who eliminate, through critical processes of the most radical type, not only all that either is or appears to be miraculous in the records, but also all that does not measure exactly with a procrustean bed of their own construction. Professor Foster appears to accept without reserve the latest phase of this sort of critical history. If his acceptance were hypothetical or provisional—as, for instance, in order to show that Christianity may suffer a change of interpretation, but no collapse, after history has done its utmost—there would be nothing to find fault with. But, on the face of it, his acceptance of these latest views in New Testament criticism is *bona fide*. And he thus lays himself open to the charge of neologism. Considering how brief the life of this phase of thought has been; considering how evanescent all its predecessors have proved, from the days of the eighteenth-century rationalists to the Bruno Bauer school; considering how each in its day has claimed to be the final and full discovery of the exact facts in the case, and how from each an irresistible reaction has taken place, putting their distinctive features among antiquated curiosities, what assurance can Professor Foster have that this most recent criticism will survive the present generation? Changes are amazingly rapid in the field of scholarship, in an age when everything else is in the process of rapid movement. We are not saying that each generation has not contributed something to the advance of our knowledge of New Testament history; but, as the results of no school have thus far stood as a whole, it is hasty, to say the least, to accept views, but a decade old at most, as the ultimate dictum of critical study, and base an attempt at reconstruction upon them. To us it does not seem at all likely that the views which Professor Foster takes as the final ground of defense for Christianity will be occupied permanently. While men are seeking for the objective truth of things, the spirit of subjectivism, either in the irresponsible form of tradition, or in the more plausible one of conjectural criticism, is uninterruptedly, though imperceptibly, building its

fanciful structure about their discoveries, and what seemed to have been laid bare is soon covered over and calls for a new search and rediscovery. Meanwhile, as far as the origins of the Christian religion are concerned, we do not believe that the world will ever be reduced for its information to the meager and shadowy data given by Professor Foster; unless indeed, it is willing to admit as sound the pyrrhonic criticism, which, on a basis of the slightest apparent inconsistency, such as is hourly witnessed in common life, will reject information about the men and the events of the past, and reduce not only Jesus, but also Socrates, Pericles, Augustus, Cæsar, and many another, into shadows hovering in the dim distance with undistinguishable outline or color.

In treading Professor Foster's *via dolorosa*, we should be somewhat more cheerful and less bewildered than he seems to have been, if we would walk along the path with more regard to the discriminations already prevailing, and with less haste in accepting apparently destructive critical results. But Professor Foster has rendered a real service to the cause of Christian thought in stimulating attention to a phase of apologetics which, although not altogether neglected in the past, was in need of special study just at present.

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I have been asked, perhaps as one who lives amid very different religious surroundings, to state my impressions of Professor George Burman Foster's book on Christianity. Certainly I have read the book with much interest and considerable agreement. It seems that, after all, the great religious problems of our age present themselves in much the same guise to men of the same type of mind, whether they dwell in Chicago or Oxford or Berlin. But beneath a general agreement there lie differences which are not without interest.

To modern apologetics Christianity presents many broad questions—perhaps, rather, many facets of the same question—which appeal to theologians according to their education and their temperament. Not long ago it was a favorite subject for writing whether the Christian religion is *absolute*. Kaftan puts forth as the subject of a large work the *truth* of the Christian religion; he had already written one on the *essence* of Christianity. Harnack has written on the same *essence* regarded in a more historic way; and Professor William Adams Brown has adopted the same title. In choosing the word *finality* I think Professor Foster

has given a clue to his mental tendency. He clearly approaches Christianity primarily in its philosophic aspect, and disclaims being an authority as to the facts of Christian history.

To me it seems that the whole matter is presenting itself to the world in a more and more practical aspect. Our acceptance of Christianity is becoming less dependent upon arguments whether it is absolute or final, and more upon the question whether it will work among Christian nations, or whether it can be adapted to those nations which are not yet Christian. But of course, for all that, the philosophical question has to be argued out according to the best light of each generation.

The impression produced by Professor Foster's writing is that his education has been mainly German. This has advantages and disadvantages. No doubt alike in philosophy and in early Christian history Germany stands at the head of the peoples. It is a great merit of the book before us that it frequently cites the views of such men as Troeltsch and Höffding, Wernle, Wendt, and Pfeiderer, and many able writers not known as they should be among English-speaking people. Mr. Foster has also learned from his teachers to move easily in the refined air of philosophic discussion. But there is something to be said on the other side. The American mind, while it in some degree differs from the English, is far more widely different from the German. And every nation must work out its solution of these primary questions on the basis of the national tendency and character. Some American work which has reached me has been spoiled by too close adherence to methods and customs which did not really fit it. I do not say this of the present book. Yet there is in it some misfitting. Some pages read like literal translations from the German, and such phrases as "an overcome standpoint" sometimes recur. Mr. Foster calls the vivifying of past history "to reanimate some formation of the past in its total individual aspect." He says of Luke that he is "highly capable of linguistic variation;" and so forth. However, these criticisms only touch the surface; and when Mr. Foster warms to his subject, his style becomes more natural. It is perhaps a more serious charge against him that he is too closely dependent upon particular German writers. For example, his account of new views as to the earliest church history is almost entirely taken from the works of Wernle, a striking and powerful writer, but decidedly too original and independent to be thus drawn upon for a mere summary of recent views.

The earlier part of Mr. Foster's book is taken up with an account of the altered way in which the modern mind regards the world in itself and in relation to the human spirit, especially since the triumph of evolu-

tionary theories; and with a vindication of our right, notwithstanding such changes in our mental horizon, to retain a conviction of the divine origin and government of the universe. Here I have little to do but to express appreciation and general agreement. Mr. Foster's apology for faith is carried out on Kantian lines, and is based upon a strong belief in personality, and a clear perception of how much the course of modern thought has tended to undermine alike materialism, and that tendency to overvalue the intellectual side of man, in comparison with his powers of feeling and action, which may best be called rationalism. As regards the primacy of will in human nature Mr. Foster expresses himself almost as strongly as Professor William James, though without the special charm of that admirable writer. Mr. Foster holds, as I also hold, that the Johannine doctrine of the *logos* may be well adapted to fit modern evolutionary theories in biology, that science is being gradually spiritualized, and that teleologic views of the world may be revived in a defensible form.

But this does not take us very far. Granted that the primacy of man over nature is as maintainable and as certain now as ever it was in the days when our earth was regarded as the center of the universe, and granted that on any other view Christianity cannot be maintained, yet this is no proof that Christianity is the final religion, since all religions of high value have accepted the same view of man's place in the universe. It has still to be shown wherein the superiority of Christianity to other religions consists, and how it meets the highest spiritual needs of man. Hence the author proceeds to take up the questions, What is the essence of Christianity, in what relation does it stand to its historic founder, and what is its value for modern life. In these great matters there is far more room for differences of opinion than in the broad inquiry whether religion as such has not been set aside by the progress of thought and discovery. I will consider only a few points amid many that are of importance.

It is, as I have already observed, a weak point in Mr. Foster's account of the Christian origins that he depends too much upon Wernle. If he had worked over the ground himself, he might have modified some of his views. For example, when at p. 341, he writes, "The great picture of the future [the end of the world and the coming of a visible kingdom of God] remains the synoptic center of the whole preaching of Jesus," I think the exaggeration extreme. I am aware that the general consensus of modern critics is largely in favor of the view that Jesus expected a speedy cataclysm. After long study of the gospels I doubt this; but, in any case, it is clear that the great bulk of the synoptic teaching has to do with the

In approaching his scientific productions, Gastrow points out that Semler was extremely unsystematic in the presentation of his thoughts, but that, when they are collected and viewed in their proper relations, they are of exceptional worth and suggestiveness. He indicates his philosophical training and method of work, and treats in independent sections his biblical, historical, and dogmatic theology. Under these three heads he brings out by means of frequent quotations, and critically discusses, generally approvingly, Semler's free handling of both the Old and New Testaments; his distinction between the Bible as a whole and the "Word of God;" his theory of accommodation, and his critical treatment of the canon; the way in which he distinguishes between religion and theology, and between private and public religion; his tolerance, continued emphasis upon morality and desire to simplify theology for practical purposes, and the characterization of his own position as that of the "theology of experience set over against a *doctrinaire* dogmatism;" all of these are in the spirit of the most scientific theology of today. He characterizes him as the "creator of modern psychologically critical church history and the father of the history of dogma," although in his own dogmatic theology he is extremely "undogmatic because he is unsystematic." But though "a long way, it is nevertheless a straight line from Semler to Harnack. . . . Both men have grown upon the same stem and been cut from one piece of wood."

In his more practical writings, for the most part in the later period of his life, Semler has often been charged with having made a complete right-about-face. Eichhorn affirms this, but Gastrow denies it *in toto* upon the basis of Semler's own utterances. To the very last Semler insisted upon the right of free investigation and the free choice of one's religion. As a professor at Halle, however, and consequently a state official with the duty of teaching the tenets of a state religion, he felt it incumbent upon himself to be somewhat guarded at times in what he said. He denied that he purposed to change the teaching of the church, but did affirm that it was his intention to improve the preachers who were to fill the pastoral offices.

The strife between Semler and Lessing as the editor of the *Wolfenbüttel* fragments the author handles skilfully. The two men, while alike in their emphasis upon reason, in their familiarity with the sources, and interest in historical investigations, were different in their philosophical outlook and temper of mind, and in their attitude toward religion. Semler was early influenced by the deists of England. He was decidedly an empiricist, with almost no speculative ability. Lessing was influenced

more by the Leibnitzian philosophy and had considerable speculative power. Gastrow regards him as the "father of speculative theology." Again, the tendency of the *Aufklärung* was to substitute ethics for religion. Semler was thoroughly religious, and although he had appropriated the "best and noblest motives of the *Aufklärung*," he opposed Lessing sturdily when he thought that he through his publications was working injury to religion as a whole.

That either Lessing or Semler was a "rationalist in the usual derogatory sense of that word" Gastrow denies, and in one place rejects the title of "father of rationalism" often applied to the latter; but he does not object to giving him that epithet, if rationalism be understood as containing "certain positive, vigorous elements which originally characterized protestantism."

Lessing has been thoroughly studied, and because of the speculative character of theology during most of the nineteenth century his thoughts have been very influential. Semler's more critical turn of mind and lack of speculative interest bring him more into harmony with the theologians of this twentieth century. Gastrow especially commends the latter to the German churches of today.

At the end of the book is a brief bibliography of Semler's more important works, and of criticisms upon them and him.

Upon finishing the book one feels that there is little left to say. The treatment is thoroughly scientific, and the author is evidently in sympathy with Semler in his manifoldness and general outlook upon the field of theology, and possessed of sufficient discernment to grasp the main points and to present them with clearness and just enough of detail.

The way in which theological problems presented themselves to thoughtful men in the eighteenth century is well indicated by Zscharnack in his *Lessing und Semler*.² The pietism with which both came into contact, Semler more than Lessing, he treats rather fully, presents English deism at length, and shows its influence upon both. Semler was more a child of his time, in that he felt the many influences playing upon him, but could not thread the maze to a firm position. He was a union of contradictions. Lessing, however, though he equally valued reason, passed beyond the intellectual turmoil of his day to a position more conservative than Semler's—one, indeed, which the rationalistic branch of Pro-

² *Lessing und Semler: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Rationalismus und der kritischen Theologie*. Von Leopold Zscharnack. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. 384 pages. M. 10.

testantism has not yet reached. Consequently Lessing's work has value today even as in the last century.

In their theological parallel Zscharnack treats their relation to the canon, to church history, including the history of dogma, and their general religious and theological principles. "Semler was the first to criticise the canon upon the basis of worth." "Practical judgments of worth he used in studying both the Old and New Testament." "His method was right, since he sought not who wrote the Bible, but for whom it was written." "He appropriated Luther's attitude toward the canon." Lessing estimated, better than did Semler, the worth of the Bible for today, but the two were much alike in their conception of inspiration. Semler's church history, though developed psychologically, Zscharnack at times criticises severely; but his important relation to the history of dogma is recognized. He rates Lessing on some points as a better historian, partly because he was more systematic, partly because he was not so one-sided. Semler at times undervalued Luther, while Lessing raised him to a lofty pinnacle. Semler's emphasis upon history is evident throughout his dogmatics. Lessing, at first, like Semler, in method of work was an empiricist, but because of his greater speculative ability he distanced the latter in theoretical questions. Semler, indeed, thought he could dispense with philosophy in his critical investigations. "Lessing built the way that led to Schleiermacher and the restoration of faith." They both emphasized the ethical in religion, distinguished between religion and theology, and between public and private religion, and based religion upon experience, although here Lessing seems to have anticipated Semler. Lessing desired the union of all religions, while Semler opposed the union of the church. "Semler was an investigator within his study; Lessing was a man of the world."

The author presents in detail Lessing's relation to Reimarus and the controversy in which Semler became involved, together with Semler's opposition to Bahrdt and the question of his change of front after 1779, which he answers in the negative.

In his general estimate of the two men Zscharnack says that

both had the purpose to make the private religion of a Christian easier, to free the truth from one-sidedness and harmful influences. . . . Semler did not found a school, but gave an impetus to many in different departments of thought. . . . Lessing saw more clearly and more deeply, but was not so well trained as Semler in distinctively theological fields. . . . Semler was the pioneer of rationalism and critical theology. . . . In many respects Lessing surpassed Semler in importance. . . . The movement which Semler as practical theo-

gical critic in every department began, Lessing carried through with greater clearness and effectiveness.

Zscharnack's work is a critical, comparative discussion of Semler and Lessing rather than an exposition of either. An enormous amount of material is introduced from church history and the eighteenth century. The closeness of the comparison, while good, detracts from the unity of impression. As a reference-book for any special topic upon Semler, or upon Lessing in his theological activity, it will prove to be exceedingly valuable.

For many years it has been felt that the eighteenth-century thought in Germany has not been sufficiently investigated. These two works, the one by Gastrow and the other by Zscharnack, while in a measure supplementing each other, will help to illumine that period.

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This essay³ was awarded the first prize offered by the Karl Schwarz-Stiftung for the best discussion of Semler's significance for theology. It is appreciative of Semler's various and important services, yet not blind to his limitations, either those which he shared with his time or those which characterized his own mental and spiritual constitution.

Lessing is regarded by the author as the first theologian of the *Aufklärung*; the second is Semler. For Lessing he claims the superior grasp of principles; for Semler, the greater learning. Semler's thought was burdened by an intolerable style, while Lessing, as is well known, was master of a style both clear and vigorous. Karo points out Semler's indefinite and changeable conception of the essence of Christianity, and contrasts it with that conception which is expressed in *Nathan der Weise*.

It is admitted that Semler was more influential with the theologians of his day than Lessing was; but when one reviews his manifold services, especially in the sphere of biblical criticism and interpretation, and observes how many of the results of his investigations have become a part of the common fund of Christian knowledge; when one also considers how many principles, which he was the first to enunciate, have come to be regarded as commonplaces of biblical science, one is inclined to believe that his influence in the present, though his name, as the author says, is little known, may be more widespread and fruitful than that of Lessing.

³ *Johann Salomo Semler in seiner Bedeutung für die Theologie*. Von Gottwalt Karo. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1905. 116 pages. M. 3.

Semler was the first to distinguish clearly between religion and theology, and to give theology a subordinate place as compared with religion. He was the first to point out the textual importance of the Scripture quotations in the Fathers. More truly than anyone before him, he recognized the importance of discriminating between that which is local in the Bible and that which is essential. And he taught that, in order to make this discrimination, the biblical student should study the geography, chronology, and archæology of the Bible, and all history that was contemporary with the origin of the biblical books. He saw clearly and emphasized the importance of historical exegesis, and rendered great service in the introduction of a historical test of inspiration. Semler's best service to the departments of church history and dogmatics was indirect. It consisted in a more rational attitude toward the sources, not in any independent contributions of value.

Karo sums up his estimate of Semler's work in the following concrete form: "Without Semler's discrimination between religion and theology, there would have been no Schleiermacher, without his critical pioneer labor, no F. Chr. Baur."

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RECENT LITERATURE IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

In this little book¹ Sabatier attempts, as was his custom, a systematic application of the historical method to the study of religious beliefs and doctrines. He follows the idea of the atonement through its metamorphoses in Christian history. He rightly holds that the investigation of the inevitable transformations the idea has undergone is the safest way to criticise it objectively and scientifically. Moreover, a knowledge that the forms of the idea in the past have been temporary warns us against according immutability and finality to any form that may prevail among us today.

In the first part the author reviews the biblical conceptions: sacrifice, the ethical doctrines of the prophets, the gospel of Jesus, the Pauline theory of redemption, that of Hebrews, and the Johannine doctrine. In the second part the history of the ecclesiastical doctrine is traced: the Satan theory, the Anselmic theory, the Socinian criticism, and modern theories. All this is briefly but finely done—a brilliant example of the nature and fruitfulness of his method. His own conclusion is that the death of Christ is an essentially moral act, the significance and value of

¹ *The Doctrine of the Atonement and Religion and Modern Culture.* By the late Auguste Sabatier. Translated from the French by Victor Leuliette. New York: Putnam; London: Williams & Norgate, 1904. 228 pages.

which proceed solely from the spiritual life and the feeling of love which it reveals. Merit, satisfaction, sacrifice, oblation, propitiation, expiation, and ransom—these are all ideas that are pre-Christian and sub-Christian, and the time has come to cast them off as time-worn trappings. The drama of Calvary was a human historic drama, the proudest and most tragic in history; so view it, and we are once more among the realities of the moral life.

The last part of the book is an address on religion and modern culture. The principle of modern culture is *autonomy*, i. e., the unconquerable assurance of the human mind, in its present advanced state of development, that it possesses within itself the norm of its life and of its thought, with the deep-seated desire to realize itself by obeying its own law. In traditional religion we have the opposite principle of heteronomy, either of book or of church. The conflict is irrepressible, the issue inevitable, unless the modern world of science, philosophy, and morality collapse. The little book is one of insight and heroism, and is to be heartily commended to a thoughtful public in this time of transition and doubt.

In recent years Kalthoff, a brilliant and effective German pastor, while accepting the dissolution and disintegration of the ecclesiastical *Christusbild* on the part of liberal theologians, in turn administers a keen critical polemic against the historical Jesus whom said theologians are wont to exhibit as center and object of faith in place of the Christ of the church. A man who was simply a good Jew, with a few parables and pious proverbs, may not be properly worshiped as the ground and goal of the universe, nor erected into a final moral ideal for all the future, nor relied upon as the bringer of a supernatural redemption. Kalthoff goes farther, and even denies the historicity of Jesus, and sets forth syncretistically the sociological, philosophical, ethical, and religious origin of the Christ of the Bible.

Bousset's little book² is an attempt to refute the arguments of Kalthoff and to give a clear survey of the present state of *scientific* work upon the gospels. He first marshals the witnesses in favor of the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth: profane testimony, Paul, the synoptists, the fourth gospel, Papias, etc. Then he treats of the importance of the person of Jesus for the present. Is it not a matter of indifference to us whether a unitary personal power exists behind the mighty phenomenon of Christianity, back of this whole stream of life? Is not such an assumption questionable, as Kalthoff contends, for our religious life? Faith points

² *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* Von Wilhelm Bousset. Halle: Gebauer-Schwerschke' 1904. 79 pages. M. 1.

forever to the future; faith wills to create, form, acquire; it is a powerful, creative, active thing. Is not this constant looking backward, this life in recollection, this binding of self to a distant strange past, a hindrance and a danger to the peculiar nature of faith?

It must be admitted that these serious queries point to the crux of the problem. Bousset meets the difficulty as follows: The great creations of past *art*—do they not have a paralyzing, inhibiting effect on the creative joyousness and independence of the present generation? As a matter of fact, such has been the effect upon many periods of artistic life; i. e., all periods of one-sided classicism. And yet it would be the height of folly to devote our energy to secure the greatest possible emancipation from the great works and masters of past art. As with art, so with the religious life.} Neither art nor religion lives, like science, in thoughts that are self-upborne, self-developing. Art and religion, in an entirely different manner, are dependent upon their past. They live on the life of great past personalities, and the creations of these personalities. In its original power, art is nowhere but in the work and persons of great masters at whose fires the fire of a new life is kindled ever anew. Thus also religion exists primarily in the great regnant personalities of religious history, in lawgivers, prophets, founders of religions, and reformers. On the authority of religious history it may be confidently asserted that the foremost religions are those behind which, at the beginning of which, or in the midst of which great effective personalities stand. It is impossible to explain all those personalities as myths and creations of the constructive imagination, with Kalthoff; but even if it were possible, this impulse to personification, manifest at the very culminating points of religion, remains inexplicable and witnesses to the might of personality in religion. In this way the author reaches the conclusion that our life comes from the life of Jesus of Nazareth. But if this be true, then Jesus is not a dead, historical, past reality. He lives and is present. The life of the present is kindled by him. It is our fault if we have a mere authority-faith, and hang on the past. The stream of his life flows by; we are up-borne by that stream. And to the leader of our souls—whom we know as well as we need to know, we say: "Thou art the way, the truth, and the life."

Though there are problems unsolved, and questions not answered, and though Kalthoff has his point as to what the object of religious faith is, Bousset's book is able and timely, and points the way to a larger treatment of the subject.

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These titles³ cover a wide range, but each evidences the present interest in Christian doctrine. Mr. Wood states his theory of God and sin in a vigorous and clean-cut fashion. The theory is not so new as he seems to think it. Mr. Wishart treats central topics in a modern tone and with a distinctly religious purpose. He has not attempted dogmatic answers to the questions he proposes; rather, he sets himself to suggest the various points through which the line of our thinking must run, if it is to be valid. Accordingly, he does not impose conclusions upon his readers, but in general leaves the final questions open. The most vital and best-handled chapters are those dealing with religion and the church, and religion and Christ. The work is fresh in thought and modern in method, while its tone is that of positive and vital religion. Its small size precludes any detailed treatment of the themes brought forward, but it will prove of value to many who are adrift on the sea of theological trouble.

Mr. Adamson has given us a decidedly vital book. Of all our "moral options" that of belief or disbelief in God is the most alive. Yet the most enthusiastic must recognize a difference between the consciousness which he has of the divine, however vivid, and that which he has of the world of harder sense; he is free to claim the superior quality for this knowledge of God, as more immediate than his knowledge of the world; but at every turn in this divine knowledge he brings up against the undefinable, if not the unknowable. In this sense we all admit the unknowable. But when one ventures to spell it with a capital U, the religious enthusiast is apt to raise such a shout as was heard in the Ephesian theater in Paul's day. Now, for religious life, this Unknowable, this Transcendent is really a prime necessity. And so we welcome this book on the Lord's Supper. It is a relief, after contemplating the thirty thousand suns with their attendant planets, or indulging freely in the intricate statistics of modern psychology and child-study, to turn to a consideration of the mysterious ways of God with the soul.

For this is the gist of Mr. Adamson's book. True, he traces the history of the dogma in orderly and interesting fashion. But beyond this he restates the doctrine in modern and intelligible terms, and points out its practical significance.

³ *The Witness of Sin: A Theodicy.* By Nathan Robinson Wood. Chicago: Revell. 151 pages. \$1 net.

Primary Facts in Religious Thought. By Alfred Wesley Wishart. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. viii + 122 pages. \$0.75 net.

The Christian Doctrine of the Lord's Supper. By Robert M. Adamson. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner. xii + 288 pages. \$1.50 net.

In his restatement he looks at the rite in two ways—as a movement of the human toward the divine, and as a movement of the divine toward the human. Any human solemnity with truth and right feeling behind it may be amply justified. So viewed, the sacrament has apologetic value as related to the person of our Lord. “The atmosphere of the sacrament seems to induce feelings of adoration that amount to worship of Christ as divine.” It is also a means of public religious witness, of fellowship, of “overt obligation.” But the divine aspect of the matter is all in all. Our theory will hinge on our theology. The author insists that a supper enjoyed by the guests is something given by the host. “The real gift is the Lord Jesus Christ himself.” This gift is found “peculiarly real in the Supper.” No doctrine of Christ’s person and work but “is comprised in a full view of the Supper.” The supreme, though not the sole, informing idea, is the sacrificial death. The presence is real, spiritual, objective; in the sacrament, rather than in the elements. Emphasis is laid on the believer offering himself to God in communicating. This is a real “making sacred.”

Practically, the author pleads for child communion, for such a sane interpretation of unworthy communicating as will admit to the Supper all “duly affected with the appreciation of the want of it.” He calls attention to the Supper as working the grace of penitence, stimulating Christian living, and “softening the hard prose of modern life.” Instead of to creeds, he looks to the sacrament as the symbol and means of real unity throughout all Christendom. The book will repay careful reading, and, while many will not follow the author to the heights of the theory of the Supper, they will gain a sense of the certainty and value for many minds of the light which lies beyond our common day.

A valuable and interesting pamphlet⁴ on the subject of religious delusion comes from the pen of a man who has a practical rather than an academic interest in the subject. The author is concerned with the pastoral care of the deranged, and knows that in this care the best intentions without expert knowledge are ruinous as well as vain.

Religious delusion is treated as subjective in origin, proceeding from a general psychic derangement directed toward religious matters. It is accompanied by such inadequacy of the reasoning faculties that even the possibility of setting up a contradiction to correct and suppress the illusion is entirely lacking. The “fixed idea” is neither the cause nor the necessary consequence of the trouble, but only one sign of the general derangement.

⁴ *Die religiöse Wahnbildung: Eine Untersuchung.* Von Th. Braun. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1906. 4+74 pages. M. 1.

Such illusions dislocate the whole moral consciousness, permitting religious ecstasy and gross sensuality to coexist. Personal relations to God are wildly conceived, gloomy, blasphemously distorted, and generally unhealthy. Religion itself is not to be held responsible, any more than political science, for ordinary cases of megalomania. An overspun religiousness may aid the delusion-creating faculty. Pastoral care may accomplish much by avoiding religious excitements, and by taking advantage of intermissions in the illusions.

The fact that religious illusions work incompetence in the reason could be interestingly applied to the case of widespread religious delusions. These do not come within the scope of the book, which is in the main a report of observed cases, covering various forms of delirium and insanity. How these individual delusions grow into general, sometimes almost universal, ones, is a problem the material for answering which must be sought largely in the character of delusion itself. One element in the problem has always been that of conscience: how could one capable of leading such a delusive movement as Mormonism, Eddyism, or Dowieism, hold the doctrine without seeing its absurdities; or, if he saw the absurdities, how could he preach it with any impressive force? The incompetence of the reason to see the contrary, sometimes recognized and asserted on principle, as by Swedenborg, sometimes unrecognized, serves in part to suggest an explanation without resorting to the idea of conscious fraud, often entirely inadmissible. The subversion of the moral sense is also noteworthy, and the inadequacy of subjective illusions to nourish religious life opens a wide outlook into the region of objective revelation, and seems to insist on an objective basis for genuinely vital spiritual experiences.

Dr. Zenos, in a popular treatise⁵ on Christian ethics, shows full knowledge of his materials, and handles modern questions in a straightforward way, though undue space is given to the historic relations of the teachings of Jesus to Pharisaism. Thorough traditional orthodoxy lies at the basis of the treatment. The book is too scholastic in style to be as popular and practical as it should be.

Professor Mayer's presentation⁶ of the relations between Christianity and civilization is timely and suggestive. Three views are distinguished: The "mystico-ascetic" or "pietistic," which declines to see moral worth in ordinary life; the "mediæval," finding value in human development

⁵ *The Teaching of Jesus concerning Christian Conduct.* By Andrew C. Zenos. New York: American Tract Society, 1905. x+171 pages. \$0.75.

⁶ *Christentum und Kultur: Ein Beitrag zur christlichen Ethik.* Von E. W. Mayer. Berlin: Trowitz, 1905. viii+64 pages. M. 1.40.

only as it ministers directly to the service of the church; and the "Protestant-Lutheran," looking upon each agency of civilization—farming, mechanics, art, science, whatever it may be—as of worth in itself even without regarding the church—"this is what God will have from these things." As the pietistic view, in its opposition to this, is based upon the supposed authority of Jesus and the New Testament, the inquiry turns on the ethical conceptions of Jesus. His fundamental conception is found in the law of love, looked upon as a "strong intention," which in its legitimate development constantly urges into activity for mankind. It is this spirit of love and service which Christianity would put behind all civilized activities.

The relationship between Christianity and civilization is in general an indirect one, governed by the Christian character of those engaged in the world's work. This character shows itself involuntarily and often unconsciously. The business of the Christian is not to separate himself from art, philosophy, or politics, but to know all of the world's work as good, "since faith and love may stand back of all." Yet more than even statesmanship is needed in the world, for the state as such can never establish faith and love. "We in Germany expect too much from the state. The last and highest aims of Christian moral activity it cannot make real." To arouse and direct these ideals is the special business of the church, which ought to and can realize them by preaching the gospel of "benevolence and conciliation." "All can but wish again and again that the church, the religious community itself, should more and more take in hand this task of the friendly helper." Whatever rearrangement this would require, men dare not refrain from working out.

Christianity thus cannot stand off from civilization nor deny validity to it, and still find for itself any real place in the world. Pietism gives up the fight, and lets the world go on its way, not indeed without protest, but without availing protest, and to the common loss. Mediævalism, seeking to exalt the church, really shrinks the world which is the field of the church, and so limits the church itself. The view which gives real worth to the world apart from the church gives likewise to the church a real task—the business of kindling on the hearth of the house which civilization builds the vital flame of love and faith. No other agency can do this, without which all other gains are worthless and the house is cold.

The unity of modern life is shown by the accuracy with which Professor Mayer's treatment of the German situation fits the American one. Perhaps we do not look for so much from the state, yet socialism is growing in America. But there is a widespread feeling that education, wealth, or perhaps what corresponds here to Kipling's "standing luck of the British

army," will see us through without the interference of faith and love. And our churches, too, need, and desire, a baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, a baptism of genuine benevolence, and of a real desire to conciliate as well as to convert men. For true success, the faith of the church must stand close behind the common activities by which the world grows, ministering inspiration.

HENRY M. BOWDEN.

SOUTH EGREMONT, MASS.

Professor Mead has undertaken to discuss⁷ some of the fundamental problems of theology with a view to making clear the ground upon which a sensible, reverent, and thoughtful Christian of the present day can stand. His logic is characteristically keen, his thought and style admirably direct and lucid. The theological position is that of evangelical common-sense, nowhere concerned to square its statements with the scholastic theologians or the more metaphysical statements of the church creeds, but loyally accepting the New Testament doctrine and the testimony of the faith of the Christian centuries. His book is well adapted to clarify the reader's mind; parts of it present by their sharp affirmations and denials a serviceable stimulus to reflection, while other parts will move the heart by their fulness of warm Christian feeling.

The "irenica" character of the discussion comes from the fundamental position of the book, that the world of Christian thought, like the world of natural science, possesses a series of facts, which abide even though they cannot be wholly understood. The attempts of men to understand them are theological theories, all of them inadequate to express the truth which they aim to explain. The wise believer will not reject doctrines which are unsatisfactory, provided they are the best attainable statement of positive truth. As the author repeatedly says, his "main purpose is to illustrate the fact that antithetic, and even apparently irreconcilable, religious conceptions are often to be regarded, not as mutually exclusive, but rather as needing to be combined, in order to express the fulness of the body of truth that is to be found in the oracles of God and in the Christian life." This attitude is, of course, not new, but it is here wrought out with freshness and vigor.

Professor Mead begins with a series of noteworthy illustrations from physical science—antithetic conceptions of matter and energy, idealism and materialism, mind and body— which serve to show that the method of

⁷ *Irenic Theology: A Study of Some Antitheses in Religious Thought.* By Charles Marsh Mead. New York and London: Putnam, 1905. xii + 375 pages.

thought proposed is applicable and necessary elsewhere than in theology. From these he proceeds to the conception of God, and to the problem of human freedom. It is evident that here his method is especially appropriate. The moral argument for free will is particularly well stated. With the problem of evil and of original sin the discussion comes nearer to this world, and increases in interest. Here and in the chapter on the relation of human and divine agency in sanctification one who has been puzzled to unite divergent inclinations to Augustinianism and Arminianism may find genuine help. The discussion of the problem of evil is very good; that of sin is rather less satisfactory. Calvin and Wesley are frankly told that "both are right in their affirmations and wrong in their negations, but that it is impossible to see how the antithetic positions can be fully harmonized with one another."

The deity of Christ is presented, and argued for in an able chapter, as a fundamental fact; and then follows an interesting and clear discussion of the various theories of the divine-human person, which gives opportunity for many wise and sound remarks. The last two chapters relate to "The Work of Redemption," and contain an excellent and convincing criticism of the satisfactional and governmental theories of the atonement, brought both from the side of rational (or ethical) and of exegetical considerations. The treatment of the use of the death of Christ in the epistles of the New Testament, while brief, is excellent. Professor Mead here develops more fully than is his wont in other chapters his own positive view, which he calls the "paternal" theory, and which is in truth merely that set forth in the gracious parables of the gospels. He presents it from a full heart, with true insight into the meaning of the gospel of Christ; and the latest pages of the book add a grateful element of positive construction to the critical analysis which mainly occupies the early portions.

The book is a contribution to critical theology of seriousness and worth, and is adapted to render useful service to many students, younger as well as older. It treats of high themes in a worthy manner, with unfailing concern for clearness of thought, tolerance of divergent opinion, and inclusive recognition of the many-sidedness of truth.

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In answer to the cry of the positive religious party in his country, that we must go back to the biblical Christianity, Professor Lüdemann⁸ raises
 8 *Biblical Christianity*. By Herrmann Lüdemann. Translated by Maurice A. Canney. London: Owen & Co., 1906. 82 pages. 2s.

this important and timely question: What is biblical Christianity? If biblical Christianity is just ancient Christianity, then the modern man must reject it; for the religious ideas of Jesus and Paul, of the gospel of John, and of the epistle to the Hebrews are bound up with an antiquated dualism and an ancient view of the world. But if we make the proper discrimination between theology and religion, then biblical Christianity can still meet the needs of the modern man. Lüdemann finds the essence of the Christian religion to consist in a morality—a love for men—based upon a firm and inward conviction of the love of God for men. It is the fundamental Christian idea that only he who has attained union with God can overcome sin. This essence of the Christian religion can be plainly discovered in the Scriptures, and is inalienably connected with the personality of Jesus Christ, which is presented without invention and without disfigurement.

One may differ with some of the interpretations of Professor Lüdemann, but it would be difficult to state with more force and clearness, and at the same time with such brevity, the religious problem that has been forced upon us through the modern critical and historical study.

One of the results of the modern psychological point of view in the investigation of religion is seen in the recognition of the fact that the doctrine of inspiration of the Scriptures—which means that the text was inspired by the Holy Spirit—contains an element of truth that is not set aside by the usual arguments.⁹ It is this truth that the zealous defenders of this doctrine feel even when they hold fast to a statement involving manifold inconsistencies and contradictions. For, of course, when taken as a literal and external process, this doctrine is false; but then, like all other religious ideas, this is not to be conceived as an outer process. Religious ideas are the direct product of feeling, possessing a poetic and symbolic character, and cannot be brought under the categories of the understanding, such as unity and multiplicity, time and space. It cannot be said that they lack reality; for, by an idealistic theory of knowledge, durability and universality are the tests of reality. The inspiration of the Scriptures means virtually the same as the revelation of the Scriptures, but it determines more closely the peculiar relation in which the Christian Scriptures stand to the monotheistic revelation perfected in Christ.

The chief criticism to the thesis herein set forth is the extreme dualism between religious and scientific knowledge. The language of piety is poetic and symbolic, and there is no doubt that back of the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures there is a feeling of their worth for the

⁹ *Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft und Inspiration der heiligen Schrift*. Von L. Kessler. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. 102 pages. M. 2.20.

religious life. But the elaboration of the ideas of religious feeling is the work of the understanding, and must have regard for the logical character of thought; and it is the task of the theologian to express the value behind the doctrine of inspiration in such a way that it will not do violence to the other facts of life.

All men today are interested to know what is "the evangel of the new theology."¹⁰ It would be difficult to have a volume of sermons from one pen in which the moral, social, and spiritual significance of the new theology could be more clearly recognized and more simply expressed. There are twenty sermons in this book, covering widely different aspects of the religious life, but all treated from a central point of view. In the author's sermons on the new theology and Unitarianism we find these statements:

Trinitarian and Unitarian are words that stand for a dead controversy from the point of view of the new theology. . . . It was the doctrine of the Trinity, with all its logical absurdity, that saved the essence of religion for the Christian world until the arrival of the new theology. . . . The present theological change does not in the first instance concern Jesus Christ, but is a radical fundamental change in our conception of God. The point of difference between the new theology and the old is not at all the same as between the old Trinitarian and the old Unitarian. The latter is concerned with the relation of Jesus to God; the former, with the relation of God to the world.

W. C. KEIRSTEAD.

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RECENT BOOKS CONCERNING IMMORTALITY

The work¹ elucidates rather than establishes the resurrection. In method, the trail of the sermon is over it all. But modern works on the subject are well recognized, and the position of modern philosophy, while very briefly presented, is stated with clearness and in good perspective. The treatment of modern science is neither so clear nor so vital. Harnack's view, distinguishing between the Easter faith and the Easter message, is treated at some length, and the author will "not quarrel with one who" gains comfort from that faith. But he does very much quarrel with the faith, and grounds his whole conviction of the significance of Christianity on the Easter message. "The order of thought in regard to Christianity is not that the faith in a living Savior produced a belief that he rose from the dead, but that the rising from the dead produced the

¹⁰ *The Evangel of the New Theology*. By T. Rhondda Williams. London: Percy Lund, Humphries, 1905; imported by Scribner. 266 pages. \$1.50 net.

¹ *The Life Everlasting: Studies in the Subject of the Future*. By David Purves. Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner. x+265 pages. \$1.50 net.

belief in a living Christ." A large gap between the argument from the empty grave and that for the spiritual body seems to be entirely unsuspected by the author.

Just because the main characteristic of Dr. Crothers' work² is his poetic imagination, the philosophic influence which shapes his little book is the more noteworthy. Passages such as that on p. 19 show less the direct influence of Professor James than the extent to which the philosophy of the Harvard professor represents the common thought of the day. The book is a healthful consideration of a universally interesting topic, presenting old and familiar matter with clearness and suggestiveness.

HENRY M. BOWDEN.

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Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, of the University of Leipzig, and at present lecturing in this country in exchange with Professor Peabody, has published in this little volume his Ingersoll lecture recently delivered at Harvard University.³ The chief value of this work is in showing the attitude which the scientifically trained mind tends to take to those problems where the clear principles and positive methods of the physical sciences do not obtain. A philosophic student may hold the conclusion of this professor, but I doubt if he would be brought to it by the argument of this work.

Throughout the discussion there is the constant application of categories which are derived purely from the physical sciences and are not applicable to this problem. One wonders why a specialist on physics is called to lecture upon a problem in another realm. The terms "memory," "energy," and "individuality," which are so important in the discussion, are derived and carried over from the realm of physics without a proper consideration of the difference between that realm from which they were taken and that in which they are now employed.

"The possession of memory means that all living matter is so changed by any process that goes on in it that a repetition of the same process becomes easier, or occurs sooner, or takes place more quickly, than any other process." Now, this seems to me to be a definition of the plasticity of matter, the physical correlate of memory, but not a definition of the psychic act called memory. The author's concept of energy is derived from the relations between spatial phenomena, and then, ignoring the geometrical element, is

²*The Endless Life*. By Samuel McChord Crothers. (The Ingersoll Lecture, 1905.) Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 55 pages. \$0.75.

³*Individuality and Immortality*. By Wilhelm Ostwald. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1906. 74 pages. \$0.75.

applied to the psychic life. But at the present time we are not able to form an intelligible concept of energy under which we can subsume both physical and psychical energy, and we certainly cannot carry over the concept obtained in the one sphere to the other. In his treatment of individuality this error is even more apparent. He ignores the peculiar character of personality according to which it "diffuses itself" to enrich and develop its own individuality. I doubt his application of, and deduction from, the term "individuality" as applied to the physical realm; for in the concept of the atom a certain static element is necessary in order for it to serve the purpose for which it is used. What he seems to do is to make the concept of energy ultimate for his science. But is energy the only ultimate concept for physics? If so, then it must contain a static element; and when it is made a philosophical category and brought out of its special realm, an antinomy will arise. That is virtually what Professor Ostwald does in this volume. He brings out the dynamic element in the concept of energy and denies permanence or individuality. But then, would it not be possible, starting from the static element, to deny the possibility of relations? After all, do we not have here what Kant told us long ago, that if we conceive the soul as substance, that is, according to the categories of physics, we have an insoluble antinomy? Apart from this method of procedure, I do not think Professor Ostwald does justice either to the moral or the religious value of the doctrine of immortality.

A little volume on immortality by the late Professor Fechner⁴ was first published in 1835, but, after nearly a lifetime spent in philosophic thinking, was revised by him in 1887. It is interesting to notice that during that time his mind had undergone no appreciable change on this important subject. Our author never raises a doubt regarding the reality of life after death, but in a very speculative and scholastic manner seeks to describe the character of the future existence. It is interesting to contrast this book with the Ingersoll lecture of Professor Ostwald, especially when we remember that both these men wrote when occupying the chair of physics in the University of Leipzig. Does the change in attitude indicate the tendency of scientific thought?

W. C. KEIRSTEAD.

ROCKFORD, ILL.

THE MESSAGE OF THE MODERN PULPIT

Everywhere the religious world is being stirred to new questioning. The restlessness is not confined to any one communion or to any one land.

⁴ *Life after Death*. From the German of Gustaf Theodore Fechner. Translated by Hugo Wernecke. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. 134 pages.

Germany and Italy, France and England, Russia and America, are hearing voices crying out in discontent with the older forms of religious teaching, and asking: "Who will show us any good?" To many these wayward doubtings seem nothing but a wicked discontent, and an impious questioning of things eternally sure. To others they portend the welcome overthrow of all religious organizations, and the wholesome freedom from past restraints. But the note of the intellectual life of today is the historic spirit, and surely no honest student of history, who has seen religion under a thousand forms mold all ages of the world, and prove herself again and again a transforming force unequalled in power and influence, can really imagine that religion is passing away with belief in witchcraft or the faith in a seven days' creation of the world! He who faces the religious doubt of today has at hand the evidence of the ever-living force of the religious life. There is more honest religion in the vague but fearless questioning of healthy-minded average college boys today than in the sleepy, conventional conformity men have all too often stupidly mistaken for devotion.

But this doubt cannot be put off with formal creed or cut and dried phrases. The religious message of today must stand before the bar of a personal experience, and be accepted or rejected as it links itself with the vital needs of humanity struggling for a new life and a higher freedom. On the writer's table lie a number of books, seemingly almost chosen at random, seeking to deal more or less directly with the great problem: What is the religious message of today?

The first we take up is ambitiously called *Eternal Elements in the Christian Faith*,¹ by a minister of the Free Kirk favorably known to students of Wesley by his account of John Wesley and Whitefield in Scotland. There is much in the book that is both true and well said. It starts from the conviction that man is a religious being, and, after a rather rhapsodical statement of the relation of Jesus Christ to God, enters upon the discussion of Christ in the various experiences of repentance, faith, love, and prayer. To the ripe and thoughtful Christian, who can separate for himself the chaff from the wheat, the message will have power; to the doubt of today it has no relation, and to nine out of ten of the troubled souls in a modern congregation the message would have no meaning. The message is hopelessly burdened by pious but doubtfully useful assertion. What does the author mean by, "The Christian religion is the final religion for man?" Does he mean by "Christian religion" Roman Catholicism, Greek Christianity, or modern middle-class Protestantism? He says: "Christianity is

¹ *Eternal Elements in the Christian Faith*. By Dulgald Butler. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferries, 1905. 188 pages. 2s. 6d., net.

Christ, and Christ is Christianity." What does he mean? Is it the Christ of the synoptic gospels, or the risen Christ of Paul, or the Logos Christ of Johannine experience? These are questions that thrust themselves on the minds of thinking readers, and pious rhapsody is not an answer. The uncritical deference to the early stages of the Christian organization works mischief. It is simply not true to say, as our author asserts on p. 83, that "the early Christian missionaries did not destroy the old temples of pagan worship," but "consecrated them to the service of the pure faith," and that their method was "evolution not revolution, a cleansing and not a destruction of the sanctuary." All too soon the old Catholic church began her series of perilous compromises with paganism, Greek, Roman, and barbarian, but it was the unconscious or subconscious conformity to the world in the interests of a new and dangerous confusion of ecclesiastical imperialism with Christian purpose. The same lack of historical discrimination marks such a statement as this on p. 99: "It was the unique glory of the Reformation that it rediscovered Christ and separated his person from the superstitions which the centuries had gathered." Surely on no field was the Reformation less active than on that of Christology. One thinks at once of the painful confusions of Lutheranism and the uncritical acceptance of Chalcedon confusions by Calvin. No doubt the author really has in mind the activities of the Pietistic revival, with its companion wave of feeling in the evangelical revival of England. But whether evangelicalism has given us advances in Christology over the scholastic statements will be gravely disputed alike in Princeton and in Berlin.

We do not know for whom these pages are meant, but for the doubt of today they have little healing, although the convinced Christian may be stirred to devotional feeling by them; and the form and the rhetoric suggest that they had their origin in the devotional meeting.

Very different is the type of teaching given in *The Atonement and Modern Thought*.² According to the introduction, the theory defended received "its first really fruitful treatment" when Anselm gave it its form "and laid down for all time the general lines on which the atonement must be conceived, if it is to be thought of in accordance with Scripture," and yet we are told that this is "the heart of the gospel" and "the keystone of the Christian system" (p. x). As a simple matter of fact, what the author and his introducer have in common is the faith in the finality of

² *The Atonement and Modern Thought*. By Junius B. Remensnyder. With an Introduction by Benj. Warfield. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society, 1905. 253 pages. \$1.00.

churchly authority when it formulates dogma, and the identification of dogma with Christianity. However Dr. Remensnyder may regard himself, he is really on the side of Rome and not of Luther. No wonder he finds the formula of Vincent "the most judicious and safe for human guidance, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*" (p. 156). And with delightful simplicity he asserts: "No doctrine of Christianity is capable of more precise statement than the atonement" (p. 38). How sad, then, that even Dr. Warfield must confess that the two historical types of thinking, the Lutheran and Reformed, "do not see quite eye to eye in all matters that concern even this central doctrine of Christianity" (p. ix). The book is well-intended, but is hopelessly entangled in scholastic methods of thought that have no meaning for the modern questioner of dogmatic Christianity. What, for instance, does he mean when he says, "Reason exercises the natural alone," and that "Christianity accordingly stands or falls with the supernatural" (p. 21)? If he means by "supernatural" "the magic," surely all sensible men will take issue with him; if he means by the word the "transcendent" then surely hundreds will have no quarrel with the statement, but it will have for them little significance. The word "supernatural" is today, without definition, meaningless. In true Roman Catholic fashion, faith, according to Dr. Remensnyder, is the demand that "the church's doctrines" be accepted (p. 23). But which "church," and which of her statements? There is absolutely no consensus of opinion on any single important doctrine in the alleged Christian system.

The doctrine of the atonement is a fine illustration. Not even Dr. Remensnyder and Professor Warfield can quite see eye to eye. And it is not the wicked perverseness of the "pupils of Ritschl" and the "shallowness of an overcome rationalism" that have made the Anselmic theory of atonement a vain message from the modern pulpit, but the entire change in men's fundamental thought about justice and suffering and God. The great problem of the ages is, and always has been: Why do the innocent suffer with and for the guilty? The Anselmic answer was built up on the Roman-Germanic conception of "*wehrgeld*." It was profoundly rationalistic. The few quotations from the Bible are mere illustration and not proofs. With the passing of the legal conceptions with which it was linked has passed what Dr. Remensnyder thinks he thinks is the "heart of the gospel." The teaching of Jesus involved no elaborate discussion of how a father could forgive a son. The prodigal came home and was forgiven. The Samaritan woman did not have to go with sacrifice either to Jerusalem or to Gerizim. The moment we think of God seriously as

Father, most of the legal and commercial "theories of the atonement" have lost all their significance, and the reason that "our modern theorists are never weary of ringing the changes on this single fundamental idea" is because Jesus taught it long ago, and today men are going back from the evangelical revival to the Reformation, and from the Reformation to Augustine, and from Augustine to Paul, and even from Paul appealing to Jesus. The Anselmic theory throws no light on the problem of innocent suffering, and the faith in a Father's love in no way challenges the justice of the Father. The awfulness of sin is just in its unalterable character. The forgiveness of the Father cannot restore the lost property and give back to the prodigal son his years of misspent time. It was enormously important for the ecclesiastical imperialism, that called herself the church and formulated the dogmatic system which Drs. Warfield and Remensnyder still identify with Christianity, to defend her message that she could enable men to escape the consequences of their sin. True repentance does not seek to escape primarily the consequences of sin, but to escape sin. The power of the Roman Catholic organization was built up on artificial penalties for sin and artificial ways of escape from these penalties.

The essence of Dr. Remensnyder's book is Roman Catholicism pure and simple. From it therefore, alas, we gather little inspiration or guidance in seeking the message of the pulpit to a sin-ridden world.

What strikes us as most discouraging in the writings of those who would build up again the waste places by going back to external authority, whether of pope or church or creed, is the complete ignoring of real problems by which Christian reconstruction is faced. These are in effect the same whether in England or Germany or America, although of course local circumstances change often the form of their expression. In *Wie predigen wir dem modernen Menschen*³ the author seeks to deal with the problem of the modern pulpit by a careful examination of the motives that move men and the appeals that comfort them. He begins by an analysis, careful and scholarly, though not always equally satisfactory, of the messages of the New Testament. He begins with the Jesus of the synoptic gospels, and closes with the Johannean literature. Perhaps his analysis of Paul is the least satisfactory, and his analysis of the message of Jesus himself the best, of these useful studies. He then proceeds to deal with the man, particularly with the "average" man, in the way he finds himself moved to good or evil. There is no quarrel with the method of the book, but the categories under which men are thus dealt with are insufficient, and the

³ *Wie predigen wir dem modernen Menschen?* Von F. Niebergall. Tübingen: Mohr, second edition, 1905. 180 pages, Part I. M. 3.

psychology, although correct as far as it goes, is too simple an outline to be of really practical help. When the positive message is reached, it again is phrased too much in the devotional (*erbaulichem*) style of the Lutheran pulpit to make much impression, at least, upon the restless, practical Anglo-Saxon. The content of the message is good and undisputed. Indeed, that is just the difficulty—it is commonplace! So that, although the volume may prove useful as indicating the need for, and the method of, a careful analysis by every preacher of the task before him, it can hardly be called a help of the first order in formulating the message of today.

A much more thorough examination of the psychological questions involved in the appeal of religion to the thinking man is found in *Die Religion, ihre psychischen Formen und ihre Zentralidee*.⁴ The writer has a fair mastery of the German literature of his subject, but is either ignorant of or ignores much of the French and English work along this line of inquiry. And this greatly to the disadvantage of his treatment, which is one-sided, theoretical, and academic. The discussion begins with an examination of the essence of religion, and then proceeds to the question of inborn religion in the older dogmatic sense and in the abstracter sense of Hegel or Caird. In these two senses he subjects the term to criticism, but then proceeds along Kantian lines to inquire what in general the relation is between inborn and acquired elements in the mental life. The conclusion reached (p. 53) is that the organization of the mental life is inherited, but that the content is dependent upon immensely variable elements of the outward life—a conclusion neither very new nor startling.

Turning to the question of religion, he determines that religion belongs in the content of the acquired experience. The organization of the mental life is formally summed up in thought, feeling, and will, and in none of these will the author confine religion. But he regards religion as neither inborn nor springing by necessity from the human mental constitution, but consisting in positive mental content, gradually acquired in contact with the outer world and handed down from generation to generation (p. 58).

The next section is a serious and useful criticism of Schleiermacher, and in unqualified acceptance of the unity of the psychological process. The conclusion is reached that religion is predominantly, but not exclusively, related to feeling. The criticism of Kant's position (p. 82) rests upon a too narrow conception of the conventional construction of Kant's ethics. It is true that Kant has laid himself open to this construction, but only because Kant was not true to his fundamental doctrine of relativity when

⁴ *Die Religion, ihre psychischen Formen und ihre Zentralidee*. Von Karl Girgensohn. Leipzig: Deichert, 1903. 218 pages. M. 4.

he came to ethics. Then, like so many, he wished to get religion free from the vague responsibilities of relativity. To get a Kantian ethics we must reconstruct it on the basis of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, and then the relation of his ethics to religion becomes clear. The criticism of our author is correct so far as he goes, but he does not go far enough. He seeks (p. 99) to remove contradictions in Kant which are simply there. Kant was not self-consistent. He did at times identify practical reason and the will, and again he includes distinct intellectual elements. But the fault was with Kant's fundamental psychology, and cannot be explained away. The main thesis of our author may be accepted, in which the secret of all religion—we would say religious advance—consists in the process by which new religious content is transferred from the intellectual acceptance to the primacy in the practical reason (in Kant's sense).

The discussion of value-judgments is interesting, but seems to us defective. We have no space for an elaborate discussion, but as between Reischle and the author we cannot but regard Reischle as fundamentally correct. The difference between subjective and objective value made by our author is too sharp and unreal.

From this the author passes to a discussion of the relation of religion to pleasure and pain theories, and to the theory of self-maintenance. Here again the knife must go deeper. In using such words as "wishes and needs" of men as a basis for religion, it must be asked: In what sense? The author seeks to show that religion cannot spring from the "wishes and needs" of men (p. 190), but from a mysterious power which produces in men the religious ideas, and causes them to work upon the feeling and the will. But here two separate regions, or rather several points of view, are brought into artificial contrast. The "wishes and needs" of men have themselves as mysterious an origin as the religious ideas. That religious ideas are related to the needs and wishes of men the author sees clearly, and that that relation is sometimes causal need startle no one. The needs and wishes of men are as divine a source as "a mysterious power," and indeed as mysterious a source as even our author could himself wish for. We fear that our author is still haunted by the ghost of a false dualism between natural and supernatural. But two things stand out as positive attainments from these two books. First, the pulpit of today must understand the psychological situation. The great artist-preacher does this by intuition; the humbler ones of us must study carefully and learn from the interpretive artists of our day. And, secondly, the connection between religion and ethics must become so vital that they can be practically measured in terms one of the other.

For we live in stirring times, and the old parental authority of a teaching, ecclesiastical machine is, for a vast number of the best minds, gone forever. In Germany there are, as in all lands, curious contrasts. On the one hand, nowhere has intellectual freedom and the scientific method wrought such complete havoc with traditionalism. On the other, the semi-feudal system has persisted with such force that the dogmatic Lutheranism of a past generation still exercises a most considerable authority even in the schools of the land. Hence the religious instruction which is insisted upon is a constant source of friction and anxiety. The average Lutheran pastor, the moment he enters the pulpit, is conventionally orthodox, and many are intolerantly narrow. But a growing number are taking modern theology seriously, and asking: Why are the working classes so completely estranged from the church, in the cities at least; and why does the intellect of the nation so largely hold aloof from its ecclesiastical activities?

The answer is being given in various ways. Among those most active in seeking to make the intellectual positions of the universities a force in the public religious life is Professor Dr. O. Baumgarten, whose work has been peculiarly distasteful to the extreme conservative party, because his eloquence, enthusiasm, and religious zeal are beyond dispute and have influenced many of the younger men. One of his books, *Neue Bahnen*,⁵ with the sub-title, "Instruction in the Christian Religion in the Spirit of Modern Theology," gives the main purpose of the book. The whole work is interesting, but much concerns only those interested in the catechetical instruction given in Germany. The book is a collection of lectures given at the university during the summer half-year, and especially designed for teachers in the public and high schools.

The critical part is an indictment of the religious instruction of the present day, and although in detail it does not quite fit our own American condition, in general we suffer under the same evils here portrayed. Quite rightly he charges Protestantism in general with the demanding from children views of life possible only with older and well-tried souls. Baumgarten puts this down to the excessive influence of Paul upon Protestant thinking, and there is some force in the charge. Paul is pre-eminently the adult's teacher, yet Augustine is perhaps far more to blame. To this day we read Paul through the pessimistic dualistic shadows that clouded Augustine's religious vision. His superb religious genius and the long experience of the world of darkest death have given him a place in fighting individualistic Protestantism that makes the very seriousness

⁵ *Neue Bahnen*. Von O. Baumgarten. Seventh ed. Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1903. 120 pages. M. 1.20.

with which an earnest man takes religion a hindrance to simple, childlike joy in life and God. Protestantism must go back to the period of Jesus' teaching that preceded the Cæsarean episode. There is a time to laugh religiously as well as to weep religiously, and the time of weeping should not be childhood's days. The bridegroom is soon enough taken away from us; then we must weep. Protestantism was born amidst fierce fightings, and the shadows of Luther's cloister and Calvin's exile are still over us. In the early days of Jesus we must find the antidote.

And terribly true is his charge that the organized church and school instruction cross the path of nearly every intelligent boy and girl, either to offend by their traditionalism or to be ignored as altogether apart from life. In many cases there is a nominal and conventional acceptance on authority of positions that are held merely because they have no vital place in the mental structure. The moment there is a serious challenge the whole superstructure goes, and with it much that is extremely precious. In Germany as with us many a young man with a warm religious purpose and high gifts has devoted himself to the kingdom purpose of Jesus. He goes full of zeal to college or theological school. Now he has been taught, by teacher, parent, and preacher, that the kingdom purpose is wrapt up in the acceptance of Bible inspiration in literalness, of wonders, of all sorts of by-products of the religious past. Suddenly he plunges into the historical-critical instruction of the modern intellectual world, and with miracle, dogma, and verbal inspiration goes also his zeal for the kingdom. How could it be otherwise? Carefully these things have been made part and parcel of that purpose. Drs. Warfield and Remensnyder tell him that to be a full Christian and a suitable proclaimer of Christ's kingdom he must accept the mediæval theory which, rightly or wrongly, these gentlemen confess themselves, is rejected by a great and increasing number of Christian thinkers. Simply because the young fellow is Christian, he chooses intellectual sincerity, and drops away from what he is taught is Christianity. Yet our older men and women look on such teachers as "safe," and not likely to "disturb the faith" of our sons and daughters. "I can't go quite as far as our preacher," an intelligent man said to the writer, of one who had been vigorously denouncing everybody who rejected a seven-day creation, "but I deem him a safe teacher for our younger members." That man's own son was scoffing at the Bible behind his father's back as a book of idle tales which his college classroom had long exploded. Safe teacher! The dull, lazy ecclesiastician that crucified Jesus, would have burned Luther, and has not today the mental vigor to doubt with the hard-pressed skeptic, is the unsafest leadership the young could have!

Happily Baumgarten does not simply dwell on the defects of the conventional orthodoxy, so called. The positive message he sketches with firm hand. Rightly he sees that the modern theology must recover values lost in the critical work of the last decade of struggle for the right to be heard. We in America must not be content with negative and successful criticism of the past. The world about us is not the kingdom of God. Who of us dares to claim that we walk in the full freedom of divine sonship? Yet until that time, struggle, repentance, the overcoming of sin and selfishness within and without must be our task and our message.

Most admirably does Professor Baumgarten formulate the relation of the message to the individual and social organism. The social organism is our larger self. In its life and in its losses, its gains and its glories, the young should be taught to find their higher and truer souls. Only so can Protestantism shake off the narrow and selfish ethics of individual reward and punishment which makes such havoc in our American communal life.

Nor is Professor Baumgarten's demand unreasonable (p. 37) that on principle all metaphysical elements should be omitted from the religious instruction of the young. He sees that certain minds must face the metaphysical questions. But Jesus did not deal with them, and what he could afford to ignore we should not insist upon.

The third part deals with matter that less concerns us. But it is interesting to note how much more thorough and systematic the religious teaching of Germany is than with us. The division of the material over the various years suggested by Professor Baumgarten would be impossible for us in the United States, simply because we cannot count upon so many years of systematic instruction.

Very wholesome do we deem the protest (p. 96) against an evil under which the Lutheran pulpit seems to suffer more than does ours; namely, the constant appeal to feeling and sentiment in the *erbaulicher* sermon. Rightly does our author demand an appeal to the intelligence as a part of the process of edification. As long as the pulpit was thought of as the channel of *quasi* inspired instruction, great care had to be taken to preserve the unity of opinion, so often confused with unity of faith. Now, however, those of us who preach can afford to stir up differences of opinion. We are primarily Protestants, and the pulpit can and does err. We can count upon the common sense of our hearers, and even at the risk of being wrong give them something of our inner thought. As Baumgarten says (p. 97): "The sermon must become more manly and stouter in its entire bearing; it must have the signs of frame and sinew of distinct view, and less generalization in feeling and sentiment." For men

are asking profound and important questions. But we dare not leave them to the daily press, the weekly paper, the review, or the passing literature to find there an answer. The pulpit has its distinct place and important power. Men may say as they please; the pulpit probably never had a better chance than today to deserve well of man and God.

In all the books we have so far passed in hasty review the present intense interest in religion is a matter of note. Publishers see this and give a large place to a certain type of religious books. Before us lies a typical example of this interest in a religious world-view.⁶ The volume is dedicated "to the memory of Herbert Spencer, the first true reconciler of religion and science;" and, in spite of both title and dedication, the book is worth reading. It proceeds along the lines which are laid down in Fiske's interpretation of Spencer, and seeks to build up out of cosmic and experimental elements a religious world-view. For the author there has not been any "'revelation' except that of human experience" (p. 99), but he goes on to say: "There are forms of experience in which the sense of dependence on a 'Power not ourselves' is especially prominent in consciousness" (p. 99). With perfect justice he then remarks (p. 128): "The revelation of experience, then, gives us no justification for asserting a creator, a beginning of the universe or an end." This is very true, but the main cause of complaint against the message of such a book as the *Cosmic Philosophy* or the one in hand is that it again seeks to build up a religious life on cosmology and metaphysics, and even though the cosmology is the latest science and the metaphysics the most rational monism, these things have no primary place with real religion in the religious consciousness. Some religious men must have a cosmogony, and they will insist upon a world-view as unitary as possible, but a dozen world-views might be hypothetically linked with the religion of Jesus, for example, in a rational synthesis. That traditional Christianity does not see this is one main weakness of the present-day situation, with its vain jangle about the discords between "science" and "religion." Personally, the writer has absolutely no quarrel with *The Religion of the Universe*, though many will feel about it as Lincoln did about the book: "For those who like that sort of thing, that is the sort of thing they will like." But vague monistic speculation is not religion, although it may be religious; nor does it seem to the writer a good basis upon which to seek to build up the spiritual life; although even here there are some to whom cosmogony has been so linked with their religious experiences that they

⁶ *The Religion of the Universe*. By J. Allanson Picton. New York: Macmillan 1904. 380 pages. \$3.25, net.

need in giving up the Babylonian cosmogony of Genesis to find a new one at the hands of Herbert Spencer. If so, in either *The Religion of the Universe* or in the *Cosmic Philosophy* they will find one that will probably last them while they live. Pantheism, our author thinks, is logically involved in the message of the "eternal gospel" (p. 230), but what he means by pantheism could just as well be called by another name. Nor has he any clear perception of the distinct difference between the message of Jesus and the religious world-view which forms his main interest. The "Pantheistic Sermon" which forms the last chapter of the book is a far better sermon than the average pulpit production, but it sins just where the ordinary evangelical sermon sins, by confounding an interesting metaphysics with the content of the religious experience, and in almost completely ignoring the real message of Jesus and the real significance of his life.

Of more importance, therefore, to the modern pulpit is the volume of lectures⁷ on the Noble foundation. It is one of the welcome and wholesome signs that the message from the pulpit today is going more and more to turn distinctly from cosmogony and metaphysics to Jesus as the actual revelation of the will and purpose of our Father. The author demands scientific examination of the religious facts, and shows himself well informed in the latest literature on the psychology of the religious experience. He claims (p. 27) that there are two sets of facts connected with Christ: "There are external facts respecting Christ, and there are inward facts. There is a historical Christ, and there is an experimental Christ." The lectures deal, not with the facts of Christ's life, but with the facts connected with the influence of Christ's life upon the world. In Jesus Christ the lecturer sees religion at last linked finally and absolutely with a pure ethics, and a pure ethics made the essential condition of communion with the Father (pp. 50, 51). The consciousness of Jesus Christ is based upon an assured faith in the ultimate goodness "which rules all things," and he is filled with "confidence in the justice and goodness of the divine order." But more and beyond that he is filled with the confidence that the purpose of the Father is an ultimate righteousness, and "toward the fulfilment of that order Jesus Christ set his face with all earnestness." Moreover, he realized, and makes us realize by revealing it, that the will of the Father is fundamentally love. He sends his rain upon the just and upon the unjust (p. 55), and therefore he is filled with horror at sin as inevitably separating the purpose of the sinner from the purpose of the Father. For heathenism the horror of sin is the punishment of an angry God. For

⁷ *The Witness to the Influence of Christ*. By William B. Carpenter. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1905. 180 pages. \$1.10.

Jesus the punishment of sin is separation from the purpose of God. In that separation there is outer darkness and gnashing of teeth. Life is harmony with the loving purpose of God, and sin is death and separation. Jesus is at once a revelation of God's wide love and mercy and the inevitable death that follows upon recreancy to the final purpose of that love. The lecturer distinguishes between "principle," "doctrine," and "dogma," and, of course, points out that Jesus taught no dogma; and that a dogma can never fully comprehend the great fundamental principle (p. 67). Jesus set forth principles; these Paul worked into doctrines, and the church drew up her dogmas. Jesus "does not theologize in the dogmatic sense" (p. 67), and though the lecturer does not raise the question, we well may: Dare we make as a condition of loving fellowship forms of teaching, needful no doubt in proper place, but which Jesus did not employ?

Again, the lecturer finds in the fact that Christ has become "the standard of human conduct . . . the conscience of humanity" (p. 94), a chief significance of his life. The lecturer takes seriously the revelation of God as Father, and sonship with God becomes the law of the human soul; and, curiously enough, he states on pp. 95 and 96 the exclusive claim of Christ in about the terms of Ritschl, although cautiously disclaiming Ritschl on p. 145, because of an evident misapprehension of Ritschl's position. Thus Jesus becomes the type of normal manhood, and thus an "authority" over our souls and in our lives (p. 155). Moreover, he becomes the basis of our hope of a final fellowship of righteousness in the redeeming love of the Father.

What may we gather from these pages about the message of today? Surely we are faced by a critical and trying situation. Modern theology is running the risks that early orthodoxy ran, and the dangers proved very real. In the struggle to save Christianity from being lost in a maze of cosmological gnostic speculation the religious leaders plunged us into a bog of dogmatic definition which clings to our feet and impedes our progress. The defense of intellectual freedom and of literary-historical positions may distract us from the real work of omitting the outworn phraseology, and of going back to the simple message of salvation. Today the world is waking up to sin. Drunkenness, brutality, selfishness, greed, dishonesty, impurity in all their horrors, are felt today as never before. Men and women went shuddering away from an exhibition of work and wages in Berlin in which the real cause of increasing prostitution was plainly made manifest. Our magazines and daily papers, our insurance exposures, with the dreadful sense that not half the rottenness came to light, have made us thoughtful, and stopped even careless ones and made them think. The

modern pulpit must deepen the sense of shame and guilt of sin and loss and lovelessness, because we will not come unto the Father and live as brothers. In a romance that has stirred Germany to its depths, Frenssen⁸ describes the search for the holy life and the holy community made by a poetical morbid boy. He is typical of many, and today the message dare not call the evil good. The message of individual and social guilt is a first duty of the pulpit. We are far from the Father's house. We are wasting the Father's inheritance. We are feeding the swine. Let us return and go unto the Father. Snug self-satisfaction has been too much the note of our prosperous American Protestantism. Again, the modern pulpit must learn again its scale of values. There are a thousand things we can let alone or deal with tentatively. To waste a precious hour with a miscellaneous congregation trying to recover Anselm's scholasticism from the wrecks of exegetical and historical criticism is about as signal a mistake as a preacher could make. We have a message of life and death. If we have found life and peace in Jesus Christ and his revelation of the Father's purpose, then we must be about the Father's business; we must be establishing the kingdom of God for which Christ died. An officer leaving the courtroom in Russia, where were condemned the unfortunate and misguided murderers of the archduke, said: "These people are dying for what we all long for." Jesus died for what we ought all to be longing for. Not simply political freedom or material comfort for all—but the freedom and loving holiness of the coming kingdom of our Father God.

The message of the modern pulpit must be full of faith and confidence that that kingdom is coming, and that Jesus is really risen from the grave, and lives in the new life of the holy community. The burdens of heathen tradition and superstition we must drop. Even true cosmogonies and correct metaphysics are not our essential message. Now we see in a glass darkly. When in a reorganized life we turn to these interesting questions, we shall often see eye to eye where now we do not even understand one another's tongue. Drs. Warfield, Remensnyder, and the present writer might argue until doomsday without any hope of changing one another's opinions. We have all, or ought to have, a common purpose given up in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ to establish on earth a kingdom of redeeming love; and when that is established, then we shall try to straighten out one another's metaphysics. There is absolutely no hope of intellectual agreement as a basis of the kingdom. Not even the willingness to agree and obey can save the Roman church from the gravest differences of opinion. It is not here the hope lies. The practical activi-

⁸ *Hilligenlei*. By A. Frenssen.

ties born of a common purpose will alone give us a working platform. We must make the prayer of our Lord the bond of our faith: "Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done on earth even as it is done in heaven."

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SPIRITUALITY—DO OUR SERMONS PROMOTE IT?

Not the least of the blessings of our modern thinking is the broadening and humanizing of this word "spirituality." We have approached the New Testament conception of it when we recognize, as we now commonly do, that the spiritual in man has to do, not with his opinions, his emotions, or the method of his worship, but with his character. It is not a department of his life into which he may retire on Sunday, but it is the essential quality of his motives and ambitions, ranking him in the scale of moral being alike in this workday world and in any other sphere wherever men may congregate. Manhood in any normal meaning of that high word is impossible without spirituality, and without it all social excellence or human progress is but the baseless fabric of a dream.

Spirituality postulates God and his living presence in the ordinary affairs of men. There was a time when God's method of making his presence felt was startling. He entered the arena with a shower of spiritual "gifts:" with tongues, healings, prophecies, portents; shaking the social structure to its foundations, and commanding amazed and awed attention. And then there came a time, which continues to our day, in which God makes himself known in "fruits" of spirit, in which in the calm and majesty of his universe of law he unfolds the higher qualities of human character and enthrones himself in "every form of goodness, righteousness, and sincerity" on the earth. Christianity is one vast system of horticulture, only half conscious even yet of its mission. When it comes to clearer vision, ethical principles will be but the shadows of spiritual truths, and the making of men will be the one inclusive business of all spiritual forces. Spiritual fruits mature slowly and require, as does all husbandry, fertilization, cultivation, time, and patience. Moreover, all spiritual fruits mature in the winds and storms and amid the manifold enemies of the everyday life. Men are rested and instructed in the dim religious light of the sanctuary, but men are made or marred in the open. Our success as preachers is not to be found in the homiletical or theological perfectness of our discourses, but in the qualities of manhood that enable men to stand or allow them to fall in the arena. Life is but an endless series of crises, so small often as to be molecular; but in those molecules

are hidden the power and potency of Christian manhood. And the sermon is a failure, however faultless in structure or peerless in eloquence, that does not register itself in some auditor's testing, at the point of temptation.

Surveyed in some such breadth as this, the field to be covered by our sermons is as wide as human experience, and the spiritual harvests to be reaped thereon are as vast and varied as is that experience. Every idiosyncrasy, as every calling distinguishing modern life, is to be affected by the preaching that "saves"—in the aim of the leader who still knows how to be "all things to all men, that by all means he may save some."

A number of volumes of recent sermons will fairly illustrate the quality of pulpit-work today in its effort to cultivate spiritual manhood. First, note *Life's Dark Problems*,¹ a series of ten addresses by Minot J. Savage. This very modern volume is, to one's great surprise, a staunch defense of the old theological proposition that we are living in the best conceivable world. Convinced by a scientific argument from design, of the existence and superintendence of God, Dr. Savage finds here a humanity in process of making, and making, too, by a divine order altogether beyond our criticism. We are urged to suspend our judgment concerning seeming disorder and actual pain until the ultimate product shall have justified the method. Optimistic, if not convincing, indications are conspicuous in "Life's Incompleteness," in "Moral Evil," in "Mental Disease and Decay," and in "Death." The fatherhood of God is an unavoidable inference from the study of his world in the light of modern knowledge.

It would be easy to find fault with creation or with Dr. Savage in spots here and there, but the prevailing winds of this splendid reasoning are from the northwest, and every man, whatever his creed, will find here a tonic counterpart to the pessimism into which modern knowledge has plunged so many gifted minds. A distinct and powerful spiritual impulse is inevitable to the Christian who will read these luminous pages. Intellectuality pays tribute here to spirituality.

In striking exegetical and theological contrast to the sermons of Dr. Savage just noticed, examine for a moment a volume of seventeen sermons by Samuel Chadwick.² Few purely theological critics would find anything in common between the preaching of extreme Unitarianism and that of intense Methodism. But, judging each by the particular output of these two volumes, we find one thing in common, and that is the highest thing,

¹ *Life's Dark Problems; or, Is This a Good World?* By Minot J. Savage. New York: Putnam, 1905. 219 pages. \$1.35.

² *Humanity and God.* By Samuel Chadwick. Chicago: Revell, 1905. 356 pages. \$1.50.

namely, spirituality. What is incidental in the argument of Dr. Savage is immediate and direct in the method of Dr. Chadwick. Brief, lucid, orthodox, abounding in Scripture and attractive illustration, these sermons are a fine example of ancient effectiveness in modern intelligence and energy. Essentials of truth and spirit never die; men die, and forms of thought and speech die with them; but spirituality lives on and is promoted by energy from ancient coal-mines as well as by that from living forests. In fact, our dependence up to the present has been chiefly upon the ancient storehouses. Dr. Chadwick deals in keen, incisive fashion with such subjects as "Sin and Grace," "Born of the Flesh and Born of the Spirit," "Man: Natural, Carnal, Spiritual," "The Incarnation and Its Glorious Purpose," "The Way of the Cross," "Christ's Promise of the Spirit," "The Spirit-Filled Life," and "Christian Perfection"—an ascending series, following the ascent of our Lord from babyhood to the throne of human character and of divine power. The spiritual biography of Christ is the spiritual pathway of the Christian. It is a notable volume of its class, not wanting in intellectual grip, but fascinating in spiritual devotion. It lacks appreciation of the everyday world where men really live, but it does valiant and necessary service in opening the door of the prayer closet and the library, and compelling men to come apart awhile to pray and to listen. The one weakness in the otherwise masterful work is in the lowering of the standard of human perfection in order to permit to consciousness the sense of its attainment. Dr. Chadwick is not alone in his apparent ignorance of the fact that, so far as men believe themselves to be perfect when they are not, character is weakened and moral progress is retarded.

The English congregations to which presumably Rev. J. D. Jones delivered his sermons³ were kin to their American brethren, if they appreciated the sweet reasonableness, the loving insistence, the ethical strength, the consequent spiritual illumination everywhere present in the volume. The aim of the preacher is to impart courage and hope to the faint and the disheartened. His congregation might well be composed of the sturdy but inconspicuous common people who make great the Anglo-Saxon race. His message is to the heart and the heart-life, and his hearers see God in the limitations and ambitions and failures of New Testament humanity, transforming the monotonous and the ordinary and ascending with Christ through temptation and sacrifice to peace and power. There is no direct attempt to promote spirituality by discoursing upon it, but with lover-like

³ *Elms of Life and Other Sermons*. By J. D. Jones. Chicago: Revell, 1905. 256 pages. \$1.

method the sermons deepen devotion to Christ by revealing him. Affection and aspiration are essential conditions of spirituality.

"Vision and Task" is the suggestive title of the first sermon of a small volume of fifteen sermons.⁴ These are all addresses to the practical man, and are valuable aids to a life of spiritual ambition; for a true spirituality has its ambitions. The titles indicate the scope and purpose of the whole volume: "The Highest Vocation," "The Plain Heroic Breed," "A Vision for the Wilderness," "A Lesson for the Street," "The Biography of a Backslider," "Doing Good by Proxy," "The Arraignment of the Unfaithful Steward," "The Thorn as an Asset," "The Other Man's Portion," "The Paramount Duty." These are strenuous sermons, clearly conceived, and delivered in pure and forcible English. The contemplative, introspective man, seeking the spirituality of the ascetic or the dreamer, will object to such preaching as disturbing. But a healthy, spiritual nature, hungering for righteousness and fearlessly asking for light upon duty rather than upon destiny, will welcome them with unusual pleasure. The most timid will find them "sound," the bravest will find them the candle of the Lord on life's rougher pathway.

One has to read the introduction to this volume⁵ to learn the secret of Professor Pattison's power as teacher and preacher. It was an intensely personal power—the product of a cultivated, consecrated manhood. "He bore without abuse that grand old name of gentleman," and he influenced men by his speech because he touched their higher natures in the silence. Every student and every other friend felt that he was in the world and felt the nobler because he was here. This volume of sermons is a beautiful expression of Professor Pattison's life, intended to fill somewhat the office of a memorial, and certain to awaken a response in every Christian reader's highest nature. We can have no more vital help in spiritual cultivation than that afforded us in the spiritual biography of heroic men. And this volume is a spiritual biography. Note the titles: "True Reverence," "Overcoming and Inheriting," "The Character and Motive of the Christian Life," "Counsel and Work," "The Man Who Never Grew Old," "The Proportions of a True Life," "The Response of the Bible to Our Intellectual Nature," "Successful Christian Service," and the like. Every page is a revelation of that in the beloved teacher which will make his

⁴ *Vision and Task*. By George Clarke Peck. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. 289 pages. \$1.

⁵ *The South Wind and Other Sermons*. By T. Harwood Pattison. With an Introduction by Clarence A. Barbour. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1905. 288 pages. \$1.25.

name revered while the church of Christ shall cherish the memory of her saints.

A thoughtful little volume⁶, with old truths freshly put and old texts unexpectedly treated. It assumes great basal truths and aims to stimulate a love for God by clarifying the vision of his goodness and his redemptive purpose. The spiritual nature that is Dr. Stockdale's ideal of the Christian character is that of the seer, capable of discerning God's intent in his active government of the world, and fearless and faithful in declaring it to men. Like every true preacher, he portrays in sermon form the order of spirituality most to be desired from his study of the oracles. And while to others the emphasis falls upon attainment in ethical qualities in one form or another, the main characteristic here is that of attaining God's angle of vision—and he who helps in this renders vital service to humanity and to God.

It seems incredible that these brilliant sermons⁷ were "preached extemporaneously and reported stenographically," and yet we are so assured in a prefatory note. They seem to comprise the literary remains of a heroic, almost tragic life—a life of physical weakness, of spiritual struggle, and of brief duration. Perhaps this is the explanation of what his friends call genius in the striking sermons printed in this volume and delivered to hushed and enraptured congregations over a decade ago. As in other instances, so here, to enumerate some of the subjects treated will best indicate the preacher and the preaching: "The Necessity of Patience," "The Sovereignty of Purpose," "Jesus at Prayer," "Outside Losses Inside Gains," "The God of Comfort," "The Greatness of Love," "The Power of the Holy Ghost." In some respects these are ideal sermons. They command everywhere intellectual respect, awaken and sustain the devotional spirit, stimulate hunger after righteousness, provide bread for the hungry, and point the way to peace and power. There is not a dull sentence, nor a trap laid for applause. There is no eulogy of sect, nor contention with brethren, nor is there any toleration of evil, nor fear of liberty or of law. Mr. Thompson speaks in these sermons from the vantage-ground of spiritual conquest, intellectual and moral, and he speaks with swift and unerring intuition to the spirit life of the men and women who do the world's work and bear its burdens.

⁶ *The Divine Opportunity*. Sermons preached by T. D. Stockdale. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. 136 pages. \$0.50.

⁷ *Burden Bearing and Other Sermons*. By John Rhey Thompson. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. 261 pages. \$0.75.

This little treatise⁸ deals with the beginning and the lapses of the most vital experiences of human life—the conscious experience of religion. Dr. Carroll does not assume that the beginning is also the middle and the end—he has been too long a pastor for that. But as there can be no middle and end without a beginning, it is evident that we have to do in such a discussion with life and death, and all that follows us into eternity. Inexpressibly serious and farthest removed from the lightness so often accompanying evangelistic endeavor, is this whole phase of Christian work. And Dr. Carroll treats it with seriousness and great clearness; and whether we agree with all that sometimes seems implied in stereotyped phrases and methods, or not, we can but gain inspiration for a more enthusiastic and intelligent outcome of life and ministry in the business of winning souls. For, after all, that is our primary business, however we may vary in definitions and methods. To all who follow Dr. Carroll in his apparent contention that winsomeness consists in words fitly spoken, this book will be of great and permanent value; while the many who believe that the more silent eloquence of a transparent and selfless righteousness is the power most sure to win and most imperatively demanded in our time, will be goaded to a more vitalizing holiness by these earnest and glowing pages. Certain it is that we do not meditate enough upon the intelligent output of Christian character as it wins or repels the indifferent or the hostile. All of us put great, and none too great, emphasis upon the light of the central Sun of Righteousness, but whether we ourselves are radio-active in the moral night of the world is to the most of us of minor consequence. And yet it may prove finally that only the winning soul is the soul won. The late Dr. Henry Clay Trumbull, a few days before his death, said to the writer, who leaned over his couch to catch his whispered words: "Have you seen my little book on *Individual Work*? It is the most important thing I have ever written." From out of the fertile and laborious years, this peerless Christian teacher gave pre-eminent place to his effort to teach men how to win one by one their fellow-men to Christ.

Summing up then our meditation and review, shall we not say that spiritual preaching is the fearless expression of the vision God gives the individual preacher? That intellectual honesty, moral purity, and prayerful obedience to the Light within him are supreme essentials to the creation of spiritual manhood in his hearers? If this be true in theory, then it is also true that the cluster of sermons at which we have

⁸ *Soul-Winning: A Problem and Its Solution*. By Phidellio P. Carroll. With an Introduction by Bishop Charles H. Fowler. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. 110 pages. \$0.50.

glanced, taken at random from current pulpit literature, attests a high order of spiritual preaching. The Christian ministers of today, with whatever of faults they may have, are more frequently qualified to be God's prophets, transmitting, unalloyed, his messages to men, than have been their brethren of recent centuries. Herein is the hope of the church, the certitude of spiritual triumph.

EDWARD BRAISLIN.

BURLINGTON, N. J.

PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS WORK IN LONDON

A foreigner can neither vouch for nor seriously criticise statements of facts drawn up by a competent observer who lives in the city which is described and who takes ten years or more to sift the evidence. Residents of London have found errors, and it is said by close friends that no one is so eager to learn of corrections as the eminent statistician who organized this vast scheme for showing to London people what London in fact is. Errors were unavoidable; but the methods employed reduce them to a minimum. The author¹ nowhere attempts to tabulate his results, for as a statistician he understands that such pretense of accuracy and completeness is deceptive. He has set down the significant facts even when they run counter to his conclusions, and he furnishes evidence for several possible explanatory theories. The proofs of good faith are found in the well-known history of the author, and in the impartial and objective way in which he presents his materials.

The author thus states the purpose and limitations of his work:

My principal aim is still confined to the description of things as they are. I have not undertaken to investigate how they came to be so, nor, except incidentally, to indicate whither they are tending. . . . Still less could I set myself up as a critic of religious truth. My concern in the matter of religion is solely with the extent to which people accept the doctrines, conform to the discipline, and share in the work of the religious bodies, and with the effect produced, or apparently produced, on their lives. (Vol. I, p. 5.)

Leaving aside, as we must, the criticism of particular assertions of facts which have been questioned by respectable British critics, we may be sure that we have food enough for reflection and many suggestions for guidance. Some of the lessons of warning and direction are here selected for brief consideration. The situation in London is near enough like that of large American cities to be instructive.

¹ *Life and Labor of the People in London*. Third Series: *Religious Influences*. By Charles Booth, assisted by Jesse Argyle, Ernest Avis, Geo. E. Arkell, Arthur L. Baxter, George H. Duckworth. London and New York: Macmillan 1903. Seven vols.

Has the church in London, on the whole, succeeded or failed? What is the conclusion of Mr. Booth, and by what argument does he support his conclusion? We must discover Mr. Booth's conception of success by carefully following his criticisms. He is not deceived by a show of numbers, a noisy crowd, nor by advertisements composed with a purpose to secure donations from rich persons who are optimistic so long as they do not themselves have to work in disagreeable quarters. Success with this writer means a sincere worship, a genuine appreciation of the value of religion, of communion with God. Attendance at church may be bought of paupers by means of treats and coal tickets. Children will crowd a Sunday school for the sake of enjoying a Christmas banquet or a summer outing. Beggars will attend a prayer-meeting to win the price of a dirty bed. Real success must be discovered behind all illusions, shams, and counterfeits.

According to the evidence, the church in London has had a notable and worthy success. It has enlisted a great multitude of faithful and self-sacrificing persons, men and women in all denominations; representatives of the High, Broad, and Evangelical tendencies, as well as of all the dissenting bodies. The church has succeeded in making almost all Englishmen know at least a little about Christianity. Apparently the number of "heathen at home" who have never heard of the Bible and its story is inconsiderable. Churches, chapels, and mission halls are everywhere. Children go in throngs to Sunday school even if they "graduate" forever when they become marriageable. The church has succeeded quite generally in influencing conduct, personal and domestic morals, except among the lowest classes. Many of those who do not attend church are not immoral or dangerous citizens, but decent, industrious, and honest. The wholesome influence of the churches is diffused far beyond the membership and congregations of the ecclesiastical bodies. The churches have succeeded on a large scale in providing for the religious wants of the people who want religion at all. They have set a table with various viands; indeed, the tables are numerous and of all styles. Every type of man, with the help of a little omnibus fare, can select the type of religious teaching and ritual which comforts and satisfies him. Evidence is given to prove that the outer and inner life of many thousands of selected persons has been renewed, made spiritual, and filled with reverence. If one fixes his eyes on this set of facts, he will have reason to be encouraged. Religion is a real power in London, and a power for good.

It is even more important to learn when and why the church has failed. Self-congratulation helps the weary toiler to catch his breath and

gather strength for a new onset; but excessive optimism blinds the judgment and perverts the motives. It is impossible at times to escape the feeling that Mr. Booth has underestimated the influence of religious work in certain quarters of London. It would be very pleasing if someone with equal reputation for scientific accuracy could convict him of error. In the meantime all confess that his analysis of the situation in general is so sadly reliable that it calls for a revisal of methods. While religious forms at least are fashionable, and therefore all fashionable people must accept the conventional outward requirements of the church; and while both state church and nonconformists succeed quite well with the middle classes, the vast majority of the working-classes resolutely, as by one consent, stand aloof; and the very poor go to mission meetings only in response to bribes.² Many exceptions are admitted; this is the rule. With the wage-workers all kinds of doctrines have been tried, from High to Unitarian; none of them attract the workingmen. All forms of ritual have been tried; the workingman refuses to select any of them. All forms of ecclesiastical organization are offered for choice; all alike are spurned. So far as the present situation among workingmen is concerned, the outlook for the institutional life of religion is almost hopeless.

Perhaps this conclusion is too pessimistic. Some able religious leaders in London think it is painted too dark. But each volume teems with proofs. One by one the audiences are counted and analyzed; and the workingmen are absent, with rare exceptions. Interviews with the pastors, rectors, missionaries, visitors, are reported, and the tone of response is full of discouragement. In many places with a dense population efforts to reach certain classes have been abandoned after long and costly effort. Men are found who work on in failure from sheer inertia of habit, or because they are not called elsewhere, or from a profound sense of duty. Others soothe the pain of defeat with the opiates of a creed of despair. They may take a grim comfort in some doctrine of predestination and say that God never intended to save the majority, and they are content with his decree; they work for "the edification of the elect." Others take refuge in the expectation that there will be a speedy coming of the Judge who will sweep away in fire the whole miserable crowd and take a few of the remnant into some paradise far away among the stars. Others still deceive themselves and their patrons by drawing up advertisements of successes

² With her worn garb contrasted
Each side in fair array,—
"God's house holds no poor sinners,"
She sighed, and crept away.

—Richard Monkton Milnes, *London Churches*.

and hopeful plans, whose boasts are all the more disgusting because they are couched in biblical phrases worn to cant.

Does Mr. Booth give no hint of hope for the effort to evangelize the working-classes and the very poor? Certainly he does not offer a distinct program of his own. He has no patent theory of pastoral duties and ecclesiastical administration to add to all the other theories which have proved disappointing; and on the surface this absence of definite devices is disheartening and depressing. Yet Mr. Booth has constructive suggestions, sometimes offered with the weary air of a man who hardly expects that those to whom they are addressed will either read or heed them. They must be picked out of the mass of descriptions, and are merely flashed out at points when the immediate subject calls for a hopeful word. The work, it should be remembered, professes to be an objective description of facts, not a treatise on ecclesiastical sociology. Certain facts, when carefully considered, indicate paths out of the tangle and morass. One of these is the oft-repeated plea for improved housing, larger plans for open spaces, condemnation of jerry-building, closer attention to sanitation, turning light into dark places, and amelioration of education. The author plainly declares his conviction that these changes must precede any general response to religious appeal. Apparently his vast observation has compelled him to think that a certain amount of vitality is necessary before any force can be utilized for religion. For the map of misery spread out before us proves that other than spiritual interests are suffering quite as much as religion. If the church has failed, so have science and art failed; for in these the very poor, the ordinary workingmen, and even many snug merchants, have no genuine delight. The pleasures are in beer and commonplace theatrical exhibitions, in bicycle runs and boisterous public-houses, in lazy undress on Sundays, with the comfort of a pipe and the solace of a heavy dinner which the wife stays at home to cook for her lord. The intellectual interests of the more intelligent workingmen are in politics and trades-unions. Socialism, with its rather materialistic dreams of a heaven on earth, becomes a faith, and is often called a religion. This is better than utter stagnation and egoistic appetite, and may one day be turned to good account by ministers who know how to approach it. But at present antagonism, if kept within respectful forms, is the dominant note in these social interests. The labor agitator and the pastor are separated by an ocean of misunderstandings.

A great statesman of Athens comforted and cheered his fellow-countrymen at a trying hour by telling them that they had not done their best; if they had put forth all their powers and failed, there would be no reserve

on which to build a new hope. If England and English churches had really exhausted their resources, the outlook for religion would be cheerless; but, as a matter of fact, the Christian economists long taught the sacredness of egoistic competition; Christian statesmen, even a John Bright, opposed a watchdog theory of state functions to the Christian and moral claims on government and to the interests of workingmen. The Evangelical Earl of Shaftesbury fought by the side of trade-unionists, and mourned that the bishops and men like Spurgeon refused to help him in his effort to protect workingwomen and children from oppression and murder. The churches of England have quarrelled over the schools so long that children grow up without the ability to read and think, and, having no intellectual pleasures, seek satisfaction in lust and drink. The nemesis of past neglect pursues the church through the third and fourth generation. This indictment is bitter, but it is necessary to save the church from despair, and the sharp lesson is as necessary in America as in England. The church of Chicago and Philadelphia has sinned the sins of omission as well as the church of London, and with the same results. When one visits the dwellings of poor workingmen in our own cities, the chief wonder is that brutal vice is not more common than it is. In a bad dwelling morality, purity, and spirituality are exceedingly rare; practically impossible. Religion must sanctify the body and its shelter, if it would make there a sanctuary. The idea that "preaching the gospel," in the conventional sense, will "act from within," is falsified by an immense array of facts. Landlords obey a sharp sheriff; they sneer at a preacher and his homilies. The magistrate who "bears not the sword in vain" is "a dream" of God who has his own message to evil men.

The workingmen themselves dislike to be patronized. They are in rebellion against caste and privilege. They are willing to let the middle classes fawn their way to the notice of nobility, but hate their workday oppression and their Sunday offer of a second-best sitting at church or chapel. They bitterly resent the pauperizing way in which religion is offered in their neighborhood, and are moved to anger when it is suggested that they need free soup or the surveillance of missionaries. The church learns slowly the significance of the new feeling of democracy, crude but real and powerful, which has taken deep root among workingmen.

Mr. Booth gives generous praise to the few pastors who have actually succeeded in winning considerable members of genuine workingmen, whether they are in the Establishment or among the nonconformists. He furnishes a good deal of evidence for the theory that such occasional

successes are due to the recognition of the new democratic impulses toward self-government. It seems altogether probable that the class which is coming to be the ruling class will never come into the church until they come to govern it, and in the modern spirit. Many will prefer mediæval subjection, but the majority are done with that in politics and industry, and they are not likely to put their necks in any sort of a parson's yoke. Perhaps it would be safe to conclude that the workingmen, long stupefied and cowed, who once professed any faith which their masters laid upon them, have come to a sense of reality and sincerity. Perhaps they will be like him who

"Fought his doubts and gathered strength;
He would not make his judgment blind;
He faced the specters of his mind
And laid them; thus he came at length
To find a stronger faith his own."

Only a prophet could foretell the issue of the present discouraging situation; and Mr. Booth is statistician, not prophet. Yet among the books of fact which the ministers of our age need most to ponder these volumes on *Religious Influences* in London must long take highest place.

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PALESTINIAN EXPLORATION

Of peculiar interest are the Ely Lectures for 1903, delivered at Union Theological Seminary by Dr. Bliss.¹ The purpose of the lectures was to sketch that interest of the world at large in Palestine which has, in modern times, resulted in organized exploration in that country. The lecturer has conceived his subject broadly, for he begins with a sketch of the references to Palestine in Egyptian records and in the cuneiform literature, where the interest in the country was political. He follows this with an account of the treatment received by the Holy Land at the hands of Greek writers such as Polybius and Strabo. All this is reviewed in the first chapter under the title "The Dawn of Exploration." The second chapter, "The Age of Pilgrimage," treats of the period from the Bordeaux Pilgrim to the Crusades. The subjects of the succeeding chapters are: (3) "The Crusades and After," (4) "From Fabri to Robinson," (5) "Edward Robinson," (6) "Renan and His Contemporaries," (7) "The Palestine Exploration Fund," and (8) "The Exploration of the Future." In these chapters the way in which

¹ *The Development of Palestine Exploration*. Being the Ely Lectures for 1903. By Frederick Jones Bliss. New York: Scribner, 1906. xvii + 337 pages. \$1.50.

religious interest has broadened so as to include archæology is well described.

The book is of value to anyone interested in any way in Palestine. Its defects are due to the circumstances under which it was produced. A long list of writers on Palestine—historians, pilgrims, travelers, and explorers—must be passed in review. Even when one selects only the most important, as our author does, many pages become little more than lists of names, with the briefest possible comment. Even these pages are of great value, however, to one desiring a guide to the immense literature on Palestine. In the necessarily brief survey an undue amount of space is given to the biography of Edward Robinson. This is natural in a course of lectures given at the Seminary where Robinson was a professor, but it seems a blemish nevertheless. Again, much space is given to the Palestine Exploration Fund and but little to the sister-society, the Deutscher Palästina-Verein. This is perhaps natural, inasmuch as the lecturer was for several years explorer to the Palestine Exploration Fund. It may be excused, too, on the ground that the English society was first in the field and affords a good example of such organized effort. It should be said also, that in the few words devoted to the German society the author is justly appreciative of its services.

The work, as a whole, is written in an admirable spirit. Justice is done to the labors of each writer mentioned, though Dr. Bliss does not hesitate to mete out fair criticism to each when it seems necessary. Even Robinson, for whom he has a great admiration, does not escape. To follow no one blindly, and, if one must criticise, to do it like a Christian, are qualities worthy of emulation.

In the concluding chapter the writer gives some opinions and suggestions on the exploration of the future. Coming, as they do, from one who has spent many years in the country, and who has had the experience as an excavator that Dr. Bliss has, these suggestions are especially valuable. No would-be explorer of the future should fail to read and ponder them. The writer does well to urge the importance of excavation in Palestine in comparison with Egypt and Babylonia. Information lies buried under the soil of the biblical lands quite as important as the more artistic remains of those richer countries.

The book contains an occasional misprint. On p. 67 the immemorial "bakhshish" is spelled *bukhshish*, and on p. 132 *stereotype* stands for "stereotyped."

GEORGE A. BARTON.

BRYN MAWR, PA.

BOOKS RECEIVED

AUCHINCLOSS, W. S. *The Book of Daniel Unlocked*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1905. Pp. 134.

Another solution of the riddles of Daniel, if we grant the rather gratuitous chronological and political assumptions of the author.

AUCHINCLOSS, W. S. *Bible Chronology from Abraham to the Christian Era*. New York: Van Nostrand, 1905. Pp. 17.

This "Chronology" places the creation of Adam in 5300 B. C., the birth of Abraham in 1982 B. C., the exodus in 1477 B. C., Belshazzar's reign in Babylon 541-38 B. C., and everything else with similar precision.

BRODY, H., AND ALBRECHT, K. *The New-Hebrew School of Poets of the Spanish-Arabian Epoch: Selected Texts, with Introduction, Notes, and Dictionary*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1906. Pp. 217. 7s.6d.

An anthology of the Hebrew poetry of Spain prepared for the purpose of an introduction to the language and thought of neo-Hebraic poetry, secular and religious.

CONYBEARE, F. C., AND STOCK, ST. G. *Selections from the Septuagint, according to the Text of Swete*. Boston: Ginn, 1905. Pp. 313. \$1.65, net.

This volume belongs to the "College Series of Greek Authors," and is designed to furnish a textbook for the student who would gain some acquaintance with the Septuagint Greek, whether from the point of classical Greek study or from that of biblical Greek study. The authors of the volume are Oxford men, and have performed their task skilfully. Interesting portions of the books of Genesis, Numbers, Judges and First and Second Kings are presented in the Septuagint Greek, with brief, but helpful footnotes, and an introduction of one hundred pages is provided covering the essentials of grammar and syntax in the Septuagint Greek. The work should find a useful place in the Greek curriculum of colleges. It is less well adapted to the training of the professional biblical student.

DARD, A. *Chez les ennemis d'Israel—Amorrhéens, Philistins*. Hors texte, cartes et illustrations. Paris: Lecoffre, 1906. Pp. 331. Fr. 3.50.

The record of the travels of a party of French Catholics, four of whom were priests, through the region east of the Jordan, and in the ancient territory of the Philistines, on the Maritime Plain.

FIEBIG, PAUL. *Joma: Der Mischnatractat "Versöhnungstag" ins Deutsche übersetzt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses zum Neuen Testament mit Anmerkungen versehen*. (Ausgewählte Mischnatractate in deutscher Uebersetzung.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. Pp. vii + 34. M. 1.

The first of a series of German translations of portions of the Mishnah, intended to furnish the intelligent Christian public an easy access to the Jewish thought of the times of Jesus.

LEFRANC, E. *Les conflits de la science et de la Bible*. Paris: Nourry, 1906. Pp. xii + 323.

A defense of the proposition that the function of the Bible is not to teach science,

but religion, and that errors in the spheres of science and history do not invalidate the religion it presents.

MEINHOLD, J., UND LIETZMANN, H. *Der Prophet Amos hebräisch und griechisch herausgegeben.* (Kleine Texte für theologische Vorlesungen und Uebungen, herausgegeben von H. Lietzmann.) Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1905. Pp. 32. M. 1.

The Greek and Hebrew texts of Amos are carefully edited, printed on opposite pages, and accompanied by numerous footnotes on the textual and literary criticism; thus furnishing a convenient textbook for use in classes studying the textual basis and literary form of the message of Amos.

MINOCCHI, SALVATORE. *I Salmi Messianici.* (Extrait de la *Revue biblique*, avril, 1903.) Paris: Lecoffre, 1903. Pp. 22.

A presentation in strophical form of the Hebrew, and translation thereof into Italian, of Pss. 72, 45, 2, and 110.

MINOCCHI SALVATORE. *Il Salterio Davidico: Nuovo ricerche di critica biblica.* (Estratto dagli *Studi Religiosi*, 1905, fasc. IV.) Firenze: Biblioteca Scientifico-Religiosa, 1905. Pp. 24.

A discussion of the so-called Davidic psalms in the first two books of the psalter.

MINOCCHI, SALVATORE. *Storia dei Salmi e Dell' Idea Messianica.* (Estratto dagli *Studi Religiosi*, 1902-4.) Firenze: Biblioteca Scientifico-Religiosa, 1904. Pp. 141.

A collection of five lectures, viz.: the religious poetry of the Hebrews prior to the psalms, the poetry of the psalms to the close of the Babylonian exile, psalms of the Persian period, psalms of the Greek period, and the closing period of the psalms. The position of the author may be characterized as clearly, conservatively progressive, and even advanced in some of his later utterances.

STAERK, WILLY. *Religion und Politik im alten Israel.* (Sammlung gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte, 43.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1905. Pp. 25. M. 0.50.

A popular essay setting forth some features of the vital relation between politics and religion in Israel from a scholarly point of view.

American Bible Society. *Eighty-eighth Annual Report*, 1904. New York: American Bible Society, 1904. Pp. 369.

ANDREWS, SAMUEL J. *Man and the Incarnation; or, Man's Place in the Universe as Determined by His Relations to the Incarnate Son.* New York: Putnam, 1905. Pp. 309. \$1.50.

AUELSEN, JOHN L. *John Wesley: Ausgewählte Predigten.* Dresden: Angelenk, 1905. Pp. 141. M. 1.

AYRES, S. G. *Complete Index to the Expositor's Bible. Topical and Textual. General Preface to the Expositor's Bible*, by the Editor, W. ROBERTSON NICOLL; together with an *Introduction to the Old and New Testament Sections*, by W. H. BENNETT and WALTER F. ADENEY. New York: Armstrong, 1905. Pp. 312.

BEVERIDGE, JOHN. *The Covenanters.* (Bible Class Primers.) Edinburgh: Clark; New York: Scribner. Pp. 136. \$0.20, net.

- BITTKAU, GUSTAV. *Leben und Glauben des Christen nach dem Wort und Vorbild des Heilandes im Anschluss an Luthers Katechismus dargestellt.* Leipzig: Durr, 1905. Pp. 197. M. 2.40.
- BOARDMAN, G. D. *Life and Light.* Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1905. Pp. 183. \$1.
- CARUS, PAUL. *Friedrich Schiller: A Sketch of His Life and an Appreciation of His Poetry.* Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1905. Pp. 102.
- COCHRANE, H. P. *Among the Burmans: A Record of Fifteen Years of Work and its Fruitage.* New York: Revell. Pp. 281. \$1.25.
- ELLIS, EDWARD. *The Young People's Imitation of Christ.* Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press, 1905. Pp. 373. \$0.50.
- FILLON, L. CL. *Saint Pierre.* Paris: Lecoffre, 1906. Pp. 207. Fr. 2.
- GARDNER, PERCY. *A Historic View of the New Testament.* (The Jowett Lectures delivered at the Passmore Edwards Settlement in London, 1901.) London: Black, 1904. Pp. 274. \$0.60.
- GLADDEN, WASHINGTON. *Christianity and Socialism.* New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. Pp. 244. \$1.00.
- HALL, FRANCIS J. *The Doctrine of God.* Second edition, revised throughout. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1905. Pp. 166. \$1.
- HAUSSLEITER, D. *Die vier Evangelisten.* München: Beck, 1906. Pp. 90. M. 1.20.
- Hermathena: A Series of Papers on Literature, Science, and Philosophy.* By Members of Trinity College, Dublin. Dublin: Ponsonby & Gibbs, 1905. Pp. 596. 4s.
- HILL, W. B. *A Guide to the Lives of Christ for English Readers.* New York: Gorham, 1905. Pp. 40.
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RECENT CHANGES IN THE THEOLOGY OF BAPTISTS

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From the apostolic time to the present there has never been complete agreement among Baptists (antipedobaptists), and no half-century has elapsed, it is probable, in the history of any particular antipedobaptist party without changes, more or less marked, in doctrine or in practice. Ebionites, Gnostics, and most of those that are commonly called "catholics" during the first two centuries, practiced believers' baptism; but they differed widely in their attitude toward the Scriptures, in their conceptions of the person of Christ, and in their ideas of God and his relation to the universe. Similar differences appear among mediaeval antipedobaptists. In the Reformation time soundly evangelical thinkers like Hubmaier, sweet-spirited mystics like Denck and Schwenckfeldt, unitarians like Haetzer, Bänderlin, Kautz, and Servetus, pantheists like David Joris, communists like Wiedemann and Huter, and millennarians like Hoffmann and Mathis, all agreed in regarding infant baptism as without scriptural warrant and as a perversion of a Christian ordinance, and in denying the legitimacy of oaths, warfare, magistracy, capital punishment, and any sort of union of church and state. Some of the millennialists believed that the kingdom of Christ was about to be set up by the swords of true believers, who, when summoned thereunto by God's prophets, would smite the ungodly and become God's

instruments in ruling the earth in righteousness. All sixteenth-century antipedobaptists, so far as the writer has been able to ascertain, were anti-Augustinian (anti-Lutheran, anti-Calvinistic), agreeing with mediaeval antipedobaptists in insisting upon freedom of will, in laying stress upon good works (the imitation of Christ and the literal carrying-out in practice of the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount), and in regarding Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone and his denial of freedom of will as immoral in their tendency.

The earliest English antipedobaptists (as distinguished from Anabaptists of the continental types) were aggressively Arminian (almost Socinian) in their theology, and while for some time, under Mennonite influence, they manifested an aversion toward oaths, magistracy, warfare, etc., their doctrine and practice with respect to these matters became gradually assimilated to those of their English pedobaptist dissenting contemporaries. During their earlier years (1609 onward) they seem to have conformed to the practice of the Mennonites and of English pedobaptist dissenters in being content with affusion as the act of baptism. Somewhere about 1641 they reached the conviction, as did their Calvinistic antipedobaptist brethren, that immersion is the only valid baptism. Soon after the latter change they came to regard the laying-on of hands as a Christian ordinance, and to disfellowship all who would not conform to this practice as well as all baptized believers who denied the universality of redemption through Christ. Restricted communion, in its most uncompromising form, was from the beginning characteristic of this antipedobaptist party.

During the later decades of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, General Baptist Arminianism degenerated into Socinianism, and many General Baptist churches that had already become weakened through the excessive application of discipline became extinct. Those that survived became for the most part avowedly unitarian. As a result of the evangelical revival under Wesley and Whitefield, the New Connection of General Baptists, moderately Arminian, distinctly trinitarian, and thoroughly missionary in spirit, was formed (in 1770) under the leadership of Dan Taylor. This body enjoyed a fair measure of prosperity and developed con-

siderable strength in missionary, educational, and literary directions. To this body belonged John Clifford, under whose leadership, a few years ago, it became amalgamated with the Particular Baptist body.

Those English antipedobaptists of the Calvinistic type who from 1633 onward separated themselves from a Congregationalist (Puritan) body in London, and who about 1641 came to insist upon immersion of believers as the only valid baptism, continued for some time in very close and friendly relations with their pedobaptist brethren, and in many cases practiced open communion. Mixed churches were common in their earlier history as well as in their present practice. During the eighteenth century, partly by way of reaction against Socinian error, which was sapping the religious life of all parties at the time, many Particular Baptist ministers and churches became hyper-Calvinistic (supralapsarian, antinomian), denying the obligation of Christians to preach the gospel to all men or to pray for the unconverted, on the ground that the fate of each individual was unalterably fixed by an eternal divine decree, and that human effort was not only needless, but almost sacrilegious. A few Particular Baptist ministers and churches, especially such as had come under the influence of the College at Bristol, held themselves aloof from the extremes of hyper-Calvinism. Under the influence of the Wesleyan revival, Andrew Fuller, who had been brought up in a hyper-Calvinistic community and had become a member of a church which had dismissed its pastor for insisting that the gospel ought to be preached to sinners, became convinced of the erroneousness of the teachings of his brethren. Though denied the privileges of scholastic training, by virtue of his unusual mental power and diligent application he succeeded in becoming well educated and was able to produce a body of moderately Calvinistic and thoroughly evangelical literature that revolutionized Baptist theology and made possible the wonderful progress of the denomination during the past century. Under his leadership, and that of William Carey and John Ryland, the modern Baptist missionary movement, whose success furnished the strongest possible argument against hyper-Calvinistic anti-effort teaching, was inaugurated. Hyper-Calvinistic Baptists still exist in small numbers in England. They have held themselves resolutely aloof from missionary and educational enterprise, and have abundantly demonstrated their

unfitness to do the work that Christianity was designed to accomplish and their unworthiness to be considered representatives of apostolic Christianity. The missionary movement led by Fuller and Carey brought English Particular Baptists into close touch with other evangelical denominations. Fuller, although to the end he insisted upon restricted communion, did not hesitate to appeal to all classes of evangelical Christians for funds for the support of the Baptist mission in India, and for the publication of Carey's translations of the Bible into oriental tongues.

Robert Robinson, the brilliant historian and hymnist, as pastor of the Cambridge church attracted the attention of wide circles outside of his own denomination. He gradually fell away from his Calvinistic principles into virtual Socinianism and became an advocate of open communion. Robert Hall, who had been educated at Bristol and in the University of Aberdeen, and who had early become imbued with the moderate Calvinism of Fuller and Ryland, came near following Robinson into the depths of rationalism, but was able to regain his footing and to become the most eloquent preacher of his time. As pastor of the Cambridge church he enjoyed a popularity among university people and other pedobaptists unequaled in the history of the Baptists. This circumstance, along with the example and the teachings of Robinson, his predecessor, had something to do, no doubt, with making him an ardent advocate of open communion. From the middle of the nineteenth century Particular Baptists were glad to welcome General Baptists into the Baptist Union, and a few years ago the two parties had become so far assimilated in theological opinion and in practice as to make the dropping of their distinctive names practicable and advisable.

The case of John Foster, one of the leading thinkers and literary men of the early part of the nineteenth century, is highly significant. Brought up as a Particular Baptist and educated at Bristol College, he later came under Socinian influence and for a time felt that he could work to better advantage among the General Baptists. Failing to find satisfaction or success in this direction, he resumed his relations with the Particular Baptists, and devoted his life to the production of moral and religious literature, which combined deep philosophical insight, intense moral earnestness, and moderate Calvinistic principles,

and which proved acceptable to evangelical Christian readers of all denominations. Foster's circumstances were thus highly favorable to the production in him of open communion sympathies. He became profoundly convinced that the eternal punishment of all who die without personal faith in Christ, especially of the heathen and those who in Christian lands are born and brought up amid adverse environments, was inconsistent with the justice and the benevolence of God, and he gave vigorous expression to his conviction in writings that influenced the minds of many Baptists and others.

That Foster should have been able to retain his fellowship in a Particular Baptist church and the high esteem of the great majority of Baptists throughout the world in his own generation and in subsequent times showed the breadth of the limits of Baptist toleration.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century a considerable proportion of the better-educated Baptist ministers of England, in sympathy with German liberal thought and with the liberal movement in the churches of England and Scotland, represented by Coleridge, Hare, Stanley, Maurice, Hampden, Thomas Erskine, J. McLeod Campbell, etc., and in antagonism to the Romanizing and Judaizing tendencies of High Churchmen, to the millennialism of the Plymouth Brethren (and some Low Churchmen), with its absurd combination of literalism and allegorism in the interpretation of the Scriptures, and its divisive and destructive tendencies, became the avowed advocates of the "New Theology," with its refusal to dogmatize regarding the ultimate destiny of those dying without a knowledge of the redemptive work of Christ, and in many cases gave expression to the "larger hope." Many came under the influence of the evolution philosophy with its disposition to obliterate the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, to deny to the biblical writers a special inspiration, to minify or repudiate the miraculous in biblical history, and to call in question the deity of Christ.

A few years before his death, Charles Haddon Spurgeon, who drew his inspiration largely from the Puritan theology of the seventeenth century, and who for a generation had preached a Calvinistic theology with full recognition of the inspiration and the inerrancy of the Scriptures, and with a fervor and an effectiveness never surpassed, became alarmed at the spread of liberal sentiments

in his denomination. In his monthly magazine, *The Sword and the Trowel*, he carried on for years an uncompromising warfare against the "Down Grade" movement, that seemed to him to be sapping the life of the churches and to be destined either to destroy them utterly or to precipitate them into unitarianism. His futile effort to induce the London Association and the Baptist Union to limit their fellowship to such as were willing to declare their belief in the inerrancy of Scripture, in the endlessness of the punishment of the impenitent dead, and in the absolute deity of Christ, led to his withdrawal from both these bodies. A large majority of his brethren resolutely refused to make the acceptance of definite dogmatic statements on matters of this kind a term of communion, many who were relatively conservative themselves declining to take the position that their own views of truth must be accepted by others on pain of the withdrawal of fellowship. The experience of English Baptists as a dissenting body suffering hardships for non-conformity has made them tolerant in the highest degree. Religious liberty has come to mean with many of them, not merely immunity from persecution at the hands of civil governments, but the right of every individual Christian freely to form and express his religious opinions without incurring the odium of church censure.

There is in England a small, but highly respectable, body of Baptists of the restricted-communion type, who maintain a theological seminary and engage successfully in missionary work. Many Welsh Baptists practice restricted communion without disfellowshipping those who differ from them in this particular. A number of pastors and churches followed Spurgeon in his withdrawal from the Union and continue their protest against the "Down Grade" movement. But the great majority of English Baptists are unalterably opposed to the requirement, for membership in churches, associations, or the Union, of any sort of creed subscription; while several of the most eminent of the leaders (as Clifford and Maclaren) have ministered to mixed churches, declining to make baptism a prerequisite to church membership; and a recent president of the Union, F. B. Meyer, was at the time of his election ministering to a pedobaptist church. It is probable that among English Baptist ministers who belong to the Baptist Union few hold to anything like a rigorous type

of Calvinism or feel any decided repugnance toward Arminianism, few feel shocked at the processes or results of the higher criticism, and few consider believers' baptism a prerequisite to participation in the Lord's Supper; and, while many believe in and teach the doctrine of the eternal punishment of all who die without faith in Christ, few would disfellowship a Christian for entertaining and encouraging in others the "larger hope."

Widely different has been the course of Baptist thought in America. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the number of Baptist ministers that could with due regard to the meaning of words be called well educated could be counted on one's fingers. Brown University had done less than might have been expected for the education of ministers. There is no evidence that those who administered its affairs were greatly concerned to fill its halls with young preachers, or that those who betook themselves to this seat of learning received much help along theological lines. Graduates of other universities that devoted themselves to the Baptist ministry were few and far between. Occasionally a man of unusual gifts and of independent means, like Richard Furman, supplied himself liberally with books and had leisure to become somewhat familiar with their contents. The great majority of American Baptists were Calvinistic, their doctrinal positions varying from that of Andrew Fuller to that of John Gill, many of the more illiterate going even beyond Gill in the harshness of their presentation of God's sovereignty and man's inability, and reaching a position hardly distinguishable from antinomianism. General (Arminian) Baptists still persisted in a feeble way, and Separate Baptists, with a tendency toward the Methodist type of evangelical Arminianism, had in many communities of the old Southwest refused to amalgamate with the Regulars; but these smaller bodies were for the most part far removed from the great currents of life and thought, and their ministers and members enjoyed little opportunity for culture.

During the early years of the nineteenth century Baptists devoted much of their energy to evangelistic work. Thousands were brought into the churches, and churches were multiplied. The preachers were for the most part illiterate, and the converts had no chance to become well instructed. The form of "free thought" current at the

time (infidelity of the Tom Paine type), so far from liberalizing popular Baptist thinking, had the effect of leading Baptists to look with horror upon any religious teaching that fell short of the strictest orthodoxy. The outbreak of unitarianism in New England about the beginning of the century caused the Baptists, even in New England, to be more than ever aggressive in their maintenance of rigorously supernaturalistic teaching. The Universalist movement, based upon the theory that Christ died for all men, and that all are therefore elected to salvation, caused some loss to Baptist churches, especially in New England, and Methodist influence led to the formation of the Free-Will Baptist denomination, which gained a considerable following in New England and in the maritime provinces of Canada. But competition with Universalism and with Methodism tended to strengthen rather than weaken the hold of Calvinism on the great mass of the Baptists. Arminian views were occasionally adopted by Baptist ministers during the early years of the nineteenth century, as during the later years of the eighteenth; but the denominational sentiment was strong enough to silence or convince the dissident, and to prevent the spread of their views.

The protest of Alexander Campbell against the rigorous Calvinism of the Baptists and their requirement of assent to the Philadelphia Confession of Faith by the churches as a condition of membership in associations, along with other features of his "reformation" that seemed to magnify Scripture authority, led to the defection of considerable numbers from the Baptist ranks in the old Southwest, but tended to harden those that remained faithful in their Calvinistic orthodoxy.

The inauguration of the Baptist foreign missionary movement and the formation of what came to be known as the Triennial Convention (1814) led to the strengthening and the consolidation of the moderate and intelligent element in the denomination, and was followed by remarkable activity, not only in foreign evangelization, but in home mission, educational, Sunday-school, and publication enterprise as well. The most intelligent and influential of the Baptist leaders of America thus became closely associated in Christian endeavor and stimulated each other in all good ways. There is no evidence of any important doctrinal differences among the members

of the Convention, and the advocate of open communion, future probation, or anything that fell short of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures would, no doubt, have found himself utterly discredited.

A large proportion of the uneducated pastors and churches looked with suspicion upon the agents of the Convention as practicing an unwarranted exploitation of the churches. The wonderful increase in Baptist members and churches that had taken place within their memory had been accomplished, not by the collection and expenditure of money through missionary societies, but by spirit-filled men who had preached the gospel without money and without price. The proposal to educate ministers was looked upon by Baptists of this type as an impertinent interference with God's call and equipment of preachers. They soon came to have a fanatical hatred of Sunday schools, prayer-meetings, missionary societies, temperance societies, tract societies, and human institutions in general, all of which seemed to them the devices of the devil for destroying the simplicity and the purity of the gospel. Within a few years the enterprises of the Convention were almost completely crowded out of Tennessee and Kentucky, and in several other states it long seemed doubtful whether the friends of the Great Commission, or those who were in the fetters of ignorance, prejudice, and avarice, would triumph. The opponents of missionary and educational enterprise became more and more extreme in their hyper-Calvinism by reason of their opposition, and many of them went to the extreme of fatalism and antinomianism. This type of Baptist life and thought has successfully maintained its numbers and has at present over a hundred thousand adherents; but the relative growth of missionary Baptists has been so great as to leave their opponents in the position of being an almost negligible quantity.

The establishment of Baptist colleges and theological seminaries and of a denominational press, together with the rapid development of educational facilities of a general kind throughout the entire country, resulted by the middle of the nineteenth century in multiplying the number of well-educated ministers and in greatly raising the intellectual standard of the denomination. Scholars like Thomas J. Conant, Horatio B. Hackett, Asahel C. Kendrick, Ezekiel G. Robinson, and Alvah Hovey, with a score of only slightly

lesser lights, at the North, and like Boyce, Broadus, Manley, Williams, Brantly, and Winkler, in the South, most of whom had been trained in the best non-Baptist institutions and several of whom had studied in the universities of Germany, gave a broader outlook to the Baptist ministry of the country than it had ever known.

Ezekiel G. Robinson, for many years president of the Rochester Theological Seminary, and a thinker of boldness and acumen, discouraged in his students the acceptance of traditional views simply because they had been handed down from past generations, and no doubt led some of the less conservatively disposed among his students ~~to~~ trust more in human reason than was commonly thought wholesome. He was less aggressive than many of his brethren in his maintenance of distinctive Baptist principles, and while he did not advocate open communion, his failure to stress restricted communion is thought to have influenced some minds in favor of the laxer doctrine and practice.

George W. Northrup, as professor of church history in the Rochester Theological Seminary and as president of the institution that has been perpetuated in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, was from the beginning of his career as a teacher distinctly independent in relation to current Baptist orthodoxy. During his later years he published a series of articles in which he departed widely from the type of Calvinistic doctrine which American Baptists had long generally accepted, and he seems to have assumed an attitude of toleration toward biblical criticism of the more radical type. Augustus H. Strong, as president of Rochester Theological Seminary and professor of systematic theology, abandoned several years ago his earlier defense of the inerrancy of the Scriptures and became ~~distinctly~~ hospitable toward the "higher criticism." He also made an earnest effort to reach a conception of the human will that involves more of freedom than Calvinism allows and less than that claimed by Arminianism. Under the influence of current Lutheran theology, with its Neoplatonic, Mystical, semi-pantheistic elements, he early adopted essentially Eutychian views of the relation of the divine and the human in the person of Christ (as in his acceptance of the doctrine of the communication of all divine attributes to the humanity of Christ, involving the virtual absorption of the finite human by the infinite

divine and in his adoption of the Alexandrian denial of a human will in Christ). His later pronouncement in favor of monism was the further carrying-out, under the influence of recent German thought, of the semi-pantheistic teaching already accepted. When, in response to criticism, he restated his position as "ethical monism," the difference between the resultant position and his earlier was hardly appreciable. Closely connected with this "monistic" phase of his theological thought is his frank acceptance of the evolution philosophy and his effort to apply this to theology without too much sacrifice of the supernatural in creation, the origin of man's moral and religious nature, the fall, redemption, and revelation. While only a few of his students and the readers of his books, it is probable, have fully realized the historical relations and the bearings of his earlier Eutychian and his later monistic views, his departure from strict Calvinistic teaching, his liberal attitude in relation to the Scriptures, and his acceptance of the evolution philosophy could hardly fail to exert a widespread influence against Baptist conservatism of the older type.

The influence exerted upon Baptist thought by Conant, Hackett, and Kendrick, the eminent linguists and biblical scholars, is not so easy to estimate. Thoroughly familiar themselves with German biblical criticism, so far as it had developed in their time, and admirers and emulators of German scholarship, they yet maintained relatively conservative views respecting the authority and the inspiration of the Scriptures, and gave no indication of any tendency to eliminate or to minimize the supernatural element in biblical history. By encouraging their students to become masters of German exegetical literature, to carry on exhaustive studies after the manner of the Germans, and when possible to study in the German universities, they greatly promoted learning among Baptists, and incidentally brought many young men under liberalizing influences.

Substantially the same thing may be said respecting John A. Broadus, who was equally eminent as a biblical scholar, and possessed a remarkably strong personality. As preacher and teacher he wielded an almost unmeasured influence throughout the South, and far beyond. He, too, promoted the study of German exegetical works and encouraged his best students to pursue graduate courses of study in German universities. His own religious experience was so pro-

found and his faith in the authority of the Scriptures so well grounded that he regarded with equanimity the thorough testing that the books of the Bible were undergoing and had no misgivings as to the ultimate result. His tolerance toward biblical criticism even of a somewhat radical type was manifest in his admiration and friendship for Crawford H. Toy, who, years before the public criticism of some of his radical utterances had made his position in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary untenable, had reached conclusions, as his intimate friends well knew, completely out of harmony with the views of his constituents. It can hardly be doubted that Dr. Toy's years of active service as professor in the seminary influenced many minds in favor of more liberal views of the Bible. That few followed him in his extreme positions was due to the deeply spiritual and practical influence of Broadus and others, and to the uncompromising conservatism of the denominational press and of the Southern Baptists in general. The dismissal of Dr. Toy had the effect, no doubt, of discrediting in the eyes of many of his former students the critical methods that were responsible for it, and of putting the seminary itself more than ever on its guard against anything that could be construed into disloyalty toward the Scriptures.

The controversy that arose a few years ago because of certain conclusions regarding Baptist history reached and promulgated by William H. Whitsitt, then president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary and professor of church history, to the effect that English antipedobaptists did not reach the conviction until about 1641 that immersion is the exclusively valid form of baptism, and that earlier antipedobaptists regarded the mode of applying water as a matter of indifference, led many graduates of the seminary, and others who sympathized with Dr. Whitsitt, to demand for the seminary faculty, and for all, freedom to investigate and freedom to publish the results of research, in opposition to those who regarded Dr. Whitsitt as disloyal to the denomination because of his willingness to proclaim as historical discoveries alleged facts that seemed to them highly discreditable to the Baptists and destructive of denominational prestige. The defense of Dr. Whitsitt was rendered all the more difficult by the fact that he had first published his alleged discoveries in editorial articles written "from a pedobaptist point of view" in an undenomi-

national journal, and that, in the interest of his reputation as a discoverer, he had avowed the authorship of the objectionable articles. Yet many who regarded the publication of the articles as a mistake and the gratuitous avowal of their authorship as unwise felt themselves compelled to do everything possible to prevent the triumph of the conservatives and the ultra-conservatives in his exclusion from the seminary. The *Baptist Argus*, that was founded about the beginning of the controversy to counteract the influence of the *Western Recorder* that led the opposition to Dr. Whitsitt and stood for a more rigorous type of Baptist conservatism than the friends of Dr. Whitsitt, including a majority of the members of the seminary faculty, approved, has become in a sense the organ of the seminary, and has exercised a profound influence in favor of freedom of thought and of utterance, especially among the Baptists of the Southeast. Its influence was paramount in the formation of the General Convention of Baptists of North America (St. Louis, 1905), and in bringing about the Baptist World Congress (London, 1905), both of which meetings effected permanent organization for the promotion of brotherhood and cooperation among Baptists. The Southeastern Baptist press stands for the most part upon the same platform as the *Baptist Argus* and the seminary, and the Southern Baptist Convention, a majority of whose attending members are always from the Southeast, is swayed by the same moderately conservative spirit.

The influence of Alvah Hovey, of the Newton Theological Institution, as professor and president, was during his long career strong, sane, and moderately conservative. Though surrounded by pervasive liberalizing influences, he maintained to a remarkable degree the even tenor of his way. Yet the introduction into the faculty during the later years of his administration of men of a somewhat liberal type would seem to indicate that he was not aggressively hostile to the practice of a reverent criticism of the biblical books, and his definition of inspiration does not carry with it evidence of conviction on his part of the absolute inerrancy of Scripture.

The Hamilton Theological Seminary (the theological department of Colgate University) was long regarded as a bulwark of Baptist orthodoxy and, like the institutions at Rochester and Newton Center, has furnished to the world a host of able and consecrated

missionaries, college presidents, professors, and pastors. A few years ago Nathanael Schmidt, a brilliant Semitic scholar, retired from the faculty because of his application of the "higher criticism" to the Old Testament books, with somewhat destructive results. Professor Schmidt immediately accepted the chair of Semitic languages in Cornell University and became a member of the Ithaca Baptist church. The recent publication of his *The Prophet of Nazareth*, which embodies the most extreme phase of New Testament destructive criticism, probably had something to do with his withdrawal from the church and the denomination. Yet William N. Clarke, professor of systematic theology in the seminary, who has given world-wide fame to the institution by writings that combine deep spirituality and devoutness with denial of the plenary inspiration and inerrancy of the Scriptures, the expression of the "larger hope" respecting those who have died without personal faith in Christ, and many other departures from what is commonly regarded as Baptist orthodoxy, has retained in the highest measure the confidence and respect of his colleagues and of multitudes of other Baptists. The example of a man who can hold to such views without loss of piety or zeal, and whose Christian character no one would dare call in question, has had a mighty influence in encouraging young men to seek to realize in themselves a like gracious combination of sanctified sweetness and light with liberal sentiments.

The influence of the late President William Rainey Harper in popularizing more liberal views of the Bible, and encouraging throughout wide circles a spirit of freedom of thought and utterance, is too much in evidence to require elaborate exposition. Through his correspondence courses in Hebrew; through his journals for the promotion of biblical and Semitic studies; through his activity in the founding and building-up of the University of Chicago, with its large opportunities for research and the publication of the results of research in every department; through the incorporation of the Baptist Union Theological Seminary with the university as its divinity school; through the publication of the *American Journal of Theology*, edited by the faculty of the Divinity School on the most liberal undenominational and international basis; through the transformation of an earlier more popular monthly into the *Biblical World*, with greatly

increased circulation and influence; through the publication of inductive Sunday-school lessons and lessons for Bible clubs, and the systematic efforts put forth to secure the effective use of these publications; through the organization of international and interdenominational societies for the promotion of biblical studies (these somewhat indefinite specifications are barely suggestive of the influences set at work by this wonderful educationist)—he influenced Baptist life and thought to an incalculable extent. Add to these his own somewhat voluminous writings and his widespread personal influence through his activity as teacher, through his addresses delivered on public occasions all over the country, and through the prestige that came from his successful leadership in the establishment of a great university, and it will scarcely be denied by anyone that we have in his person an elemental force of the first magnitude for the liberalizing the Baptist denomination.

Some of the Eastern Baptist universities (notably Brown) have been for some time conducted on almost as liberal a basis as the University of Chicago, and are exerting, in a less conspicuous way, a like influence on Baptist thought and life. Many Baptist students have been educated in undenominational universities and seminaries noted for their liberal thought (as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin, Union Theological Seminary, etc.), and have imbibed more or less of the spirit of these institutions.

Many even of the smaller Baptist universities and colleges, even those that are being conducted under highly conservative auspices, have felt compelled to look for teachers of natural science and specialists in other departments among the graduates of the larger universities in which liberal ideas prevail.

Textbooks, popular, scientific, and philosophical literature, much general literature, much periodical literature (including the daily press), have come to be permeated with modes of thought antagonistic to the spirit of Baptist conservatism.

The Baptist Congress, organized twenty-four years ago by a small group of Baptists of the more liberal type for the purpose of promoting freedom of discussion, while it has never sought recognition as a denominational institution, has furnished occasion for the utterance

of radical opinions in every department of religious thought distasteful to the great majority of Baptists. It has been the policy of the management of the Congress to secure in the discussion of each topic the presentation of conservative and liberal views by representative men, and thus to add zest to its sessions and attract readers to its annual reports. There can be no question that many Baptist ministers inclined to liberal views have been led by the Congress to commit themselves publicly to advanced positions and to become aggressively liberal, who might otherwise have kept their skepticism in abeyance and have finally overcome it.

Baptist orthodoxy is being vigorously assailed in another direction by an aggressive premillennialism, whose advocates maintain uncompromisingly the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures and regard with abhorrence the application of the "higher criticism" to the books of the Bible as being prompted by satanic influence. Institutions in which such criticism is practiced and encouraged they look upon as Satan's chief instrumentalities for counteracting the influence of true Christianity. They assume a distinctly hostile attitude toward modern science and philosophy, and do not for the most part encourage those who are under their influence to pursue courses of study in universities and theological seminaries wherein modes of thought hostile to their conceptions of religion and of the Bible are inculcated. They show, on the other hand, a marked preference for Bible schools or training-schools, from which modern modes of thought are, as far as possible, excluded, and in which attention is given to the inculcation of their method of Scripture interpretation and the securing of a practical knowledge of the English Bible, with skill in using its contents for evangelistic purposes and for the defense of the millennarian system. A favorite and effective method of propagandism is the holding of Bible conferences in the great religious centers, especially where a member of the party is in a position of influence. At these conferences the chief Baptist millennialists of the country gather and with leading millennialists of other denominations employ the intensive method for impressing their views on all who attend. The ties that bind Baptist premillennialists to premillennialists of other denominations are in many cases much closer than those that bind them to non-millennialist Baptists, and many of the former develop

strong open-communion sentiments. This type of thought has a tendency, it would seem, to produce indifference toward the organized work of the denomination, and to stimulate interest in undenominational evangelism, as represented in the institutions founded by Mr. Moody and the China Inland Mission. This type of evangelistic millennialism came into the Baptist denomination from the influence of the Plymouth Brethren, through evangelists like Henry Varley and Dwight L. Moody. Among Baptists who have been active in propagating it the most influential was Dr. A. J. Gordon, whose university and theological training, rich personality, popularity as preacher and lecturer, literary skill and industry in bringing his views to bear upon the reading public, and organizing ability in building up a training-school and in directing the work of many evangelists, gave to him a foremost place among the religious influences of his time.

Dr. A. T. Pierson, a baptized believer, but not a member of a Baptist church, has much in common with Gordon, and is still exerting a widespread influence in favor of evangelistic millennialism, through the press, the pulpit, and the lecture platform. Perhaps the most eminent living Baptist representative of this type of religious thought and work in America is A. C. Dixon, pastor of the Ruggles Street Church, Boston, who as preacher, evangelist, and participant in Bible conferences has become widely known and highly influential throughout America and also in Great Britain. He is said to devote little attention to any books but the Bible, and to wish to be known as in the strictest sense a man of one book.¹ On the same platform in all important particulars stand Len G. Broughton, of Atlanta, and W. B. Riley, of Minneapolis. These, with many other premillennialists of less eminence, are exerting a strong influence in favor of a millennialistic type of evangelism, with its rigorous views of Scripture, its intense earnestness, and its magnifying of the work of the Holy Spirit, of salvation by grace, and of atonement through the substitutionary sacrifice of Jesus Christ. Many conservative Baptists have no doubt been driven by fear of the destruction of

¹ Since the above sentences were written, Dr. Dixon has accepted a call to the pastorate of the Moody church in Chicago, and the denominational weeklies are questioning the consistency of his profession of loyalty to the denomination and his identification of himself with a non-Baptist organization.

scriptural authority and of evangelical religion through the spread of rationalism to seek refuge in this intensely anti-rationalistic mode of thought, which claims to make the Scriptures absolutely supreme and to accept the Holy Spirit as sole interpreter and guide.

But it would be a colossal mistake for ultra-liberals to conclude that victory has been achieved and that the days of Baptist orthodoxy are numbered, or for the premillennialist brethren to conclude that the future is theirs. There is no occasion for undue alarm on the part of conservative Baptists, who are still in a vast majority and who still control the working forces of the denomination. With perhaps two exceptions, all of our theological seminaries wish to be regarded as adherents to the faith for which Baptists in the past have earnestly contended. Nathan E. Wood, the present president of the Newton Theological Institution, having in mind the denomination at large, but no doubt expressing his own convictions and those of his colleagues recently wrote:

No one of the great Christian doctrines which we held at the beginning of the century [the nineteenth] has been abandoned at the close of it. Each one has gained a richer content of meaning, a wider application, and a larger appreciation. The century has wonderfully illustrated the fact "that new light is continually springing out of God's word." Baptists have never in all their history had such a point of vantage as at the beginning of the new century for carrying the gospel into all the world and so glorifying their ascended Lord.*

Yet he elsewhere speaks of the theory of verbal inspiration universally held by Baptists at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and still held explicitly or implicitly by fully nine-tenths of the Baptists of America, as "crass" and as having barred "the way against any inquiry into the grounds of authority."

Baptists [he says] now appear to accept the authority of the Scriptures chiefly because of the Christian consciousness of their eternal fitness to be the words of God. . . . The real and ultimate grounds of acceptance are the affirmations of Christian consciousness. The verbal theory itself has been so modified as to allow for the free play of the human element in inspired utterance.

He regards "historical criticism" as a means of determining "the ultimate grounds of the authority of the Scriptures" as "distinctly a failure," being no more effective than water would be as a test

* In *A Century of Baptist Achievement*, edited by the writer (Philadelphia, 1901), art. "Movements in Baptist Theology."

of gold in ore. He seemingly accepts the theory of evolution in the realm of biology, and admits that many new questions regarding "the origin of evil; of race-sin as well as individual sin; of race-penalties as well as individual penalties; of how far the union of Christ with the race lifted both kinds of penalty; to what extent incarnation marks Christ to be in every man and every man in him," etc., have been raised thereby, some of which, he thinks, are still unsolved; yet he earnestly repudiates the universalistic conclusions that some have drawn from evolution premises, and regards missionary enterprise as more than ever incumbent upon Christians. It is probable that some members of the Newton faculty are more conservative and some more liberal than President Wood; but it seems certain that the institution as a whole, while it stands upon a more liberal platform than in earlier days, still earnestly maintains that the Scriptures are a divine revelation, and that the religion of Christ is of supreme importance to all men. m |

Reference has already been made to the somewhat advanced teachings of W. N. Clarke, of the Theological Seminary of Colgate University. It is not to be supposed that the president of the university or all the members of the divinity faculty accept all his teachings. They believe in the man as an earnest Christian, respect him for his power as a teacher and his literary gifts, and would not feel justified in demanding his withdrawal; but it is probable that they disapprove of much that he has written. Few institutions take a deeper interest in foreign missions, or send a larger proportion of their graduates to the foreign field, than Colgate.

While the president of the Rochester Theological Seminary has + in some respects departed from the older orthodoxy, and while some other members of the Rochester faculty have manifested liberal tendencies in other directions, the institution still wishes to be regarded as holding fast to the great truths for which our fathers contended, and is endeavoring, with greatly increased resources, to maintain its place as a potent agency for the promotion of Christ's cause. In a recent report to the board of trustees President Strong thus expresses his conception of the present attitude of the institution:

Yet we have not apostatized from the faith, nor have we ceased to teach the unity and sufficiency of Scripture, righteousness as the fundamental attribute of /

God, the fall of man and original sin, the deity, pre-existence, virgin-birth and physical resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, his omnipresence in nature, in history, and in the hearts of his people, the regenerating work of his Holy Spirit, and his future second coming to judge the world and to reward the faithful. I believe that the teaching of these truths has won for us the confidence of the churches and the favor of God. Let others teach as they will; we propose to walk in the old paths and to hand down to our successors the old gospel.

The venerable Henry G. Weston, president of the Crozer Theological Seminary, stands today on virtually the same platform that he has stood upon for the past fifty years, and is still exerting a profound and widespread influence in favor of conservative Baptist thought. While some of his colleagues have manifested a more liberal spirit, Crozer may safely be numbered among the positive forces for the conservation of Baptist orthodoxy.

The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, with the largest constituency of any of our institutions, has carefully avoided any expression of sympathy with the "New Theology" or destructive biblical criticism. President Mullins, on behalf of the faculty, has recently given the strongest possible assurance that the moderately conservative attitude of the institution will be maintained, and that the institution will continue to send out large numbers of preachers who accept without qualification the authority of the Scriptures, and who believe that the gospel of Christ, and that alone, is the power of God unto salvation.

Decidedly conservative is the Baylor Theological Seminary, of Waco, Tex., where B. H. Carroll, mighty in the Scriptures, and mighty in his power to impress and enforce the most rigorous orthodoxy and yet remarkably tolerant toward those who honestly differ with him in their theological views, and Calvin Goodspeed, who, with rare sweetness of spirit and with rare logical acumen, teaches a thoroughly orthodox theology and repels what he conceives to be erroneous innovations, constitute a tower of strength for accepted Baptist doctrine and practice. The new theological seminary in Kansas City is also working along distinctly conservative lines.

It is easy to exaggerate the extent to which the Divinity School of the University of Chicago is given over to the promulgation of ultra-liberal views. From the beginning several members of the faculty have represented conservatism of the most thoroughgoing type.

So far as the writer can judge, the majority of the faculty as at present constituted are earnest and devout representatives of the same type of thought that characterizes the more liberal members of the Rochester, Newton, and Colgate faculties. The following extract from a recent editorial in the *Biblical World* probably represents fairly their attitude toward the Bible and revealed religion:

It is our conviction that in the books which have for centuries been accepted as the Bible of the Christian church there is contained a revelation of religious truth which the world still needs and will never cease to need. We believe that it is good for men everywhere that these books should be read and studied—by scholars, with scholarly thoroughness and exhaustiveness; by Christian preachers, in reverent search for the message which they shall give to the people; by the student of good literature, for their literary beauty, their elevated and elevating thought; by busy men and women, for comfort, inspiration, and spur to right action; by the young, that they may set out upon their careers with high ideals and fixed purpose to live strongly and nobly; by the children, that they may early come under the charm of the truth-suggesting stories which these books contain, and the elevating atmosphere in which they move. . . . That solid results for theology and life are to be gained by historical study, and only thus, is regarded as established beyond the necessity for further debate. What remains to be done is faithfully and patiently to prosecute such study, and to promote it by the publication of its reasonably assured results. . . . They expect some changes, both in the opinions of scholars and in the opinions of thoughtful men and women generally. They anticipate that the children of the next generation will begin life with conceptions of some matters pertaining to religion and the Bible somewhat different from those with which they themselves began. They welcome all progress that comes through larger knowledge. It is not for them to determine beforehand what is to be learned, and what direction progress is to take. Nor will they call all change progress. The old that is true—and they are persuaded that the heart of the old is true—they will seek to defend and conserve with all fidelity. They hold no brief for any new view. But they will seek ever to keep their faces to the light, in the confidence that all truth is good, the newly found equally with the long familiar.

The strongest and most pervasive conservative influence among the Baptists of America at the present time is unquestionably the denominational press. Of the scores of weekly journals that go into hundreds of thousands of Baptist homes hardly half a dozen, it is probable, show any inclination on the part of their editors toward liberal views regarding the Bible and its teachings. It is probable that no Baptist newspaper that should become the advocate of ultra-liberal views could find a constituency large enough to support it.

The great mass of Baptist people, even in the States that have come most under the influence of the new theology, are conservative, and they demand conservatism in the papers they support. The positive influence of denominational papers in keeping conservative teaching constantly before the minds of the people, and their negative influence in deterring those who have come more or less under the sway of liberal modes of thought from rash and radical utterance, can hardly be overestimated.

It is probable that even in the New England and Middle States not one Baptist member in ten is conscious of any important change in theology or departure from the old Baptist orthodoxy. In the western and southeastern States probably not one Baptist in twenty has been seriously affected by the "New Theology." In the great Southwest, where Baptists abound and are exceedingly aggressive, one in a hundred would, it is thought, be a liberal estimate of those who have to any appreciable degree yielded to innovating influences.

Mention should be made of the influence in favor of conservative Baptist thought still being exerted by several eminent Baptists not now actively engaged in theological instruction. Howard Osgood, formerly a member of the faculty of the Rochester Theological Seminary, and generally recognized as one of the foremost Old Testament scholars in America, has published much in defense of the older views regarding the Old Testament books, and is no doubt devoting his leisure to more elaborate writings against the alleged results of the "higher criticism." Henry E. Robins is enriching Baptist literature with ethical and apologetical works embodying conservative Baptist teaching. William C. Wilkinson, the greatest writer that the denomination has ever possessed, has published much in defense of Baptist conservatism, and has just completed what will probably be accepted by evangelical Christians as by far the best life of Christ ever written, and which is no doubt his theological masterpiece. William Ashmore, the veteran missionary; Jesse B. Thomas, who recently retired because of advancing age from the Newton faculty; and Galusha Anderson, who for the same reason recently discontinued his work in the Divinity school of the University of Chicago, are all earnestly contending for the faith of our fathers and influencing many minds.

It has been made abundantly evident that Baptists and their antipedobaptist predecessors have never been completely homogeneous in their modes of thought or in their doctrinal beliefs. Considering the mental idiosyncrasies of individual Christians and of different Christian communities, and the influence that current philosophical and scientific thought inevitably exercises upon theological thinking, absolute uniformity, persisting from generation to generation, can hardly be expected. That without a creed recognized as authoritative and binding, without ecclesiastical courts for the enforcement of uniformity in doctrine and practice on churches and ministers, and with the completest independence of individual Baptist churches, there is as much in common as there is among five million Baptists of America, is one of the marvels of church history. To one who is familiar with the past history of Christianity and that of the Baptist denomination there is nothing in the facts of the immediate past and the present that should cause alarm. "Things are getting better," to use J. B. Gambrell's expressive phrase, and not worse. With Hubmaier, the great antipedobaptist of the sixteenth century, we may console ourselves with the assurance that "the truth is immortal." Nothing that is vital in historical Christianity will or can perish or cease to be effective. Gold is not destroyed by passing through the crucible, but rather refined. If the documents that Christians regard as sacred and authoritative are really the expression and embodiment of God's truth for the guidance of mankind in spiritual things, they will only be made more effective, as they have been made in the past, by criticism, whether it is hostile or friendly. Baptists need fear to lose nothing of their inheritance that is valuable, if they prove faithful in their use and administration of all that has been committed to them. As a matter of fact, they never possessed so many advantages and never encountered so few obstacles to progress as today. Individuals, institutions, and communities may for a time fall into error and disturb the harmony of the body; but the denomination as a whole is too well grounded in the truth, and too mighty in numbers, in institutions, and in denominational spirit, to be disadvantageously affected by currents of thought that may seem adverse.

RELIGION AND THE IMAGINATION

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That the subject is of great importance to those who seek a vitalizing conception of religion seems clear from the history of the connection between religion and the arts. On the lighter side the familiar illustration of dancing comes at once into the mind. When first men danced, they danced for the glory of God. Passing into a more serious mood, the history of dancing suggests the history of poetic measure; for it was through dancing that men beat out the laws of rhythmic utterance. Going deeper still, we know that all the liberal arts found their beginnings in religion. And more than their beginnings. The drama has never gone higher than the pitch to which the Greeks carried it, and in their conception of it from beginning to end, the connection is plain. Architecture, lifting itself above the level of naked utility in order to honor the Deity, in the same service has attained its highest flights.

But it may be thought that, while the connection between religion and the work of high imagination is necessarily close in the youth of the world, in the world's maturity it need not be so. Certainly our own age, with its manifold specializations of function, may seem to suggest this conclusion. Yet even in our time there is still one art, music, which refuses, when aiming at the best, to accept any mistress but religion. And one thing is certain: so far as the deepest interests of religion are concerned, our affairs at present are not so well organized that we may safely generalize upon our immediate experience. Not until the religious consciousness shall have had a new-birth and, after taking into itself that feeling for nature and for social obligation which is becoming characteristic of our age, shall have set itself to find the channels of enduring self-expression, would it be safe to infer that the connection between religion and the supreme forms of aesthetic emotion is any less close in the alleged maturity of the world than in its so-called youth.

In speaking on so grave and weighty a subject, I claim the freedom of an irresponsible layman who, lacking all technical knowledge and unhampered by the conscience of the specialist, judges things altogether in the light of their appeal to his own needs and their influence upon his personal feeling. At the outset of the *Laocoon*, Lessing contrasts three judges in the field of aesthetics—the philosopher, the art-critic, and the everyday lover of the beautiful. For the last of the three all judgments are built on the fact that the beautiful makes absent things present and identifies appearance with reality. This is the layman's point of view—the point of view from which I start, and back to which I shall continually return. And in particular I take the latter of Lessing's two counts in the layman's estimate as my text. The main effect of the beautiful is to overcome the dualism between reality and appearance, and so bring the mind to rest. In childhood we do not dream that our world shall some day break in two. It is all of one piece, a field of joyous action and self-expression wherein the material and spiritual, the body and the soul, form an indivisible unity. What things seem to be, things are. But, as we grow up, there comes a tragic breach in the unity and integrity of our world. The reality of things draws aloof from appearances. And the search for reality, for things that shall never make a promise to the ear only to break it to the heart, becomes the main end of an earnest life.

The history of our own mind is the history of the race writ small. In the selfsame way did Greek philosophy—the one philosophy which in its course wrought out with perfect coherence and intellectual beauty the logic of thought—run its career. In its first phase appearance and reality are indivisible; matter and mind are one; the universe is all alive with a continuous and unbroken meaning. In its second phase this unity is broken. Mind, distinguishing itself from nature, finds knowledge as a problem on its hands. And in the third phase, philosophy having wearied of the task of thinking appearance and reality together, the soul appeals to religion to overcome the dualism that is wrecking life. Religious emotion is to do what philosophy cannot do, and, surging through the restless heart of man, makes his world one again, and so grants him absolution and peace.

The simple and untrained lover of the beautiful finds, to repeat Lessing's words, that painting and poesy, by making absent things present, put his choicest emotions above the reach of time. We may well join to Lessing's words the fine saying of Charles Eliot Norton about the classic books; they are the books that are contemporary with all generations. The nobly beautiful brings the eternal into our midst, and naturalizes it. But this is contributory to the prime result, and that is to overcome the gulf between reality and appearance. In the presence chamber of beauty things are what they seem to be.

So far as the history of aesthetic theory comes home to the man who, deeply enjoying the beautiful, seeks for the root and ground of his pleasure, it is the modern aesthetic theory that chiefly concerns him. The fact that the ancients for the most part suggest aesthetic theory rather than develop it, the related fact that the bulk of modern theory is so large, points to the conclusion that the need of modern folk for the distinct and specific ministry of the beautiful is peculiarly compelling. With us the arts are consciously, in some cases deliberately, independent of religion. This is a situation which was quite foreign both to antiquity and to our own past so recent as the Middle Ages. One may apply to antiquity at large the well-known saying that there is no supernatural in Homer. Nature and the supernatural were everywhere one. And while, in the Middle Ages, nature and the supernatural were clearly distinguished, still the supernatural had such complete control of the situation, such entire predominance over the human spirit, that nature became a plastic symbol in the hands of the supernatural. But with the men of the post-Renaissance and post-Reformation period, nature and the supernatural became not only distinct but practically separate fields of being and spheres of action.

In Stoicism "God" and "nature" were inseparable. In Neoplatonism, widely as it differed from Stoicism in thought, the same thing held true for emotion. As a consequence, the religious consciousness and the sense of the beautiful slipped into each other without being aware of a break. But with us it is not so. We are apt to be aware of something going on, more or less like the jar produced by the coupling of cars, when we pass from one to the other. It may be that in the distant future, when the great revival of religion and

theology shall have got well under way, when the cosmic feeling which science is bringing to the birth shall have so matured as frankly to disclose its religious quality, we may once again attain, upon a higher level, the point of view, or rather the instinctive consciousness, of antiquity. Meanwhile, however, things being as they are, the modern needs the distinct and specific ministry of the beautiful. Our aesthetic theory is more or less a part of the answer to our demand for salvation.

Aristotle, the one ancient about whom the most casual reader is bound to know something, comes fairly close to being a modern. Just as his theory of evolution, since it was far ahead of his time, had to wait till our day to be clearly grasped and fully appreciated, so in a measure with his aesthetic theory. Unlike Plato, Aristotle was not deeply religious by nature. Unlike him also, he gave his mind and attention to scientific studies. To Plato the visible world is a symbol of the idea. To Aristotle it is an integral part of reality. Hence there is in him a distinct suggestion of the modern need and the modern theory. The visible universe is immensely real. The soul is not, as with Plato, quick and eager. Idealism has hands and feet, discards wings. So the problems of life are imperious, and, the appeal to religion not being instinctive, the need for the ministry of poetry in its highest form, the drama, becomes almost conscious. It is the function of the drama to purge the heart of pity and fear. One sees a noble character brought through fault and disaster to the lowest level of misery and shame; pity racks the mind of the onlooker. Before our eyes stands the hero, bent on the best things, yet twisted from his purpose and his plan of life wrenched from his hand by pitiless and irresistible circumstances; and our hearts are pierced through with dread, with a deep sense of our littleness and incompetence, and the fear of unseen and unsympathetic powers and tendencies that bear us on, without our will and say, to goals unknown and undesired. But the dramatic action weaves the tragedy into the context of life. The deep emotion it excites makes connections real even though uncomprehended, between the heart of man and the heart of things. Pain and disaster become somehow part of a larger plan, a wider law. And the sympathetic mind is cleansed of pity and fear, thus attaining sanity and peace.

Aristotle's theory, while not wholly appropriated in antiquity had many conscious or unconscious imitations. One is tempted to think that we catch an echo of it in Vergil's noble line: *Sunt lachrymae rerum ac mentem mortalia tangunt*. Beyond doubt, it is consciously in the mind of Dion Chrysostom when he sets himself to describing the impression left on the imagination by the Olympian Zeus of Pheidias. "Let a man whose soul is at hard labor, and who has drunk the cup of disaster and sorrow to the dregs, once stand before this statue; he will forget all the terrors and the woes of human life" (*Ov.* 12:51). The note is distinctly modern.

For by modern feeling we mean the feeling of the European or American who is acutely awake to the problems of life as it must be lived by men who are sincere and whole-hearted in their devotion to the life of the nation in its entirety. There is a ready shield against the keenest edge and sharpest point of these problems, if a man will only forget his ancestry. The sweet and urgent mysticism that has its birth and breeding in India bids one leave the affairs of state to the men who have no distinct bias for the spiritual. To be sure, this is not altogether easy. For so ingrained in us is the interest in political and social problems that, strive as we may to forget, the social ideal will persist, to borrow a phrase from *The Wild Duck*, in sending us duns. But if we can attain to perfect absenteeism, if we can think the state off the field of primary reality, then the problem is solved—at least its point is broken. The heart that is pierced through with many sorrows drinks of the river of forgetfulness.

But this voice we cannot, as loyal sons of the West, listen to. For us as for Aristotle—nay, for us even more than for Aristotle—the state possesses primary reality. Consistent mysticism may tempt, but it cannot convince us. We stand fast in our place within a society dreaming of freedom. We may not hope to escape the awful problems which the nation presses upon us. Rather, as becometh men of our descent, we bare our breasts to them. We will have no peace that is to be purchased by flinching from the supreme task of conscience. Our problems are our heritage. If we cannot live with them, we will die with them. And the universe, finding us in this mood, presses in on us with its unmeasurable being. The cozy parochial conceptions of our fathers are gone forever. The vastness

of our world terrifies while inspiring us. Its air of indifference to our woes and sorrows is so serene that it becomes majestic. If the storm "pities neither wise men nor fools," yet as a storm it is magnificent. But the majesty of the universe in league with its indifference makes the problem of life acute. Not for long can the mystic get us away from its compelling interest. We must stand fast, seeking to find our place and fulfil our function within the visible order of things. Like the mediaeval serf, we are written down in the law code of the cosmos as belonging to a definite nook and corner of mother Earth. Less and less can we conscientiously appeal our vital causes to the future life for settlement. The snow, falling from our heaven, no longer covers over the hideousness and the horror within life as it is. We face things as they are, and, no matter how great may be our faith in the future, the present situation strikes to the heart with irresistible pain.

Aristotle has this modern quality in a measure. It is the large possession of it that makes Kant so deeply representative. On the one side, he caught the full impact of the modern conception of the universe. On the other side, he carried the philosophic conception of reason to the full length of mental initiative. Sharing with Rousseau that splendid interest in the rights of the common people which was the ennobling passion of the revolutionary period, he, with all the idealists of his age, made freedom his supreme end. The philosophic reason is wholly incompetent to ground and base man's belief in freedom. The philosophic argument for the existence of God as the sufficient support of the ideal world and its interests, riddled by criticism, sinks to the bottom. So far as philosophy can carry us, we stand in a world of unsolved contradictions. Encompassing and assailing us is the realm of natural necessity. In our souls is the ideal of freedom, of ethical initiative, and of creative moralizing power. What help can the eye and the ear bring to us? For the besieged heart of man, what cheer?

Here is the birthplace of the Kantian theory of beauty. Beauty, in all its varied appeals to us, is detached from and superior to bare utility. To use Schiller's thought, it shares in the freedom of play. Just as in play we attest to ourselves our possession of a nature larger than our plans and our work can account for, so in the field of

the beautiful we are naturalized within a world too large for the conception of natural necessity to account for. The effect of the beautiful, lifting us above sensation and logic, enfranchises us. This effect is carried to its height by the noblest form of beauty, called the sublime. The sublime frightens our senses and threatens them with disorganization; but the spirit within us, answering the spur and appeal of the beautiful, rises above the world of the senses. This form of beauty, as Wordsworth says, "hath terror in it." Yet the terror is within the beauty, does not stand outside it as a destructive critic. And in that sanctuary of supreme beauty man's spirit, tortured by the unsolved contradictions of life, attains, at least for a time, heart's ease and serenity.

When Kant's thought is stripped of its technical terminology, it turns out to be the clue to the deepest modern feeling regarding beauty. Schopenhauer's striking theory of aesthetic absolutism comes to the same end. Tortured by the restless will to become what he is not, man enters the presence of some supreme work of art and there finds sanctuary. For in the nobly beautiful the will passes completely into its work. The work contents the will. The will rests in its work. So the tormenting thirst for something that is not is quenched and satisfied. "The heavy and the weary weight of all the unintelligible world is lightened." One's debt to the ideal is paid in full. For the time being, the actual is the ideal. The straining purpose in us is absolved. The peace of the universe allays life's fever.

Beauty justifies existence. In so far as man creates it, it expresses his control over the materials of experiences. Thus the higher fairy-story, made, as Lowell says, "out of the dream of the poor," is a triumphant love-match between the desire for happiness and the desire for justice. "Once on a time," it opens; and these words sometimes bring pathos into the minds of men and women. But for the child, the true owner of Fairyland, there is no hint of pathos. Fairyland is a land absolutely real in the imagination, a world where boy and girl live with Homer and the ancients, obliterating the distinction between nature and the supernatural. Loving desire has its way unchecked. Man "draws his frontiers where he pleases." Hence the shock inflicted on the child's imagination by the conclusion to the *Puritanical Pedagogue's* edition of *Aladdin*: "He awoke and

found that he had been fast asleep on his father's shop board!" It brings the child's fancy to earth with a violent jar. It undoes the very constitution of the fairy-story. It sins against the laws of that imagination that "peoples space with life and mystical predominance." It is a square circle or wooden iron, or any other impossible thing you please. By the judgment of catholic emotion, the judgment of all children, at all times and in all places, it should be expurgated from the true text.

Again, the love-story finds a sufficient motive and an ample justification in the self-same need of absolution from the merciless grip of circumstance and fate. In the lover's mind, the eternal is within the present, soul and body are one, the ways and means of living joyously respond to the creative word, and enobling passion finds a thoroughfare through the world. So, too, on the highest levels of beauty. The starry sky makes us fresh and strong, by filling us with the joyous conviction that the deepest desires of our hearts are one with the constitution and tendency of nature; and that the Power that moves our wills, when they are working at their best, also moves the sun and other stars. Nature, in her noblest moods, takes the ashes of our defeated hopes and, giving us beauty in exchange, completely justifies our existence, blesses us with a peace that is only less deep than the peace of God. Or, is it a constituent part of the peace that is divine and abiding?

And the means whereby this effect is served? Primarily it is the unifying of sensation and reason. We can all testify that in those rare moods when the aesthetic pleasure has been at its highest pitch, "thought was not, in enjoyment it expired." The beautiful appeals deeply to our senses. It is a supreme poet who tells us that poetry of the grand style must be "simple, sensuous, and impassional." And Milton's verse—verse which, taken at its height, is, possibly, almost the noblest English verse that has been written—illustrates the truth of this assertion; for in it the moral passion of heroic Puritanism has made a love-match with the genius of a supremely gifted artist. The result is a majestic sweetness that fills us with radiant pleasure, while at the same time the pleasure is instinct with exalted thinking and noble planning. The appeal to the senses is an inherent part of imaginative power. A chair built to the body naturalizes us

in a world where ease is elemental. Place the chair before the open fire, and the fire and the chair together suggest a world where ease and longing are at one. Let the hour be eventide, when the shadows are teaching the light to remember, and the appeal to one's nature is still wider and deeper. Recollection, faith, hope, pathos, and love, all blending with pleasurable feeling, render the day-dreams that come to us at such times almost convincing, not easy to forget. Choose a house by the sea, where the low-voiced, intimate talk between the great deep and a familiar shore comes in to blend with the silence, and there the appeal takes on a noble form. One thinks of Prometheus chained to his cliff and hearing the ceaseless laughter of the sea. From that mighty personification of the majesty and pathos, the hope and the terror of our existence, the mind turns irresistibly to the Hebrew prophet's personification of the law of the higher life, the suffering servant of the Lord. One's whole nature is stirred, one's entire being appealed to. But in the ascent from the pleasurable ease of the chair to the highest level of emotion, at every step the appeal to sensation is strong and compelling. Lose that, and imagination falls from its supreme place and power to the plane of homiletic allegory.

Nature in her noble moods overemphasizes rather than underemphasizes this appeal to sensation. A vast wheat-field in the American or Canadian Northwest, enjoyed just before the harvesters strike in, sends against the eye wave after wave of color, submerging the mind in rich and fruitful feeling. The sky of the Rockies, a sort of perpetual northwest sky, enables the eye to make a happy marriage with the universe. Or rather, since in such uplifting moods we are delivered from the tyranny and torture of subjective consciousness, the universe becomes an irresistible wooer and makes a joyful marriage with the eye. Through intimate and ennobling beauty, nature weds the heart of man to the heart of things.

The physiological effect of beauty is to quicken the pulse, start the blood, and set in motion a vitalizing flood of feeling, thus flushing the veins with a radiant sense of competence and ease. While the spell lasts, existence is unvexed, and our strength is equal to our day.

The secret of noble imagination, then, is a high conception charged with feeling. Through the beautiful, reason and conscience, pressing

close to a life larger than consciousness, take nurture from the breasts of immeasurable being. The infinite becomes intimate with the finite. The unseen universe enters into covenant with the visible world. Or, to put it better, for a little while we are lifted above our false italics. There is a single world, and a single meaning runs through it from top to bottom. While reason painfully struggles toward a perfect synthesis, imagination reaches the goal, visualizing the unity of things. Appearance and reality are made one. Our experience and our education so drill analysis into us that, bye and bye, the habit of walking around things, of trying to get in behind them, becomes a disease. But beauty cures us of the disease. There is no being to be found behind it; the whole of being is in it. Upon the beautiful the restless mind comes to rest.

Nothing can be nobly beautiful unless the eye and the reason work together without a hitch or jar. This is the explanation of the fact that the vast cannot by itself be beautiful. If vastness be its decisive and dominant quality, it runs into the vague. And then the judgment is at odds with the eye. A great cliff, like El Capitan at the Yosemite, viewed from the base, is over half a mile of height, more than three thousand feet sheer. But the eye cannot come up to one's judgment. We pinch ourselves, violently nudge our senses, to make them perceive what they ought to perceive. All in vain! The eye and the judgment are hopelessly at odds. Behind the eye, judgment is at hard labor. The heavy guns of statistics come lumbering up. But the eye simply denies their competence. The great cliff is immensely interesting, and never for a moment ennobling. In striking contrast is the grand cañon of the Yellowstone. Here the vastness of the gorge, the majestic reach of the cliff, is wedded to an indescribable spread and loveliness of color. The result is that vastness becomes tributary to something higher than vastness. The judgment and the eye are instinctively in unison. There is no consciousness of mental labor. The seer is all eye, if you will. But just as truly is he all soul. His soul is in his eyes. The majestic loveliness of the cañon suffuses him with a divine content. The universe is one and indivisible, and through the eye he falls heir to it.

So, again, the unifying effect of high imagination is clearly seen in the influence that certain places have over us. In a way they are

sacraments, in which the seen and the unseen perfectly blend. Rome, Athens, Jerusalem—in such places history is visualized. An American who has read all there is to read on the Gettysburg campaign does not truly know the great event. But let him, having digested his knowledge, spend a day by himself on the battle-field. A strange thing happens. His knowledge becomes a different thing. History takes a visible form. Standing on the stone wall where the charge of the gallant southerners broke, he lives the event over again. In his own person he takes part. He catches his breath as he realizes the closeness of the issue. History is a living presence. And he feels the unity of the nation as if it were the touch of a living hand, great and gentle, laid on his head in blessing and in consecration.

The work of the imagination is to visualize the invisible. The beautiful bodies forth the soul of things. Thus legend sometimes has a truth superior to scientific knowledge of the past. Criticism rejects its details, cashiers its testimony on this or that point. But legend is the artist of history. For details as such it has no concern. While it does not consciously neglect correctness, it does not deliberately aim at it. Legend deals with the soul of history. Its heroes are our contemporaries. Its events happen in the heart of man. Its truth is the truth of creative imagination using history as its raw material. Even so with all noble forms of the beautiful. Imagination is not fancy. Fancy plays on the surface of things. Its truth is the truth of impressions, of passing moods and temporary interests. It is an escape from reality. But imagination controls reality. It deals in the fundamental. The presence of the beautiful is the audience chamber of the eternal. Watson's line, "Time trembled at the opening of the rose," occurs to us. And Matthew Arnold's criticism of the Celtic fancy, on the ground that it is in collision with reality, is admirably in point. Fancy plays over life. Imagination goes to the root of life, and so gives us the Greek and the Shakspearian drama, whose reality is as well guaranteed as the existence of the tides and the stars.

A final illustration is a noble biography, the story of a life that is a meeting-place of the seen and unseen. We talk about this world and the other world. It is our crude experience that gives us our school-girl italics. The world is one. And in the noble lives lived

now and then in our midst the world's unity is revealed to us with convincing power. A great biography lays bare the secret of the free spirit. Events and circumstances are faithfully drawn, but so drawn that they become a living body informed by a living soul. History, said Aristotle, is a poor drama, full of episodes. But a great biography is dramatic through and through. It unifies the seen and the unseen. And "mankind is enriched by a joyous and refreshing story," to use the dear phrase we find at the end of Bayard's life.

The layman's impressions of beauty sum up to this; the beautiful brings him into quickening touch with the invisible. Through high imagination, the perfect, the ultimate reality, becomes a real presence. Keats' lines, of which, happily, only the first is hackneyed, publish the secret.

A thing of beauty is a joy forever:
Its loveliness increases; it will never
Pass into nothingness; but still will keep
A bower quiet for us, and a sleep
Full of sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing.
Therefore, on every morrow, are we wreathing
A flowery band to bind us to the earth,
Spite of despondence, of the inhuman dearth
Of noble natures, of the gloomy days,
Of all the unhealthy and o'er-darkened ways
Made for our searching: yes, in spite of all,
Some shape of beauty moves away the pall
From our dark spirits.

Turning to religion, I do not propose a complete analysis of its nature and effects, but shall seek to carry the analysis far enough to make plain the relation between religion and the imagination. Now, in the aesthetic consciousness, while the visible and the invisible are unified, the emphasis falls on the visible. But in religious feeling taken in its deeper forms, the emphasis falls on the invisible. This stands out in the history of the idea of God, which rises out of consciousness when the pressure of unfriendly circumstances threatens man with demoralization. The arguments for the existence of God, whatever may be their apologetic value, have immense worth as part and parcel of idealizing thought. They are the product of the mental

effort to keep the scheme of life coherent, to lay unseen and eternal foundations for experience in time and space, to insure and safeguard the worth-whileness of human existence. Necessarily the emphasis is laid upon the invisible. The religious consciousness, whenever it is impassioned, forgets second causes. Only the First Cause counts. Yet, while the emphasis differs, the effect in terms of feeling is very much the same. It is the real presence of the unseen within the visible and tangible order of things with which vital religion is concerned. This is made plain by the belief in the personality of God. Human personality, when it is high above the level of average humanity, becomes a trysting-place where the visible and the invisible hold loving communion. The personality of God, judged by its effects on feeling, accomplishes the same result on a greater scale. God conceived as an omnipotent Person brings all the power and resources and tendencies of the unseen universe within reach of the struggling human purpose, the straining will, and puts them into man's service. The visible and the invisible worlds are unified, becoming parts of a single context of experience and meaning.

The methods adopted by religion throw clear light on the matter under consideration. In proportion to the depth and persistence of religious emotion is the necessity for sacraments—made up of symbolical words and dramatic actions—by whose means the ardent believer is assured of the unity of life in its entire reach and range, so that the things unseen and uncomprehended befriend and enlarge what he sees and understands. Of all sacraments the appeal to sensation is a necessary and constituent part. On the lower levels, a great mass of facts is in evidence, such as the *taurobolia* or blood-bath in the religion of Mithras, the “dancing dervishes,” the “holy jumpers,” and the coarse forms of revivalism the world over. But it is just as true of sacraments on the highest levels of religious feeling, unless having altogether ceased to be real sacraments, they shall have shriveled to bare doctrinal declarations, lacking all vitalizing power.

Again, the dependence of religion on music goes to show the same thing. How great is the difference between the “comfortable words” of our Lord, “Come unto me all ye that labor and are heavy-laden, and I will give you rest,” if never so well read, and the same words sung in the *Messiah* by a sweet and noble woman's voice. The music, allying itself to the words, carries it to the very depth of our

being. The undermeanings and suggestions of life come into consciousness; all of them, however great the pains of memory they bring, convince us for the moment that all is well with our world. Of similar nature is the effect of the hymn. Hymn-singing, when it is greatly done, produces a kind of conviction that is vitally different from the results of philosophic reasoning. It brings the distant ends of life close home. Inference takes wings and becomes vision. On the lower side, it partakes of the emotion excited by a good, though not too heavy, dinner—a glow of comfortable feeling that temporarily saps the foundations of doubt and mistrust. On the higher side, it is of the same nature with the joy of a June day which catches us up, body and reason and spirit together, into a mood of ecstatic content. The conviction born of the marriage between word and music is a radiant conviction. The moral corrosive of a half-hearted faith is overcome. The understanding is quieted. The soul is glad.

The deepest difference between the aesthetic and the religious conviction is that the latter deals primarily with the unknown. From the earliest days of organized religion, as we find it at work in Chaldea down to the relation between religion and science in our own time, this law holds true. Chaldean magic inseparably bound up with prayer, and Chaldean astronomy or astrology inseparably connected with theology, aimed to rid man of the fears which would, if not arrested, unman and demoralize him. This they did by bringing the unknown into friendly and sympathetic relations with the intelligible. And when once our heads are cleared touching the controversy over religion and science, we shall find that the nature of religion, beneath all the changes in ideals and in methods, has remained unchanged. It consciously and deliberately concerns itself with the things that put fear and misgiving into the heart of man. Its objective point is a deep relationship, an indestructible covenant, between the known and the unknown.

But, when all is said that can be said regarding the difference between the religious and the aesthetic consciousness, we return to the strong likeness between them. The resemblance is profound. Judged by their enduring effects, they are at one. Just in proportion as religious certitude differs from the conclusions of abstract reasoning does the likeness become striking. In both, the emotional consequence is the real presence of the unseen. The appeal to sensation is

essential. Everything turns on how it shall be made or how it may be controlled. No one needs to be reminded that the plague of religion is the greedy appetite for rich sensation, and that not a few forms of religious exaltation do not differ in their moral quality from the exaltation of imperfect drunkenness. Religion, on the lowest as well as on the highest levels, seeks to bring the mystery of the unseen into the heart of the believer. "What have I if I have not all?" cries the youth in Schiller's "Veiled Image at Sais." "For in the sacrament one crumb is all," says the adoring woman in "How Lisa Loved the King." In impassioned religious emotion soul and body become parts of an organic unity. An uprush of feeling floods the mind. The unknown is the divine, and the divine is a real and quickening presence. Lacking this, we have not vital religion at all, but either a cold and cheerless theory that resembles religion pretty much as a herbarium resembles a flower garden, or a dilettantism that adopts the tasting of emotion as its hobby.

Religion is necessarily sensuous, for in it the supreme form of idealism triumphantly asserts its power over the mass of men. It is an impassioned conviction that the unseen things, not the things we see, possess primary reality. And then it is an equally impassioned conviction that the unseen ends and issues of life have the right of way. A thousand things deny it. The love of pleasure and place and power, face and fashion and fate, assail it. The sorrows and disillusionments of existence undermine our faith. Yet, in spite of all, when the Christian consciousness is at its best, there is a serene and radiant conviction that the way of the Christ shall some day be the way of the world. And, in order to publish this conviction with convincing force, religion must take imagination into her service.

The aesthetic sense and the religious consciousness are, then, very closely related. But what is the nature of this relation? Matthew Arnold, in the introduction to Ward's *English Poets*, declared that "Poetry is the guide of life." When he coined the sentence, he was no doubt thinking of Bishop Butler's proposition, "Probability is the guide of life." And he is right, if we mean by "poetry" high reasoning that has passed into noble imagination. For only so can the will in our breasts that makes for righteousness visualize the distant end of our mortal struggle with the lower self. But the final question is: Where lies the ultimate source and spring of great

poetry? Verse is an easy thing to come by. Charming poetry is relatively easy. But poetry of the grand style, poetry that masters the hearts of earnest folk and braces their wills—where is it born and how is it nurtured? Lange ends his history of materialism with the frank confession that man cannot live by science alone, and, theology having been thrown on the scrap-heap, poetry and art must feed him. Again we will agree. But, once more, the previous question must be put: How are we to insure the possibility of poetry of the grand style? We might appeal to the history of art and literature to show that creative periods of interpretation and expression have been on intimate terms with ardent, and if you will, even naïve religion. At this point, however, we are concerned not so much with the history as with the nature of things.

Bosanquet, in his *History of Aesthetic* (p. 21), criticizing Plato's subordination of the beautiful to the moral, says:

Beauty . . . is really an expression, co-ordinate with the moral order as a whole and not bound under its rules, of that larger complication and unity of things which reflects itself in the sense of beauty on the one hand, and on the other hand in the social will.

He is quite right, so far as the nature of beauty is concerned. Beauty is not subordinate to the good. The artist is in his rights against the moralist. The beautiful and the good are co-ordinate expressions of an unseen compelling reality. But Bosanquet falls into deep error through not considering, on the spot, the relation between the beautiful and the good, taken together on the one side, and religious feeling on the other. When he says that beauty, with the "social will," is a co-ordinate expression of ultimate reality, he leaves out of sight some very vital history. For art without leisure or free time is impossible. Now, leisure is the fruit of co-operative labor both on the lower economic levels and on the higher social and political levels. Athens is within and behind the supreme form of classic literature and art. But how was Athens made? That is another way of asking: "How is the social will made?" The secret of the social will lies underneath high art. The supreme problem is the problem of law. How to ground and bottom the social will? It can be done only by religion in one form or another. The heart of man must be brought into an indestructible covenant with the unseen and unknown forces of the universe. While the work of grounding the

social will is going on, imagination and the moralizing will constitute an indivisible unity. After it is done and when leisure gives use to specializations of function, the artist and the Puritan come to blows. Both are right; both are wrong. The beautiful and the good are in equal subjection to the unseen, neither being subject to the other.

So, too, with the true. At the end of his noble essay on the *Scientific Use of the Imagination*, Tyndall writes:

In his hours of health and strength and sanity, when the stroke of action has ceased and the pause of reflection has set in, the scientific investigator finds himself overcome with . . . awe. Breaking contact with the hampering details of earth, it associates him with a power which gives fulness and tone to his existence, but which he can neither analyze nor comprehend.

Tyndall's use of the term "imagination" is inexact. For if any definite meaning is to be attached to "imagination," it means a conception visualized, an idea fused with sensation. Tyndall has in mind the function of hypothesis in its largest possible reach and scope. But in the words, "it associates him with a power which gives fulness and tone to his existence," there is a very clear suggestion of religion in its vital sense. Perhaps it was impossible for Tyndall to use the word "religion" in this connection, because it seemed to him to be heavily handicapped by associations that rendered a working alliance between science and religion impossible. For all that, there is a distinctly religious element in the situation which his words seek to cover. And his essay is a fine illustration of the inherent religious quality of science. Plotinus said that the beautiful was an ascent into the unseen. So is that ennobling love of truth which is the inspiration of science. Its soul is a potential religion, an enthusiasm for the universe which gives to the most insignificant facts an infinite value. The beautiful and the true and the good are co-ordinate expressions of an unseen, but an authoritative, reality. But conscious relation with this upholding and outreaching reality—this and nothing else is the pith and meaning of vital religion. Inevitably, then, religion has an imperative need of imagination. For only through the imagination can the unseen become and remain a real presence within the things that are seen. Reason can develop the context of thought into which our opinions must widen, if they would retain our respect. But this abstract reason cannot make the saving unities of life and mind compelling. To reach that end,

reason must ally itself to noble imagination. The philosopher must join forces with the poet. Then the unity of things, taking the complication of things up into itself, captures the eye of man, and so brings his restless heart to rest. This may not be done without religion. Great imagination is not possible upon a negative view of life. Doubt, piercing and cleansing doubt, is necessary. But somehow doubt itself must be incorporated into the indwelling unity of things. Or else, the imagination and the constructive will, going lame together, the world is cursed by men of the Hamlet and Sordello type, in whom thought "breaks yoke" with action.

On the one hand, religion is vitally necessary to the imagination; on the other hand, imagination is vitally necessary to religion. Without imagination, religion is crippled, inference being substituted for vision. Possibly, the new-birth of dogmatic theology may be helped along by the discovery that dogma, rightly apprehended, is an exercise of high religious imagination, and so is an inevitable part of earnest and spacious and enduring morality. Anyway, imagination is indispensable to religion. For it is the work of religion to stay the heart and steady the will by restoring to us, after the merciful cruelty of life has taken from us our childhood, the unity of our world. There is no other world than this. But the larger part of this world is the over-world; and by reason of the over-world, there is opened, within our being, an inner world in which our souls take sanctuary from the fret and fever of existence. Yet we are not mystics of the Hindoo type. The visible is immensely real. How, then, shall it frame itself to the invisible? That question is answered when moods of intense aesthetic pleasure fuse with moods of deep religious feeling. Then the saving work is completed. On Christmas Eve we hear the *Messiah* nobly rendered. The very beauty of it stirs us to keenest pain. Motherhood and babyhood in their ideal forms! And the great city with its horrors of lust and sense looking at us over the heads of the men and women who sing to us! But the surge of pain, of grief and terror and pity, that goes through the heart, is redemptive. By means of beauty the spiritual reality of things becomes compelling. One's whole being is brought into covenant with things unseen and eternal. We do not dare to be afraid regarding the final issues. We go forth to greet our world with a high purpose, a dauntless will, and a gladdening hope.

ARE THE RESURRECTION NARRATIVES LEGENDARY?

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I

Are the gospel narratives relating to the resurrection of Jesus Christ, taken in their obvious, and obviously intended, sense, to be accepted as truly historic; or are we to criticize them freely, and find them either wholly, or in important part, legendary and not worthy of trust? There is a third thing possible, or held by some to be possible in the way of critical method, different from either of the two foregoing alternatives. What that third thing is, and how it is to be regarded, are points which it would require the space of a full article to treat as their present importance might dictate.

To prevent misunderstanding, I feel that I ought at once to record here express recognition of the fact—undoubted fact I believe it to be—that there are some biblical students who, while admitting in general the presence of the true supernatural in Scripture, still so far yield to the importunate stress of the scientific, not to call it the critical-skeptical, spirit of their time, as to incline constantly toward keeping this element confined within its very strictest, narrowest boundaries, doubting, for instance, the literal bodily resurrection of Christ, rejecting his miraculous virgin-birth; such biblical students there undoubtedly are, who—and I now reach the fact which I wish distinctly to acknowledge—remain, notwithstanding their scruples, sincerely loyal disciples of Jesus. The biblical students to whom I refer are too reverent, too believing, to use themselves the word “legend,” much more the word “myth,” in characterization of any gospel narrative, these words being more skeptical in their connotation than they will admit to be truly descriptive of their attitude toward the New Testament. Out of sincere regard for such fellow-disciples, I should be glad myself to use in the pages following some other word than either “myth” or “legend,” if I could find—but I cannot—some other single word equally available for present purposes.

There is no denying that report of a resurrection from the dead is one of the most difficult of all things conceivable to believe. The incredulous attitude and behavior of the first disciples as to the resurrection of their Lord were perfectly natural. The account given of their attitude and behavior is one among many traits of self-evidencing truth in the gospel narratives. Even their attitude toward those many predictions uttered by the living Jesus that he would rise from the dead, was perfectly natural. It is not in the least surprising that they did not so much as understand those predictions; much less that they did not really believe them. So little impression did those predictions, when uttered, make on the minds of the disciples, that nothing but the actual fulfilment following would probably ever have brought them back to their recollection. Moreover—and this is important—but for their actual fulfilment, there never would have been transmitted to us—nay, there never would have arisen—report of the fact that such predictions were uttered. Falsified, they would have been too utterly insignificant for record or preservation. This is so evident that it may be set down as self-evident.

Why is it that a resurrection from the dead is a thing inherently so incredible? Because it is contrary to all human experience? But is it? Does not affirming it to be, beg the question? If a resurrection even once has occurred, then it is *not* contrary to *all* human experience. What is the fact? That is our true inquiry. It would be the reverse of wise, of “scientific” (to use the favorite current term), to preclude investigation as to the fact alleged, by arbitrarily assuming that the fact alleged does not exist—does not exist because forsooth contrary to all human experience. Is it thus contrary? is the very point at issue. Let us look at the evidence. The evidence must be very strong—admitted; for the fact to be proved is, admittedly, in the highest degree improbable.

That is, it would be in the highest degree improbable in the case of any other than Jesus Christ. In his case, by unique exception, the antecedent improbability vanishes, or at least is reduced to quantity so small that it may logically be quite disregarded. Even irrespectively of Christ’s predictions of his own resurrection, it may be affirmed that the resurrection of such a being as, if the gospel

records are substantially true, he undeniably was, after such a life as he had lived, and after such a death as he had died, was a thing, we cannot indeed quite say to have been expected, but certainly a thing not to excite wonder on our part; contrariwise, to be, on proper evidence, believed in without any sense of violence suffered to our reason. Yes, so much as that we can most confidently say.

Let us, however, for the moment put out of our minds this line of argument for the reality of Christ's resurrection, and soberly consider what skeptic historical criticism has to say in the way of objection to the reality of it. Such criticism says in effect substantially always the same thing. It says: "True, if the gospel narratives are to be accepted as trustworthy, then the attitude and behavior of the disciples, in first obstinately disbelieving, and then believing so strenuously as they did, the alleged fact of the resurrection of Jesus, is a nearly overwhelming argument in favor of the reality of that resurrection. But the account given of the disciples' attitude and behavior is not history, it is legend; we do not know that they took the attitude reported of them; we do not know that they behaved as it is affirmed in the gospels that they did; in fact, the gospel stories are not true history." Such, in effect, is the frankly skeptic critico-historical position.

Legends, then, let us for the moment suppose the stories in question to be. We instinctively at once inquire: What gave rise to the legends? The resurrection did not occur, is the skeptic assumption. Very well, then—when, at what point of time, was the first mistaken belief entertained that it did occur? Who first believed it, and communicated his belief to another, and another, and another, and got those others to believe it along with himself? In some such way, the legend, if legend the resurrection story be, must have arisen. No personal disciple of the living Jesus can be imagined to have been the originator of the report (supposed false) that Jesus rose from the dead. The disciples, *all* of them, showed themselves too incredulous about it, at the time when, as the gospels report, the rising occurred. Mary Magdalene? She was as incredulous as any of the disciples. Besides, if the resurrection did not occur (which is now our supposition), there was the tomb undisturbed to confirm her unbelief, and, moreover, the dead body therein which she, not believ-

ing but loving, pathetically brought spices to embalm withal for its perpetual, never-to-be-broken sleep!

But if the report, supposed false, could not have started with any of the personal disciples of the living Jesus, may it not have got its start with a later generation of disciples? Improbable, almost to the degree of impossible. A tender memory of him might have grown into an affectionate tradition about him; but such a possible tradition would have had a short life, it could hardly have outlived the generation with which it arose, and it would have given rise to no written record of his words and his works, much less have enlisted a new generation of disciples to that crucified teacher now hopelessly dead. Yes, if the report (still to be supposed false and groundless) did not start—and demonstrably it could not have started—with Christ's own immediate disciples, the lapse of time, after that first generation of disciples had disappeared, would constantly more and more increase the impossibility—if an impossibility can be increased—of the false report's getting started at all. In view of what is reported, whether truly or not, in the gospels, to have happened, and in view of what has certainly been happening for nineteen centuries since, the legendary theory as to the resurrection of Jesus (supposed unreal) is absurd, is unthinkable. The theory can be put into words, but it cannot be construed in thought. This, I am aware, is a bold postulate, but I insist upon it.

Perhaps I ought not to insist upon it. It may be a postulate too bold, to say that the legendary theory applied here "cannot be construed in thought." Let me limit myself to saying instead that as for myself I cannot construe it in thought. I have made the effort and have failed. Some person of far greater ingenuity than mine might succeed. I should like to see such a person's construing scheme drawn out to some fulness of detail in hypothetical statement. It would not satisfy my own sense of what, in order to constitute a suitable working hypothesis, is rigorously required, for him to say vaguely, for example:

"Ah, I would not apply the word 'legend' to the case. I would rather use the word 'tradition.' I would then say: A certain tradition, having in it doubtless some germ of fact for nucleus, gradually grew up and finally took definite form, written, and so thenceforward

unchangeable, in the gospels as we have them. There was never any conscious and intentional falsifying in the case. It was an automatic process of evolution from an original germ of truth—nobody in particular responsible for the result, which accordingly, though unhistorical and untrustworthy, is not to be stigmatized as fraudulent or even as legendary merely."

Such a construing in thought would not, I say, satisfy my historical sense of what is required. The word "tradition" substituted for "legend" does not help at all. What is a tradition? It is report passed on from one to another, passed on *by* some one *to* some other. In the course of being thus passed on by many in succession to many in succession, the tradition naturally "grows," no doubt. How grows? Through being added to—added to *by* someone. We do not get rid of the need of personal agency by using the word "tradition," and the word "grows," instead of the word "legend"—which names a thing that also has the habit of "growing." "Legend" or "tradition," whichever you will have it, the resurrection story had to have a start in some individual's initiative. Who, supposably—I do not, of course, ask for a name, but person of what time, of what relation to Jesus, possessed of what secret, whence derived, to get himself believed, of what capacity, how acquired, to impose ungrounded belief upon himself; describe him somehow, and tell me what sort of man it was, when, where, under what conditions living, that first falsely, groundlessly (however innocently), reported that Jesus Christ rose from the dead—the fact being that the condemned and discredited victim of the cross lay undisturbed and "saw corruption" in the sealed and guarded tomb of Joseph? There was no time left vacant by the hastening march of events, in which could "grow" an ungrounded false tradition that Jesus rose from the dead. A few days only and Pentecost had come, and with Pentecost there was the erewhile coward Peter, the perjured renegade coward Peter, standing up boldly before an immense crowd at Jerusalem to proclaim that the Lord he had lately in panic with oaths denied, was risen from the dead, and was Lord of all. (Important, in its evidential value, is the fact that the pentecostal intrepidity and zeal of Peter, and with him of "the Eleven," was not a mere momentary exaltation on their part which might be due to the transporting effect of self-begotten

subjective delusion. That same spirit lasted lifelong in all the apostles. Is it conceivable that delusion was the secret of it, the unfailing support of it?) Can the theory of false tradition be construed by anybody in thought? By the way, it deserves to be pointed out that the tradition, the report, that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, being a perfectly simple, single proposition, is a tradition that by its very nature precludes the idea of "growth." It is full-grown at once at its birth. There may be subsequent agglutination of all sorts of other matter about this as nucleus, but the tradition itself is not a tradition that has "grown." The reader will at least see how impossible the present writer finds it to construe in thought the legendary (or traditional) theory of Christ's resurrection. But there remains to be given yet one more evidence of this confessed incapacity on his part.

For there is another method often adopted of making the gospel narratives seem legend, or groundless tradition, nothing more—which is equally unsatisfactory to my own individual historic sense. That method, sometimes employed no doubt in perfect good faith, is resort to the expedient of pointing to the staggering but indisputable fact of omnivorous human credulity, rendering great masses of men, at all times and everywhere, easy prey to the most extravagant pretensions of enthusiasts or impostors, especially religious enthusiasts or impostors. There is Mohammedanism, there is Mormonism, not to mention imposing phenomena of superstitious belief displaying themselves in our own times and among us; the same tendency in human nature that accounts for the success of these systems and movements, accounts for the success of Christianity—so the argument runs.

To this view of the case it is to be replied: First, that, by very noteworthy exception to the general rule of popular credulity, a resurrection from the dead is, as was well exemplified in the case of Christ's disciples, an object of the most immediate and most obstinate incredulity; this particular incredible marvel no other religious system has for an indispensable article of its creed, while Christianity makes this its very foundation; secondly, that such a line of thought quite avoids the real issue involved. The problem is not: How did Christianity, once fairly launched on its great historic career, thenceforward easily

win its multitudes of adherents? but: How, without the resurrection of Jesus Christ, did it get its first launch? Who was it—when? where? how?—that launched it, and launched it on the false report of such resurrection, seen, or not, by the launcher, to be (as assuredly it was) an article of belief quite indispensable, if there was to be a future for Christianity after its founder's death? If there was no resurrection of Christ, how came there to be a resurrection of Christianity? For a resurrection of Christianity undeniably there was.

Besides, there was the fact of the disciples' first utter incredulity as to the resurrection of their Lord. General human credulity accounts for much; does it account also at need for incredulity? The disciples did not believe, when they had reason to believe. Did they then, soon after, believe, when they had no reason to do so, and when they had, on the contrary, every reason not to believe?

It is sometimes difficult to treat respectfully the varying shifts and devices of destructive New Testament criticism. In dealing with the question of the resurrection of Christ, whatever way it may be that this criticism takes in which to account, on the hypothesis of legend or ungrounded tradition, for the incontrovertible facts existing in the case, that way always turns out to be a *cul-de-sac*, closed with inevitable *reductio ad absurdum* at the end.

Perhaps I owe it to myself, if not to my readers; still more perhaps I owe it to the propounders of that legendary theory which, on experiment with it, I constantly find to be so unequal to the task it sets itself; perhaps, I say, I ought to exhibit—very briefly it must be—a tentative of mine, essayed in all good faith, futile though it proved, to construe that legendary theory in thought. "Somebody," so I began with myself, postulating, for a start, what I suppose no one in the world would deny, or could; "somebody," I began, "it does not signify who, first said Jesus Christ rose from the dead. Why did he say that?" The next step, the answering of that question, halted an instant between two alternatives. The man who first gave voice to the momentous allegation may really have believed what he said; or he may have said it in conscious falsehood, for a purpose. This latter alternative may be dismissed with the mere statement of it; no one, I take it, now would seriously maintain the contention of conscious fraud in the matter under consideration. The supposed

first affirmer then affirmed, because he believed, that Christ rose from the dead. How came he to believe it? That is our inevitable next question. (If we could only say, "Because it happened," all would be easy; but the hypothesis under which we are working forbids us to say that, since according to that hypothesis it did not happen.) Let us say: "He came to believe it, because he wished it to be true." That is the natural skeptic answer to the question why he believed it. The wish was father to the thought, as the saying is.

This sounds plausible enough, as long as we leave it in the vague. But to leave it in the vague, is not to construe it in thought. Let us try to construe it in thought. Obviously, the wish begetting, and the thought, the belief, begot, must correspond, must agree, must in fact be substantially the same. Now exactly what, supposably, was that first affirmer's wish? Not merely to have Jesus Christ rise from the dead—assuredly not *merely* that. He must have wished his Lord—our supposed person is of course a disciple, one too of Christ's own immediate disciples, we are compelled to conjecture—he must have wished his Lord to live after his resurrection in the exercise of that messianic power which, just before his crucifixion, his disciples, for a brief moment of apparent glorious triumph on Christ's part, would seem to have happily trusted that he had been holding all the time in reserve, but was then about to exert in the immediate establishment of his kingdom. This, nothing less than this, nothing other than this, was what our hypothetical first promulger of the idea that Christ rose from the dead must have wished, when (according to the hypothesis for the moment entertained) he wished Christ's resurrection so strongly that, without evidence, he came actually to believe Christ's resurrection had occurred according to his wish.

It obviously is important, if we are to attempt accounting for a given false belief on the hypothesis of a supposed wish's having begotten it—it is, I say, obviously important, first of all, to determine, with some degree of definiteness, what the supposed begetting wish necessarily was. I submit that here the wish in question must have been such as I have been representing it. There is no other possibility to be for a moment entertained; that is, I can think of no other. Now, did the state of things that existed at the time, that stared every observer in the face, admit of any disciple's imposing upon

himself the notion that Christ, hopelessly dead in Joseph's tomb, had indeed risen from the dead and was indeed putting in active exercise the messianic power previously held by him in abeyance and was at length visibly establishing a visible kingdom on earth to the overthrow of Roman dominion and to the corresponding exaltation of Israel? This is what our supposed affirmer must have thought was in progress, if what he thought was determined and begotten by what he wished.

In sincere and loyal endeavor to make the legendary theory somehow accomplish its task, let us not even yet submit to be finally baffled. There is still a chance that looks at first blush as if we might make shift to escape ultimate defeat in our experiment with it. Although, as already suggested, everybody must admit that to suppose our imaginary first promulger of the resurrection legend, deceived by his ardent wish to have it so, could, in the teeth of what in the world of fact was laughing such a notion to scorn, have imagined that a risen Christ was visibly at work erecting a visible messianic kingdom on the ruins of the Roman domination in Israel—although to suppose this, I say, is indeed quite impossible, yet may he not have wished to believe, and therefore believed, that an invisible Messiah, the late crucified Jesus, spiritually alive, while corporeally dead, was invisibly employed in founding an invisible messianic kingdom on earth, such as in fact all Christians now, the world over, believe in, and labor to help establish and extend? This, or substantially this, is the sole alternative resort that I have been able to think of, left to the legendary theory whereby to save itself and still survive in the acceptance, or even in the decent respect, of candid, intelligent men. Let us endeavor intelligently and candidly to consider this alternative.

It will be observed that this alternative presupposes a complete, a revolutionary change of conception as to the true character of messiahship and of the messianic kingdom, from the conception up to that time universally held by all Jews, the disciples themselves not excepted. Even after the alleged resurrection of Christ, as we learn from Luke in the acts, the disciples still held to the traditional Jewish idea that the Christ was to be a temporal ruler of unlimited power, and of loyal patriot disposition to glorify Israel. Is it sound critico-historical sense to suppose that those disciples suddenly, without cause to do so,

transformed their conceptions on this subject? Were they morally, spiritually, intellectually even, equal to such a feat of transformation? And whence came to them so soon the courage to preach the transformation (supposed against all probability, actual in their own minds) publicly in the face of hostility bitter enough, vehement enough, powerful enough, to have just procured the crucifixion of Christ? The alternative, thus for a moment entertained, refuses on experiment to be construed in thought—at least, to be so construed by me.

Besides, an impossibly transformed conception of the Messiah and of the Messiah's work in the world, such as has been supposed, would not require that the disciple who achieved the transformation should wish the bodily resurrection of Christ in order to the fulfilment of his dream. His dream would seem to him to be even better in the way of fulfilment without the bodily resurrection of Christ. The wish, thus, imagined by the legendary theory to have been creative of the thought, that Jesus rose from the dead, would be wanting, and in the absence of that pregnant wish, the legend (supposed) would, hovering uneasily in the air, still wait for solid ground, or probability even, under its feet on which to alight and rest secure.

II

"To be on proper evidence believed in," I said some pages back, with reference to the literal bodily resurrection of Christ. But, "What would be 'proper evidence'?" the historical critic will with good reason ask, and add: "You surely would not have me admit that the testimony of a few women, bewildered women, to so momentous, so incredible, an event, constituted 'proper evidence.' The simple truth is that the exacting scientific spirit of today will, in such a matter, be satisfied with nothing short of qualified expert testimony for determining, first, the question, Did death in a given case actually supervene? secondly, the question, Did the subject, supposed dead and perhaps really dead, resume the functions of life? In the first place, we do not know, and for lack of proper evidence we never can know, that Jesus met with death that day on the cross. And still more certainly, if more certainly be possible, we do not know that, granted he truly died, as alleged, he afterward truly, as alleged, came

back to life. The 'proper evidence' is lacking. To satisfy the modern mind, there should have been a jury of scientific men to pass upon the fact in either case. That of course was impossible so long ago, so far away; for true science was not born till our day, nor does it now live anywhere save among us [in *Christendom*, our historical critic might have said!], and the idea of the resurrection of Jesus Christ must be relegated to the limbo of fond human imaginations never realized."

Science is "a great matter," but common-sense is sometimes useful. And common-sense asks: Do we then not know that Julius Caesar was killed at the base of Pompey's statue in Rome—not know it, because forsooth no coroner's jury of biologic experts sat upon his corpse to pronounce him truly dead? Do we, in fact, not know that Julius Caesar ever lived, because no commission of competent experts examined the man that purported to be he and pronounced that he did indeed fulfil the usual functions of life? Would not his campaigns in Gaul answer the purpose of evidence to show that he was alive when he carried them on? Certainly "the modern man" will never believe much of either the past or the present, if he requires strictly scientific evidence to assure him of facts open to everyone's common observation. Those who witnessed the crucifixion, the burial, and afterward the repeated appearances, of Jesus (risen from the dead), were, in the form of reason and common-sense, perfectly competent (even if they were women, some of them!) to testify to what they saw and heard. They cannot be ruled out of court on the ground of their not being scientific experts. There are absurd things in the world, and it is absurd to withhold belief in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, simply for the reason that God did not take the precaution to provide a commission of truly scientific gentlemen to look into the case and deliver their verdict, duly certified, upon it. "Proper evidence" for the astounding fact is forth-coming in abundant supply, as will presently be shown.

It is sometimes (quite too easily, because, as the present writer fully believes, unhistorically) assumed that the age in which the gospels were written, and the age immediately antecedent, in which the events recorded in the gospels occurred, was an uncritical time when legend-mongering, due to general popular belief in miracles,

abounded in Palestine. The "time-spirit" is thus invoked to account for the alleged miracles reported in the New Testament, even the miracle of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Now—Josephus here being silent (except indeed as to demoniacal possession and as to methods of exorcism) and the wilderness of the Talmud (untrustworthy source of information at best) being as yet not thoroughly explored—there is, so far as is known to me, no satisfactory contemporary evidence at present available bearing on this point apart from the evidence contained in the New Testament itself. It is at once to be admitted—nay, insisted upon—that miracle in abundance is reported of there. But, what is remarkable, accompanying unbelief relative to that abounding miracle is also reported of in the gospels. It is a case of extraordinary, and yet perfectly natural, paradox. Multitudes thronged Jesus and beheld his miracles without genuinely believing in them or in him. Logically, the entire mass of the Jewish population should have been overwhelmed into believing and obedient discipleship. That this did not occur is demonstration that credulity was not a predominant, was not even a characteristic, trait of the spirit of that time among the Jews. It is noted more than once by Jesus, or by the evangelists for Jesus, that he could not, or would not, exercise his miracle-working power in certain places, because of the "unbelief" prevailing there. "Hath any of the rulers believed on him, or of the Pharisees?" asked his enemies—a question which shows plainly that, however there might be a popular tendency to credulity, that tendency did not affect the influential classes of Jewish society.

Still, if there had occurred, as in fact such a thing was far from occurring, a general, a unanimous, movement of muster and adhesion in genuine discipleship to Jesus, by reason of ready belief in his miracles, that would not have proved the prevalence in Palestine of a credulous time-spirit. Such a movement ought to have occurred. There was reason enough, valid reason, why it should occur. That it did not occur proves irrefutably that a peculiarly credulous time-spirit did not in Christ's day prevail among the inhabitants of Palestine. Guilty, conscience-stricken King Herod's terrified cry, "It is John whom I beheaded, he is risen from the dead," wildly uttered when he heard of Christ's "mighty works," is sometimes adduced to make

it seem probable that a resurrection from the dead was an idea not unfamiliar in that day and one easily believed in—singular use of a half-crazed man's exclamation of panic alarm, to be hazarded in face of the fact that not only are no "mighty works" attributed to John the Baptist by either history or tradition, but by John the evangelist it is expressly recorded that the people noticed and said concerning John the Baptist, he "did no sign." It is noteworthy that Martha, in the agony of her grief for her deceased brother, and in the ecstasy of her faith in the power of Jesus to have kept him alive, never once thought of such a thing as his being now raised by Jesus from the dead. The idea of a possible present resurrection for Lazarus was apparently as remote from Martha's mind as in like case it would be from anyone's mind among us today.

!Incontrovertibly, at least as to the resurrection of Jesus Christ, the time-spirit in Palestine was exactly and intensely the opposite of friendly to belief in it and acknowledgment of it. This is even startlingly evident on the very face of all the accounts that we have of the actual state of the facts existing in the place at the time. If there had been in Palestine during Christ's time a prevailing popular tendency to imagine and attribute miracle, it is as nearly certain as anything not quite certain well could be, that John the Baptist, an acknowledged prophet, of commanding influence, of universal popular renown, would have been a favorite subject of legend and tradition. As to Christ's resurrection, I repeat it, the unbelieving, the hostile, spirit dominated the Jewish mind.

The penetrative, the well-nigh irresistibly penetrative, power of prevailing public opinion (the time-spirit) in Palestine, was, then, such as I have described it. "Crucify him!" was its demoniac final cry. The disciples of Christ lived and breathed in this atmosphere. That finally they should have withstood its influence and have overcome it, and this in spite of their own instinctive and persistent incredulity, is one of the wonders of history. It is a wonder that can be rationally explained in only one way, and that one way is to admit the reality of the fact which they in the teeth of so much hostile influence believed, asserted, died to attest. In the absence, the non-existence, supposed, of that fact, what was there to render it probable—nay, to render it conceivable—that he, a man discredited by his

crucifixion and by the ignominious falsifying, through failure, of his promise and prophecies, would, in the near event, become the subject of groundless glorifying legend? There was nothing, nothing. The gospel stories are not to be set aside as simply one product among many of legendary disposition rife widely in their time. There was no such legendary disposition then at work, least of all at work concerning a crucified malefactor. Those gospel stories are not legend.

By the way, the very remarkable contrast shown by the gospel accounts to have existed between Jesus and John the Baptist, in the abundance of miracle attributed to the one, and the total absence of miracle attributed to the other, has a second aspect of evidential bearing, exceedingly well worthy of note, additional to the one that has just been pointed out, with its evidence that disposition to invent and attribute miracle was not rife in Palestine during the time of those two great figures in Jewish history. Here were two prophets of Israel, absolutely contemporaneous, both of them filling the whole land with their prophetic renown. One of them surrounded himself living, and dying left his memory encircled, with a halo of miracle-working fame, incomparably beyond that of any personage that had ever preceded him, or that has ever followed him. The other, though "a prophet and more than a prophet," lives in history as simply a "voice." Why this difference? Legend could not possibly have created the difference. So far as prophetic power and prophetic fame tended to beget legend, there was the same reason in the one case as in the other—reason existing in both cases in approximately the same degree—why legend of miracle-working should accompany both the two names. But it does not. Why the difference? There is but one reasonable answer to the question. That answer is, first, John "did no sign," and, secondly, the "signs" attributed to Jesus are truly attributed to him. Here then is unexpected additional evidence, if additional evidence were needed, to prove the gospel narratives of miracle historical and not legendary. If the miracles of Jesus were legendary, there would infallibly have been legendary miracles for John the Baptist. I have not been able to think of any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable difference thus pointed out between Jesus and John, any explanation indeed deserving a

moment's consideration, except the obvious explanation that Jesus was a true miracle-worker, while John was not. That these two kindred prophets should have flourished side by side, with such a contrast subsisting between them at this vital point, looks like a divinely devised method of accrediting Jesus to all ages of men, as one uniquely worthy to be glorified in being declared the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead.

I beg the reader to remember that the legend, if legend there was in the case, was not a simple, single legend barely affirming that Jesus rose from the dead. It was a legend with circumstance, a detailed legend—in fact, a very involved and complicated legend; a legend resolvable into many legends, all of them as little likely ever to have arisen, without the actual occurrence of the fact, as was the main legend itself about which they grouped themselves. Even a legend has to have a start. What—I repeat the question—what was the start of this legend, this false report, that is to say, that Christ rose from the dead? I do not hesitate to say that *no* start for it, plausible enough to be respectfully entertained, is even conceivable. I check myself again, and say, conceivable by me. But were it conceivably once started, there is no conceivable way in which it could subsequently have continued to be maintained, that is, to be credited as veritable history. And then there is the great historic fact, the indestructible historic fact, of the apostle Paul, not of the apostle Paul's express testimony, but of the apostle Paul himself and his great career—a problem he, impossible to be rationally solved except upon the hypothesis that Jesus rose from the dead and ascended to an eternal throne of omnipotence in the heavens.

“Not of the apostle Paul's express testimony”—but this momentary waiver of such testimony is not to be misunderstood. It is far from being intended as any disparagement of it. Quite to the contrary of that, Paul's express testimony has in my view a peculiar, an incalculable, value which ought to be strongly insisted on. Apart from the extraordinary convincing power of the historic phenomenon that Paul was, apart from the extraordinary convincing power of the miracle by virtue of which Paul became the historic phenomenon that he was—apart, I say, from these two things, separately and concurrently so powerful to convince, the further consideration that such

a man as Paul was, a man of intelligence so penetrating, of intellectual discipline so thorough, of judgment so sane, of native temper so haughty, so imperious, of prior attitude so hostile, living as Paul did in the very center and focus, both as to time and as to place, of the events concerned—that this man, being altogether such and so conditioned, should have come to be persuaded, immovably persuaded, *no matter how*, that Jesus of Nazareth rose from the dead, is, soberly considered, an evidence of the reality of that stupendous fact sufficient by itself alone to constitute a reasonable basis for the same persuasion to every thoughtful mind of whatever succeeding generation of men. Paul would not have believed without compelling cause to believe, miraculous or other; that he did believe is therefore reason enough for our believing.

Let us still consider a little with candor and with calmness the unavoidable conditions of the problem with which we have to deal. It has, I may assume, been made clear that in using the expressions, "legend," "legendary theory," I have in mind no one particular form of such treatment among the many forms to which the gospel narratives have actually been subjected. I mean any form of such treatment that assumes the literal bodily resurrection of Jesus not to have occurred. I need to be even more explicit, for the skeptical treatment of the gospel narratives is very full of shifts. I mean, then, by "legendary theory" whatever theory assumes that the bodily resurrection of Jesus—his literal resurrection, as distinguished from a figurative, his physical resurrection as distinguished from a spiritual (that is, an influence from him posthumously revived and indefinitely continued)—I mean, I say, whatever theory assumes that such a real resurrection of Jesus did not occur, that the report of its having occurred is false. One exception I need to make in saying this; for there is one critical theory, not best described as "legendary," which yet, like the legendary theories, denies, or at least holds in doubt, the literal bodily resurrection of Jesus. The critical theory thus referred to might appropriately be dealt with under a second interrogative title, "Misunderstood?"

The crude critical short way once was, to dispose of the gospel narratives very summarily by declaring them the concoction of fraud. This method seems to have been employed very early, for the apostle

Peter, apparently in view of such a charge already then brought against the apostles' testimony, protests: "We [he and his fellow-"eyewitnesses"] did not follow 'cunningly devised fables' in proclaiming the power and glory of Jesus Christ." (This note of Peter's shows that the apostolic age was not too credulous to furnish itself with critics and skeptics.) But the gross critical theory of fabrication for the gospel narratives has long since been abandoned. Even the mythical theory, which seemed a softening from the fabrication theory, and, three-quarters of a century perhaps ago, was very bold and confident of triumph, is now nearly or quite obsolete. It perhaps still flourishes up occasionally in a book or an article produced by some New Testament critic who has belatedly been informing himself on the subject, and who naïvely enjoys the fallacious sensation of important discovery, he not having brought continuously down to date his researches in the ever-varying state of this ever-"burning" question. But in general it may be said that New Testament critics of the time current are careful to avoid seeming to confess any dependence upon mere myth in dealing with the historical and interpretative problems presented by the gospels. Even the less destructive-seeming word "legend" is seldom now used by New Testament critics. Some of them find in the gospels matter "not historical," which, however, they avoid calling "legendary." Legendary in fact, such matter of course generally is, wherever it is found, and I apply the term here because I need some single word to designate it briefly.

The theory of the genesis of the resurrection "myth," lightly set forth, perhaps a half-century ago, in certain French romances dealing with New Testament history, may be mentioned, although it has now only a quasi-antiquarian interest, so completely have those charmingly written romances, purporting, though they do, to be serious historical treatments of their subjects, been discredited in point of critical value. Their author is that brilliant pseudo-critical Semitic scholar who, treating of Hebrew history, exposed himself by hazarding the assertion (at the very moment, it happily chanced to be, when the Tel-el-Amarna tablets were uncovered to confute him) that Moses could not have written the Pentateuch for the reason that the art of writing was not known to Israel in his time! According to this method of disposing of the gospel narratives, it was a case of hallucina-

tion pure and simple, due to an overwrought, half-hysterical state of mind in the disciples. Mary Magdalene is given a great part in the illusion. She perhaps, so it is conjectured, was earliest to feel the demonic stress upon her spirit, and the contagion of hallucination easily spread abroad to all from her. Nothing easier!—although the narratives supply no hint to encourage the explanation. It might be called the method of mental contagion. Parallel instances are unhesitatingly said to abound.

As has been pointed out, the main legend (to indulge the notion expressed by the word) is accompanied with a considerable number of minor legends vitally related alike to that and to one another. What I wish now additionally to point out is that, if the main fact alleged—namely, the literal bodily resurrection of Jesus—is a legend, then the legends accompanying, in the gospel report of that, are not, I submit, *such in character* as can rationally be imagined to have arisen. Just *such* subsidiary stories as are found in the gospel narratives respecting the resurrection of Jesus, require the actual occurrence of that resurrection to account for their appearance in the history. For example, take the statement that Jesus, in express terms singularly detailed and definite, foretold his own impending death and subsequent resurrection—that statement it would never have occurred to anyone, either friendly or hostile to Jesus, whether contemporaneous with him or of a following generation, to make, unless Jesus did do such foretelling. And if he did do such foretelling, and the foretelling was promptly falsified by the fact, then, I ask, had not Jesus beforehand effectually discredited himself as prophet, and as, in a peculiar, a unique, sense, Son of God, and thus rendered it impossible that he should ever have any following after his death, or ever become the subject of admiring, glorifying legend and tradition?

That Jesus did really make those predictions is rendered, as it were, superfluously certain by the fact that in one instance (there were many instances) a very remarkable incident accompanied—an incident inconceivable as the product of legend, and inconceivable as not having had one of those repeated solemn predictions from Jesus for its occasion. Peter, irrepressible Peter, took in hand to “rebuke” his Lord for predicting those dreadful things of his own imminent future. Both Matthew and Mark relate this, together

with the staggering retorted rebuke from his Lord that Peter thus drew upon himself in the presence of his fellow-disciples. The evangelist Mark, by the way, takes pains to say expressly that Jesus made this prediction of his, not "somewhat vaguely," but "openly;" that is, without reserve, definitely.

Now would it, could it, ever have occurred to a legendary—for a legend presupposes a personal legendary—to state that the disciples of Jesus did not understand those predictions of his, supposed made? The natural thing would have been rather to say that the disciples treasured those remarkable predictions in their hearts and waited eagerly after the crucifixion to see whether they would be fulfilled. Yet further, it would never have occurred to a legendary to represent the disciples to have been, all of them, as it were stupidly incredulous in their attitude toward the resurrection of Jesus. The natural thing would rather have been to conceive of them as expectant, as refusing to admit to themselves, until at least the three days of the prediction were past, that their Lord was irretrievably dead.

True indeed, as has previously been pointed out, both the incredulity and the slowness of understanding attributed to the disciples, were perfectly natural. But that they were thus natural, it would have been beyond the subtlety, beyond the blind good fortune, of any legendary to divine. Only in the light of the report, paradoxical at first blush, supplied to us in the gospels, that these two attitudes of mind did in fact subsist with the disciples, do we see how natural, how inevitable, they were. The report itself is thus, in a peculiar manner, its own unimpeachable and irrefutable voucher.

Left to himself, in the absence of fact to guide him, the legendary would naturally have had the disciples hold watch at the tomb that they might witness the resurrection when it occurred. Then, in the gayety of his imagination, rejoicing in its sense of freedom to invent whatever would contribute to exalt his hero and to delight believers in him, he would infallibly have gone on to provide a famous flourishing account of the occurrence and of its overpowering effect upon the witnesses of it; a flamboyant report it would have been, replete with prodigies and marvels—a report in fine, contrasted with which the restrained, simple, and solemn sublime narrative of Matthew would seem tame and dull indeed. Legends, wonderful legends, tend by

their very nature to become extravagant. The remarkable sobriety and self-possession of the gospel narratives, their perfectly maintained superiority to the temptation to draw themselves out in detail and circumstance of marvel—this is an unmistakable note of the truly historical, in discrimination from the laxly and loosely legendary.

In short, all in the gospels is exactly as we can now see it should have been, if the resurrection of Jesus was a literal historic fact; while much at least in the gospels is as it could not rationally be supposed to have been, if the resurrection of Jesus is not a fact, but a legend. The remarks immediately foregoing, as to the improbable, the impossible, character of the incidental stories considered as legends that accompany the main story of the resurrection of Jesus, might be supported by the pointing out of additional specific instances supplied in the gospels.

Speaking now in the character, not of a Christian apologist, but of a disinterested student and critic of history (a student and critic not prepossessed with the disqualifying anti-scientific assumption that a certain event, which men may choose to call a miracle, could not, because it would be a miracle, occur)—speaking, I say, in this judicial critical character, I with all confidence submit that, quite apart from any question of their peculiar divine inspiration, the gospel narratives in general, the narratives respecting the resurrection of Jesus certainly not excepted, are, sanely studied in their own extraordinarily self-evidencing character, and then besides in the extraordinarily confirmatory light of nineteen finished centuries of Christian history—those gospel narratives are, I submit, the most trustworthy memorial monuments of a remote past that exist anywhere in human language. Petty discrepancies of statement contained in those narratives, though they may be discrepancies absolutely irreducible—that is, admitting of no possible adjustment and harmony—will be judged by the truly wise unprejudiced students of the documents to strengthen rather than weaken the substantial trustworthiness in the main of the accounts. The gospel narratives abruptly and definitively refuse to be set at naught as collections of legend and tradition.

VERGIL IN MEDIAEVAL CULTURE¹

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Of all the writers of Greece and Rome of whom the Middle Ages had knowledge none has undergone more singular changes in the minds of men than Vergil. The church numbered him among the prophets of Christ; in the schools he ranked among the philosophers; with the common people he became an enchanter and necromancer, a worker of wonders, and the story of his marvelous deeds was even made the basis of romance.²

Few poets were ever happier in their lifetime than Vergil, and the memory of few was more highly honored than his when he had passed away. The *Aeneid* became a classic almost immediately after Vergil's death, and was edited by various Roman commentators.³

¹ A short but critical bibliography of the literature on Vergil in the Middle Ages is to be found in Gregorovius, *City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, IV, Part 2, p. 677, n. 1. To the references there given the following may be added: Graf, *Roma nella memoria e nelle immaginazioni del Medio Evo*. (Turin, 1882), II, 196-258; C. F. Leland, *Unpublished Legends of Vergil* (1899); Tunison, *Master Vergil* (2d ed., 1890); McCabe, *Vergil in Middle Ages* (1902); Maury, *La magie et l'astrologie*; Michelet, *La sorcière*; Figuiet, *Histoire du merveilleux*; Rosières, *Histoire de la société française au moyen âge*.

² One of the best sources of information for the legendary Vergil is Gervase of Tilbury, *De Otii imperiale*, Book III, chaps. 12, 13, 15 (in Leibnitz, *Rerum Brunsvicarum*, I, 963 ff.). He wrote in the first quarter of the thirteenth century and asserts that he saw miracles performed by the magic of Vergil in Naples in 1191. Another interesting source is Alexander Neckham, *De rerum naturis* (R. S. no. 34, chap. 164; cf. Wright's Introduction, pp. lxvii, lxviii); also Vincent of Beauvais, *Speculum historiale*. The earliest English printed version appeared in 1510, and is reprinted in Thoms, *Metrical Romances*. Alexander Neckham converts the life of the bee as described by Vergil in *Georgics*, IV, 153 ff., into a homily. The cell of the bee is made symbolical of the monastic life, and the order prevailing in the hive and the virtues of bee-nature pointed out as worthy of imitation by men.

³ P. Vergilius Maro; cum magnete suo Servio Mario grammatico: interprete quam castigatissimo. *Venditur apud Gorgonzolam: Impressum Mediolani per Iohannem Angelum scinsenzeler Anno Domini. M. D. XX. (1520) sexto idus Nouembris.*

Émile Thomas, *Scolia de Virgile: Essai sur Servius et son commentaire sur Virgile, d'après les manuscrits de Paris et les publications les plus récentes, avec la liste*

It would be an interesting study to follow out the course by which the elements of the pagan world and the practices of Christianity, by slow fusion and infiltration, melted together. Suffice to say, at the present moment, that the work of a Spanish priest named Juven-
cus, who lived during the reign of Constantine, did much to bridge the chasm between pagan and Christian literature, and to reconcile classic taste and religious sentiment. Juven-
cus wrote a life of Christ in four cantos, into which he skilfully wove Vergilian hexameters. One example will avail: the episode of Jesus falling asleep in the stern of the boat in Lake Genessaret afforded Juven-
cus the opportunity directly to incorporate a line and a half of the fourth book of the *Aeneid*, which portrays the pitching of a ship at sea:

Postquam altum tenuit puppis, consurgere in iras,
Pontus.⁴

But Vergil had claims to popularity other than those of a literary perfection. The most interesting is that which is based on the fourth eclogue, in which the men of the mediaeval period thought they discovered a foreknowledge of the birth of Christ. About the end of the fourth century Proba Falconia⁵ compiled a history of the New Testament out of the Vergilian cantos, which so imposed upon the credulity of the ignorant that Pope Gelasius I⁶ was compelled

et la description des manuscrits de Paris, l'indication des principaux manuscrits étrangers; la liste et l'appréciation des principales éditions, et un tableau général des scolies sur Virgile. viii+xvi+358 pages, 8vo (Paris, 1879).

⁴ Cf. Boissier, *La fin du paganisme*, I, 46, 47; Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, p. 280.

⁵ Falconia: Probæ. Centonæ. Vatis Clarissimæ. a Divo Hieronymo. comprobata. Centonam. de. Fidei nostræ. Miisteriis. Maronis Carminibus excerptum Opusculum. [Colophon.] *Impressum. In Florentissima Lugdunensi Civitate. Solertia. Stephani de Basignand. Gorgoni Carmelite. Doctoris. Theologi. In officina Bernardi Lescuyer Regnante. victoriosissimo Francisco Francorum Rege. Christianâ orbem Moderâ Leone decimo. Animarum tutissimo Medico*, 1516. Sm. 8vo.

The printer of this rare little volume, beautifully printed in a black italic type, appears to have belonged to the Carmelite order. His wood-cut device appears on the verso of the last leaf. The literature concerning Proba Falconia is extensive. For references see Chevalier, *Bio-bibliographie*, col. 711.

⁶ This pope, who reigned 492-96, was very active in his efforts to stamp out the vestiges of paganism. It was he who abolished the celebration of the Lupercalia every February, to which the Romans had clung so long. (See Gibbon [ed. Bury], IV, 33, 34.)

to condemn it as apocryphal. St. Jerome strongly inveighed against this method of destroying the sense of a pagan author. His love of the classics and his Christian piety were alike offended.⁷ The earliest transformation of Vergil into a prophet dates from the time of Constantine. In the writings of Eusebius there is a Greek discourse which purports to be the translation of an address in Latin made by that emperor before the Council of Nicaea. Constantine therein, in order to demonstrate the verities of Scripture, appeals to the witness of the sibyls and invokes the fourth eclogue of Vergil, and portrays the Latin poet as a prophet of Christ's coming.⁸ Thanks to this official patronage of Vergil by the emperor who first recognized Christianity, this belief took deep root among the scholarly.

⁷ Vergil was a favorite author of St. Jerome (ca. 346-420). His writings contain more quotations from Vergil than from all other authors of pagan antiquity put together. He quotes Vergil 25 times, Horace 11, Cicero 4, Terence 2, Lucan 2, Juvenal 1, Ovid 1. At first however, Jerome's homage to Vergil disturbed his conscience, for he could not reconcile the reading of pagan literature with Christian practice. "What have Horace and the Psalms in common?" he asks in the eighteenth epistle. "Or Vergil and the evangel? Or Cicero and the apostle?" Jerome could not practice what he preached, for his love of Latin literature was too overpowering. Finally, the saint yielded altogether, and found in the verses of Vergil the means to express the subtleties of the devil, the hatred of jealous monks, and even to depict the disasters of barbaric invasions. For

"Non mihi si linguae centum sint, oraque centum
Ferrea vox."

Cf. Bossier, *La fin du paganisme*, I, 330.

⁸ Eusebius, chap. 19 (in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, I, 535, 536); the editor makes the remark that "Constantine takes large liberty with the poet in order to make him say what he would like to have him say." On this whole occurrence see Gibbon, II, 307, 308. The notes are especially instructive. The lines to which the emperor referred are the following:

"Ultima humani venit jam carminis aetas;
Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo;
Jam redit et virgo: redeunt Saturnia regna,
Jam nova progenies coelo, dimittitur alto. . . ."

Astraea is implied in the word *virgo*, while the word *puer*, used elsewhere, is a complimentary allusion by Vergil to the son of his patron, Asinius Pollio. Dante uses Astraea's name in much the same form in *De monarchia*, where he says: *Virgo namque vocabur Justitia, quam et Astraem vocabant*. Rienzi, as Gregorovius points out, rejected the Messianic interpretation of the eclogue (Gregorovius, *City of Rome in M. A.*, IV, Part 2, p. 671, note). Boissier finds a similarity between the cross in the sky as Constantine is said to have beheld it and the Roman practice of divination, and quotes the instance of Servus in *Aeneid*, II, 691, who demanded a repetition of the portent ere he would believe (*La fin du paganisme*, I, 31-35.).

Giraldus Cambrensis, an English monk who lived in the reign of Henry Plantagenet (1154-89), credits Vergil with having foreseen the prosperity of the church, owing to Constantine's policy, and her poverty and suffering following upon the barbaric invasion.⁹

This subjection of Vergil to the baser uses of the grammarian and the soothsayer is traceable as far back as the reign of Hadrian (117-34), at which early time "the decadent imperial period joins hands with the Middle Ages."¹⁰ In point of fact, Vergil has nothing but a vague glimpse of the future in this poem. Yet, if he had not caught the vision, he would not have been a poet, for it is the poet's mission to point out the way of aspiration and hope. As Shelley said in his defense of poesy: "poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present." Vergil, then, had no foregleam of wondrous type or vision fair; yet it was sufficient to rank him among the lay prophets. It is to this supposed foreknowledge of the coming of Christ that Dante makes allusion each time that he glorifies Vergil as the source of all knowledge. He calls him "that wise gentile who has seen all things;" he addresses him as the "honor of all science and all art;" as "the deep, the infinite sea of all sciences."

It was Vergil's misfortune to have died before the coming of Christ, and therefore, like the *peri* of Arabian legend, he was shut out of paradise. He had seen but as in a glass, darkly. Yet though "a pagan suckled in a creed outworn," he had had glimpses that had made him less forlorn. Who can wonder that Dante, an exile himself from home and the fatherland that Florence was to him, honored, loved, revered the tender Latin poet whose life beyond the grave must needs have seemed to him an eternal exile?

Once the authority of Vergil was recognized by Christianity, it grew apace. The gem of the funeral oration of St. Ambrose (*ca.* 340-98) over the younger Valentinian, whom he deeply loved, is his tender application of the story of Nisus and Euryalus to the dead prince and his surviving brother Gratian.¹¹

⁹ Giraldus Cambrensis, *Speculum ecclesiae*, R. S. no. 21, IV, 285, 286.

¹⁰ Taylor, *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, p. 38.

¹¹ Ambrose, *De obitu Valentiniani*.

But even greater than the influence of Jerome or Ambrose in enlarging the recognition of Vergil was that of St. Augustine (354-430). He credited Vergil not only with prophetic spiritual vision, but also with the power to discern coming events of a secular and political nature. The best example of this is his belief that Vergil foresaw "the impending ruin of the Roman state" in 410 A. D., in consequence of the Visigothic sack of Rome in that year—a belief which is based upon *Georgics*, II, 489 ff.¹²

The idea of Vergil as a prophet prevailed throughout the course of the Middle Ages. We find traces of it in frequent places: in the *Roman de la rose*, the *Roman de Cléomades*, and the *Poème des Lorrains*, the manuscript of which was lost two years ago when the library of the University of Turin was burned. Vergil, the magician, figures in the work *De naturis rerum* of Alexander Neckham and in the *Polychronicon* of Ranulf Higden, where Aristotle, Vergil, and Rome are grouped together as the supreme examples of a philosopher, a magician, and a city.¹³ Naples was the city of Europe where the cult of Vergil was carried farthest.¹⁴ As late as the seventeenth century

¹² "Sermon on the New Testament," no. 55 in *Works*, VI, 433. Augustine's citations of Vergil throughout his writings are even more frequent than those of Jerome; i. e.: *Aeneid*, 53 times; *Georgics*, 15; *Bucolics*, 11; *Eclogues*, 1. In the *Enchiridion*, chap. 8, he quotes from Vergil and Lucan, the prophecy of Joel, Romans, Galatians, the First Epistle of James, and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

¹³ Higden tells us that Vergil was much instructed in natural philosophy and used much necromancy, and then goes on to cite a list of wonders borrowed from the narrative of Alexander of Neckham.

Hic itaque automaticæ nomen philosophi promeruit, ut sicut urbs Romam, poeta Maronem exprimit, sic philosophus Aristotelem,—R. S. 41, vol. III, bk. 3, p. 359. Magic formulas, receipts for philtres, secret and mysterious utterances, were extracted from the verses of the *Bucolics* and the *Aeneid*. The name of Vergil's grandfather, Magius, was invoked to prove that his lore was derived from the Persian magi. *La grande encyclopédie*, art. "Virgil." A brief account of some of Vergil's wonder-working is in Gregorovius, *City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, IV, Part 2, pp. 666-77.

¹⁴ *Neapolim versus mare et versus terram, quæ civitas quondam Virgilii fuerat domicilium speciale*.—Matt. Paris, V, 417 (R. S.). The poet's tomb is still pointed out to the tourist in Naples.

"Neckham tells us how, when the city of Naples was visited by a plague of innumerable leeches, Vergil made a leech of gold which, being thrown into a well, caused all the leeches to disappear immediately, and the Neapolitans were no longer troubled with them until ages afterward, when the well was cleaned and the golden leech found and carried away; the plague of leeches returned, and was only appeased

Vergil's magic mirror was still shown to the curious; his portrait was a talisman, a charm which guarded the wearer against the evil eye.

Now and then the intelligent appreciation of Vergil by some more cultured and critical intellect of the mediaeval epoch, as Alcuin,¹⁵ or Servatus Lupus,¹⁶ or Notker,¹⁷ or Odo of Cluny,¹⁸ is a protest against the popular belief concerning the poet; but such a spirit of criticism and loyalty to the classic ideal is very rare. So universal was the superstitious veneration of the Latin poet that some modern

when Vergil's golden leech was found and again thrown into the well. On another occasion the butchers of Naples were in great distress because in their butchery the meat could not be preserved from unusually rapid corruption; Vergil immediately laid a spell upon the place, in consequence of which meat remained there uncorrupted for a very great length of time. He condensed the air into a strong wall of defense around his garden. He made a bridge through the air by which he went to any part of the world he desired to visit. He built in Rome a vast palace, on which he placed wooden images of all the countries belonging to the Roman Empire, each holding a bell, so contrived that when any region was about to rise in rebellion the statue representing that region rang its bell, and the emperor was thus early warned of the danger. When anybody asked Vergil how long this palace would stand, he replied: 'Until a virgin should bear a child;' which was commonly taken as meaning that the building would last forever. But on the birth of our Savior it fell to the ground." Wright's ed. of Neckham, *De naturis rerum*, p. lxviii. Alexander Neckham was an English Augustinian monk, who was born at St. Albans in 1157, was a professor at Paris in 1180, became abbot of Cirenster in 1213, and died at Kempsey, near Worcester, in 1217. Consult Wright, *Biog. Brit. Lit.* (1846), II, 449-59, and the introduction to the *De naturis rerum* (Rolls Series, no. 34, pp. ix-lxviii). Substantially the same account is to be found in the *Polychronicon*, where the curious reader may examine the mediaeval Latin and the Old English versions on opposite pages.

¹⁵ *H. F.* VI, 375. His letters and other writings are to be found in this volume of the *Recueil*. Teulet published a French translation of them in 1856.

¹⁶ Servatus Lupus was abbot of Ferrières (842-62). His writings are in *H. F.*, VI. The most recent critical examination of his letters is to be found in the *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, 1903. Cf. Nicholas, *Étude sur les lettres de Servat-Loup* (Clermont-Ferrand, 1861).

¹⁷ Notker was a monk of St. Gall who lived in the tenth century. He was one of the most learned men of his age: theologian, mathematician, astronomer, musician, poet, grammarian. His knowledge of the classics, for the epoch, was profound; he even knew Greek. See VonArx, *Geschichte von St. Gallen*. His extant writings are to be found in Piper, *Die älteste deutsche Literatur*, pp. 338 ff. They are chiefly expositions of the Psalms, Aristotle, Boëthius, Marcianus Capella, and a treatise on music.

¹⁸ Odo of Cluny was a French monk who was abbot of the famous monastery of Cluny from 926 to 943. His writings are in Migne, *Patrolog-Lat.*, CXXXIII. For literature upon him consult Chevalier, *Bio-bibliographie*, col. 1666.

scholars have questioned if there were not actually a mediaeval magician by the name of Vergil with whom the Roman laureate became confounded.¹⁹ According to the author of the *Imago Mundi*, St. Paul came to Rome after Vergil's death in order to get the books which the poet had left concealed under a spell; the saint broke the power of enchantment, but failed to get the precious writings.

Comparetti, in his excellent book upon Vergil in the Middle Ages, develops some other reasons of the poet's popularity; for example, the inclination, not to say mania, for allegory which prevailed then. Vergil's verse, both the *Eclogues* and the *Aeneid*, was subjected to curious examination, picked to pieces line by line, and every word made the symbol of some secret truth. A still better reason for the popularity of Vergil in the Middle Ages is to be found in the continual triumphal chant to the glory of Rome throughout his hexameters. Think what this worship of Rome implied in an age when St. John Lateran was in a far greater sense than today "mother and head of the churches and of the world." To the cultured mediaeval man, pre-eminently to Dante, who was a Ghibbeline in politics, Vergil was the incarnation of the "ordered peace" of the ancient Roman Empire, for which the broken and divided condition of Italy made him crave so passionately.²⁰ But there are yet other important reasons for the popularity of Vergil. The idea that the second coming of Christ was not far hence was cherished by the church for centuries. As late as 410, when Alaric sacked Rome—the Eternal City, the symbol of power and permanence—men thought in their consternation that the fountains of the great deep were about to break up, that the heavens

¹⁹ Cf. Dibeneck, *Croyances populaires et légendes héroïques du moyen âge*; Schmidt, *Contributions à l'histoire de la poésie romantique*; Michel, *Quae vices quaeque mutationes et Virgilium ipsum et ejus carmina per mediam aetatem exceperint* (Paris, 1846). There is a curious coincidence between the legend of Vergil, the magician, and that of Gerbert, who as Sylvester II, was reputed to have gained the papal throne by means of the black art. Cf. *Pos. des thèses*, 1869, p. 36. On Gerbert consult Havet, *Lettres de Gerbert*, Introd. p. xxxiv and n. 3; Olleris, *Vie et les lettres de Gerbert*, pp. clxxxviii-cxcviii. Upon Gerbert, the magician, see Gregorovius, *The Tombs of the Popes* (Eng. trans., pp. 46-52); de la Fons-Mélicocq, "La légende de Gerbert," in *Bulletin du bouquinier*, IX (1865), 459-64; *Hist. litt. de la France*, VI, 558; Boulay, *Hist. Acad. Paris*, I, 314, 319; Naud, *Apologie pour les grandes hérésies fausement accusées de la magie*, chap. xix, § 4.

²⁰ Bryce develops this idea in *The Holy Roman Empire*, pp. 271, 272 (new ed., 1905).

would soon be rolled together as a scroll, that the end of the world was nigh. This fear was the immediate occasion of the writing of one of the books of the ages, St Augustine's *City of God*. For as his frightened people crowded about his knees in wonder and terror at what was happening, Augustine comforted them by the thought that, though the empire of Rome, though all the earth might pass away, there was still a city of God in heaven for the just who had faith to believe. Thus was begun that magnificent series of sermons which, united, form this great book. Augustine supplied the only political philosophy of that epoch when the elements of civilization were fusing as with fervent heat.²¹

The idea of the second advent was an ever present thought to the early church. This belief is expressed with perfervid force by the author of Revelation. The Book of Revelation in the Middle Ages was the most authoritative source of all foreknowledge and all prophecy. Among these glimpses beyond the veil of time and sense that wrapped men round, the clearest was that of the millennium. St. Augustine applied the mysterious words of Revelation²² directly to Rome; he declared that the Roman Empire would still endure for a season, that it would perish utterly at last, and that then would begin the reign of Jesus Christ and the Church for a thousand years in the earth. But on what day, at what hour, could it be said that the Roman Empire had passed away? Moreover, before the realization of that blessed cycle, Satan was to be unchained as Anti-christ,

²¹ On St. Augustine and the origin and influence of the *City of God* see, in addition to the book itself, Guizot, *Civilization in France*, Course II, lecture 5; Gregorovius, *City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, I, 163 ff.; Hampden, in *Bampton Lectures*; Gibbon, chaps. 21 and 23; Boissier, *La fin du paganisme*, II, 310-12. Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire* (new ed.), p. 94, says it is "hardly too much to say that the Holy Empire was built upon the foundation of the *De civitate dei*." This work of Augustine's was Charlemagne's favorite book. Cf. Einhard, *Vita Caroli*, chap. 24. For an extended study of the influence of the *City of God* upon the political philosophy of the Middle Ages, see Bourgeois, *Le capitulaire de Kiersey*, chaps. 7, 8.

²² "And I saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit, and a great chain in his hand. And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent which is the devil and Satan, and bound him a thousand years . . . and when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison and shall go out to deceive the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth. . . . And I saw the dead . . . small and great, stand before God, and the books were opened . . . and the dead were judged."—Rev., chap. 20.

and a frightful duel would have to be fought between him and the church of God. At last would come the triumph of Christianity and blessedness unto all men who believed. This prediction, a combination of terror and hope, tormented the Middle Ages. Theologians asked themselves at what moment the Roman Empire would terminate. The uncertainty was the greater because, after a long period of decline, Rome had been restored in the form of the Holy Roman Empire, by Charlemagne and his successors. Henry IV²³ and Frederick I²⁴ both declared themselves the successors of the Caesars. How could the Roman Empire be said to have come to an end? On the other hand, it was quite as impossible to declare at what day or what hour the millennium would begin. Where in all Europe, in France, Germany, or Italy, could the pious Christian look round about him and say: "I am living in the reign of Jesus Christ upon earth?" Some supposed that, despite wars and rumours of war the reign of the Prince of Peace might even then be in the earth: they believed that the fabled realm of Prester John,²⁵ in some remote quarter of Asia or Africa, was a strip of heaven fallen through from on high. Eyes were dimmed and hearts ached for the breaking of the morning "when on the glittering limit far withdrawn" God would make himself "an awful rose of dawn." Was St. John (if he be the wondrous mystic who wrote the Apocalypse) in error? The learned pored over the famous division of history into the seven ages of man as found in the *City of God*. The first epoch marked by Adam; the second by Abraham; the third by David; the fourth by the captivity of Babylon; the fifth by the birth of Christ; the sixth was the time in which St. Augustine wrote, the time of great trial; the seventh would witness the coming. But how could this period of tragedy and suffering, in which one could not lie down to sleep with the certainty

²³ Letter of Henry IV to Gregory VII, January 24, 1076, in *M. G. H. Leges*, II, 47.

²⁴ Manifesto of Frederick I, October, 1157, in Ragawin, *Gesta Frederichi*, Book III, chap. 4.

²⁵ Prester John was actually the Coptic Christian king of Abyssinia in the first half of the thirteenth century. See Yule, *Marco Polo*, II, 209 ff. At this time, however, the popular belief was that his kingdom lay somewhere in central Asia. Cf. Matthew Paris, II, p. 316; VI, 115, 116. The error arose from the fact that he was confounded with the Mongol emperors Tamerlane and Kublai-Khan, owing to the belief that the Nestorian doctrines of Christianity had come to prevail in their empires.

of enjoying wife, children, or home or fatherland, on the morrow, be the vestibule to an earthly paradise?

It is a popular but erroneous belief that as the year 1000 approached the terror of Europe grew intense.²⁶ Michelet has dilated upon this theme in three pages of superb color.²⁷ But it has been historically proved that this terror was not general throughout Europe. In the second half of the tenth century there seems to have been a number of sensational or deluded priests in the Rhinelands, in Lorraine, and

²⁶ Professor George Lincoln Burr, of Cornell University, in an article in the *American Historical Review*, VI (1901), 429-39, is the most recent authority who has examined all the evidence on this subject. A full bibliography will be found in his notes. The strongest plea in favor of the old belief as to the year 1000, in recent years, has been made by Professor Flach, of the Collège de France, in *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, I, 139, 40. A long note contains an extensive list of evidence in support of his contention. In most cases I believe that these phrases were stereotyped phraseology, not unlike similar phrases in modern legal documents, as deeds of gift, wills, etc. Viollet, *Institution politique de la France*, I, 457, remarks, very appropriately, that "le jour où l'empire s'effondra, en 843, et dans les temps qui suivirent, au IX^e et au X^e siècle, les peuples éprouvèrent le sentiment poignant, l'angoisse d'un effroyable effondrement. Plus d'un pensa que le monde allait finir et ceux qui le crurent ne se trompaient pas tout à fait. Le monde ancien finissait; le monde nouveau commençait." And Viollet adds the guarded comment in the note: "Je me suis appliqué à trouver une expression mesurée et vraie pour faire allusion dans le texte à la croyance à la fin du monde."

To the same purpose is Giry, *Manuel de diplomatie*, 543, 544: "Les préambules des très anciennes donations pieuses expriment fréquemment la crainte de la fin du monde: *Mundi termino appropinquante* en est la formule la plus brève et la plus ordinaire; souvent elle est développée par des réflexions sur la méchanceté croissante du genre humain et sur tous les signes précurseurs de l'Anti-christ. La plupart des historiens n'ont pas manqué de grouper les textes de ce genre qu'ils ont trouvés dans les chartes de la fin du X^e siècle, et de les considérer comme un témoignage de la terreur légendaire qui aurait précédé l'an 1000. Mais, si l'on considère que l'idée exprimée par ces préambules se rencontre déjà dans le testament de sainte Radegonde [died 587], et dans le prologue de l'*Histoire des Francs* de Grégoire de Tours, écrit vers 576; que la formule même du préambule, telle qu'elle a passé dans un grand nombre de chartes, se trouve dans le recueil de Marculf et dans les formules de Tours, c'est-à-dire au VII^e et au VIII^e siècle; que depuis cette époque on la trouve dans une série ininterrompue de chartes, sans que la fréquence s'en accroisse aux approches de l'an 1000; et qu'enfin ce préambule n'a guère été moins souvent employé au XI^e siècle qu'auparavant, on en devra conclure qu'il n'y a là rien autre chose que l'expression banale de la doctrine catholique sur la proximité de la fin du monde, très propre à être invoquée par les moines pour déterminer les laïques à se dépouiller de leurs biens."

²⁷ *Histoire de France*, Book IV, chap. 1. Cf. Martin, *Histoire de France*, III, 37; Duruy, *Histoire de France*, I, 214 (ed. of 1874); Kitchin, *History of France*, I, 198 (ed. of 1881).

especially in Champagne, who frightened the people with the idea that the end of the world was near.²⁸ Charters have come down to us bearing the formula *mundi termine appropinquante*.²⁹ But, on the other hand, there is no allusion to this terrible year in the acts of all the councils of the tenth century. And terrible the last years of the tenth and the first years of the eleventh were, without imagination to enhance the effect. When the infamous popes of Tusculum were reigning in Rome, in the blackest age of the papacy,³⁰ Europe, especially France, was perishing of famine. For two years there was so much rain that it was impossible to sow any wheat; the seed rotted in the ground; men ate roots and leaves and tender bark of trees; when there were no more animals but vermin, even human flesh was devoured. He who wishes may read of such an incident in the chronicle of Verdun³¹ and the history of Raoul Glaber,³² the tale of a desperate man who built himself a hut in the forest of Macon and waylaid men and children; who did not merely eat of human flesh himself, but cunningly disguised it and sold of it to others. Was it any wonder that in times like these men fled into the monasteries for refuge? It was in contemplation of such an age, of war, of famine, and of pestilence, that Bernard of Cluny wrote that wondrous hymn, "Jerusalem, the Golden." There is the picture of a whole civilization in lines like these:

The world is very evil,
The times are waxing late;
Be sober and keep vigil,
The Judge is at the gate.

.
Brief life is here our portion,
Brief sorrow, short-lived care;
The life that knows no ending—
The tearless life is there.

²⁸ Glaber, *Historiae*, Book IV, chap. 4; Abbon, Abbot of Fleury, in *H. F.*, X, 332; "Le chant du dernier jour (prose de Montpellier)," in Zeller, *Extraits des chroniques et des mémoires*, volume entitled *Les premiers Capétiens*, pp. 54, 55.

²⁹ Cf. examples in Flach, *Les origines de l'ancienne France*, I, 139, 40, notes.

³⁰ Duchesne, *Les premiers temps de l'état pontifical*, chaps. 16, 17.

³¹ *H. F.* X, 209.

³² Glaber, Book IV, chap. 4. For a list of such famines in France, see Lamprecht, *Études sur l'état économique de la France*, transl. by Marignan, pp. 264, 265; Daresté de la Chavannes, *Journal des Économistes*, 1853, October-December, p. 207. For Germany see Lamprecht's *Deutsche Wirtschaftsleben*, I 589 ff.

Can you not see Bernard, standing on the walls of the monastery of Cluny, looking, as Scott described Durham cathedral, "half house of God, half fortress 'gainst the Scot?" The church to many in those days was what the fatherland is to us today. Is it any wonder that Bernard's heart cried out:

For thee, O dear, dear country,
 Mine eyes their vigils keep;
 For very love beholding
 Thy happy name, they weep.
 O, sweet and blessed country,
 The home of God's elect!
 O, sweet and blessed country
 That eager hearts expect!
 Jesu, in mercy bring us
 To that dear land of rest,
 Who art with God the Father
 And Spirit ever blest.

Years, centuries, rolled by, and toward the end of the twelfth century a new fear stalked abroad. A monk of Calabria again prophesied the end of the world, and thousands believed and trembled. Joachim of Flora could not tell if the supreme moment would come in 1200 or in 1260. All signs pointed to the impending end. The Crusades were failing. Jerusalem, which untold blood and treasure had taken in 1099, was lost in 1187. In the conflict between the popes and Barbarossa, Alexander III was an exile from his own city. The population of Rome fell to a handful of people—but twenty-five thousand, it is said; this for the mother of empire!³³

It was under the strain of thoughts and feelings such as these that a few Christian spirits in whom love of the classic learning was not dead remembered the lines of Vergil and drew hope from them, reading their own hopes and aspirations into the hexameters of a Roman singer who lived before the days when all the world was to be taxed, and "Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of Nazareth, into Judea, unto the city of David which is called Bethlehem," where was born "a Savior which is Christ the Lord." (Luke, chap. 2.) And those lines of Vergil are these:

Ultima Cumaevi venit iam carminis aetas:
 Magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo.

³³ Gregorovius, *Tombs of the Popes*, p. 97, says that the population of Rome fell below 20,000 in the fourteenth century. On the population of Rome in the seventh century see Gibbon, V, 31, 32.

Vergil was the poet and the prophet of joy and blessedness; and because he was tender-hearted and optimistic, and looked into the future with joy and not with fear, men believed that pagan though he had been, the mercy of God had permitted him to pierce beyond the veil, and he was loved and revered by the Middle Ages. Of all the poets of antiquity, Vergil was the purest and most saintly. Men might have Horace and Ovid, Lucan, Cicero, Livy, and the greatest of the Greeks to the mediaeval mind, Aristotle, the master of all human knowledge, who was regarded with wonder by the student; but what of them? Vergil had walked by faith, not by sight. The faith that could make a pagan hopeful of the future made Christians in the mediaeval era sing while treading through thorns and ashes, and see "a budding morrow in midnight." Doctors of canon law, bishops, abbots, the cultured clergy, leaned on Vergil's hopefulness and tenderness for consolation and strength. To all those who had any knowledge of the classic learning he was a person reverently regarded. This leads to a word upon Vergil as a philosopher.³⁴ In the Middle Ages the title "philosopher" was applied to the celebrated writers of antiquity, not merely to moralists and sages, but to poets, orators, and even kings, notably Alexander the Great.³⁵

³⁴ F. Piper, *Virgilius als Theolog und Prophet* (Berlin, 1862); Gauthiez, *De Virgilii philosophia* (Paris, 1895).

³⁵ For references upon the legendary Alexander see Talbot, *Essai sur la légende d'Alexandre-le-Grand dans les romans français du XII^e siècle* (Paris: Franck, 1850). Taylor, *Classical Heritage of the Middle Age*, p. 360, gives an extensive bibliography on the subject.

"Alexander was one of the most celebrated of the mythical names in mediaeval times. A letter purporting to have been written by Alexander to his tutor Aristotle, and containing a wonderful account of the extraordinary animals he had seen in his expeditions in Asia, was published in Latin at a rather early period, for it was translated into Anglo-Saxon, and copies of it are of very common occurrence in mediaeval manuscripts. The Anglo-Saxon version and the Latin text have been recently edited by Mr. Oswald Cockayne (8vo, J. Russell Smith, 1861). This fabulous letter formed the groundwork of much of the science of natural history of the Middle Ages, and was wonderfully popular. The adventures of Alexander also formed the subject of a mediaeval romance which appeared in different forms in French, German, and English, and in fact in all the languages of western Europe, and of which the letter, greatly extended and improved upon, formed an important feature. In the English romance of Alexander (printed in Weber's *Mediaeval Romances*, 8vo, 1801, Vol. I) the story of the great hero's descent to the bottom of the sea in a glass vessel is not told, but is found in the French romance, and was so well known in western Europe that Neckham here quotes it as though its authenticity admitted of no doubt."—Preface to Neckham's *De naturis rerum*.

Guyot de Provins,³⁶ in his *Bible*, numbers Vergil among the ancient philosophers of whom he taught in the schools of Arles. In the early centuries of the Christian era Vergil was famed for the extent of his knowledge, and his reputation did not decline. In the *Imago Mundi* he is the master of the seven arts. In the *Renart le Nouvel*, *Renarz li Contrejaiz*, the *Dicta philosophorum*, and the *Songe du Vergier*,³⁷ he renders homage to science.

So far as I have described it, knowledge of Vergil in the Middle Ages was limited to the learned, and veneration of him would have continued to be confined to the cloister wholly, if that wondrous reformation of the church and society had not taken place in the thirteenth century, under the inspiration of St. Francis of Assisi. The Franciscan movement made Vergil *popular* in the Middle ages. Vergil had a deep love of nature, a profound sense of fellowship with the beasts of the field and the forest, and the birds that sang in its branches. He is one of the few writers, perhaps the sole writer of antiquity, who felt the unity of nature; who, like Burns, had pity for the field-mouse whose home was destroyed by the rude plow-share; in a word, Vergil, like Christ, "had compassion." Had he not written: *sunt lachrymae rerum*—"there are tears for everything"? Among all the names of antiquity—captains, conquerors, poets, historians, wits—Vergil is almost the only one distinguished for his love of animals, birds, and flowers. Horace loved his farm, but not the four-footed and winged denizens of it; Pliny the younger was the most finished type of a cultured Roman gentleman, who shrank from cruelty because he was a gentleman, but he had no positive affection for the poor, the weak, the inferior, either among men or

³⁶ Cf. Demogeot, "La Bible de Guiot de Provins: Satire des mœurs du XII^e siècle," in the *Revue du Lyonnais*, XVI (1892), 237-52. Guyot de Provins was a French *trouvère* who, about the year 1205, wrote a satirical poem under the title "La Bible de Guyot de Provins", which was printed in the collection of Fablius and Conte, of Barbizon. The poem is especially interesting because it contains one of the earliest allusions to the mariner's compass.

³⁷ The *Songe du Vergier* was a work which appeared in France at the inception of the Great Schism, during the reign of Charles V (1364-80), and which was dedicated to the king. In it a cleric and a knight argue the relative rights of the church and the secular power. Both the Latin and the French texts are extant; the first is probably of 1376, the latter of 1378 (to be found in the *Traité des libertés de l'Église gallicane*, ed. 1731). Cf. Müller, "Ueber das Somnium Viridarii," *Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht*, XIV, 134 ff.; Esmein, *Histoire du droit français*, p. 648 and n. 3.

animals. But Vergil was a genuine lover of these. What reader of the classics does not know the word-picture of the ox who has fallen in the way by the side of his mate in the yoke? How the laborer unfastens the one still standing and leads him slowly toward the stable: *Moerentem abjungens fraterna morte juvencum?* Or the sick horse who will never more know the brooks or the fields? Or birds? Of the nightingale whose nest has been despoiled by some boy marauder, and the poor bird sits not upon the orphaned nest, but upon a bough, solitary, forever uttering the plaintive cry of a bird's lamentation? Or it may be flowers. Vergil finds a poppy or a violet by the wayside which the carter's wheel has cut down, and his heart is touched to see such a thing of beauty languish and die.

I have dilated upon this feature in order to make my point perfectly clear. St. Francis of Assisi brought into the world, for a thousand years dead to natural beauty, dead to love of flowers, dead to sympathy for the lower animals,³⁸ a feeling of compassion and a love of nature. In St. Francis the mind of the Roman poet, by some Rosicrucian mystery, seemed to have rebirth, but purged of its paganism—Christian. But even Francis' Christianity was different from that of his contemporaries. His humanity was deep enough and broad enough to go out unto all men. In an age when chivalry had become a caste, when the church had become an aristocratic corporation, all men were brothers unto him, whether Jew or gentile, bond or free, pagan or heretic or infidel. This is how the reverence for Vergil, to whose heart that of St. Francis was akin, spread from the cultured precincts of the cloister down among the common people of the Middle Ages.

³⁸ Cf. *L'Église et la pitié envers les animaux: Textes originaux puisés à des sources pieuses*. Under the direction of the Marquise de Rambures; preface by Robert de la Sizeranne.

JUSTIN MARTYR ON THE PERSON OF CHRIST

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Justin's idea of the person of Christ is well stated in the words which he puts on the lips of Trypho in the *Dialogue*.¹ The words are these: "When you say that this Christ existed as God before the ages, then that he submitted to be born and to become man, yet that he is not man of men, this appears to me not only paradoxical but also foolish." Whether this doctrine is "paradoxical and foolish" is not now our concern, but to see clearly what Justin believed. He sums up his doctrine for us in these points: (a) that Christ existed as God before the ages, or, as he says elsewhere, "before the morning star and the moon;"² and (b) that the Christ who existed as God became incarnate in a supernatural manner—the Word became man, but not "man of men."

Justin held that this Christ who existed as God before the morning star "came forth from the Father,"³ or was "begotten by him;"⁴ yet not as though the essence of the Father were divided (*ὡς ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας*),⁵ but as one fire comes forth from another, leaving the original one undiminished. He came forth like "the host of the other good angels," from whom he differed in that he was the first-born; the only-begotten Son of God.⁶ This Christ, when he existed as God, appeared in the shape of fire and in the likeness of an angel to Moses.⁷ He appeared to Abraham and Laban and Jacob, to Joshua and other Old Testament saints and heroes.⁸ This first begotten Word of God, which is even God,⁹ became man according to the will of the Father, being born of a virgin of David's line.¹⁰

Such, in brief, was the faith of Justin, and the defense of this

¹ *Dialogue with Trypho*, 48, Otto's edition.

² *Ibid.*, 45.

³ *First Apology*, 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁵ *Dialogue*, 128.

⁶ *Apology*, 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁸ *Dialogue*, 76, 78, etc.

⁹ *Apology*, 63 (*θεὸς ὑπάρχει*).

¹⁰ *Dialogue*, 45.

faith constitutes the vital part of his extant writings. Though a philosopher, Justin thought that he found this faith in the books of the prophets.¹¹ He proved it all from the Scriptures, and indeed from Scriptures which appeared to him to teach it so plainly that he said they "need not be expounded, but only listened to."¹² He does, however, give not a little exposition, as well as cite many passages of the Bible without comment, and we will now follow him as he vindicates, from the Old Testament, his faith regarding the person of Jesus.

Justin claims that Christ appeared in Old Testament times and that certain parts of the Old Testament refer to him. This claim is evidently of vital importance, and yet it is presented much as though it were a Christian axiom. Speaking of Moses, he says: "Our Christ conversed with him under the appearance of fire from a bush, and said, 'Put off thy shoes, and draw nigh and hear.'"¹³ He does not offer any proof of the assertion, or betray any consciousness of a need of proof. We shall see later how this view arose, and how he sought to justify it.

Justin's method of appropriating Old Testament Scripture to Christ is seen where he seeks to prove that Christ is called "God" and "Lord of hosts."¹⁴ He cites Ps. 24, and then adds:

When our Christ rose from the dead and ascended to heaven, the rulers in heaven, under appointment of God, are commanded to open the gates of heaven, that he who is king of glory may enter in, and having ascended, may sit on the right hand of the Father until he make the enemies his footstool. For when the rulers of heaven saw him of uncomely and dishonored appearance, and inglorious, not recognizing him, they inquired, Who is this king of glory? And the Holy Spirit, either from the person of his Father or from his own person, answers them, "The Lord of hosts, he is this king of glory." For every one will confess that not one of those who presided over the gates of the temple at Jerusalem would venture to say concerning Solomon, though he was so glorious a king, or concerning the ark of testimony, "Who is this king of glory?"

Thus the argument of Justin runs on this wise: The passage could not refer to Solomon and to an event in terrestrial history; therefore it must refer to Christ, and to him at the time of his entrance into heaven. This argument needs no other refutation than to be

¹¹ *Apology*, 32.

¹² *Dialogue*, 55.

¹³ *Apology*, 62.

¹⁴ *Dialogue*, 36.

clearly stated. What Justin declared could not be referred to Solomon is now universally referred either to him or to some other earthly king.

Other psalms are referred to Christ without any attempt to justify the act; as Ps. 46, beginning, "God went up with a shout;" Ps. 98, which speaks of Jehovah as revealing himself to Israel in the pillar of cloud; and Ps. 45. This sweeping and direct reference of Old Testament Scripture to Christ accords with that theory of inspiration which is laid down in the *First Apology*.¹⁵ "The utterances of the prophets," says Justin, "are not spoken by the inspired ones themselves, but by the Divine Word who moves them Sometimes he speaks as from the person of God the Lord and Father of all; sometimes as from the person of Christ; sometimes as from the person of the people answering the Lord or his Father." Thus the words of the Old Testament were truly spoken by Christ, he being the real author back of the human authors. At one time he impersonated the Father, at another the people of Israel, and again he spoke of himself. The human authors were an "instrument like a harp or lyre" on which the divine *plectrum* descended.¹⁶ Thus we see that Justin's use of the Old Testament, assigning some parts to Christ and others to the Father, was bound up with a particular theory of the origin of Scripture, and we may safely say that this theory proceeded from Justin, the philosopher, rather than from any sympathetic study of the Old Testament itself.

These Old Testament passages, which Justin thus claims for Christ, speak of "God," "Jehovah," and "the Lord of hosts," and accordingly he concludes that these designations are given to Christ by the Divine Spirit. It is indeed evident that if the passages refer to Christ at all, they refer to him under the name "God," or "Jehovah," or "the Lord of hosts;" for the name "Christ" does not occur in them.

Now, finding Christ referred to in the Old Testament as God, Justin proceeds to show that this God is distinct from the Father. To this point he devotes considerable attention in *The Dialogue with Trypho*. His first and chief proof is in the story of God's appearance to Abraham by the oaks of Mamre.¹⁷ He identifies one of the three

¹⁵ *Apology*, 36.

¹⁷ *Dialogue*, 56, 57.

¹⁶ *Hortatory Address to the Greeks*, 8.

angels with God, and does it on this wise. The words of the Lord, "At the set time I will return unto thee, when the season cometh round, and Sarah shall have a son" (Gen. 18:14)—words that evidently have their fulfilment in the birth of the promised child—are referred by Justin to an event subsequent, not only to the birth of the child, but also to the time when he was weaned (Gen. 21:8). That event was the word of God to Abraham when he was grieved by Sarah's demand that he should put away his son, Ishmael, with Hagar, his mother. Now, since this passage is regarded as the fulfilment of the word at Mamre, and since the speaker here is God, therefore, according to Justin, it is proven that one of the three who appeared to Abraham was God. But the angel's word to Abraham, "I will certainly return unto thee when the season cometh round; and lo, Sarah, thy wife, shall have a son," obviously finds its fulfilment in the birth of Isaac. It has nothing to do with the message to Abraham at the time of Ishmael's rejection. It may be noticed, in conclusion on this point, that, according to modern scholars, Jehovah was equally manifest in each one of the three angels.

Again, in the passage, "Jehovah rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from Jehovah out of heaven" (Gen. 19:24), Justin sees a numerical distinction between the God who appeared to Abraham and the Father.¹⁸ But to find such a distinction here, to speak of a Jehovah upon earth distinct from the Jehovah above, is manifestly to make the Old Testament contradict itself on one of its fundamental teachings. For the very name "Jehovah" is a monumental proof that the Jewish people thought of their covenant God as one (Ex. 3:14). There is no necessity of seeing in the passage anything out of accord with the strict monotheism of the Old Testament. The repetition of the name "Jehovah" may simply give emphasis to the thought that the awful judgment came from him; or, possibly, the word "Jehovah," in the first instance, is used of the angels who represented him. It is easy to explain it in harmony with the Old Testament.

Justin follows this proof from the history of Abraham with several other passages to show that the Old Testament knows a God who is distinguished from the Father. He quotes without comment the

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 56: θεὸς ἕτερος . . . ἀριθμῷ λέγω ἀλλὰ οὐ γνῶμη.

first verse of Ps. 110: "The Lord said unto my Lord," and vss. 6 and 7 of Ps. 45: "Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever. . . . Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee."¹⁹ The first of these, which reads, according to the Hebrew, "Jehovah saith to my Lord," gives no support to the point to be proved, for the one to whom Jehovah speaks is an earthly ruler; and the second, in like manner, cannot be relied upon, for in the very passage in which the messianic king is supposed to be called "God" he is compared with his "fellows," so that, if we have one God here, we have several, and the text would prove too much. If, then, the messianic king of the psalm is called "God," which is by no means certain, the term is evidently employed rhetorically, as in Ps. 82, where rulers are called "gods."

Justin further adduces several passages in which the speaker is called "the angel of God" and then speaks as *God*, such as the account of Jacob's wrestling and the narrative concerning Moses at the burning bush.²⁰ Now, if these passages really identified "the angel of God" with God, there would seem to be some ground for Justin's view; but it is quite certain that this identification is never made. When one who is called "the angel of Jehovah" speaks and says, "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," it is now understood that he claims to *represent* God, and speaks in his name. As representing God and making known his will to men, the angel of the Lord, or the prince of Jehovah's host, or the prophets, may consistently be identified with God, for they speak with divine authority. But to identify the "angel" or the "prince" with God as respects *being* would be as foreign to the Hebrew mind as to identify the prophets with him. For the prophets' language concerning their relation to God is quite as favorable to Justin's interpretation as is that of those passages which speak of the angel of the Lord. Thus, e. g., the author of Isa. chap. 61, says: "The spirit of the Lord Jehovah is upon me, because Jehovah hath anointed me to preach good tidings to the meek;" and then a little later, with no indication of a change of speakers, he continues: "For I, Jehovah, love justice; I hate robbery." We see here an identification of the prophet with Jehovah in the matter of authority, and nothing more than this can legitimately be claimed when an angel of

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 56.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 58.

the Lord or the prince of his host communicates his will in the first person. The remaining texts which Justin cites in proof of his statement that the Old Testament knows a God who is distinguished from the Father are the famous passage in Prov. 8:22-36, and the two passages in Genesis where God is represented as speaking in the plural number (1:26; 3:22).²¹ But the passage in Proverbs is in praise of wisdom, and the author nowhere intimates that his readers may substitute the name of Christ for wisdom. To do this is to disregard the principles of safe interpretation, and thus to open the door to every sort of abuse of Scripture. Of the passages in Genesis—"Let *us* make man in our image," "Man is become as one of *us*, to know good and evil"—Justin says that they are proof of the association of at least two persons, and then he infers that the second person was Christ. The inference is not unnatural for one who approaches the Old Testament with a firm faith that "Christ existed as God before the morning star and the moon," but manifestly the inference is not necessary to the interpretation of the passage. We know of no biblical writer who understood the passages in this manner. And even if it be granted that the language of Genesis suggests at least two persons, it does not follow that, in the thought of the author, the second of these persons is Christ.

Before leaving this part of Justin's argument, it is fitting that we should notice with what conception of God he came to the discussion of such passages as these in Genesis. The philosopher's mantle, which he continued to wear after his conversion, is here very apparent. In his remarks on the angel that appeared to Moses in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush, after Trypho has admitted that God was present on that occasion with the angel, Justin says that this God cannot have been the creator of all things, for "he who has but the smallest intelligence will not venture to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, having left all supercelestial matters, was visible on a little portion of the earth."²² And again we see clearly how his explanation of certain Scriptures was determined beforehand when he says to Trypho that, whenever we have such sayings as these, "God went up from Abraham," "The Lord spake to Moses," "The Lord came down to behold the tower which the sons of men had

²¹ *Ibid.*, *Dialogue*, 61, 62.

²² *Dialogue*, 60.

built," "God shut Noah into the ark," we must not imagine that the unbegotten God himself came down or went up from any place.²³

For the ineffable Father and Lord of all neither has come to any place, nor walks, nor rises up, but remains in his own place wherever that is, quick to behold and quick to hear, having neither eyes nor ears, but being of indescribable might; and he sees all things and knows all things, and none of us escapes his observation; and he is not moved or confined to a spot in the whole world, for he existed before the world was made. How then could he talk with anyone, or be seen by anyone, or appear on the smallest portion of the earth?

Since, then, the Old Testament speaks of God as having intercourse with men, and since in Justin's thought "the ineffable Father and Lord of all" cannot have such intercourse, therefore the Old Testament knows of a God who is distinct from the Maker of all, and this must be Christ. It is quite evident that this is not exegesis, but philosophy.

There remains one point in Justin's view of the person of Christ which we are now to consider—viz., that the Son of God, who is God numerically distinct from the Father of all, "submitted to become incarnate and to be born of a virgin of the family of David."²⁴ Justin finds in Gen. 49:11 a proof that "Christ is not man of men, begotten in the ordinary course of humanity."²⁵ The whole verse from which Justin quotes, taken from the prophecy of Jacob concerning his son Judah, reads as follows:

Binding his foal unto the vine,
And his ass's colt unto the choice vine;
He hath washed his garments in wine,
And his vesture in the blood of grapes.

These last lines signify, according to Justin, that

Christ would wash those who believe in him with his own blood. For the Holy Spirit called those who receive remission of sins through him, his *garments*; among whom he is always present in power, but will be manifestly present at his second coming. That the Scripture mentions the blood of the grape has been evidently designed, because Christ derives blood, not from the seed of man, but from the power of God. For as God, and not man, has produced the blood of the vine, so also has (one) predicted that the blood of Christ would be, not of the seed of man, but of the power of God.

Here Justin takes for granted that the words spoken of Judah

²³ *Ibid.*, 127.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 54.

concerned Christ, also that the "garments" of Judah are a symbol of those who believe in Christ, and that "the blood of grapes" is an inspired allusion to the blood of Christ. It is this last clause that contains the vital point of the argument; for as the blood of grapes is not produced by man; but by God, so Christ derives his blood from the power of God; that is to say, his birth was supernatural. This exegesis does credit to Justin's fancy rather than to his knowledge of Scripture. To readers of the present day it is not necessary to point out its weakness.

The next two proof-texts of Justin, as they do not give the sense of the Hebrew, but follow the incorrect rendering of the Greek translation, are naturally without weight. The passages as he cited them read thus: "Who shall declare his generation, for his life is taken away from the earth" (Is. 53:8); and, "I have begotten thee from the womb before the morning star" (Ps. 110:3). According to the American Revision the first reads, "And as for his generation, who among them considered that he was cut off out of the land of the living?" and the second,

Out of the womb of the morning
Thou hast the dew of thy youth.

Justin sometimes finds support for his doctrine in the most unexpected places. Thus in the first verses of Ps. 19, which speaks of the sun's daily journey across the sky, he finds it declared that Christ "would come forth from the highest heavens, and again return to the same places, in order that you may recognize him as God coming forth from above, and man living among men."²⁶ Here Justin follows neither the original Hebrew nor the Greek translation, but imports into the text a thought quite foreign to it. Where the Hebrew, speaking of the apparent movement of the sun, says:

His going forth is from the end of the heaven,
And his circuit unto the ends of it,

Justin gives the following version:

From the highest heaven is his going forth,
And he returns to the highest heaven.

After one has discovered this meaning in the psalm, it is only neces-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 64.

sary to assume that the poet was talking of Christ rather than of the sun, and one has an admirable proof-text!

Equally interesting is Justin's explanation of Isa. 8:4, which gives the reason why the prophet should call his son Maher-shalal-hash-baz." The verse reads: "For before the child shall have knowledge to cry 'My father' and 'My mother,' the riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria shall be carried away before the king of Assyria." This child, according to Justin, was Christ, and hence the passage is thought to support his doctrine of the incarnation. The fulfilment of the prophecy is found in the visit of the magi to the infant Jesus. These magi came from Arabia, and Damascus is in Arabia. The riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria refer to "the power of the evil demon that dwelt in Damascus." The king of Assyria is Herod, so called "on account of his ungodly and sinful character." When therefore the magi came and worshiped the infant Jesus, in that hour "the riches of Damascus and the spoil of Samaria" were "carried away before the king of Assyria."

Unfortunately for this interpretation, there is no proof that the magi came from Arabia, or that there was a particular evil demon residing in Damascus, or that the magi had ever been subject to a demon either in Damascus or elsewhere, or that the riches of Damascus and spoil of Samaria could mean the power of a demon in Damascus, or that Herod might be spoken of as the king of Assyria!

There are yet three passages which Justin regards as proof of his view. The first is Isa. 7:14, spoken to Ahaz: "Therefore the Lord himself will give you a sign: behold, a virgin shall conceive and bear a son and shall call his name Immanuel." Justin appropriates this, making the following brief comment in justification: "It is evident to all that in the race of Abraham according to the flesh no one has been born of a virgin, or is said to have been born, save this our Christ."²⁷ In another connection²⁸ he says that the birth of the child would not have been a "sign," had it been natural. But at present this statement would be regarded as having no weight. Scripture does not confine the name "sign" to phenomena of a supernatural character (see, e. g., Luke 2:14). Then it is necessary to Justin's argument that the Hebrew should certainly speak of a virgin,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 77.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 66.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 84.

but scholars are still divided on the meaning of the word which Justin took in that sense (see, e. g., the margin of the American Revision); and surely on an uncertain text of Scripture we cannot safely build a doctrine. Further, it is equally necessary to Justin's argument that the conception spoken of in Isaiah should clearly belong to the future, but the Hebrew leaves this also in doubt. It is possible to hold that the prophet had in mind a present reality, viz., that the child contemplated had *already* been conceived, and manifestly in this case the verse does not lend so ready support to Justin's view. Then there is another obvious obstacle in the way of Justin's use of the verse. The prophet gave a sign to Ahaz, but the birth of a child hundreds of years after the death of Ahaz would surely not have been a sign to him. If then the passage speaks of a sign which Ahaz was to receive, the language can be referred to the birth of Jesus only as foreshadowing it, and so does not discriminate the character of his birth from that birth which was to be in the lifetime of Ahaz. It is possible that the prophet had the Messiah in mind, but, if so, he thought of his coming as an event of the immediate future.

From the Book of Daniel two passages are cited by Justin, each with brief comment.³⁰ In the night visions the seer saw "one like unto a son of man" (Dan. 7:13). This shows, according to Justin, that Christ "appeared, and was man, but not of human seed." This teaching he finds of course in the word "like." It is assumed that the prophet in saying "*like* unto a son of man" implied that the one he saw was really *different* from the sons of men, and then Justin defines this difference as an essential difference in origin. But in this he plainly goes quite too far. If the language in Daniel implies a difference, it certainly does not suggest the *nature* of that difference.

The other word of Daniel, and the last proof-text cited in support of the doctrine that God is represented in the Old Testament as becoming incarnate of a virgin, is that Nebuchadnezzar in a vision saw "a stone cut out of the mountain *without hands*." This teaches, in a "mystery," the supernatural origin of Jesus, for the expression "cut out without hands" signified that it is not a work of man, "but of the will of the Father and God of all things, who brought him

³⁰ *Dialogue*, 76.

forth." But here one must appeal from Justin to Daniel himself, who interprets the king's dream, and leaves no room for a reference to Jesus in the part concerning the stone cut out of the mountain without hands. "In the days of those kings," he says, "shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed, nor shall the sovereignty thereof be left to another people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms and it shall stand forever." Thus the stone that smote the image, and which itself became a great mountain, was a *kingdom* set up by the God of heaven. There is no reference whatever to the Messiah. The contrast between this victorious kingdom of the future and the kingdoms of iron, clay, brass, silver, and gold, consists in the fact that the victorious kingdom is *from God*. It is this divine origin which is set forth in a figure in the "stone cut out of the mountain *without hands*."

We have now considered the Scripture support which Justin adduces for his doctrine that "Christ existed as God before the ages, then, that he submitted to be born and to become man, yet that he is not man of men." We will not say with Trypho that this appears paradoxical and foolish, but we can confidently say that it is not established by the Old Testament passages to which Justin makes his appeal. His Scripture argument is without historical basis. His propositions are not germane to any section of the Old Testament, and are made to appear so only by a kind of exegesis which has been as completely exploded as has the ancient theory of astronomy.

But this is not all of Justin's belief; it is simply a part of the theological aspect of it. He loved and worshiped the Jesus of the gospels, and found the sweetest rest in the diligent practice of his words.³¹ Occasionally we have statements regarding Jesus which are based on his own experience and observation, as when he says that, if all nations are blessed in Jesus, then is he indeed the Christ;³² and again when he says that he has been conquered by the divine instruction and power of the Word.³³ We have the ring of an unimpeachable argument that Jesus is the Christ, the Savior of the world, when Justin cries out "O trumpet of peace to the soul that is at

³¹ *Dialogue*, 8.

³² *Ibid.*, 121.

³³ *Discourse to the Greeks*, 5.

war! O weapon that putteth to flight terrible passions! The Word exercises an influence that does not make poets, it does not equip philosophers nor skilled orators, but it makes mortals immortal." Here, on the plane of Christian life, Justin stands forth a worthy example of the faith, and one could wish that his thought had followed this vital line, instead of seeking by an artificial exegesis to establish propositions regarding Christ which lie beyond the range of experience. Of the facts which can be tested by life he had little to say, to judge from his extant writings; and even when he mentions these, as in the examples given above, he makes no use of them to confirm his views regarding the person of Christ. On the contrary, he goes to the Old Testament, and by preference to its oldest parts, and fixes on passages to prove his doctrine which, with the establishment of scientific principles of interpretation, are found to be irrelevant, obscure, or inconclusive.

SHEBNA AND ELIAKIM

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In the last volume of the *American Journal of Theology* (pp. 621-42) Professor Kemper Fullerton has published "A New Chapter out of the Life of Isaiah." Commentaries on the article were inevitable. They would certainly have appeared even if this new chapter from the biography of Isaiah had been drawn in strokes less bold; and I feel that I have the first right to comment on it, because, as author of the article "Shebna" in the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, I am probably the most recent predecessor of Professor Fullerton. But my readers must not be frightened by this announcement, as if my commentary on the chapter threatened to be longer than the chapter itself. I shall endeavor to exercise the right of commenting as sparingly as possible, and for this reason, if for no other, I shall follow Professor Fullerton's exposition point by point.

I. In regard to Isa. 22:15-18, in which Shebna, on account of his arrogance, is threatened by the prophet with the loss of his office as major domo, I agree almost completely with Professor Fullerton (pp. 622 f.), except that the word "this" in the command of God, "Go, get thee unto this treasurer" (vs. 15b) cannot "suggest that the personality of the official was well known." This significance would be probable if the command had been addressed to some obscure man of the people. But it was addressed to Isaiah, and to him the personality of the major domo was known as a matter of course. In his case it would have been natural for the sentence to read: "Get thee to *the* treasurer." Consequently the demonstrative pronoun "this" rather has the function here of pointing toward a contemptible personage. It has this meaning in quite a number of passages, which are enumerated in my *Syntax*, § 48. The arrogant character of Shebna is also probably expressed by the choice of the phrase *ha-sôkhen*,¹ for סֹכֶן in the Phoenician means

¹ Compare *ha-sokheneth* Abishag of Shunem (I Kings 1:2).

"to care for, to administer,"² and *sakānu* in the Tell-el-Amarna letters has the sense of "to care for."³ If *sōkhēn* had been "a general title" (Fullerton, p. 622), it would probably occur more frequently. Furthermore, Professor Fullerton has not by any arguments disproved that Shebna was "a member of the pro-Egyptian party" (p. 623, n. 6). This conjecture is rather suggested by the figure of speech in which Isaiah expressed the threat against Shebna: that Jehovah would toss him like a ball into a land which would not have narrow valleys like Canaan, but would be "wide in both directions;" that is to say, into the broad plains along the Euphrates and Tigris. Now, if Shebna favored the political alliance of the kingdoms of Judah and Egypt (see Isa., chaps. 30 f.), it would be very natural that he should be taken prisoner during some invasion of the Assyrians as one of their opponents, and that he should be deported to the countries of the East. I may say, in passing, that the idea that Shebna was a foreigner who possibly had been brought from Damascus by Ahaz (cf. II Kings 16:10 ff.; Isa. 2:6) may be indicated by the נ in שֶׁבְנָא. This is strongly supported by Arnold B. Ehrlich in *Mikrā ki-Pheschūtā*, Part III, "Die Propheten" (1901), p. 44: אֵין לוֹ בֵּית אֵב בִּישְׂרָאֵל (22:17a; Peshitta, *gabrā*) also occurs nowhere else in the Book of Isaiah.

II. Passing to the section Isa. 22:19-23, which announces to Eliakim that he is to succeed Shebna in the office of major domo, I would say, in the first place, that Professor Fullerton has not put the correct interpretation on the transition from the third person to the first. He simply asserts: "There is nothing to explain this sudden change of persons" (p. 624). But that is hardly the state of the case. The transition from the third person to the first occurs rather frequently, as Professor Fullerton might have discovered if he had consulted my *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik*; on pp. 248 ff. this very usage is discussed. We have a perfectly analogous case in the words in Deut. 29:3 f.: "But Jehovah hath not given you a heart to know . . . and I have led you forty years in the Wilderness;" also in Isa. 3:1a and 4a: "For behold the Lord Jehovah of hosts

² Bloch, *Phoenisisches Glossar*, *sub voce*.

³ *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, Vol. V, Brief 105, l. 3: *liskin*, "thou carest;" Brief 105, 34, 38: *liskin*, "may he care."

doth take away . . . and I will give children to be their princes, etc."⁴ There are even parallels for a further return from the first to the third person, as my collection, pp. 253 ff., will show. On the other hand, of course, it is possible that an original **אֶדְרִיֶּסְךָ**, "I shall pull thee down," was changed by some mechanical copyist into **יֶדְרִיֶּסְךָ**, "he will pull thee down," on account of the third person singular which follows immediately afterward. But that is not a fact of much importance. The main thing is that the sentence, "And I will thrust thee from thine office" (vs. 19a) need not, as Professor Fullerton thinks (p. 624), be regarded as the beginning of a new section on account of the change to the first person (p. 624).

III. As soon as we reach vs. 24 f., the question confronts us with tremendous emphasis whether these verses still refer to Eliakim. Professor Fullerton denies this with great decision (pp. 625 f.), but I venture to give several reasons why the question may be answered in the affirmative. Here are the reasons: (1) The Waw which begins vs. 24 may be simply the equivalent of an adversative conjunction—a usage which is not infrequent in Hebrew and in other languages (compare, for instance, *wəlo*, Isa. 30:15 ff., "but not"). (2) A conditional sentence can do without its introductory conjunction in this passage, just as in many others.

For instance, in Jer. 20:9a the word **וְאָמַרְתִּי** is translated "and I said" or "and if I said." I would also call attention to such cases as Jer. 22:15, **וַיַּעַשׂ**. The words "and did justice" here are followed by **וְהָיָה**, which introduces the sentence "then it was well with him." Consequently the word **וַיַּעַשׂ** means: "and *if* he exercised justice." It follows that the beginning of Isa. 22:24 may have this meaning: "And yet (or, However), the whole weight of his father's house shall hang upon him,⁵ . . . and then," etc. (vs. 25). (3) Most of the expressions of vs. 24 are probably to be taken ironically. (4) The intention may have been to warn Eliakim's family,

⁴ For the other cases see my *Stilistik*, pp. 249 ff. Condamin, too, has failed to take note of them. In his *Le livre d'Isaïe* (1905), p. 152, he simply orders us: "Lire **וְדִרְסְךָ**, au lieu de **וְדִרְסְךָ**."

⁵ *Kabôd* is used in a double sense, like *derekh* in 10:24b, etc. (Cf. my *Stilistik*, etc., p. 11.) It is possible, however, that in the original orthography the second **כְּבֹד** may have been **כָּבֵד**, and that it meant *Kôbed*, which occurs in Isa. 21:15 and 30:27, but nowhere else except in Nah. 3:3 and Prov. 27:3.

or even Eliakim himself, not to exploit the influential position of their relative. (5) The phrase "in that day" (vs. 25) may mean "in that time" or "then," for $\square\dot{\text{r}}$ has the more general sense of "time," for instance in Jer. 7:22, etc. In that case this *bajjōm* may be practically equivalent to the IN in Jer. 22:15, to which reference has been made; that is to say, it may indicate the beginning of the apodosis of a conditional sentence.⁶ (6) The decisive point is this, that the expressions used in vs. 25 so manifestly refer back to vss. 23 f. that they must refer also to the same person with whom vs. 23 deals, namely to Eliakim. Consequently the paraphrase of the Targum on vs. 25^b is quite correct: "And the saying of the prophesy concerning him will cease," that is, will lose its validity.⁷ This view would not necessarily involve that the Old Testament must somewhere tell of the punishment of this Eliakim, for he and his family may have taken the warning. As a matter of fact, in all passages where this Eliakim is mentioned we find him still administering the same office as major domo (II Kings 18:18, 26, 37 and 19:2; Isa. 36:3, 11, 22 and 37:2). The final reason for arriving at this judgment concerning vss. 24 f. is that all other views taken of vss. 24 f. are, in my judgment, burdened with still greater difficulties.

IV. Of these other views I shall discuss first one which could not yet have been known to Professor Fullerton, and which seems to be the simplest. It is the view taken by Condamin in his *Commentary on Isaiah* (1905, pp. 153 f.), who asserts that vs. 25 is the only part of the passage added by a later interpolator. He seeks to prove this by pointing out that vss. 20-24, in form and sense, are an exact parallel to vss. 15-19.⁸ But this sample of strophe will hardly be convincing to anyone who is not already convinced that the Israelite prophets were fond of strophic construction,⁹ for the strophe

⁶ In my *Syntax*, § 390, *p q r*, a number of conditional sentences without the conjunction have been collected, running down to the Mishna. Cases of IN as the sign of the apodosis will be found § 415, *n*.

⁷ Targum on Isa. 22:25^b: $\text{וְהַנְּבִיאִים לֹא יִשְׁמְרוּ עוֹד אֶת דְּבָרָיו}$.

⁸ Condamin, *loc. cit.* p. 153: "20-24 est exactement, par la forme comme par le sens, la contre-partie de 15-19, l'antistrophe parallèle."

⁹ See on this point my *Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik*, pp. 304 ff.

which Condamin tries to build up out of the sentences in vss 15-19 contains only twelve lines, and even then the mere fragment of a sentence, "into a large country" (vs. 18a), has to do duty as an entire sentence. On the other hand, Condamin himself has to recognize that there are fifteen lines in vss. 20-24. Condamin discovers a further important correspondence of form in the two sections in the fact that the words *kabod*, "glory, honor," and *bajith*, "house," occur both in vs. 18b and in vs. 24a. But in vs. 18a these two words have no connection with each other; in vs. 24a they have a different sense; and finally these two words are so common that their use could hardly be avoided. But the main point is that the words of vs. 24 manifestly carry a tinge of irony. That ironical sense crops out even in the choice of צִפְיֹת, "issue," that is, descendants of a less distinguished kind; also in the choice of the metaphor concerning the vessels. On that account, too, the word *kabod* (vs. 24a) has the sense here of "weight, burden"—unless, indeed, the original reading was *kōbed* (see note 5 above). Consequently the words of vs. 24 cannot be intended to describe the culmination of Eliakim's triumph. On the contrary, they must refer to a possible occurrence which, if it should happen, would be fatal to the position of Eliakim. It follows that vs. 24 is not connected with the preceding sentences, but forms a separate section with vs. 25.

V. Many expositors have thought they could remove the difficulty by assuming that vss. 24 and 25 once more refer to Shebna. The futility of this attempt has been set forth by Professor Fullerton (pp. 626 f.) almost exhaustively. I would add only two suggestions. It is characteristic of vs. 25 that several phrases refer back with great precision to phrases in vs. 23. Consequently vs. 25 itself must also refer to Eliakim. Furthermore, the judgment on the reprehensible character of Shebna had already been pronounced as a message of God (vss. 15-19). It would therefore have been superfluous to introduce this judgment once more with the phrase "Word of Jehovah."

VI. Finally, some expositors have felt that severer operations are necessary to remove the difficulties found in Isa. 22:15-25.

Duhm in the *Handkommentar*, and Marti in the *Kurzer Handkommentar*, think the riddle can be solved by treating not

only vss. 24 and 25, but also vss. 19-23, as later additions. Professor Fullerton has criticized this view (pp. 635 f.), but his criticism needs supplementing in several directions.

1. In the first place, vs. 24 f. is regarded by these expositors as a later addition, because it would be an act of "desperation" to treat vs. 24 as a conditional sentence (Marti). But vigorous expressions do not compensate us for lack of argument. It would have been more to the point if the question had been investigated how often in Hebrew and in other languages the conditional sentence is replaced by other constructions.¹⁰ Moreover, would not the interpolator who wrote vss. 24 and 25, according to Duhm and Marti, himself have intended to put a hypothetical meaning into vs. 24? Certainly, for it is inconceivable that the supposed interpolator, who had just spoken of the new major domo in the most honorable expressions in vss. 19-23, should now proceed in vs. 24 to accuse him positively of nepotism.

2. They think there are good reasons for assuming that the work of the interpolator began at vs. 19.

a) One reason for this assumption is drawn from the form, namely the transition from the third person to the first. But I must point out once more (see Section II above) that Isa. 3:1-4, for instance, is analogous in form with 22:17-19. In the former passage the construction runs: "Behold the Lord Jehovah of Hosts doth take away, . . . and I will give, . . ."; just as in 22:17-19 it runs: "Behold Jehovah will hurl . . . and I will thrust," Not even Marti concluded that the transition from the third person to the first in Isa. 3:4 indicated an interpolation. Consequently this transition in 22:19 cannot by itself constitute an argument for such an assumption. The question might even be raised whether an interpolator would have been likely to begin his work by creating such a dissimilarity in form. However, Marti discovers a second formal proof for the interpolated character of vs. 19 in the fact that "the officer who had already been hurled into exile in vss. 17 f. is only now to be removed from his position." Now, aside from the fact that the interpolator would have committed the same mistake in style, it is clear that the beginning of vs. 19 has the sense,

¹⁰ See my *Syntax*, § 390, q.

"and thus I will thrust thee from thine office." This simply expresses in plain terms what had previously been expressed by metaphor,¹¹ and such a transition to the announcement about the successor of Shebna is not unnatural. There are no further arguments for the secondary origin of vss. 19-23 which might be drawn from the form of the construction. Or can it be claimed that only a later writer would speak of מִשְׁנֵי (Marti)? The terminology of the esoteric priestly¹² sections of the Pentateuch of course had its roots in the past. The ancient case ending \tilde{i} (vs. 16) would not necessarily appear again in vss. 19-23, because in general it occurs only very rarely.¹³ Moreover, there is no attached participle in vss. 19-23.

b) Those who deny that vss. 19-23 were written by Isaiah think that the contents of the section furnish additional grounds for their opinion. They say that it was not part of the prophet's office to appoint a new major domo. But the same scholars expressly admit that Isaiah had the right to announce to Shebna, a duly installed officer of the king, that he was to be exiled; and they justly judge so, for Amos did the same in regard to a priest of the royal sanctuary (Amos 7:16 f.), and Jeremiah did the same in regard to Passhur (20:6). Now, to depose a royal officer and to appoint another comes to the same thing as a question of right. Furthermore, we may assume (Isa. 37:2 ff.) that Isaiah was sure of the consent of King Hezekiah.

Finally, the representatives of this new view are unable to tell us from what source this saying about Eliakim was drawn, if it does not belong to Isaiah. Marti, indeed, suggests that someone identified the scribe Shebna of Isa. 36:3 with the evil officer of 22:15-18, and then assumed that the major domo Eliakim (36:3) had become his successor. But there is no occasion in 36:3 for drawing any such conclusion, for there is not the slightest indication in that passage that the scribe Shebna was a bad officer. If such conjectures were to be invented, it would have been wiser at least not to quote 36:3 in their support.

Thus the representatives of this opinion are unable to assign any

¹¹ We have the same phenomenon in style for instance in Isa. 1:6 f. and 22 f. See additional examples in my *Stilistik, etc.*, p. 157, 37 and 203, 23 f.

¹² See on this point my *Einleitung ins Alte Testament*, pp. 225 ff.

¹³ See my *Syntax*, § 272.

satisfactory motive why any later author should have interpolated the passage concerning Eliakim, vss. 19-23. But possibly they have succeeded in discovering the cause for the other interpolation in vss. 24 f. Marti thinks (p. 177) that "it is not beyond the reach of possibility that this interpolation alludes to the death of the wicked high-priest Alcimus in the year 160 before Christ." He arrives at this conjecture by the fact that Josephus¹⁴ after the mention of "Ἀλκιμος" adds the words ὁ καὶ Ἰάκειμος κληθείς. He thinks that this name does not refer to Jakim (cf. Jahkin, Gen. 46:10 ff.), but to Jojakim, and that from the word "Alkimus" we may surmise that its original Hebrew form was "Eliakim." But suppose these conjectures were sure, was this Alkimus ever a high-priest who merited the commendation of God? After his first institution by Antiochus V Eupator¹⁵ he was expelled by those Jews who were faithful to the law, and later was again thrust out of his office by them. For this reason, if for no other, this Alkimus could not have been identified with the Eliakim of Isa. 22:20-23, quite aside from the fact that a highpriest and a major domo are two different things. It follows that a passage alluding to the rejection of Alkimus could not have been attached to 22:20-23. And, finally, what a grotesque assumption it is that men of the second century should try to secure a justification for the expulsion of Alkimus by interpolating a remark in the Book of Isaiah! Thus the defenders of the law who were opposed to Alkimus tried by falsification of the Scriptures to cement the base on which they proposed to take their stand!

VII. Finally Professor Fullerton applies entirely new machinery to shed full light on Isa. 22:15-25, and my chief concern is to examine the need and the value of this new light. I shall touch only indirectly on opinions which he shares with his predecessors or which are of inferior importance.

1. He finds a secondary basis for his entire construction of the passage in the claim that the words "unto Shebna, who is over the house" (that is, of the king) (vs. 15b), were interpolated by a later hand (p. 623). But this is by no means certain. (a) There are passages¹⁶ where שֶׁבְנָא and שֶׁבְנָא, etc., are parallel. I would also call

¹⁴ *Antiquities*, XII, ix, 7.

¹⁶ Cf. my *Syntax*, § 319.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, XII, ix, 7, and II Macc. 14:3 7.

attention to the parallelism of לֵּא and לֵּי in Isa. 2:2b and Mic. 4:1b, and to the same change of words in I Kings 16:7. (b) The expression *el ha-sôkhên ha-ze* would hardly have been sufficiently clear by itself. If anyone asserts the contrary, let him prove that *sôkhên* was an official title, and that the word *ha-ze* in this place does not necessarily have an ironical sense (see Section I above). Professor Fullerton thinks that "this view is opposed by the allusive character of the passage as a whole." But if these words of his contain any clear and possible thought at all, they do not exclude the ironical meaning of *ha-ze*. (c) The words in question could not possibly have been inferred from 36:3, and it is far more preferable to hold to these words as a correct designation of the object of the prophecy, vss. 15-18, than to assume that this prophecy is hung in the air without definite address. (d) We might even venture the extreme assertion that the words "against Shebna, the major domo," are more original than the preceding words, "Go, get thee unto this treasurer." The former phrase is more directly and closely attached to the sentence, "Thus saith the Lord Jehovah of hosts." Moreover, in that case we should no longer feel the lack of some verb of utterance before the following verse: "What doest thou here, etc." (Vs. 16a.) At any rate, I venture the conjecture that one cause for the change from לֵּא to לֵּי in vs. 15b was the desire to indicate that the sentence "against Shebna who is over the house" was to supplement the words, "Thus saith the Lord Jehovah of hosts."

2. One of the most important claims of Professor Fullerton is that vss. 20-23 in his judgment are intended to promise the royal office to Eliakim (pp. 629 f.). He asserts (a) that the word מְשִׁלָּה (vs. 21a) is not applicable to such an office as that of major domo. He cites the fact that in the Revised Version the word is nine times translated by "dominion," twice by "to rule," once (II Chron. 32:9) by "power," and only once, in Isa. 22:21, by "government." But all this does not do away with the fact that the word מְשִׁלָּה does also designate such a commanding position as the major domo in general necessarily occupied and such as the major domo Shebna—who according to the context is here addressed—occupied in particular. It is certainly a fact that the same word in Gen. 1:16

and in Ps. 136:8 f. expresses a merely secondary rule. It is still more important that Isa. 22:21a did not select the word מַמְלִכָה, which would have meant royal rule. (b) A pious and capable major domo might well become a "father to the inhabitants of Jerusalem and to the house of Judah." He could earn this title by impartial justice in his appointments for lower offices, and by wise benevolence toward the poor and oppressed, just like Job (29:11; cf. 31:18), and just as Joseph in a similar position is called a "father to Pharaoh" (Gen. 45:8). (c) It is very questionable if אֲבִינִי signified only the girdle of a priest, and therefore necessarily refers to the priestly function which the kings occasionally exercised. (d) Thus these three points contain no positive argument for any royal dignity of Eliakim. On the other hand, his designation as the son of Hilkiah (vs. 20), and the sentence, "And the key of the house of David will I lay upon his shoulder" (vs. 22), carry a far greater weight for the contrary argument. Thus, even if we should assume, with Professor Fullerton, that vss. 20-23 may be viewed by themselves, we should be unable to discover in them such significance as that the author of this section meant to offer the royal dignity to Eliakim.

3. It is a further important assertion of Professor Fullerton that 22:15-18 are later in time than chaps. 36 f. (pp. 632 f. and 637). He thinks that we are to conceive of Shebna as a man climbing from the inferior position of the scribe of the state (36:3 and 37:2) to the highest office in the land; or rather that Shebna, "the upstart and foreigner," had pushed his way into the position of Eliakim (p. 633). He thinks that from this point of view the indignation of Isaiah, which found expression in 22:15-18, was quite natural. But, in the first place, Professor Fullerton's expressions, "Isaiah's hostility to Shebna," and "the burning indignation of Isaiah expressed in our prophecy" (pp. 637 f.), are hyperbolic. In the second place, the threat against Shebna in 22:15-18 finds a sufficient explanation in the arrogance of Shebna, which is indicated in the double "here" (22:16a), and in other mistakes of Shebna which had merited the appellation "thou shame of thy Lord's house" (vs. 18b). If we thus find the cause for the prophetic condemnation in the encroachments of which Shebna had been guilty, we can stand by the text as the trustworthy basis for our judgment. If, on the other hand,

we propose to side with Professor Fullerton, how much do we have to add to the text 22:15-18! Perhaps the objection will be raised that, even if the occurrence in chaps. 36 f. succeeded that of 22:15-18, we still have to insert at least one assumption, namely, that the divine threat was actually fulfilled, though perhaps only in modified form, just as in Jer. 18:7-10. But such an insertion would be quite natural, because it would have clear motives and would be indicated by the text itself. On the other hand, if we sanction the sequence proposed by Professor Fullerton and assume that 22:15-18 succeeds chaps. 36 f. in time, it can be inferred neither from chaps. 36 f. nor from 22:15-18 that Shebna actually did force out Eliakim. In that case the indications which are really perceptible in the text (the double "here" and "thou shame," etc., vss. 16*a* and 18*b*) fail to receive the weight which they deserve, and we drift into the realm of baseless conjecture.

4. The final claim of Professor Fullerton is that 22:20-23 was the manifesto for a revolution by which Eliakim was to be raised to the throne against Manasseh (pp. 639 f.). But we were not able to concede (section 2 above) that the section quoted, even if viewed without regard to its present context, does contain the offer of the royal dignity to Eliakim. It is just as impossible to concede that this section can be inserted in the history of King Manasseh as the programme for an insurrection. We do not at all deny that a prophetic reaction against the anti-prophetic policy of this king would have been possible. Just as the prophet Elisha sent one of "the sons of the prophets" to anoint Jehu (II Kings 9:1), so a similar opposition movement might have been directed against Manasseh. But we do most decidedly doubt that such a movement of the prophets against Manasseh actually did take place. It is true that Manasseh "shed innocent blood till he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another" (II Kings 21:16). But the guilt of the house of Ahab was certainly still greater. We must also consider the fact that revolutions were more frequent in the kingdom of Israel, and that the idea of dethroning the dynasty of David in Jerusalem was far more remote. A revolution would have overthrown the dynasty; for that Eliakim (Isa. 22:20) was a member of the Davidic dynasty is almost certainly excluded by the wording of vss. 22 f. Certainly,

when the writer of II Kings 21:16 mentioned the "innocent blood," he had a good opportunity to speak of any reaction against the shedding of it. But while such a reaction is reported in the history of the house of Ahab, there is no mention of it in the history of Manasseh. Consequently we have no right to regard a text which simply tells of a son of Hilkiah, on whose shoulders the key of the house of David was laid that he might open and close as master of the palace (see I Chron. 9:27), as the programme of a revolution against Manasseh.

As I review the entire argument at the close of this critical discussion, my final judgment can only be this: That the difficulties inherent in the present connection of the sentences in Isa. 22:15-18, 20 ff., and 36:3, are not as great as those which are inherent in the interpretation which Professor Fullerton has advocated with so much vivacity and skill.

CRITICAL NOTE

THE HARVARD GOSPELS

The cursive manuscript of the Greek gospels belonging to the library of Harvard University, and numbered 666 in Gregory's catalogue and ε 1293 in von Soden's, seems to have come from Albania. Gregory must have had it in his possession in 1888-89, for his name appears on fol. A, recto, of the prefatory quire, with the date "Leipzig, 4 December 1888," while the description prefixed to the manuscript is headed "Ev. 666. Gregorii 2." and is signed by him under date of May 26, 1889, at Leipzig. The book plate of the Harvard University Library bears the words "Received 10 June 1889." Of earlier possessors the only hints are in the words *δημητρηου* in a scrawling modern hand on the verso of fol. A, and *καθηδημη δημητρηου πιερητερας* on next to the last paper fly-leaf at the back.

The manuscript belongs to the twelfth century. It consists of 295 leaves, arranged in 36 quires besides the prefatory one. The quires usually contain four double-leaves of parchment, but foll. 244 (John 3:4-18), 251-53 (John 5:12-6:7), and 259-87 (John 7:2-21:25) were anciently lost from the manuscript, and their places subsequently filled with paper leaves duly inscribed in a later hand with the missing portions. The parchment leaves measure 21.7 by 15.2 cm. and are inscribed in single columns with twenty-four lines to the column. The paper leaves 244, 251-53 have nineteen lines to the column; 259-87 have twenty-five. The prefatory quire of five single leaves contains little save the list of chapter titles for Matthew and the portrait of that evangelist. Similar lists and portraits precede the other gospels.¹

In text the manuscript will be seen to approximate very closely to the Received Text. Where the first hand has departed from it, the hand of the corrector has often substituted its reading and brought the manuscript into still closer conformity with the dominant mediaeval text. Some pre-Syrian readings will be recognized indeed among the deviations from the Received Text noted below, but they appear in a curiously uneven pro-

¹ Professor Gregory's description prefixed to the manuscript runs thus:

Ev. 666. Gregorii 2. olim in Albania.
saec. XII, 21. 7x15. 2, membr, foll. 295, col. 1 (14. 2x
9), ll. 23, 24; litt mai rubr, max et orn color; membr
med, atr fusc, disp et lin usit, litt infra lin; capp-
t, capp, titl, sect α'-αβ' id Mt, (lect et subscr m ser sub fin Joh),
pict: *Evu*; m ser suppl Ioh 3, 4-18; 5, 12-6, 7; 7, 2-21, 25

portion, now small, now large, to the Syrian readings. The collation is based upon Lloyd and Sanday's reprint of Stephen's edition of 1550. As to the abbreviations used, it should perhaps be stated that *tr.* = "transpose so as to read."

The writer's acknowledgments are due to Mr. C. E. Anderson and Dr. B. W. Robinson for help in collating Matthew and Luke. He has not, however, neglected to go over the whole manuscript himself, further to insure the accuracy of the collation. The kindness of the authorities of the Harvard University Library in forwarding the manuscript to Chicago for collation, must be especially acknowledged.

The present study is part of the task, undertaken some years ago, of examining the Greek and oriental manuscripts of the New Testament that are in America, and exploring their text. The Newberry and Haskell Gospels were first collated, and the Syracuse Gospels has been exhaustively studied by Professor H. H. Severn. The Ethiopic Gospel of John in the Newberry Library has been examined, as has the Beirût Syriac Gospels in the library of Union Theological Seminary. It is proposed to add to these, studies of the remaining New Testament textual materials in this country, in order that they may contribute their part to New Testament criticism.

Matt 1:4 ἀμυναδάμ *pro* Ἀμυναδάβ *bis* 6 σολομῶνα *pro* Σολομῶντα 24 ὁ *om.* ante Ἰωσήφ

2:1 ἱερουσαλήμ *pro* Ἱεροσόλυμα 5 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 11 εἶδον *pro* εὔρον

3:6 ποταμῷ *add. post* Ἰορδάνη 8 καρπὸν ἄξιον *pro* καρποὺς ἄξιους 11 καὶ πυρί *om.*

4:10 ὀπίσω μου *add. post* ὕπαγε 18 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* 24 ἡ *om.* ante ἀκοή; *suppl. mg.* 25 κολούθησαν *pro* ἠκολούθησαν *man. prim.*; ἡ *suppl. mg.*

5:12 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 16 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 19 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 20 *tr.* ὑμῶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη 22 εἰς τὴν γέεναν τοῦ πυρός *man. prim. in liura* 25 τὸ *pro* τῷ¹ *man. prim.*; τῷ *corr.* 27 τοῖς ἀρχαίοις *om.* 28 αὐτὴν *pro* αὐτῆς 32 ἂν *pro* ἐὰν 44 τοῖς μισοῦσιν *pro* τοῖς μισοῦντας 45 τοῖς *add. ante* οὐρανοῖς 47 φίλους *pro* ἀδελφοῖς

6:7 βαττολογήσετε *pro* βαττολογήσητε 18 ἐν τῷ φανερῷ *om.* 19 βρῶστις *pro* βρώσις 20 διορίσσουσιν *pro* διορύσσουσιν 21 ἔστε *pro* ἔσται *man. prim.*; ἔσται *corr.* 23 σου *om. post* ὀφθαλμός 24 μωμῶν *pro* Μαμμωνᾶ 27 προσθῆναι *pro* προσθεῖναι

7:10 ἡ *add.* *αντε* καὶ 12 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 14 τί *pro* ὅτι 17 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 25 κατέβη *corr.* 27 κατέβη *corr.*

8:5 αὐτῷ *pro* τῷ Ἰησοῦ 8 λόγῳ *pro* λόγον 14 εἰσελθὼν *pro* ἐλθὼν 15 αὐτοῖς *man. prim.*; αὐτῷ *corr. man. prim.* 24 ὑπὸ *man. prim. in liura* 25 αὐτοῦ *om. post μαθηταὶ*

9:1 τὸ *om.* 5 σου *pro* σοι 6 ἔχη *pro* ἔχει *man. prim.*; ἔχει *corr.* 13 ἔλεον *pro* ἔλεος *corr.*; ἔλαιον *man. prim.* | ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' 16 δὲ *om. post* οὐδεὶς 17 ἀμφοτέροι *pro* ἀμφότερα 18 εἰς *add. post* ἄρχων 24 τὸ *man. prim. in liura* 27 υἱὸς *pro* υἱέ 33 Ὅτι *om.* 35 ἐν τῷ λαῷ *om.* 36 ἐσकुλμένοι *pro* ἐκκελυμένοι

10:8 νεκροὺς ἐγείρετε *om.* 9 κτίσσηθε *pro* κτήσσηθε 10 ῥάβδους *pro* ῥάβδον 11 κάκει *corr.*; *man. prim. κάκη* 14 ἐκτεινάξατε *pro* ἐκτινάξατε 16 γίνεσθε *corr.*; *man. prim. γίνεσθαι* | ὥσει *pro* ὡς οἱ 19 λαλήσετε *pro* λαλήσητε 25 οἰκειακούς *pro* οἰκιακοὺς 26 ὁ οὐκ . . . κρυπτὸν *om. man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* 27 ἀκούσετε *pro* ἀκούετε *man. prim.*; *corr. ἡκούσατε* 28 φοβεῖσθε *pro* φοβηθῆτε | ἀποκτενόντων *pro* ἀποκτεινόντων | τὴν *add. αντε* ψυχὴν² | τὸ *add. αντε* σῶμα² 31 πολλῶν *man. prim.*; *corr. πολλῶ* 36 οἰκειακοὶ *pro* οἰκιακοὶ 39 ἀπολέση *pro* ἀπολέσει *man. prim.*; ἀπολέσει *corr.*

11:8 βασιλείων *pro* βασιλέων 16 παιδίοις *pro* παιδαρίοις | ἀγορᾶ *pro* ἀγοραῖς 17 ἡύλισαμεν *man. prim.*; ἡύλισαμεν *corr.* 21 χωραζὶν *pro* Χοραζὶν | βηθσαϊδὰ *pro* Βηθσαϊδὰν

12:3 ἰησοῦς *add. αντε* εἶπεν 6 μείζον *pro* μείζων 11 πέση *pro* ἐμπέση 13 τῷ ἐξηραμμένην ἔχοντι τὴν χεῖρα *add. post* ἀνθρώπῳ 21 ἐν *om.* 27 ἐκβαλοῦσι *pro* ἐκβάλλουσι 28 ἐγὼ *om.* 32 ἐὰν *pro* ἀν¹ | τῷ νῦν *pro* τούτῳ τῷ 35 τῆς καρδίας *om.* | τὰ *om.* 42 σολομῶνος *pro* Σολομῶντος *bis*

13:3 σπείραι *pro* σπείρειν 14 ἐπ' *om.* 27 τὰ *om.* 28 συλλέξομεν *pro* συλλέξωμεν 30 τῷ *om.* 33 ἐνέκρυψεν *man. prim.*; ἔκρυψεν *corr.* 37 ἐστὶ *pro* ἐστὶν *man. prim.*; ἐστὶν *corr.* 39 ἡ *add. αντε* συντέλεια 40 καλεται *pro* κατακαίεται 54 ἐκπλήσσεσθαι *pro* ἐκπλήττεσθαι

14:14 αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτοὺς 19 καὶ² *om.* 34 γῆν *om.* | γεννησαρέτ *pro* Γεννησαρέτ

15:4 σου *om.* 14 ἐμπεσοῦνται *pro* πεσοῦνται 25 προσεκύνησεν *pro* προσεκύνει 26 ἐστὶ *corr.* 32 νῆστῖς *pro* νήστεις

16:3 συνίετε *pro* δύνασθε 17 ὁ *add. αντε* Ἰησοῦς 20 Ἰησοῦς *om.*

17:2 ἐγένοντο *pro* ἐγένετο 4 μωσεὶ *pro* Μωσῇ 6 αὐτῶν *corr.*;

αὐτὸν *man. prim.* 9 ἐκ *pro* ἀπὸ 14 γονυπετῶν *corr.*; *man. prim.* γανυπετῶν | αὐτὸν *pro* αὐτῷ *post* γονυπετῶν 20 ἔχητε *corr.*; *man. prim.* ἔχετε 25 εἰσῆλθον *pro* εἰσῆλθεν 27 ἀναβαίνοντα *pro* ἀναβάντα

18:4 ταπεινώσει *pro* ταπεινώσῃ 6 εἰς *pro* ἐπὶ 11 ζητήσαι καὶ *add.* ἀνιε σῶσαι 12, 13 ἐνενήκονταεννέα *bis* 14 μου *pro* ὑμῶν 15 ἀμάρτη *pro* ἀμαρτήσῃ 19 ἀμὴν *add.* *post* πάλιν | αἰτήσωνται *corr.*; *man. prim.* αἰτήσονται 26 προσεκύνει *corr.*; *man. prim.* προσεκύνη? 28 εἴ τι *pro* ὃ τι 29 πάντα *om.* 31 ἑαυτῶν *pro* αὐτῶν 35 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω

19:3 οἱ *om.* 5 αὐτοῦ *add.* *post* πατέρα 8 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 9 εἰ *om.* | γαμήσει *pro* γαμήσῃ 12 αὐτῶν *add.* *post* μητρὸς | οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 19 ἑαυτὸν *pro* σεαυτὸν 25 σφόδρα *le-* *man. prim.* *in limbo* 28 καθήσεσθε *pro* καθίσεσθε

20:2 καὶ συμφωνήσας *pro* συμφωνήσας δέ 3 τὴν *om.* 4 καὶ ἐκείνοις *pro* κάκεινοις 5 ἐννάτην *man. prim.*; ἐνάτην *corr.* 11 δέ *corr.* 17 καὶ *add.* ἀνιε καὶ² *man. prim.* *ex errore; del. corr.* 18 παραδοθήσεται *pro* παραδοθήσεται 21 σου *add.* *post* εὐκυνύμων 22 ἡ *pro* καὶ 25 αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτοῦς 26 ἔσται *pro* ἔστω 33 λέγουσιν *corr.*; *man. prim.* λέγου?

21:1 βηθσφαγὴ *pro* Βηθφαγὴ 3 ἀποστέλλει *pro* ἀποστελεῖ 5 καὶ *om.* *post* πρᾶυς 7 τὰ ἱμάτια . . . ἐπάνω αὐτῶν *om.* *man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* 14 *tr.* χωλοὶ καὶ τυφλοὶ 33 τις *om.*

22:7 καὶ *add.* ἀνιε ἀκούσας | δέ *om.* | ἐκεῖνος *add.* *post* βασιλεὺς 9 εἰν *pro* εἰν 13 λέγει *pro* εἶπεν | *tr.* χεῖρας καὶ πόδας 23 οἱ *om.* 30 γὰρ *om.*; *suppl. man. prim.* 31 ἡμῖν *pro* ὑμῖν *man. prim.*; ὑμῖν *corr.* 37 ἔφη *pro* εἶπεν | τῇ² *om.* 39 αὕτη *pro* αὐτῇ; *man. prim.* αὐτῇ? | ἑαυτὸν *pro* σεαυτὸν 40 κρέμμανται *pro* κρέμναιται *man. prim.*; κρέμναιται *corr.* 46 ἡδύνατο *pro* ἐδύνατο

23:3 εἰν *pro* εἰν 15 ποιήτε *pro* ποιεῖτε 18 εἰν *pro* εἰν 21 ἐν αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτὸν 25 ἀδικίας *pro* ἀκрасίας 26 αὐτοῦ *pro* αὐτῶν 30 ἡμεθα *pro* ἡμεν¹ *man. prim.*; ἡμεν *corr.* 32 ἡμῶν *pro* ὑμῶν 36 ὅτι *add.* ἀνιε ἤξει | *tr.* πάντα ταῦτα 37 ἀποκτείνουσα *pro* ἀποκτείνουσα

24:2 *tr.* ταῦτα πάντα | μὴ² *om.* 6 μελήσεται (?) *pro* Μελλήσετε *man. prim.*; μελήσετε *corr.* 15 ἐστὼς *pro* ἐστὸς (*corr.*? ἐστὸς *man. prim.*?) 17 καταβάτω *pro* καταβαινέτω | τὰ *pro* τι 18 ὁπίσω *om.* 20 ἐν *om.* 31 καὶ *add.* ἀνιε φωνῆς 33 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω *man. prim.*; οὕτω *corr.* 36 τῆς² *om.* 43 ἐκείνω *pro* ἐκεῖνο *man. prim.*; ἐκεῖνο *corr.*

25:3 αὐτῶν *pro* ἐαυτῶν¹ 9 οὐ μὴ *pro* οὐκ 30 ἐκβάλετε *pro* ἐκβάλλετε 32 συναχθήσονται *pro* συναχθήσεται 44 αὐτῷ *om.*

26:4 *tr.* δόλω κρατήσωσι 11 *tr.* τοὺς πτωχοὺς γὰρ πάντοτε 15 καὶ ἐγὼ *pro* καὶ γὰρ 17 ἐτοιμάσομεν *pro* ἐτοιμάσωμεν 23 τριβλίω *pro* τρυβλίῳ 26 εὐχαριστήσας *pro* εὐλογήσας 31 διασκορπισθήσονται *pro* διασκορπισθήσεται 33 καὶ *om.* | δὲ *add.* *post* ἐγὼ 35 ἀπαρνήσωμαι *pro* ἀπαρνήσομαι | δὲ *add.* *post* ὁμοίως 36 προσεύξομαι *pro* προσεύξωμαι *man. prim.*; προσεύξωμαι *corr.* 38 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *add.* *post* αὐτοῖς 48 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 52 ἀποθανοῦται *pro* ἀπολοῦνται 54 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 59 *tr.* θανατώσωσιν αὐτὸν 70 αὐτῶν *add.* *post* ἔμπροσθεν 71 αὐτοῖς *pro* τοῖς 74 καταθεματίζειν *pro* καταναθεματίζειν 75 τοῦ^a *om.*

27:7 εἰς τάφην τοῖς ξένοις *om.* 20 αἰτήσονται *pro* αἰτήσωνται *man. prim.*? αἰτήσωνται *corr.* 35 βάλλοντες *pro* βάλλοντες | ἵνα πληρωθῇ ἔβαλον κλῆρον *om.* 41 καὶ φαρισαίων *add.* *post* πρεσβυτέρων 42 ἐπ' *add.* *ante* αὐτῷ 44 αὐτόν *pro* αὐτῷ^a 45 ἐννάτης *pro* ἐνάτης *man. prim.*; ἐνάτης *corr.* 46 ἐννάτην *pro* ἐνάτην *man. prim.*; ἐνάτην *corr.* | λιμὰ *pro* λαμὰ 54 γινόμενα *pro* γενόμενα 61 ἐκεῖ *om.* 65 δὲ *om.*

28:9 ὁ *om.* 19 οὖν *om.*

Mark 1:2 τοῖς *om.* 5 ἐξεπορεύοντο *pro* ἐξεπορεύετο 6 ὁ *add.* *ante* Ἰωάννης 13 ἐκεῖ *add.* *ante* μετὰ 14 ὁ *om.* 16 τοῦ Σίμωνος *add.* *post* αὐτοῦ 22 ἐξεπλήττοντο *pro* ἐξεπλήσσοντο 24 σὺ *pro* σοὶ 27 ἐαυτοὺς *pro* αὐτοὺς 31 αὐτῷ *pro* αὐτοῖς 35 ὁ ἰησοῦς *add.* *post* ἀπῆλθεν 37 *tr.* σε ζητοῦσι 38 καὶ ἐκεῖ *pro* ἀκεῖ 44 προσένεγκε *man. prim.*; προσένεγκαι *corr.*

2:1 *tr.* εἰσῆλθε πάλιν 7 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 8 αὐτοῖ *add.* *post* οὕτως 9 σου *pro* σοι 14 λευὶ *pro* Λευὶν 26 τοῦ^a *om.* | οὖσιν *pro* οὔσι

3:5 πορώσει *pro* πωρώσει 7 ἠκολούθησεν *pro* ἠκολούθησαν 11 ἐθεώρει *corr.*; *man. prim.* ἐθεώρη? | *tr.* φανερόν αὐτόν 27 οὐδεὶς δύναται *pro* οὐ δύναται οὐδεὶς | διαρπάση *pro* διαρπάσει 32 καὶ αἱ ἀδελφαί σου *add.* *ante* ἔξω

4:2 αὐτοὺς *pro* αὐτοῖς 4 τοῦ οὐρανοῦ *om.* 8 ἐν *pro* ἐν *ier* 9 καὶ *corr.* | αὐτοῖς *om.* 12 ἀκούουσι *man. prim.*; ἀκούωσι *corr.* 16 σπειρόμενοι *man. prim.*? σπειρόμενοι *corr.* 18 οὗτοί *εἰσιν*^a *om.* 20 ἐν

προ εν ιερ 27 βλαστάνει προ βλαστάνη 30 ὁμοιώσωμεν προ ὁμοιώσωμεν 31 κόκκον προ κόκκῳ 40 οὕτως προ οὕτω

5:2 ὑπήντησεν προ ἀπήντησεν 3 μνήμασι προ μνημείοις | ἐδύνατο προ ἡδύνατο 8 ἀκάθαρτον corr. 11 τῷ ὄρει προ τὰ ὄρη 15 ἰματισμένον καὶ om. 16 διηγῆσαντο δὲ προ καὶ διηγῆσαντο 19 πεποθήκε προ ἐποίησε 26 αὐτῆς προ ἑαυτῆς 40 πάντας προ ἅπαντας

6:2 ὅτι om. | γίνονται corr. 13 ἐξέβαλον προ ἐξέβαλλον 15 δὲ om. | ἡ om. 16 ὁ om. 17 τῇ om. 19 ἤθελεν corr. ? 20 ἀκούων προ ἀκούσας 27 σπεκουλάτορα προ σπεκουλάτωρα 29 τῷ om. 31 εὐκαίρουν προ ἡκαίρουν 32 ἀπῆλθεν προ ἀπῆλθον 33 οἱ ὄχλοι om. 34 αὐτοῖς προ αὐτοὺς 37 ἀγοράσωμεν προ ἀγοράσωμεν | ιτ. δηναρίων διακοσίων 39 ἀνακλίνειαι corr. 44 ὥσει om. 51 περισσοῦ μαθ. prim.; περισσοῦ corr. 52 ιτ. αὐτῶν ἡ καρδία 56 ἐὰν προ ἀν¹

7:2 ἄρτον προ ἄρτους 17 καὶ om. 18 οὕτως προ οὕτω 19 χωρεῖ προ ἐκπορεύεται 21 βλασφημίαι προ βλασφημία 24 τὴν om. 26 ἡ om. μαθ. prim.; συρρλ. corr. | συραφοινίκισσα προ Συροφοίνισσα | ἐκβάλη προ ἐκβάλλη 32 μογγιᾶλον προ μογιᾶλον 33 ἐπιλαβόμενος προ ἀπολαβόμενος 35 ἐλάλη μαθ. prim.; ἐλάλει corr.

8:1 παμπόλου προ παμπόλλον 2 ἡμέραι προ ἡμέρας 7 παραθῆναι προ παραθεῖναι 13 τὸ¹ om. 24 ὥσει δένδρα προ ὅτι ὡς δένδρα ὁρῶ 25 ἀνέβλεψε προ ἐνέβλεψε 26 τὸν om. 28 εἶπον προ ἀπεκρίθησαν 31 τῶν add. ἀπὲ ἀρχιερέων | τῶν add. ἀπὲ γραμματέων 35 ιτ. ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν προ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ² 38 ἐὰν προ ἀν

9:2 τὸν³ om. 3 ἐγένοντο προ ἐγένετο | κναφεὺς προ γναφεὺς 6 λαλήσει προ λαλήσῃ 7 λέγουσα om. 15 ἐξεθαμβήθησαν προ ἐξεθαμβήθη 16 ζητεῖτε προ συζητεῖτε 20 ἦνεγκα μαθ. prim.; ἦνεγκαν corr. 22 καὶ εἰς προ εἰς τὸ 25 ὁ add. ἀπὲ ὄχλος 31 ἐγεροθήσεται μαθ. prim., προ ἀναστήσεται; corr. ἀναστήσεται 32 ιτ. ἐπερωτήσῃ αὐτόν 40 ἡμῶν προ ὑμῶν bis 42 ἐὰν προ ἀν | αὐτοῦ μαθ. prim. προ αὐτῷ; corr. αὐτῷ 45 ἔκκοψον προ ἀπόκοψον 48 σβέννυνται μαθ. prim. ? σβέννυται corr. 50 ἀρτύσεται προ ἀρτύσετε

10:1 ιτ. εἰς τὰ ὄρια ἔρχεται | διὰ τοῦ om. 2 οἱ om. 17 καὶ δραμῶν προ προσδραμῶν 21 τοῖς om. 24 τοῖς om. 27 τῷ¹ om. 28 καὶ¹ om. μαθ. prim., συρρλ. corr. rec. 29 δὲ om. μαθ. prim.; συρρλ. corr. rec. | ἔνεκεν add. ἀπὲ τοῦ 31 οἱ om. 32 αὐτοῖς προ αὐτοὺς 34 ἐμπτύξουσιν μαθ. prim. προ ἐμπαίξουσιν, corr. ἐμπαίξουσιν 38 ποιεῖν προ πιεῖν | ποτήριον corr. 40 μου² om. 43 οὕτως προ οὕτω | ιτ.

ὑμῶν διάκονος 44 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 49 αὐτῷ *man.* *prim.* *pro* αὐτὸν; *corr.* αὐτὸν 51 σοι *corr.* | ῥαββουνὶ *pro* ῥαββονὶ 52 ἠκολούθησε *pro* ἠκολούθει

11:3 ἀποστέλλει *pro* ἀποστελεῖ 5 ἐστῶτων *man.* *prim.* *pro* ἐστήκῳτων; *corr.* *rec.* ἐστήκῳτων 13 σύκων *corr.* 15 κολουβιστῶν *pro* κολλυβιστῶν 18 ἀπολέσωσι *pro* ἀπολέσουσιν 19 ἐ | ξεπορεύετο *man.* *prim.*; ἐξεπορεύετο *corr.* 20 ἐξηραμένην *pro* ἐξηραμμένην 22 ὁ *add.* ἀντι Ἰησοῦς 23 πιστεύσει *pro* πιστεύσῃ 29 καὶ ἐγὼ *pro* καὶ γὰρ 32 εἶπομεν *pro* ἐὰν εἴπωμεν

12:5 δέροντες *man.* *prim.*; δαίροντες *corr.* | ἀποκτείνοντες *pro* ἀποκτείνοντες 14 ἀνθρώπου *pro* ἀνθρώπων 23 οὖν *om.* 25 ἐγκαμίσκονται *pro* γαμίσκονται 26 τοῦ *pro* τῆς 27 θεὸς *add.* ἀντι νεκρῶν 28 πάντων *man.* *prim.* *pro* πασῶν; πασῶν *corr.* 29 πάντων *man.* *prim.* *pro* πασῶν; πασῶν *corr.* 32 θεὸς *om.* 35 τοῦ *add.* ἀντι Δαβίδ 36 *it.* εἶπε Δα(βί)δ | τῷ¹ *om.* | τῷ² *om.* | λέγει *pro* εἶπεν² 43 βαλλόντων *pro* βαλόντων

13:8 ἀρχὴ *pro* ἀρχαὶ 11 λαλήσητε *man.* *prim.*; *corr.* λαλήσετε 14 ἐστὼς *pro* ἐστὸς 21 καὶ *om.* | πιστεύετε *pro* πιστεύσητε 25 *it.* πεσοῦνται ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ *pro* τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔσονται ἐκπίπτοντες 32 τῆς² *om.* | τῷ *add.* ἀντι οὐρανῷ

14:6 ἐν ἐμοί *pro* εἰς ἐμέ 8 ἔσχεν *pro* εἶχεν 9 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 12 ἐτοιμάσωμεν *pro* ἐτοιμάσωμεν 15 ἀνώγειν *pro* ἀνώγειν | ἔτοιμον *om.* 23 τὸ *om.* 24 τὸ² *om.* 25 γεννήματος *pro* γεννήματος 27 ἐν ἐμοί ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ ταύτῃ *om.* 30 σὺ *add.* ἀντι σήμερον 31 ἀπαρνήσωμαι *corr.* *rec.* *pro* ἀπαρνήσομαι 32 προσεύξομαι *pro* προσεύξωμαι 33 τὸν² *om.* | τὸν³ *om.* 34 λέγειν *pro* λέγει 35 καὶ *add.* *ex errore* ἀντι προελθὼν | *man.* *prim.* προσελθὼν; προελθὼν *corr.* 41 τὸ² *om.* 45 αὐτῷ *add.* *post* λέγει 51 ἠκολούθησεν *pro* ἠκολούθει 60 τὸ *om.* 62 *it.* ἐκ δεξιῶν καθήμενον 63 ἔτι *om.* 65 ἔβαλον *pro* ἔβαλλον 68 ἐξῆλεν *man.* *prim.*, *corr.* ἐξῆλθεν 71 ὁμνῦναι *pro* ὁμνύειν 72 τὸ ῥῆμα δ *pro* τοῦ ῥήματος οὐ

15:17 περιτιθέασιν; *peri in litura.* 18 ὁ βασιλεὺς *pro* βασιλεῦ 22 γολγοθᾶν *pro* Γολγοθᾶ 23 ἐδίδουν *corr.*; *man.* *prim.* ἐδήδουν 24 διαμερίζονται *pro* διεμέριζον | καὶ *add.* ἀντι βάλλοντες *man.* *prim.*; *del.* *corr.* 26 γεγραμμένη *pro* ἐπιγεγραμμένη 31 δὲ *om.* 33 ἐνάτης *pro* ἐννάτης 34 ἐνάτη *pro* ἐννάτη | λιμὰ *pro* λαμμὰ 39 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 40 καὶ² *om.* 42 πρὸς σάββατον *man.* *prim.*, *corr.* προσάββατον

16:1 ἡ τοῦ *om.* 8 ταχὺ *om.* 18 βλάβῃ *pro* βλάβῃ

Luke 1:9 θεοῦ *pro* κυρίου 10 *tr.* ἦν τοῦ λαοῦ 15 τοῦ *om.* ἀντι
Κυρίου 25 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 34 μοι *add. post* ἔσται 36 γήρει *pro*
γήρῃ 44 ἐσκίρτησε *pro* ἐσκίρτησεν | *tr.* τὸ βρέφος ἐν ἀγαλλιάσει
59 αὐτὸ *om.* *post* ἐκάλουν

2:9 αὐτοῖς *corr.* 10 φοβεῖσθαι *man. prim.*; φοβεῖσθε *corr.* 12
τῇ *om.* 15 εἰς *add.* ἀντι βηθλεὲμ 20 ὑπέστρεψαν *pro* ἐπέστρεψαν |
οἱ ποιμένες *corr.* 21 αἱ *add.* ἀντι ἡμέραι | αὐτόν *pro* τὸ παιδίον 25
tr. ἦν ἁγιον 37 ἡμέρα *pro* ἡμέραν 39 ἑαυτῶν *pro* αὐτῶν

3:1 ἀβιλινῆς *pro* Ἀβιληνῆς 2 ἐπὶ ἀρχιερέως *pro* ἐπ' ἀρχιερέων |
τοῦ *om.* 19 φιλιππου *om.* 22 καὶ¹ *corr.* 27 ἰωάνν *pro* Ἰωαννᾶ 33
ἀμναδάμ *pro* Ἀμναδάβ | τοῦ ἰωράμ *add. post* Ἀράμ 35 σερούχ
pro Σαροῦχ

4:4 ὁ *om.* 7 ἐμοῦ *pro* μου | πᾶσα *pro* πάντα 8 γὰρ *om.* 9 ὁ
om. 11 ὅτι *om.* 18 εἵκεν *pro* ἔνεκεν | εὐαγγελίσασθαι *pro* εὐαγγε-
λίζεσθαι 19 ἀποστεῖλαι *corr.* 26 εἰ *man. prim.*; εἰς *corr.* | σάρεφθα
pro Σάρεπτα 29 τῆς² *om.* 31 αὐτοὺς *om.* 35 τὸ *om.* 38 ἡ *om.*
42 ἐπεζήτουν *pro* ἐζήτουν 43 ταῖς *om.*

5:1 γενησαρέτ *pro* Γεννησαρέτ 6 *tr.* πλήθος ἰχθύων 8 γónασιν
pro γónασι | τοῦ *om.* 19 διὰ *om.* | ποίας *man. prim.*; πὼς *corr.* 29
ὁ *om.* 36 ἐπίβλημα³ *om.* 37 *tr.* ὁ οἶνος ὁ νέος

6:7 αὐτὸν *om.* 9 ἀποκτεῖναι *pro* ἀπολέσαι 10 εἶπεν *pro* εἶπε |
αὐτῷ *pro* τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ | οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 18 ἀπὸ *pro* ὑπὸ 21 μακά-
ριοι οἱ πεινῶντες νῦν, ὅτι χορτασθήσεσθε *om.* | γελάσεται *man. prim.*;
γελάσετε *corr.* 22 ἔνεκεν *pro* ἔνεκα 23 χάρητε *pro* χαίρετε 25
πειθήσεται *man. prim.*; πειθήσετε *corr.* | κλαύσεται *man. prim.*; κλαύ-
σετε *corr.* 26 ὑμῖν *om.* | πάντες *om.* 28 καὶ *om.* 33 ἀγαθοποιήτε
corr. 34 οἱ *om.* 35 τοῦ *om.* 37 καὶ¹ *om.*

7:2 ἔμελλε *pro* ἡμελλε 7 ἀλλ' *pro* ἀλλὰ 12 ἦν *om.* 14 βαστά-
σαντες *pro* βαστάζοντες 16 πάντας *pro* ἅπαντας 21 τὸ *om.* ἀντι
βλέπειν 22 ἴδετε *pro* εἶδετε 24 τοῖς ὄχλοις *pro* πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους
31 εἶπε δὲ ὁ κύριος *om.* 34 λέγει *man. prim.*; λέγετε *corr.* | *tr.* φίλος
τελωνῶν 37 καὶ *add.* ἀντι ἐπιγνοῦσα 45 εἰσῆλθεν *pro* εἰσῆλθον

8:3 αὐτοῖς *pro* αὐτῷ 8 εἰς *pro* ἐπὶ 15 ταῦτα λέγων ἐφώνει ὁ
ἔχων ὅτα ἀκούειν, ἀκουέτω *add. post* ὑπομονῇ 18 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν *bis* |
ἔχῃ² *corr.*; *man. prim.* ἔχει 29 παρήγγειλε *pro* παρήγγελλε 31
παρεκάλουν *pro* παρεκάλει 34 ἀπελθόντες *om.* 40 ὑπεδέξατο *pro*

ἀπεδέξατο 43 ἰατροῖς *pro* εἰς ἰατροῖς 51 ἔλθων *pro* εἰσελθών | *tr.*
ἰωάννην καὶ ἰάκωβον 55 ὑπέστρεψε *pro* ἐπέστρεψε

9:1 μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ *om.* 4 ἦν *corr.* 5 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 9 ὁ *om.* 10
βηθσαϊδάν *pro* Βηθσαϊδά 13 *tr.* ἰχθύες δύο | ἀγοράσομεν *pro* ἀγορά-
σωμεν | τοῦτον *om.* 15 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 20 ὁ *om.* 21 παρήγγελε
pro παρήγγειλε 23 καθ' ἡμέραν *om.* 24 ἐὰν *pro* ἂν 27 ἐστῶτων
pro ἐστηκότων | γεύσονται *pro* γεύσονται 28 τὸν *om.* 33 εἶπε *pro*
εἶπεν | ὁ *om.* | *tr.* μίαν μωσεῖ 36 ὁ *om.* 38 ἐπιβλέψαι *pro* ἐπί-
βλεψον 41 *tr.* τὸν υἱόν σου ὧδε 49 τὰ *om.* 52 αὐτοῦ *man. prim.*;
ἑαυτοῦ *corr.* 54 δὲ *corr.* | εἰπομεν *pro* εἰπωμεν 55 καὶ εἶπεν . . .
ἀλλὰ σῶσαι *om.* 58 κλῖνη *man. prim.*; κλίνει *corr.* 62 *tr.* ὁ ἰησοῦς
πρὸς αὐτόν

10:2 ἐκβάλλη *pro* ἐκβάλλη 6 μὲν *om.* | ἐπανακάμψει *pro* ἀνα-
κάμψει 8 δ' *om.* 12 δὲ *om.* *man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* 13 βηθσαϊδάν
pro Βηθσαϊδά 20 μᾶλλον *om.* 22 *tr.* μοι παρεδόθη 27 ἑαυτὸν *pro*
σεαυτόν 32 ἀντιπαρήλθε *pro* ἀντιπαρήλθεν 36 *tr.* πλησίον δοκεῖ
σοι 39 τῶν λόγων *pro* τὸν λόγον

11:4 ἀλλὰ πονηροῦ *om.* 5 πορεύεται *man. prim.*; πορεύ-
σεται *corr.* 6 μου *om.* 9 ἀνοιχθήσεται *pro* ἀνοιγήσεται 11 ἡ *pro*
εἰ 13 *tr.* δόματα ἀγαθὰ 16 καὶ ἀποκριθεὶς εἶπε πῶς δύναται σατα-
νᾶς σατανᾶν ἐκβάλλειν *add. post* δαιμόνια 17 μερισθεῖσα *pro* δια-
μερισθεῖσα 24 εὕρισκων *man. prim.*; εὕρισκον *corr.* 32 νινεὺτ *man.*
prim.; νινευῖται *corr.* 33 κρυπτὴν *pro* κρυπτὸν | φῶς *pro* φέγγος 39
ὑμῶν *om.* 42 ὑμῖν *om.* *man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* 44 οἱ² *om.* 51 ἄβελ
corr. 54 καὶ *om.*

12:4 ἀποκτείνοντων *pro* ἀποκτευνόντων 7 πολλῶν *man. prim.*;
πολλῶ *corr.* 20 ἄφρον *pro* Ἄφρων 21 ταῦτα λέγων ἐφώνει ὁ ἔχων
ᾧτα ἀκούειν, ἀκουέτω *add. post* πλουτῶν 22 ἐνδύσεσθε *pro* ἐνδύσησθε
28 τὸν *add. post* χόρτον | ἀμφιέννυσιν *man. prim.*; ἀμφιέννυσι *corr.*
38 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 54 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 58 βάλλη *pro* βάλλη

13:6 *tr.* ζητῶν καρπὸν 8 κόπρια *pro* κοπρίαν 14 τὸ *pro* τῷ¹
man. prim.; τῷ *corr.* | θεραπεύεσθαι *pro* θεραπεύεσθε *man. prim.*;
θεραπεύεσθε *mg.* 20 καὶ *om.* 21 ἐνέκρυψεν *man. prim.*; ἔκρυψεν
corr. 29 ἀπὸ² *om.* 34 ἀποκτένουσα *pro* ἀποκτείνουσα 35 ἀμὴν
om. | *tr.* λέγω δὲ | ἤξει *pro* ἤξη

14:5 υἱὸς *pro* ὄνος 9 τοῦτο *man. prim.*; τούτω *corr.* 10 ἀνά-
πεσαι *pro* ἀνάπεσον 11 καὶ ὁ ταπεινὸν ἑαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται *om.* 15

ἀριστὸν *pro* ἄριστον 24 μου *om. man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* πολλοὶ γὰρ αἷσι καλῆται, ἡλόγηται δὲ ἐκλεκτοὶ *add. post* δείκνυν 25 αὐτοῦ *pro* ἐκταύ^ς 26 ὁ *add. ante* θέλων εἰσαγαγεῖν *man. prim.*; γιν. *mg.* οἰσολιμῆσαι δαπάναι^ς?, *man. prim.*; δαπάνη *corr.* 32 *tr.* τὸρρω αὐτοῦ

15:4 ἐνενηκονταεπτά *pro* ἐννενηκονταεπτά 5 αὐτοῦ *pro* ἐκταύ^ς 7 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω ἐνενηκονταεπτά *pro* ἐννενηκονταεπτά δικαίους *pro* δικαίους 10 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 26 αὐτοῦ *om.*

16:1 καὶ^ς *om.* 9 ἐκλείπητε *pro* ἐκλέπητε 25 ἔδε *pro* ἔδε 26 ἐθεν *pro* ἐντεθεν· δύναται *pro* δύωνται

17:4 ἐπὶ σέ *om.* 6 ἔχετε *man. prim. pro* εἴχετε; εἴχετε *corr.* * 7 ἔχων *om. man. prim.*; *suppl. corr.* 9 αὐτῷ *om.* 10 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω | *tr.* ἀχρεῖοι δούλοι 22 ἐπιθυμῆσεται *man. prim.*; ἐπιθυμήσετε *corr. man. prim.* 24 καὶ *om.* 26 τοῦ^ς *om.* | καὶ^ς *om.* 34 ὁ^ς *om.* 35 δύο ἔσονται ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ· ὁ εἰς παραληφθήσεται· καὶ ὁ ἕτερος ἀφεθήσεται *add. post* ἀφεθήσεται

18:1 αὐτοῖς *add. post* προσεύχεσθαι 9 καὶ^ς *om.* 14 γὰρ *add. post* ἢ 15 αὐτὸν *man. prim.*; αὐτῶν *corr.* 18 ἄρχων *om.* 28 ὁ *om.* 36 ταῦτα *pro* τοῦτο

19:4 συκομορέαν *pro* συκομοραίαν | δι^ς *om.* 7 πάντες *pro* ἅπαντες 8 μοι *pro* μου | ἐσυκοφάντισα *pro* ἐσυκοφάντησα 15 καὶ^ς *om.* 23 τὴν *om.* 29 βηθσαφαγὴ *pro* Βηθθαγὴ 48 ποιήσουσιν *pro* ποιήσωσιν

20:1 ἱερεῖς *pro* ἀρχιερεῖς 5 οὖν *om.* 9 τις *om.* 10, 11 δείραντες *man. prim.*; δήραντες *corr. bis* 13 κύριος *corr.* 19 τὸν λαόν *om.* 27 *tr.* μὴ εἶναι ἀνάστασιν 28 ἔχων . . . ἀποθάνη *om.* | ἐξαναστήσει *man. prim.*; ἐξαναστήση *corr.* 30 ἔλαβεν ὁ δεύτερος *corr. man. prim.* 31 ὡσαύτως *add. ante* ὡσαύτως; *del. corr.* 32 δὲ *om.* 33 γίνεται γυνή *corr.*

21:2 *tr.* τινα καὶ 4 ἔβαλεν *man. prim.*; ἔβαλε *corr.* | ταῦτα λέγων ἐφώνει ὁ ἔχων ὅτα ἀκούειν, ἀκούετω *add. post* ἔβαλε 6 λίθον *pro* λίθῳ 16 *tr.* συγγενῶν καὶ φίλων καὶ ἀδελφῶν 18 ἀπώληται *pro* ἀπόληται *man. prim.*; ἀπόληται *corr.* 21 ἐν^ς *corr.* | καὶ^ς *om.* 30 βλέποντες . . . ὅτι ἤδη *om.* 34 βαρηθῶσιν *pro* βαρυνθῶσιν | αἰφνιδίως *pro* αἰφνίδιος *man. prim.*; αἰφνίδιος *corr.* 36 ταῦτα *om.*

22:4 τοῖς^ς *om.* 9 ἐτοιμάσομεν *pro* ἐτοιμάσωμεν 12 ἀνώγειν *pro* ἀνώγειον 30 ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου *om.* | καθίσεσθε *pro* καθίσθησθε 31 σινιάσαι *corr.* 32 ἐκλείπη *man. prim.*; *corr.* ἐκλίπη 34 φωνήση

(corr.?) *pro* φωνήσει 36 πωλήσει *pro* πωλησάτω | ἀγοράσει *pro* ἀγορασάτω 45 αὐτοῦ *om.* 47 αὐτοὺς *pro* αὐτῶν | τοῦτο γὰρ σημεῖον δεδώκει αὐτοῖς· ὃν ἂν φιλήσω αὐτός ἐστιν *add. post* αὐτόν 55 συγκαθησάντων *man. prim. pro* συγκαθισάντων; συγκαθισάντων *corr.* 60 ὁ² *om.* 63 δαίροντες (corr.?) *pro* δέροντες 66 τε *om.* | αὐτῶν *pro* ἑαυτῶν 23:1 ἤγαγον *pro* ἤγαγεν 11 ἐξουθενήσας *pro* ἐξουθενήσας 12 καὶ *add. ante* φίλοι 25 αὐτοῖς *om.* 26 τοῦ¹ *om.* 29 αἱ *add. ante* κοιλῖαι 44 ἐνάτης *pro* ἐννάτης *corr.*; *man. prim. ἐννάτης* 54 καὶ² *om.* 55 καὶ¹ *om.*

24:1 γυναῖκες *add. post* ἦλθον 4 *tr.* ἄνδρες δύο 18 ἐν¹ *om.* 24 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 31 αὐτῶν *pro* αὐτόν 36 καὶ *add. ante* αὐτὸς 39 πνεῦμα *corr.* 42 μελισσείου *pro* μελισσίου

John 1:28 βηθανία *man. prim. pro* Βηθαβαρᾶ; *mg. man. rec. γρ(άφε) βηθαβαρᾶ* 29 ὁ Ἰωάννης *om.* 30 αὐτός *pro* οὗτός 39 λέγετε *man. prim. pro* λέγεται, *corr. λέγεται* 40 οὖν *add. post* ἦλθον | δέ *om.* 42 μεσίαν *pro* Μεσσίαν | ὁ *om.* 43 δέ *om. man. prim.; surpl. corr. rec.* 44 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* | ὁ ἰησοῦς *add. post* αὐτῷ 49 ὁ *om.*

2:17 καταφάγεται *pro* κατέφαγέ 19 ὁ *om.* 22 ἔλεγε *pro* ἔλεγεν | αὐτοῖς *om.* 23 τοῖς *add. ante* Ἱεροσολύμοις

3:3 ὁ *om.* {*fol.* 244 *perg. amis.* 3:4 εἰσελ[θεῖν . . . 3:18 υἱοῦ] τοῦ θεοῦ; *surpl. chari.* 10 ὁ¹ *om.* 16 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω] 23 σαλήμ *pro* Σαλεῖμ 28 μοι *om.* 36 τὴν *add. ante* ζῶν²

4:3 ἀπῆλθεν *pro* ἀπῆλθε | πάλιν *om.* 8 ἀπεληλύθασιν *pro* ἀπεληλύθεισαν 10 *man. prim. ἤδης; ἡδεις corr.* 13 ὁ¹ *om.* 15 *man. prim. ἔρχομαι, corr. ἔρχωμαι* 20 *tr.* τῷ ὄρει τούτῳ 25 μεσίας *pro* Μεσσίας | οὖν *add. post* ὅταν 31 αὐτοῦ *add. post* μαθηταὶ 35 τετράμηνός *pro* τετράμηνόν 42 ἐστι *pro* ἐστιν? 46 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* 47 ἔμελλε *pro* ἤμελλε

5:1 ἡ *add. ante* ἐορτὴ 7 βάλη *pro* βάλλη [*coll.* 251-253 *perg. amis.*; 5:12 σοι[ἄρον² . . . 6:7 αὐ] τῷ *surpl. chari.* 19 βλέπει *pro* βλέπη *corr.?* 35 ἀγαλλιαθῆναι *pro* ἀγαλλιασθῆναι 36 πληρώσω *pro* τελειώσω 44 ἀνθρώπων *pro* ἀλλήλων 46 μωσαεῖ *pro* Μωσῇ

6:2 ἠκολούθη *pro* ἠκολούθει 3 *tr.* ἐκάθητο ἐκεῖ] 15 ἀνεχώρησε *pro* ἀνεχώρησεν | πάλιν *om.* 19 γενόμενον *pro* γινόμενον 23 ἰησοῦ *pro* Κυρίου 24 καὶ¹ *om.* 29 ὁ *om.* 39 ἐν *om.* 45 τοῦ¹ *om.* 55 ἀληθῆς *pro* ἀληθῶς bis 58 ζήσει *pro* ζήσεται 62 θεωρεῖτε *pro*

θεωρήτε 69 ὑμεῖς *pro* ἡμεῖς 70 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* 71 ἔμελλεν *pro* ἤμελλεν

7:1 *tr.* οἱ ἰουδαῖοι αὐτὸν [7:2 ἐγγὺς [ή—*fin.* *joll. rel. perg. apis., chart. surpl.* 15 οἰουδαῖοι *pro* Ἰουδαῖοι 16 οὖν *add. post* ἀπεκρίθη 21 ὁ *om.* 25 ἱεροσολυμητῶν *pro* Ἱεροσολυμιτῶν 27 ἔρχετε *man. prim. pro* ἔρχηται; *corr.* ἔρχητε 29 δὲ *om.* | κἀκείνος *pro* κἀκείνος 30 ἐληλύθη *pro* ἐληλύθει 31 μὴ *pro* μήτι | τούτων *corr.* 32 οὖν *add. post* ἤκουσαν | *tr.* ὑπηρέτας οἱ φαρισαῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς 33 αὐτοῖς *om.* 34 ζητεῖτε *man. prim. pro* ζητήσετε; *ζητεῖσθε corr.* 36 ζητεῖτε τέ *man. prim. pro* Ζητήσετε; *ζητεῖστέ corr.* 39 ὁ *om.* 40 τοῦτον *add. post* λόγον 41 ἀληθῶς *add. post* ἐστίν | δὲ *om.* 53 ἀπῆλθον *pro* ἐπορεύθη | ἕκαστος *om. surpl. corr. mg.*

8:1 καὶ ὁ ἰησοῦς *pro* Ἰησοῦς δὲ 2 βαθέως *add. post* πάλιν; *rubr.* βαθέος | ἦλθεν ὁ ἰησοῦς *pro* παρεγένετο 3 πρὸς αὐτὸν *om.* | ἐπὶ *pro* ἐν 4 εἶπον *pro* λέγουσιν | ταύτην εὔρομεν ἐπαυτοφώρῳ μοιχευομένην *pro* αὕτη . . . μοιχευομένη 5 ἡμῶν *add. post* νόμφ | μωϋσῆς *pro* Μωσῆς | ἡμῖν *om.* | λιθάζειν *pro* λιθοβολεῖσθαι | περὶ αὐτῆς *add. post* λέγεις 6 κατηγορίαν κατ' *pro* κατηγορεῖν | μὴ προσποιούμενος *add. post* γῆν 7 ἐπερωτῶντες *pro* ἐρωτῶντες | ἀναβλέψας *pro* ἀνακύψας | εἶπεν *pro* εἶπε | αὐτοῖς *pro* πρὸς αὐτοὺς | τὸν *om.* | *tr.* βαλλέτω ἐπ' αὐτήν 9 καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως ἐλεγχόμενοι *om., loc. iamen his verbis relicto* | *tr.* ὁ ἰησοῦς μόνος | οὐσα *pro* ἐστῶσα 10 εἶδεν αὐτήν καὶ *pro* καὶ . . . γυναικὸς | εἶπε *pro* εἶπεν | αὐτῇ *om.* | γῖναι *pro* ἡ γυνή | ἐκεῖνοι *om.* 11 ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν *add.* ἀπὲς μηκέτι 12 *tr.* ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς | περιπατήσῃ *pro* περιπατήσει 14 ἦλθα *pro* ἦλθον | ὑμεῖς . . . ὑπάγω *om.* 19 ὁ² *om.* 20 ἐληλύθη *pro* ἐληλύθει 26 λαλῶ *pro* λέγω 36 ἐλευθερώσει *pro* ἐλευθερώσῃ | γενήσεσθε *pro* ἔσεσθε 44 τοῦ *add.* ἀπὲς πατρὸς¹ | λαλεῖ *pro* λαλῇ 52 γεύσῃται *pro* γεύσεται 53 σὺ² *om.* 58 οὖν *add. post* εἶπεν 59 διελθὼν *om.*

9:3 ὁ *om.* 8 οὐχ' *pro* οὐχ | προσαιτῶν *corr.* 9 δὲ *add. post* Ἐκείνος 11 κολυμβήθρα *pro* κολυμβήθραν 15 ἐπέθηκέ *pro* ἐπέθη-
κεν | *tr.* μου ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς | καὶ βλέπω *om.* 16 ἔστιν ἐκ *pro* ἔστι παρὰ | σημεῖα *om.* 20 δὲ *add. post* ἀπεκρίθησαν 21 ἑαυτοῦ *pro* αὐτοῦ 22 ἦδαι *pro* ἦδη 27 *tr.* μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ | γενέσθε *pro* γενέσθαι 28 οὖν *om.* 29 μωσεῖ *pro* Μωσῇ 31 ἀμαρτωλὸν *pro* ἀμαρτωλῶν 35 Ἦκουσεν . . . ἔξω *om.* | ὁ ἰησοῦς *add. post* αὐτὸν

10:1 οὗτος *pro* ἐκεῖνος 4 ἐκβάλλη *pro* ἐκβάλῃ 8 πρὸ ἐμοῦ *om.*

13 μέλλει *pro* μέλει 16 ἀκούσωσι *man. prim. pro* ἀκούσουσι; *mg.* ἀκούσουσι 18 θῆναι *pro* θείναι 22 τοῖς *om.* 23 σολομῶνος *pro* Σολομῶντος 29 ἐστὶν *pro* ἐστὶ 39 *it.* αὐτὸν πάλιν 40 πρότερον *pro* πρῶτον; *mg.* γρ(άφε) πρῶτ(ον)

11:7 αὐτοῦ *add. post* μαθηταῖς 9 ὁ *om.* 9-10 φῶς . . . ὅτι τὸ *om. man. prim., suprl. mg.* 15 εἵμην *pro* ἤμην | ἀλλὰ *pro* ἀλλ' 19 ἐληλύθησαν *pro* ἐληλύθεισαν 20 ὁ *om.* 22 καὶ *om.* | αἰτήσῃ *pro* αἰτήσῃ 30 ἐληλύθη *pro* ἐληλύθει 31 μνῆμα *pro* μνημεῖον 32 *it.* αὐτοῦ εἰς τοὺς πόδας 33 κλαίουσιν *om.* 48 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω 51 ὁ *om.* 55 περὶ *pro* πρὸ 57 καὶ¹ *om.*

12:2 σὺν *add. ante* αὐτῶ² 3 βαρυτίμου *pro* πολυτίμου; *mg.* πολυτίμ(ον) 6 περὶ τῶν πτωχῶν *om.* | ἔμελλεν *pro* ἔμελεν 7 αὐτό *corr.* 13 ἀπάντησιν *pro* ὑπάντησιν | ὁ² *om.* 15 σοι *add. post* ἔρχεται 16 ὁ *om.* 25 ἀπολέσῃ *pro* ἀπολέσει 26 διακονεῖ *pro* διακονῇ *bis* 30 ὁ *om.* | *it.* ἡ φωνὴ αὐτῇ 33 ἔμελλεν (*corr.?*) *pro* ἤμελλεν 40 διάνοιαν *pro* καρδίαν 41 ἴδε *pro* εἶδε 45 καὶ ὁ . . . με *om.*

13:3 δὲ *add. post* εἰδὼς 8 ὁ *add. ante.* Πέτρος 9 μου *om.* 12 τῶν μαθητῶν *pro* αὐτῶν 18 γὰρ *add. post* ἐγὼ 25 οὕτως *add. post* ἐκεῖνος 29 ἐδώκουν *pro* ἐδόκουν 32 αὐτῷ *pro* ἑαυτῷ 34 δίδωμι *pro* δίδωμι 35 ἔχετε *pro* ἔχητε; *mg.* ἔχητε 36 ἐγὼ *add. ante* ὑπάγω 37 ὁ *om.* 38 μὴν *pro* μὴ | φωνήσῃ *pro* φωνήσῃ

14:2 *it.* πολλὰι μοναὶ | *it.* ὑμῖν τόπον 3 καὶ ἐὰν . . . τόπον *om.* 12 ὅτι *add. ante* ὁ πιστεύων | μεῖζονα *pro* μεῖζονα 15 μου *pro* τὰς ἐμὰς 16 δώσῃ *pro* δώσει 22 καὶ *add. ante* τί 23 ὁ² *om.* 27 ταρασέσθω *pro* ταρασσέσθω 30 τούτου *om.* 31 οὕτως *pro* οὕτω

15:2 φέρων *pro* φέρου¹ 6 τις μεί *add. ante* τις, *ex errore* | τὸ *add. ante* πῦρ 7 αἰτήσασθε *pro* αἰτήσεσθε 9 ἡμᾶς *pro* ὑμᾶς 16 μείνῃ *pro* μένῃ

16:3 ὑμῖν *om.* 7 ἐγὼ *add. ante* μὴ 8 καὶ *om. post* ἀμαρτίας 15 γὰρ *add. post* πάντα | λαμβάνει *pro* λήψεται 16 ἐγὼ *om.* 20 ἀμὴν² *om.* 27 πεποιστεύκατε *pro* πεπιστεύκατε 33 ἔχετε *pro* ἔχητε | ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ θλίψιν ἔχετε *om.*; ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ θλίψιν ἔχετε *suprl. mg.*

17:2 δώσει *pro* δώσῃ 7 ἔγνωσαν *pro* ἔγνωκαν 9 εἰσιν *man. prim. pro* εἰσι; *corr.* εἰσι 12 εἰμὶ *pro* εἰ μὴ 20 πιστευόντων *pro* πιστευσόντων 21 να *pro* ἵνα¹; *ca. om. tuhr.* 23 γινώσκει *pro* γινώσκῃ 24 δέδωκας *pro* ἔδωκας

18:8 ὁ *om.* 15 ἠκολούθη *pro* ἠκολούθει 16 εἰστήκει *pro* εἰστήκει

| τὴν θύραν (θύρα?) *προ* τῇ θύρᾳ 17 ἢ *προ* εἰ 18 εἰστήκησαν *προ*
εἰστήκεισαν 24 δαίρεις *προ* δέρεις 25 οὖν *add.* *ποσὶ* ἡρνήσατο 28
ἄγουσι *προ* ἄγουσιν | οὖν *om.* | ἦν δὲ . . . πραιτώριον² *om.* 32 ἔμελ-
λεν *προ* ἤμελλεν 36 ὁ *om.* 39 *tr.* βούλεσθε οὖν ἀπολύσω ὑμῖν 40
βαραβᾶν *προ* Βαραββᾶν | βαραβᾶς *προ* Βαραββᾶς

19:6 αὐτὸν *add.* *ποσὶ* σταύρωσον² 7 ὑμεῖς *προ* ἡμεῖς 10 αὐτῷ²
om. 11 ὁ² *om.* 12 ἑαυτὸν *προ* αὐτὸν 13 τοῦ *om.* | γαβαθᾶ *προ*
Γαββαθᾶ 16 ἤγαγον *προ* ἀπήγαγον 17 τόπον *προ* τὸν² 20 *tr.* ὁ
τόπος τῆς πόλεως | *tr.* ῥωμαῖστὶ· ἑλληνιστὶ 25 εἰστήκησαν *προ*
εἰστήκεισαν | κλωπᾶ *προ* Κλωπᾶ | μαγδαλινῇ *προ* Μαγδαληνῇ 26 ἶδε
προ ἰδοῦ 27 *tr.* ὁ μαθητῆς αὐτὴν 30 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* 33 οἶδον *προ*
εἶδον 34 εὐθέως *προ* εὐθὺς 35 *tr.* ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτοῦ | εἶδεν *προ*
οἶδεν 36 δὲ *προ* γὰρ 38 ὁ² *om.* 40 ἐν *add.* *σπε* ὁθονίοις

20:1 μαγδαλινῇ *προ* Μαγδαληνῇ 5 μέντι *προ* μέντοι 12 καθη-
μένους *προ* καθεζομένους 14 ὁ *om.* 15 κηπωρός *προ* κηπουρός | *tr.*
ἔθηκας αὐτὸν 16 ῥαββουνὶ *προ* Ῥαββουνί 18 μαγδαλινῇ *προ* Μαγδα-
ληνῇ | ἀπαγγέλουσα *προ* ἀπαγγέλλουσα 19 οὖν *om.* 26 εἰρήνη *corr.*
29 Θωμᾶ *om.* 31 ὁ² *om.*

21:1 δὲ *add.* *ποσὶ* μετὰ | πάλιν *om.* 3 ἐνέβησαν *προ* ἀνέβησαν
5 ἔχεται *προ* ἔχετε; *mg.* ἔχετε 6 βάλλετε *προ* Βάλετε 14 ἐφανερώσεν
ἑαυτὸν *προ* ἐφανερώθη 15 ὁ Ἰησοῦς *om.* 18 ἑαυτὸν *προ* σεαυτὸν

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

BOOKS ON THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Five recent volumes on the science of religion show a common interest in the subject-matter. Otherwise they differ in purpose and point of view.

Mr. Jordan's¹ aim is scientific. He wishes to lay broad and deep the foundations of a new-born science. The volume before us is only one in a projected series of three. The second will treat of the principles and problems of comparative religion, the third will discuss its opportunity and outlook. Together they will formulate the prolegomena of the science of religion. The question will occur at once whether the work is not planned on too large a scale; and, without presuming to forecast what is yet in the future, the reviewer is obliged to confess that the volume already published would have been improved by judicious condensation. The diffuseness may be accounted for in part by the fact that the material was first prepared for oral delivery. In part it must be attributed to the author's enthusiasm for his science. Everything which bears upon it is important in his eyes—even details which cannot be called essential for his main purpose.

Mr. Jordan treats comparative religion as a science within a science. He makes the science of religion include three divisions: the history of religions, the comparison of religions, and the philosophy of religions. It must be clear to the reader that we need some English word equivalent to the German *Religionswissenschaft*. Religion is not a science, but an experience. In comparing religions we do not get comparative religion, but comparative science of religion, just as in comparing languages we get, not comparative language, but comparative philology or comparative grammar. Analogy would require "comparative theology" or "comparative mythology," or, if these be objectionable, "comparative pistology." It is a pity that we cannot settle on one of these as the name for our science.

Science is necessarily comparative. Our author justly points out that the work of the scientific student is to collect all the available facts that bear on his subject; then to group the facts according to their relations; thirdly, to discover the law which accounts for these relations. Comparison is the

¹ *Comparative Religion: Its Genesis and Growth*. By Louis Henry Jordan. With an Introduction by Principal Fairbairn. New York: Scribner, 1905. 668 pages. \$3.50.

method by which every investigator works. But this being so there is no ground for separating the history of religions from the comparison of religions. The science may proceed historically in making its comparisons, or it may endeavor to ignore the element of time which is so important in history. It may plead that it takes its facts wherever it finds them and groups them according to their obvious resemblances. But it is a peril to ignore the historic order. In philology we may have the grammar of a single language as it is spoken at a particular epoch. Or we may, conceivably, have a comparative grammar which puts the related phenomena of two or more languages side by side. But this illustration shows the unscientific character of any method which is not historical. The grammar of the English language as it exists today is mere empiricism—it explains few of the facts which it registers. If it be the business of a science to make us understand things, English grammar of this kind is not a science. To become a science it must become historical. This is more emphatically true of a comparative grammar; it is really comparative only when it is really historical.

Here is the danger that the science of religion will turn away from the true path. The recurrence of similar phenomena in the most diverse religions is so striking that the collection and grouping of such facts becomes a fascinating pursuit. But such a study cannot be truly comparative unless it is rigorously historical. It follows, as has already been pointed out, that there is no ground for making comparative religion a science by itself. If it is anything it is the science of religion, and it is historical in its method.

Whereto we have attained in the construction of such a science is set forth at large in the volume under review. The method and scope of the science are discussed in two chapters; two more are devoted to the historical preparation; and then come seven which relate the historical development. As was to be expected, the survey of a large part of this development is crude and tentative in character. Men have been groping around for the science and have made many false starts. It was perhaps worth while to put all this in the record; the volume shows wide reading and great industry in bringing so many names together. Yet the chapter on auxiliary or subsidiary sciences might have been retrenched with advantage, and the illustrations of comparative sciences are too many. The value of the book will be found to consist in its full bibliography, which is made available by a copious index. A word of commendation may also be given to the colored charts which make us realize the numerical ratio of the different religions now existing on the earth.

The next volume—that of Dr. Aston²—is descriptive. The author aims to give us “a repertory of the more significant facts of Shinto for the use of the scientific students of religion.” The sources from which he draws are documents dated in the seventh, eighth, and ninth centuries of our era, together with the more systematic treatises of modern Japanese theologians. Guided by these documents we discover in Shinto a nature religion, its objects of worship being sun, earth, sea, wind, and mountains. The sun, it may be remarked, is feminine as in some other systems. Before the stage of belief in which these divinities came to their right there was an earlier polydemonism. This is indicated by the authorities themselves who say that aforetime the islands were peopled by savage deities, who in the daytime buzzed like summer flies and at night shone like firepots. These were banished when the present inhabitants came in, but some of them may survive in the numerous *genii locorum* who are worshiped along with the greater nature-gods. Dr. Aston does not think that Shinto arose directly out of ancestor-worship, though in the historic period a large number of deified men are found in the pantheon. In many cases it is difficult to tell whether a divinity who now figures as clan-ancestor was originally a real human hero, or whether an already existing god has been appropriated as ancestor by a clan whose members thus sought to enhance their own glory. Here, as in other countries, the double process has gone on. The worship of the mikado is the logical outcome. In the book before us the student will find an interesting account of the Japanese pantheon, mythology, and ritual. It is illustrated by wood-cuts from Japanese sources.

The next book³ is frankly historical in its purpose. It is one of the series entitled “Weltgeschichte in Charakterbilder,” whose aim is evident from the title itself. Professor Hardy is a well-known authority on Buddhism, and his book a fine example of the popular sketch—eloquently written, thoroughly scholarly, yet without obtruding the apparatus of scholarship upon the reader. The author is in love with his subject and makes us see King Asoka as a lovable and admirable character. In these pages a long-forgotten hero comes to his rights as a wise and enlightened ruler, the nursing father of the Buddhist church to which he gave himself with the ardor of a genuinely religious soul. Incidentally Buddhism itself is portrayed for us in its best light. The pictorial illustrations do not always

² *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*. By W. G. Aston. New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1905. 390 pages. \$2.

³ *König Asoka: Indiens Kultur in der Blütezeit des Buddhismus*. By Edmund Hardy. Mainz: Kirchheim, 1902. 72 pages. M. 4.

bear directly on the text, but are at any rate excellent examples of Indian art. The book may be unhesitatingly commended and should appear in an English dress.

Of Mr. Medhurst's book ⁴ we may say that its purpose is missionary and practical. The author is himself a mystic, as he confesses, and, having found in the old Chinese thinker a kindred spirit, he wishes to commend him to those who seek for light. *The Tao Teh King* sets forth a pantheistic view of the universe in aphoristic form and, as is usual in ancient philosophies, accompanies it with ethical maxims and reflections on life. Its aphorisms are indeed often obscure—so obscure that the uninitiated will be tempted to doubt whether the translators have always understood their text. But the analogies which it presents with what has been taught and said in other times are often striking. The editor brings this out by printing parallels from the most various sources. The Upanishads, the Bhavagad-gita, the Bible, Plato, the Gnostics, Meister Eckhardt, Thomas a Kempis, Hartmann, Thoreau, Emerson, Tennyson, Longfellow, and Browning appear in these pages along with Mr. Sinnett's alleged esoteric Buddhism and the world-mystery of Mr. G. R. S. Mead. The result is not unpleasing, but it can hardly be called a study in comparative religion. It is more properly a mystic anthology.

Last in our list comes the work of Messrs. Edmunds and Anesaki,⁵ interesting because of the collaboration of American and Japanese scholarship. The idea of the authors is apparently to solve the definite problem of Buddhist influence on the New Testament. Such influence has repeatedly been asserted in recent years, and we now have all the material bearing on the question. The authors are to be commended for their reserve in refusing to affirm the dependence of any early Christian document on Buddhist sources. The only direct parallels they adduce are the ones already commented upon by Seydel and others. Their caution might have led them to closer criticism of some of their historical statements. The ancient Greek story that "Aristotle conversed with a Jew from Asia who came from the region of Damascus and belonged to a sect in that country that was derived from the Hindu philosophers," is only one of those bits of gossip which floated about in the Hellenistic world. It is taking it too seriously to base upon it the theory that Buddhist missionaries had reached

⁴ *The Tao Teh King: A Short Study of Comparative Religion.* By C. Spurgeon Medhurst. Chicago: Theosophical Book Concern, 1905. 194 pages.

⁵ *Buddhist and Christian Gospels now First Compared from the Originals.* By Albert J. Edmunds. Edited, with Parallels and Notes from the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka, by M. Anesaki. Tokyo and Chicago: Yukokwan Publishing House, 1905. 226 pages.

Syria as early as the time of Alexander. The various utopias which classic authors located in India or Ethiopia prove nothing about specifically Buddhistic communities in those regions, and the so-called oriental speculation which influenced Greek and early Christian thinkers is Brahminic rather than Buddhistic. Pantheistic emanationism has always been at home in Asia; but it is a mistake to ascribe its spread to the preaching of Buddhism. The problem which needs solution is not how the New Testament writers were influenced by this type of thought, but how they kept so thoroughly free from it.

As to specific Buddhistic influence, the work before us proves no more than that some sort of connection exists between the stories of the nativity and of the temptation and similar accounts in Buddhist documents.

By the way, it was new to me that modern scholars are gradually accepting the view that *Pharisee* is only *Parsi* writ large.

NEW YORK CITY

HENRY PRESERVED SMITH

THE BROSS PRIZE

A peculiar interest attaches to Dr. Orr's book¹ as being the first-fruits of the Bross prizes. Does it contain the guarantee of a usefulness commensurate with the dignity it possesses as the winner of so generous a prize in a competition thrown open to the scholars of all nations?

The temper of the book is admirable. Dr. Orr is no obscurantist. In dealing with the problem of the Old Testament he does not press the authority of Christ's testimony as if that closed the debate (p. 523). He does not argue on the basis of an inerrancy theory of inspiration (pp. 49, 363). He admits that the Old Testament books and the Old Testament religion must be studied as other books and other religions are studied (pp. 9, 14). He pays a fairly generous tribute to the great value of the critical work of the past century (p. 9), especially in its interpretation of prophecy (p. 453). He trusts to the self-corrective power of reverent science finally to solve "The Problem" (p. 15). In these respects Dr. Orr adopts a common standing-ground with the scholars from whom he differs. Therefore argument with him is possible. It may be thought that in the opening chapter he raises, in an unwarranted fashion, a dogmatic presumption against the critical position, when he emphasizes the fact that the chief exponents of criticism have been thoroughgoing anti-supernaturalists, and suggests that there is, "on the face of it, a supreme improbability that a theory evolved under the conditions . . . described

¹ *The Problem of the Old Testament: Considered with Reference to Recent Criticism*. By James Orr. New York: Scribner, 1906. 562 pages. \$1.75.

should be, in that form, adequate to Christian faith" (p. 17); i. e., to a faith in a revelation which culminates in Christ (p. 22). To "go it blind" in the search for truth, as a good many popularizers of critical results seem inclined to do, is not the surest way to find truth, at least in the religious sphere. And yet, when "the majority of scholars of all classes, in churches and out of churches, High Church, Broad Church, and Low Church, skeptical and believing," have substantially adopted the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis (p. 17), this not only witnesses to the "plausibility of the theory," as Dr. Orr admits, but suggests that the traditional interpretation of the Old Testament must really leave the problem of the Old Testament unsolved. Otherwise how account for this remarkable communion of light with darkness?

Dr. Orr's disposition of his material appears to be excellent. In what is really the first part of the book he adopts, provisionally, the usual analysis of the Hexateuch, and on the basis of this argues against the historical inferences of the critics (chaps 2-6). He then proceeds to a criticism of the analysis itself and the dating of the various codes (chaps 7-10). This order of discussion has the double advantage of preserving as long as possible a common critical standing-ground with his opponents, and of keeping the great historical issues as free as possible from the complications and technicalities of the critical analysis. In chap. 11 the recent archaeological discoveries are utilized to support the conclusions of the preceding discussion as to the essential historicity of the Old Testament. The last chapter on the Psalter, the reality of predictive prophecy, and the progressiveness of revelation is more in the nature of an appendix than a necessary link in the general argument of the book.

We think it is safe to say that nowhere will the student find in so compact a form an abler arraignment of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, which is Dr. Orr's immediate object of attack, than in the present work. Deserving of special notice is the way in which the critical admission that JE is pre-prophetic is made use of to assign a much higher antiquity and consequent trustworthiness to these documents than is commonly accorded to them. If these documents are as monotheistic as the critics admit, and if at the same time they are pre-prophetic, then ethical monotheism is not the discovery of the writing prophets, but must have arisen much earlier. Again, if JE represents a north-Israelitic and a Jewish tradition which are substantially parallel, this means that the patriarchal and Mosaic tradition was certainly fixed before the division of the kingdom, and it can be dated back to a much more remote antiquity without violating any objective historical probability, but only the prepossessions of the Wellhausen school.

By this line of argument Dr. Orr seeks to vindicate a highly developed religion in the time of Moses and a substantial historicity for the patriarchal narratives. Again, the disagreements of the critics among themselves are very skilfully employed to discredit the whole critical position. This argument is especially relied upon in the discussion of the date of P. Here Dr. Orr urges the arguments of the Dillmann-Kittel-Baudissin school to prove the existence of a large amount of P material in pre-exilic times (pp. 313 ff.), and then presses the contention of Wellhausen, that if P is not post-exilic, it may as well be substantially Mosaic (pp. 326 ff.).

It is at this point that one of the chief criticisms of Dr. Orr's book may be made. While obtaining a very clear insight into the difficulties of the critical position, especially in the Graf-Wellhausen formulation of it, the uninitiated reader would really gain very little idea from this work of the seriousness of the problem of the Old Testament. Such a reader, especially if he be temperamentally opposed to the removal of the ancient landmarks, would probably lay down Dr. Orr's book with the easeful conviction that all the armies of the aliens had been disastrously routed. The book is indeed so "plausible," to use the word which Dr. Orr applies to the Wellhausen hypothesis, that we fear it will serve as "poppy and mandragora" to many persons who will not take the time to examine exhaustively the biblical data, and lull them to sleep in a false security as to the tenableness of the ancient tradition. In all critical work it is the cumulative argument which is used with the most telling effect. Dr. Orr is able at best to refer only to a few exegetical difficulties urged by critics against the traditional views. But difficulties that may be successfully treated when kept in quarantine often prove fatal when exposed to the fresh contagion of contexts. The cumulative force of the exegetical data underlying the critical position is largely ignored by Dr. Orr. A striking instance of this is the omission of any real discussion of the problem suggested by the relation of the sources preserved in Kings to the redactor's framework, and the relationship of the book of Kings as a whole to Chronicles—one of the strongest indirect arguments in favor of the Wellhausen hypothesis. This leads to the second criticism which we think may fairly be passed upon the work of Dr. Orr. Able as it undoubtedly is (we will admit its ability and not merely its plausibility), one cannot avoid the feeling that Dr. Orr is more successful in pointing out the weak spots in the critical position than in his own exegesis of the biblical data. For example, he distinguishes the priests and Levites in Deut. 18:1 and 6 (pp. 187, 191); Exod. 33:7 only implies that Moses pitched the tabernacle "in particular

circumstances" without the camp (p. 168); the "house of God" in Judges and Samuel is identified with the tent of meeting (p. 172); "There are no good grounds for disputing the genuineness of Exod. 15" (p. 100; cf. 265. Has Dr. Orr really studied the tense sequence in this passage?); "The festal title of Deuteronomy is different from, and additional to, the ordinary title for the maintenance of the Levites" (p. 275); the phrase "beyond Jordan" as used in Deuteronomy does not necessarily imply a west-Jordan standpoint (!) (pp. 281 ff.); the fourth empire in Daniel is the Roman (pp. 536 ff.)! These illustrations, which are all taken from crucial points in the debate, suggest the question whether Dr. Orr's position would not ultimately compel a return to the old harmonistic method of interpreting Scripture, and whether this reversion is at all probable? Scientific exegesis raised the problem of the Old Testament. The study of comparative religions has accentuated it. Dr. Orr's exegesis does not inspire confidence, and he shows little sympathy with the attempt to observe the biblical phenomena in the atmosphere created by the latter study. The above considerations compel us to share in the doubt of the author when he confesses that he "entertains no oversanguine expectation as to its [the book's] effect on general conviction;" but we would also share in his "hope that it may at least rouse to reflection some who have given too easy an assent to current theories" (p. xvii). As a critique of present criticism it certainly challenges a respectful and a studied reply.

The notes on pp. 362-77 do not agree in their sequence with those on pp. 522-27.

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SOME COMMENTARIES ON THE PROPHETS

Commentaries on prophetic books of the Old Testament representing three distinct types lie before us. Professor von Orelli¹ is a representative of the older school of exegetes of the class of Delitzsch—those who have ever been open-minded, and scholarly, eminent in learning, and yet not profoundly original. Thus in the volumes of von Orelli we find evinced sound historical and grammatical exegesis, and a full knowledge of the literature of his subject; and yet a failure to fall into line with some

¹ *Der Prophet Jesaja*. Ausgelegt von C. von Orelli. Dritte, neu durchgearbeitete Auflage. München: Beck, 1904. vi + 228 pages. M. 3.50.

Der Prophet Jeremia. Übersetzt und ausgelegt von C. von Orelli. Dritte, neu durchgearbeitete Auflage. München: Beck, 1905. vi + 216 pages. M. 3.50.

(Both of these volumes belong to Strack & Zöckler's *Kurzfassender Kommentar zu den Heiligen Schriften des Alten und Neuen Testaments*.)

of the most notable recent achievements in biblical scholarship: for whatever may have been the excesses of Duhm's application of the principles of Hebrew rhythm in his epoch-making commentary upon Isaiah, it is certain that no one in the future can suitably present the Book of Isaiah as a product of Hebrew prophetic literature without in translation exhibiting the poetic parallelisms, if not also strophical divisions. Professor von Orelli, however, in this third edition has hardly made an endeavor in this direction, but has given us the German text of Isaiah printed as in the former editions, entirely in the form of prose.

Von Orelli remains also extremely conservative in the matter of introduction. He repudiates the notion that the Book of Isaiah is in any way an anthology of prophecies, but with slight hesitation assigns chaps. 1—32 almost entirely to Isaiah. He has, however, modified his views considerably in this third edition compared with his first—published some nineteen years ago and translated into English. In that he held to the Isaianic authorship of the oracles concerning Babylon (chaps. 13—14:23), concerning Edom and the redemption of Israel (chaps. 34, 35), and of the Apocalypse (chaps. 24—27). With this conservatism in introduction remains an almost slavish adherence in translation to the Massoretic text. For example, in the forty-fourth chapter of Isaiah there is retained in vs. 7 the reading **מְשׁוּמֵי עִלָּם וְאַחֲזִיחַ**, although the clearly preferable reading of Oor *et al.*, **מִי הַשָּׁמַיִם מַעֲלָם אֲחִיחַ**, is mentioned in a note; and in vs. 8 **בִּלְדַּעַת** is retained, although it is clearly a dittography of **מִבְּלַעַת** which has been misplaced. Again in vs. 16 **חֲצִיז**,* another clear dittography, has been retained instead of **כַּחֲלִים** after the Greek version. And—to give a single example from Jeremiah—in 17:13 **יִכְתְּבוּ** is retained without even noticing the reading **יִכְלְמוּ** given by Ewald, Cornill, and Duhm as a ready suggestion of the parallelism.

Professor Marti² is representative of the advanced school of commentators, and is to be classed with Professors Duhm and Cheyne, although less original and less given to extravagances in textual emendation and in interpretation. The most marked feature of this school is, first, subjective textual emendation based upon Hebrew parallelism and rhythm; and, secondly, the view that our present prophecies have been largely edited in the interests of post-exilic Judaism, so that in many instances the messages of hope and salvation, which have usually been regarded

* *Kurzer Hand-Commentar zum Alten Testament: Dodekapropheten*. Erklärt von Karl Marti. Tübingen und Leipzig: Mohr; 1. Hälfte 1903. 2. Hälfte 1904. 492 pages M. 8.

as the most significant and original sayings of the prophets, are now assigned to later periods. Thus in the volume before us we are told:

Hosea threatens the Israelites with pitiless judgment. God calls upon death and Sheol with all their pangs to prepare an end for the people. Jehovah is the holy one whom no human suffering weakens [in his wrath]. The sections containing prophecies of salvation not only from their contents do not fit into the circle of Hosea's thought, but they interrupt in a disturbing manner the threats of calamity or weaken their meaning.

Moreover, Professor Marti holds that these passages more or less presuppose the exile and are dependent in a measure upon the later prophets, especially Isaiah. Thus he regards as additions to Hosea the following: 2:1-3 (1:10-2:1), 15b-25(2:13b-23); 3:1-5 (entire chapter); 5:15-6:3, 5b; 11:10 f.; 14:2-10. Accordingly, the gospel is eliminated from the message of Hosea, and the glory of the vision of the bottomless love and compassion of Jehovah is given to some later Jewish editor. We do not accept this. We regard it in the highest degree improbable that any prophets of Israel spoke messages of judgment unrelieved by messages of salvation. To pronounce doom only is not worth the effort, and we do not believe that the school of criticism represented by Marti, Duhm, and Cheyne, and to which President Harper in his commentary upon Hosea gave his adherence, will in the end stand over against the more conservative position represented by Canon Driver and Professor George Adam Smith.

In other particulars we have only commendation for the comments of Professor Marti. He divides the material of the prophets into strophes and gives many grammatical references and mentions just enough authorities in recent commentators of the critical school which he represents. Thus he fulfils most excellently the purpose of the series of commentaries to which his work belongs, and which aims at nothing encyclopedic, but only to enable one to interpret correctly the Hebrew text.

In Père Condamin's³ "Book of Isaiah" we have a commentary representing neither the backward conservatism of Professor von Orelli nor the radicalism of Professor Marti, but midway between them, presenting in the main the soundness and sanity reflected so largely in the works of Driver, G. A. Smith, and Skinner. Père Condamin, however, is an independent scholar, who handles the text freely and is untrammelled in his use of the textual emendations furnished by Duhm, Cheyne, and Marti. In matters of introduction he is more conservative

³ *Etudes bibliques: Le livre d'Isaie*. Traduction critique avec notes et commentaire. Par Albert Condamin. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. xix+400 pages.

than these last-mentioned scholars, refusing to follow them in ascribing so very much of the Book of Isaiah to post-exilic writers. The full discussion of the questions of introduction is, however, reserved for another volume. In Père Condamin's exegesis one sees little trace of any bias from his Roman Catholic faith until we come to 7:14, where a direct reference to the Virgin Mary is preserved by suggesting the rendering of "Rehold" [וְהִנֵּה] as a conditional particle, *Suppose que*. And he closes a full discussion of the Servant of Yahweh of Isa., chap. 53, with these words:

Concluons. L'ancienne tradition de l'Eglise et la plupart des exégètes ont eu raison de reconnaître dans le Serviteur de Iahvé le Messie des Evangiles, et de voir dans les quatre passages en question une prédicament direct de son œuvre de ses souffrances, de sa mort et de son règne universel.

But the striking feature of this work is a graceful and vigorous translation, preserving the parallelism of Hebrew poetry especially, dividing the text into strophes. In this latter feature the author follows in the line of the theories advanced by Dr. H. Müller (*Die Propheten in ihrer ursprünglichen Form*, Vienna, 1896) and J. K. Zenner (*Die Chorgesänger im Buche der Psalmen*, Freiburg 1896). Hebrew poetry, he holds, had a strophical structure in which a strophe whose size varies from 3 or 4 verses (not lines) to 7, 8, 10 verses, and so on, is followed by a symmetrical antistrophe. If a strophe is composed of 7 verses grouped according to the meaning thus, 3, 2, 2, then the antistrophe will have the same number of verses in symmetrical or parallel groups, 2, 2, 3 or 3, 2, 2. After the strophe and the antistrophe comes an intermediate strophe composed of parts symmetrical to each other; thus, 2, 2, 3, 3 or 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, or 3, 2, 2, 3, etc. (never 3, 2, nor 3, 2, 2, nor 3, 3, 2, etc.). Then again come the strophe and antistrophe; and if the poem is still longer, the series is repeated in the same order—intermediate strophe, antistrophe, etc., to the end. The strophes are determined by the principal thought developed, by the symmetry of the number of verses and groups of verses between consecutive strophes and antistrophes, and by the repetition of certain words at the beginning and end of strophes. The intermediate strophe expresses threatenings, invitations to repentance, or messianic promises. On these principles the entire book of Isaiah (excepting, of course, the historical sections and a few other passages which are plainly prose), is divided into poems subdivided into strophes, whose titles are given in italics and whose catchwords are printed in heavy type. All of this appeals strongly to the eye. But we are far from being convinced that any real law of strophical structure underlies Hebrew poetry. Each

verse is in one sense a strophe in itself, and the verses lend themselves readily into an almost infinite variety of grouping, as appears at once when one will divide passages of Hebrew poetry or prophecy into short paragraphs. Given now, with the thought of paragraphing, a variety of assumptions upon which paragraphs may be made, and then again the liberty, which Père Condamin and others frequently take, of varying the order of verses, it becomes evident that the development of a system of strophes is more a work of ingenuity than the discovery of a real guiding principle used in composition by the Hebrew poets.

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THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

The new importance which the historical method is assuming in theology has of late appeared in a number of German publications. Among them is the discriminating essay of Dr. Carl Clemen, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Methode in der Theologie*.¹ Though but an address, it grasps the center of the real historical problem in Christianity and indicates the significance of both the comparative and the genetic methods in the study of the New Testament. Dr. Clemen is not ready to accept all the conclusions of Gunkel, but at the same time he recognizes and insists that the dependence of New Testament thought upon other religions must be recognized. In this recognition, however, he very strongly affirms that it will be found that nothing really essential to Christian teaching has been surrendered. While in an address it is impossible for him to handle the literature in detail, he has in a very striking fashion brought together the chief positions of the different representatives of the new method.

The address is valuable, however, not merely as an orientation in literature, but particularly in its caution against excessive zeal in the discovery of the origins of Christianity in Judaism. A particularly happy illustration is his brief discussion of the origin of the Lord's Supper and his note upon one of Feine's sweeping statements. Christianity, with all its historical dependence, is certainly something more than a patchwork of Jewish and Hellenistic practices.

Martin Brückner² states that he began his study of the origin of the

¹ *Die religionsgeschichtliche Methode in der Theologie*. Von Carl Clemen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1904. 39 pages.

² *Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie*. Von Martin Brückner. Strassburg: Heitz, 1903. 237 pages. M. 5.

Pauline Christology under the conviction that Paul was greatly influenced by the historical Jesus—that is, the Jesus of the gospels. His investigation, however, convinced him of the contrary. The picture which Paul draws of Christ is almost entirely independent of the historical personage Jesus. This conclusion, since the days of Pfleiderer at least, certainly is not particularly novel. Dr. Brückner, however, has reached his conclusion independently, and his work must receive attention. One chief source of the Pauline Christology he finds in the conversion of Paul. Out from that experience he drew certain implications. These were, it is true, to a certain extent supplemented by what he could learn from the other apostles, but, as a matter of fact, the real heart of Pauline thought does not center about the earthly life of Jesus, but about that heavenly personality who had revealed himself to the former persecutor. The position of Feine Dr. Brückner discriminately approves and rejects. With Feine he holds that Paul is not a second founder of Christianity by his emphasis of the death of Jesus, but is rather the Master's greatest apostle. Yet the Pauline estimate of the death of Christ is not derived from historical investigation or through a knowledge of historic facts, but rather by giving to the historic fact a profound religious meaning because of the apostle's messianic interpretation of Jesus. Dr. Brückner very carefully develops the picture of the heavenly Christ from the Pauline epistles, and refuses to be swept over into those psychological processes in which Feine delights. It is at this point (pp. 65-82) that some of his best exegetical work is to be found. Jewish and even Gnostic influence he finds at work contributing to the Pauline thought, particularly in the idea of the Christ-*πνεῦμα* with its *δοξαί*, *δύναμις*, and *σοφία*.

His method also throws him back on a very elaborate discussion of the messianic expectation of the Jews. Like every other investigator, he discovers difficulty in drawing out anything like a thoroughgoing orthodox Jewish messianism. In it he finds two great elements in the work of the Messiah: the destruction of enemies and sinners, and sovereignty in the messianic kingdom. On pp. 169 f. he gives a very good summary of the phases of the messianic expectation which lies back of the Pauline interpretation, making due allowance for the kernel of expectation and the great variety of expositions to be found in Jewish literature. The Pauline messianism, substantially derived from Judaism, has been to a considerable degree modified by the Hellenistic contrast between flesh and spirit. The ninth section of his book, in which he describes the relations of the Jewish Christology to the Pauline, deserves careful consideration, not only in point of method, but as an aid to the understanding of Paulinism.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that Brückner does not find historical elements in Pauline Christology. Paul had been convinced that Jesus was the Christ by the experience of his conversion. The idea of Christ was not drawn from the actual doings and sayings of Jesus—that is to say, it was not inductive—but was rather a transcendental concept already to a considerable extent existing in the apostle's mind. But the heavenly Christ had become the earthly Jesus by humiliation; thus Brückner arrives at a valuation of that personality.

Any student of Judaism and of Paulinism will recognize the importance of this treatise. It combines two great factors of New Testament theology—namely, the inherited expectation of Jewish messianism, and the actual facts of the historical life of Jesus. Its most important contribution lies in distinguishing the order of the development of the Pauline interpretation. Certain particular positions which Dr. Brückner takes are open to criticism, but the historical student finds himself in pretty general agreement with his general method. At one point only would we give a little stronger emphasis than that which seems to be given by the author. The facts of the life of Jesus were known to Paul, and they served to modify to a very considerable degree his inherited messianic definition. Unless we mistake, it is at this point that we are able to distinguish with considerable sharpness between the genuinely Christian and the inherited Jewish beliefs. The facts of Jesus' life, particularly his death and resurrection, are not the outcome of an expectation, but were objectively given to Paul. In so far as he uses them, his Christology is inductive, and they, rather than any definition given by the Jewish and Greek world-view and philosophy, are the essential elements in the apostle's teaching.

Decidedly different from the works thus far considered is the almost monumental treatise of Bovon.³ In it the author, whose death is to be lamented, gives what might be called the historico-exegetical introduction to the Christian doctrine of salvation. It is a good illustration of the new method which biblical theology has forced upon us. While it is impossible for any writer to be absolutely unswayed by his dogmatic position, Bovon's work is on the whole admirably objective. He recognizes the genetic relation of New Testament thought with contemporary thinking, and endeavors to use his historical knowledge in the interpretation of New Testament thought. Questions of criticism do not concern him as much as they would Holtzmann, but he is not indifferent to them. He finds

³ *Theologie du Nouveau Testament*. Par Jules Bovon. 2 vols. Lausanne: Bridel, 1905. 571 and 586 pages. Fr. 10

in Paul the influence of Judaism, but he further discovers in the apostle a personal development. Similarly, he finds in the other New Testament books the evidence of the steady development of Christian thought under the influence of contemporary beliefs. But Bovon, like all other unbiased historic students of the New Testament, recognizes the fact that Christianity has its own elements to contribute to religion, and that these elements lie in the two great fields of the biography of Jesus and of Christian experience. His work is not marked by any revolutionary positions, but is a sane and distinct presentation of the main elements of New Testament theology. If at times he is inclined to overestimate the differences existing between New Testament writers, he is also most commendably sensitive to the great mass of common belief and hope which lies back of all differences.

It seems almost gratuitous at this late day to call attention once more to the remarkable book by Paul Feine, *Jesus Christus und Paulus*.⁴ The book has already exercised large influence and has won a permanent place in the literature dealing with the New Testament. There are, however, one or two matters of which it treats which it is particularly appropriate at the present time to emphasize. Feine is one of those men who are interested in purely philological criticism, but at the same time know how to use lexicography in the solution of broad historical problems. He particularly emphasizes the fact that the real historic religious method cannot be content with any one organon of investigation but must handle the historical situation as a totality and in the light of psychological inductions. The problem of Christianity as a phase of religious development he insists is something bigger than some thoroughgoing Ritschlians allow. Feine insists that, to judge any historical character aright, one must place him in relation with the spiritual life of his time, and mark sharply both his agreements and his differences with his spiritual environment. History is thus not a mere description of a man's life; it also calls for a very distinct treatment of his actual relations with all moments psychological and social, of his situation.

In pursuance of this plan, his method involves an objective handling of sources. He treats Paul as well as Jesus as historically conditioned, and as a result finds in their christological thought something other than the development of purely abstract ideas. His criticism of Wrede's position relative to the messianic interpretation given to Jesus by Mark is well worth considering. It is satisfactory to find his critical processes

⁴ *Jesus Christus and Paulus*. Von Paul Feine. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1902. 319 pages, M. 6.

undetermined by what he thinks ought to have been true of Jesus' messianic self-estimate. Further attention should be called to his general treatment regarding the relation of Mark and Paulinism. It is his historical recognition that Paul was dependent upon Jesus rather than Jesus (in the synoptic picture) upon Paul that sounds the note of sane historical criticism. There have been many impossible things written upon the synoptists' dependence upon Paulinism, which never would have been written had our critics been better historians and more thoroughly read in the messianic views of the day. Both in the case of Jesus and in the case of Paul the schema of thought is the same, and the emphasis upon this common material as that which is inherited by Jesus and Paul alike is one of the important contributions which Feine has made to the study of New Testament history. The reading of Feine's book will go far to establish a balance in theological method, which has been seriously threatened by theories of knowledge.

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BOOKS ON NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION

Professor Jülicher's "Introduction to the New Testament" was first published in 1894; the third and fourth editions appeared in 1901, and now, after five years, come the fifth and sixth.¹ The revision has been thoroughgoing, extending to all parts of the work. The original 404 pages have grown to 581, and of these about 80 represent the last increase. In expressing his regret at the expansion, Jülicher explains that it was unavoidable if he was to give a fresh statement of present-day conclusions rather than a revised presentation of the situation eleven years ago.

The general plan of the book remains unchanged, but within this framework there are important modifications. The sections where this is most noticeable are those dealing with the gospels, particularly the Synoptic Gospels. Wellhausen's "Introduction to the First Three Gospels"² appeared just as Jülicher was engaged in carrying his own book through the press. He felt in duty bound to delay publication until he could take account of this very important contribution to the discussion of the synoptic problem. The conclusions of Wellhausen have not led Jülicher to modify his main positions, but they have influenced his whole presentation. He holds that among the earliest of the gospel-like writings

¹ *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*. Von Adolf Jülicher. Fünfte und sechste neu bearbeitete Auflage. Tübingen: Mohr, 581 pages. M. 9.

² *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien*, 1905.

to come into existence was one in Aramaic, made up mainly, though not exclusively, of sayings of Jesus. This is often called the "Logia source," and by Wellhausen is designated as Q. It was gradually developed from a collection of loosely connected sayings into something resembling a gospel. In its original Aramaic form it is older than Mark, but in its Greek translation, as used by Matthew and Luke, it contained parts that are later than Mark. Jülicher is thus enabled to admit that Wellhausen has made it extremely probable that the Logia source (or Q) of Matthew and Luke is post-Markan, and still hold that in origin it is older. A dependence, however, of the Logia on Mark cannot be proved, though some influence may have been exercised by that gospel in the process of the Logia development. We have too little knowledge of this source to attempt to determine its probable plan and extent, or to distinguish the later additions from the original composition. It may well go back in its earliest beginnings to the apostle Matthew, but in its later form it is certainly post-apostolic.

Professor Jülicher is as averse as ever to postulating a primitive Mark. He finds other ways that seem to him preferable for explaining the difficulties that are disposed of by this hypothesis. He rejects the assumption that the writer of Mark sought to incorporate into his gospel all the information at his disposal regarding the words and deeds of Jesus. Only that was used, rather, which seemed to set forth the kingly, the irresistible, the divine in the world's Redeemer. He is of the opinion that the Aramaic origin of most of the synoptic material and the existence of written Aramaic sources has been established by Wellhausen, but he does not think that it has been shown that in our Mark a translator speaks who is a different person from the Aramaic author. Nor would he agree in regarding Mark as our one reliable source for the life of Jesus. Matthew and Luke belong at the close of the period when old sources were still available. They were composed much after the manner of Mark and with much the same purpose. With reference to the two kinds of material, narrative and discourse, Jülicher regards it as incorrect to make the discourse material so entirely secondary as Wellhausen does. More additions may have been made in the course of time to the words than to the deeds; and in so far the historical narrative would deserve precedence; but, on the other hand, the words were at first transmitted with more care, because what the Lord had said was regarded as authoritative. Too much importance ought not to be given to literary attestation.

Aside from the Synoptic Gospels, the new revision shows most noticeable changes in dealing with the Fourth Gospel, but without essential

modifications of main conclusions. Of recent discussions of the Johannine question, that of E. Schwartz³ receives most consideration. External evidence for Johannine authorship is considered to be practically valueless. Papias is the first to give such testimony, but he also states that John, as well as his brother James, suffered a martyr's death. This could have taken place only in Palestine. The witness of Irenaeus and Polycrates to the Ephesian origin of the gospel cannot stand before the silence of the earlier Fathers, Ignatius and Polycarp. The tradition of the apostle's residence at Ephesus arose from confusing him with the John to whom Papias gives the title of Elder. This last-named John may well have been the author of the Apocalypse, but if so, he could not have written the gospel, since hardly any other conclusion is so certain as that the same author did not produce both works. Internal evidence shows that the author of the gospel was not an eyewitness of the events that he relates. He was an unknown Christian resident in Syria, who in the second century wrote to defend Christianity against objections arising directly or indirectly from Jewish unbelief. Considerable space is given to refuting the theory of Schwartz that chap. 21 is an addition of Asian and probably Ephesian origin. Jülicher holds that the chapter is by the same author as the rest of the book, though it was possibly added subsequently, in response to a demand on the part of the readers for a more definite indication of the person of the loved disciple.

The list of the genuinely Pauline letters remains the same. The investigations of W. Wrede⁴ and G. Hollmann⁵ regarding the genuineness of II Thessalonians have received attention, but the possibility of Pauline authorship for the letter is still affirmed. The South Galatian theory has made no appreciable progress in Jülicher's favor in the last five years. An undue importance seems to him to have been given to the discussion of this question. The analysis of II Corinthians by A. Halmel⁶ meets with as little approval as previous attempts to solve the Corinthian problem by a like method. The difficulties that beset the assumption that II Cor., chaps. 10-13, is a distinct letter, either the one alluded to in the earlier chapters or a fifth one, written after chaps. 1-9, are met by Halmel in maintaining that chaps. 10-13 follow as well as precede chaps. 1-9.

³ *Ueber den Tod der Söhne Zebedaei: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Johannes-evangeliums*, 1904.

⁴ *Die Echtheit des 2. Thessalonicherbriefs untersucht*, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*, N. F., Vol. IX, No. 2, 1903.

⁵ *Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, Vol. V, (1904) pp. 28 ff.

⁶ *Der 2. Korintherbrief des Apostels Paulus*, 1904.

That is, he analyzes what remains of this last-named section after he has excised 6:14—7:1 as an interpolation and 3:12—18; 4:3—43 as redactional additions of ancient liturgical phrases, into two letters, a fourth and a sixth. This feat of critical ingenuity, notwithstanding its brilliancy, has but confirmed Jülicher's opinion that chaps. 10—13 were written at the same time with chaps. 1—9. Change of tone and bearing and broken connections need not disturb us, considering our very imperfect knowledge of the circumstances that called forth the letter and attended its writing. The conclusion of the section on Ephesians has been so recast as to make Pauline authorship seem more questionable. But the difficulties in the way of this view are affirmed to be hardly greater than those encountered by the hypothesis of post-Pauline origin.

The importance which Jülicher attaches to the second and third parts of his "Introduction," "History of the Canon and History of the Text," is made evident by the careful revision, which is no less apparent here than in the preceding special "Introduction." Results are the same, making clear "the incontestable fact of the gradual and human origin of the Canon." He finds little progress to be noted in text-criticism. There continues to be wide divergence of view in fundamental matters. The rejection of the *Textus Receptus* is still the one important point of agreement. The hope for advance lies, not in a grand reconstruction, but in careful laborious investigation of the ancient versions and church fathers. Dogmatic prejudices and desires have unfortunately a decisive influence in the handling of inner evidence. Wellhausen has shown that the history of the text of the gospels during the first two centuries is in reality a section of the history of the church's conception of Christianity. It is time to recognize more fully that reasonable conjectural emendation has its rightful place, when other means of establishing the text are wanting. The advice of Blass that the critic should strive to find a witness of some kind supporting his conjecture does not meet approval.

It is to be hoped that the English translation of Professor Jülicher's "Introduction" will also be soon revised and brought up to date. We have in English no recent work of such wide and careful scholarship, presenting in such a candid way what can be claimed as results and what are still to be regarded as problems in the field of New Testament introduction. One does not need to accord throughout with the judgment of Jülicher in order to appreciate his broad-mindedness and sound common-sense. There is no doubt that his one aim has been to produce a scientific textbook that shall help in the search for truth. His style and choice of material are determined by this purpose.

Of all sections, the treatment of the Johannine question remains as before perhaps the least satisfactory. It is difficult to feel that the weight of external evidence has been adequately valued. In spite of recent investigations, this continues to be of first importance in reaching conclusions as to authorship. So, too, the author's estimate of the historical value of the Fourth Gospel will still provoke wide dissent.

Professor von Soden, of Berlin, has recently published a brief treatise devoted to special introduction.⁷ It has been well translated, or rather paraphrased, by Rev. J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., and appears as Vol. XIII of the "Crown Theological Library."⁸ It is more popular in character than the work just considered, aiming to present conclusions in a readable form rather than to furnish a discussion of problems. In fact, it is the almost entire disappearance of many problems that impresses one who turns to this book after reading Professor Jülicher; and one can hardly repress the wish that as many things were definitely settled as here seem to be.

Aside from a preliminary survey of 20 pages, and appendix of 14 pages devoted to the epistles of James, Jude, and II Peter, there are four main divisions: I, "Paul," pp. 21-120; II, "The Gospel Literature," pp. 121-200; III, "The Post-Pauline Literature," pp. 201-333; IV, "The Johannine Literature," pp. 334-462. In the Pauline section it is said to be most highly probable that the letter referred to in II Cor. 2:4 ff., has come down to us in chaps. 10-13. Rom. 16:1-20 is considered by itself under the heading "A Supposed Epistle to the Ephesians." It is thought that this may have been a short epistle prepared for the use of Phoebe wheresoever she might travel in Asia. Colossians is held to be Pauline, save for 1:15-20, which is a later expansion. Ephesians, the Pastorals and II Thessalonians are assigned to the post-Pauline literature. Tychicus is suggested as a possible author of Ephesians. If not by him, it is by some disciple of Paul, of lofty, far-seeing, and rich spirit, who may have heard his master express "similar thoughts concerning the unifying power of Christianity without, of course, making them the central point in the gospel, as happens in this epistle." In another passage we are told that the Catholic church "has learned and borrowed more from this epistle than from all the writings of Paul taken together." A Pauline

⁷ *Urchristliche Literaturgeschichte (die Schriften des Neuen Testaments)*. Von Hermann Frhr. von Soden. 1905. 237 pages.

⁸ *The History of Early Christian Literature: The Writings of the New Testament*, by Baron Hermann von Soden. Translated by J. R. Wilkinson. Edited by W. D. Morrison. New York: Putnam's; London: Williams & Norgate, 1906. 476 pages.

kernel is found in Titus and II Timothy. The redactor of these two letters, who is also the author of I Timothy, was closely related in his ideas to the writers of Ephesians and Acts.

The two-source theory is accepted for the Synoptic Gospels. A sketch of the probable contents of the Logia is given on the basis of Luke, who has best preserved its order. The primitive Mark was based on the reminiscences of Peter, and was written in Rome shortly after the apostle's death in 64 A. D. The writer of our canonical Mark was probably acquainted with the Logia. His plan of writing is sketched, and the additions attributable to his pen are noted.

The post-Pauline literature, which, beside the works referred to, includes Acts, Hebrews, and I Peter, is thought to belong to the last decade of the first century. An attempt is made to separate the "we"-document of Acts from its "wrapping of oral tradition," and a part of what results from this effort is printed as a consecutive narrative (pp. 112 f.; Eng. pp. 240 f.). In historical value this is regarded as hardly inferior to Paul's epistles. The Epistle to the Hebrews is thought to have been written to gentile Christians in Rome and other Italian churches.

The Johannine writings are likened to a group of buildings belonging to the same school of architecture. The Apocalypse is based on a Jewish apocalypse written at Jerusalem between May and August, 70 A. D. The sections attributable to this source in 8:1-22:5 are indicated. The Fourth Gospel is a "doctrinal textbook in historical vesture." The discourses are addressed to the readers, and not to those who on each occasion are supposed to have heard them. The writer was a prophet, who was conscious that he was not reporting historical fact as a chronicler would record it, but was nevertheless assured that he was giving to men its abiding, eternal significance. There is nothing in the gospel to indicate that the evangelist regarded the Beloved Disciple, of whom he was a devoted adherent, as John, the son of Zebedee. If we assume that he was rather John, the famous elder of Ephesus, who might have been a native of Jerusalem and for a time a personal disciple of Jesus, we have a satisfactory explanation of the tradition of Johannine authorship and of the phenomena of the gospel.

James, Jude, and II Peter are relegated to an appendix, because in time and content they lie outside primitive Christian development and contribute nothing essential to our knowledge of the same.

In method of investigation, as well as in many conclusions, Professor von Soden is in accord with Professor Jülicher. One marked difference, however, is noticeable—the readiness with which he employs literary

analysis and the confidence which he places in the results. Because of the large number of readers who will not discriminate, one can but feel that what is generally conceded should be more sharply distinguished from personal opinion and from what is widely questioned. Jülicher's "Introduction," though less popular in character, will none the less be more serviceable, even to the general reader. There is much in von Soden's book that is stimulating and suggestive, but oftentimes it is difficult to recognize the reasonableness or advantage of his hypotheses. For instance, if the Epistle to the Ephesians has such near relationship to Paul, why not make the connection a little closer? Or again cannot most of the objections based on internal grounds, and many of those on external, still be urged against this hypothesis of a double of the apostle John? Other questions of a like import will suggest themselves to the thoughtful reader.

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SOME RECENT WORKS ON PAUL AND PAULINISM

The half-dozen books which are to be considered in this article cover a pretty wide field. Nägeli's¹ pamphlet of 100 pages is an introductory characterization of the Pauline vocabulary. It makes abundant references to the inscriptions and papyrus fragments discovered in recent years. The author regards the *κοινή* as a natural development from the classical Greek, a connecting link between that and the new language. The letters attributed to Paul share throughout the character of the *κοινή*. The apostle was uninfluenced by the literary theories of his day. His vocabulary is not only largely post-classical, but it bears another mark of the *κοινή*, viz., its giving new meanings to old words. This vocabulary represents both grades of the *κοινή*, its more select diction being found in I Corinthians, Philippians, and Romans; its more common forms, in Galatians and Philemon.

Nägeli suggests, and with force, that too much has been said of Hebraisms in Paul's writings. Most of the expressions thus denominated are from the LXX, and are to be attributed to the influence of this Greek version rather than to a Semitic mode of thought on Paul's part.

In regard to the bearing of the lexical argument on the question of genuineness the view of Nägeli is cautious and moderate. He finds the four chief letters bound together by vocabulary and mode of expression.

¹ *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus*. Von Theodor Nägeli. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1905. 100 pages. M. 2.80.

They take us directly into the sphere of the non-literary *κοινή*. The lexical character of II Thessalonians is rather for than against its genuineness. So also with Ephesians. But in the case of the Pastoral Letters the language is thought to weigh somewhat heavily against their genuineness. This pamphlet leads one to hope that the author's plan to publish a Pauline lexicon which shall consider the significance of every word, its relation to the LXX, to classic and late Greek, and especially to the *κοινή*, may be realized.

From the lexical point of view, according to Nägeli, the four chief letters of Paul belong together and constitute a homogeneous literary monument. Between this result and that at which Professor Völter,² of Amsterdam, arrives the difference is great. For this scholar is convinced that these four letters are not a homogeneous monument, and did not originate in one mind. Of Romans about seven-sixteenths are regarded as genuine, the same amount is ascribed to an interpolator, and the remainder is regarded as late additions. Galatians entire is given to the man who revised Romans. About three-quarters of I Corinthians is considered to be the work of Paul. Of the first nine chapters of II Corinthians (the last four chapters constitute a letter by themselves) a little more than one-half is interpolated. The genuine letter to the Philippians was about one-quarter the size of the canonical epistle. The interpolations in Romans include most of chapters 1-4 and 7-9, those in I Corinthians include the famous chapter on love, and those in Philippians include the passage on the humiliation of Christ and the intensely personal third chapter.

The elaboration of the above positions constitutes a volume of 331 pages. It is not possible in this article, nor is it necessary, to follow the analysis at great length in order to form a fair judgment of its quality and of the force of its ultimate conclusions. We will consider two or three characteristic passages. Chapter 2:6-16 of I Corinthians is said to disturb the connection and not to be in harmony with either the preceding or the following verses. Two arguments are advanced in support of this view. It is said, in the first place, that Paul had spoken "wisdom" to the Corinthians in 1:17 f., while 2:6 implies that he had *not* thus spoken to them. But that depends upon what Paul meant here by "wisdom." If he meant "the word of the cross" in its simplest form, then 2:6 does not appear to be in line with the preceding chapter. But we see no reason why the "wisdom" of 2:6 should be thus limited. The word of the cross may be presented as "milk" (3:2), or it may be presented as "meat," as

² *Paulus und seine Briefe*. Von Daniel Völter. Strassburg, 1905. 331 pages. M. 7.

wisdom for spiritual Christians. Again, it is said in favor of regarding 2:6-16 as an interpolation that 3:1 seems to follow immediately on 2:5. In both places Paul is speaking of his appearance in Corinth, and the same introductory words are used. But these statements have no independent force as against the originality of the intervening verses. We have no right to assume that even an apostle will always write in such a manner that no verse can be removed without destroying the sense of what is left. Finally, it is urged that the thoughts of 2:6-16 are mainly borrowed from the Wisdom of Solomon. But while certain general resemblances are to be seen, the characteristic thought of the Corinthian passage in regard to our knowing the mind of God (vs. 11) has no parallel in the Wisdom of Solomon.

Or take the grounds on which I Cor., chap. 13, is taken away from Paul. Chapter 12:31a speaks of "greater gifts" which ought to be desired, and we expect some description of these, but do not find it until we reach 14:2. Meantime chap. 13 goes beyond chaps. 12 and 14. Its author put a lower estimate on spiritual gifts than either the Corinthians or Paul himself. Chapter 14 has absolutely no sense after chap. 13. Therefore chap. 13 can not have stood originally between chaps. 12 and 14. Chapter 12:31b and 14:1 were put in to make the interpolation of chap. 13 smooth.

The author of chap. 13 was a Greek, in high position, whom without doubt Greek motives influenced; to whom, however, the Christian spirit gave the genuine impulse (*Schwung*) and the right word.

Now, the critical leverage in this case seems to be quite inadequate. Granted that Paul's words in 12:31a lead us to expect some description of the "greater gifts," we cannot dictate at what exact point such a description shall be given. The gift of chap. 13 rises, it is true, above the gifts of prophecy and speaking with tongues, but that fact of itself is plainly no reason why the chapter should be taken from Paul. The same man may have a lofty spiritual ideal of character and yet attach some value to physical agencies. We may well regard chap. 13 as preparing the way for a correct estimate of the gifts which chap. 14 discusses.

From Völter's treatment of Galatians a single point in further illustration of his method. He takes 1:12 as claiming that Paul received his entire gospel by a revelation from Jesus Christ, and, rightly rejecting such a view, affirms that his gospel had a historical basis. But the fifteenth verse of the same chapter indicates that our author's reading of the twelfth verse is wrong. The fifteenth verse affirms that God revealed his Son in Paul, and this furnishes an adequate explanation of vs. 12.

The revelation of Christ in him meant a revolution in his thought of Christ. This was fundamental, but it did not relieve Paul of the necessity of learning as others did about the earthly life and teaching of Jesus.

These specimens of the author's method must suffice. It seems to be altogether arbitrary and inconclusive. Oftentimes the difficulties against which the critic's arguments are leveled have no real existence.

A very real difficulty, however, confronts us when, e. g., we attempt to regard our letter to the Romans as a document addressed to the church at Rome soon after the time of Nero, nearly half of which came from a man whose views were not a little different from those of the apostle. What became of the original letter? Is it not strange that it disappeared entirely? Is it probable that a thoroughly revised and modified form of an apostolic letter should find at once universal acceptance? If there was some disciple of Paul whose influence at Rome so overshadowed that of the great martyr-apostle that his revision of the apostle's letter crowded the original out of circulation, is it not a little remarkable that tradition has preserved no trace of him? And the same sort of difficulty has to be met in connection with Völter's analysis of I Corinthians, Galatians, and Philippians. Paul was the master-mind of his generation, the most widely known, the most inspiring. Therefore a hypothesis which requires us to believe that his letters were radically revised by some of his disciples, and that as thus revised they were everywhere accepted in the place of the autographs, must marshal a more formidable array of arguments than have as yet been discovered and brought together.

By the side of Professor Völter's book that which we are now to consider,³ is in strongest contrast. In the first third of his large volume (528 pages), which discusses the documents, the author accepts as genuine writings of Paul not merely Romans, Galatians, I and II Corinthians, but also II Thessalonians, Ephesians, and the Pastoral Epistles; that is to say, thirteen letters. He also accepts the Lucan authorship not merely of the diary, but of the entire Book of Acts. The survey of this field does not profess to be exhaustive. It deals chiefly with the most recent arguments for and against Paul's authorship. The survey, however, is broad and the treatment forcible. The second third of the book deals with Paul's testimony in relation to the gospels, and the last third with his testimony in relation to the life of the church. This section does not appear to form an integral part of the general theme, though some readers may find it the most interesting part of the entire volume.

³ *The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ*. By R. S. Knowling, New York: Scribners, 1905. 531 pages. \$3.

The author divides Paul's letters into four groups. The first includes the Thessalonian letters and Galatians; the second, Corinthians and Romans; the third, the letters of the first imprisonment; and the last, the Pastoral Epistles. It is plain that, in the author's view, the vital part of Paul's testimony to Christ is testimony to his Godhead. He finds this in the earliest group of letters, and virtually in a complete form. "We may well ask," he says, "whether any Christology and soteriology can really go beyond that which meets us in this earliest group of epistles" (p. 48). But it is noticeable that he goes to the *second* group of letters for an explanation of the Galatian passage: "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law." It is said that the clause, "God sent forth his Son," must clearly be interpreted in relation to such passages as Rom. 8:3, 32. But the second of these passages does not employ the words to be explained, and the first does not throw any light on their use in Galatians. The author, in harmony with such early theologians as Athanasius, regards the words "his own Son" as signifying a participation by the Son in the essential nature of the Father (p. 46). In the fact that the language (Rom. 8:32) is like that which describes Abraham's relation to the sacrifice of his son "we may see in an incidental, but in a very distinct, manner how St. Paul recognized the identity of nature between God and him who is called by the apostle 'God's own Son'" (p. 47). This is like Chrysostom's argument that because Jesus said to Peter, "Thou art Simon, son of Jonas," and Peter said to Jesus, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," therefore Jesus was Son of God in the same sense in which Peter was son of Jonas.

Dr. Knowing thinks (p. 66) that the testimony to Christ in the second group of letters (Corinthians, Romans) goes beyond that of the first group in the clearness of its affirmation of pre-existence. He refers especially to I Cor. 8:6, to the clause "through whom are all things," but nowhere seeks to show that his interpretation of this is the only tenable one.

The christological doctrine which the author finds in the epistles of Paul is that of the Nicene theologians. His exegesis is far more cautious than theirs, and his christological passages are fewer, but it seems not unfair to say that in him as in them one perceives the influence of ecclesiastical tradition. It appears unfortunate that only one side of Paul's testimony to Christ should be given, and the other side, which is fuller and more explicit, should be passed in silence. It is surely a mistake to think that we can explain Gal. 4:4 by Rom. 8:3, ignoring such words as Acts 13:38; I Cor. 11:3; 15:28; and Eph. 4:5, 6.

In regard to matters of fact and in statements of evidence, apart now

from christological passages, the language of our author is sometimes open to criticism. Thus, e. g., he considers it certain that Eutychus was dead. He refers to Luke's statement in Acts 20:9. He does not, however, allude to the fact that Paul in the next verse says: "Make ye no ado; for his life is in him." We surely cannot at once assume that these words mean: "Make ye no ado; for he is now *restored* to life." Again, having said (p. 279) that Jeremiah had used the phrase "a new covenant," the author adds that "every Israelite was looking forward to that covenant with eager hope." But was there ever a time in the history of Israel when that was even remotely true? It is said of Paul (p. 354) that after his first visit to Jerusalem subsequent to his conversion he went to Tarsus "to spend many years in his native town." But of such inaccuracies these cases may suffice, and our survey of the book may be concluded with reference to a statement in which we fully agree with the author. Although he exalts the service and teaching of Paul, he declares that it is "unintelligible to speak of Paul as if he was the founder of Christianity," or as "the second founder of Christianity." One who claims that Paul founded Christianity must, we should suppose, identify Christianity with theology, and even then the statement would need qualification.

We have now to notice more briefly three other German works. Emil Weber⁴ writes a monograph of 152 pages to maintain that Romans, chaps. 1-3, are to be fully understood only from the standpoint of the missionary. They were born out of missionary experience, and enable us to form an idea of the kind of preaching with which Paul introduced his gospel to the gentiles. They are not regarded as being at all a reproduction of one or more missionary addresses, but rather as indicating in a summary manner the lines of approach which the missionary had followed. Rom. 2:17-29 gives in substance a scene out of Paul's experience with the Jews, and shows how he was in the habit of meeting the objections which they brought against him. From this point the author proceeds to a study of the first chapter and the third. It is held that Paul's picture of the development of sin and its resultant moral degradation was not based on Genesis, but on his missionary experience.

Johann Walter,⁵ pastor, as he tells us in his *Vorwort*, of a parish of some 24,000 souls in Livland, discusses the Christianity of Paul, or a

⁴ *Die Beziehungen von Rom. 1-3 zur Missionspraxis des Paulus*. Von Emil Weber. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1905. 152 pages. M. 2.40.

⁵ *Der religiöse Gehalt des Galaterbriefes*. Von Johann Walter. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1904. 257 pages. M. 6.

section of it. The method is psychological in this sense that the author proceeds from his own experience of Christianity to find out the Christianity of Paul, assuming, of course, that real Christianity is always the same; the avowed purpose of the undertaking is religious—the purifying and deepening of present religious life. The book, though in form of a commentary, discusses the course of thought rather than the separate words—discusses it broadly, with logical and analytical power, but not, conspicuously, with power of compact, and clear statement. The author's conclusions, though independently reached, are in general agreement with such works as the late editions of Meyer.

The second letter to the Corinthians, which, by the way, is regarded as a single letter, is interpreted by Langheinrich⁶ from the point of view of pastoral theology. This discussion first appeared some eighteen years ago, and appears now in a second edition, which, the author says, differs little from the first. If the book had to do with critical questions, this confession would make a somewhat unfavorable impression, but it has not. It keeps close to the practical value of Paul's example and word for the Christian pastor of the present day. It is characterized throughout by a general and elevated spirit and by good practical sense. We cannot do better than close this article with a few words of Langheinrich to the preacher of the twentieth century:

Your sermon must breathe the certainty of victory. It must not be a discouraged apology, or a weak mediation made up of dominant conceptions of the day. It must be a decided witness of the salvation of Christ on the basis of a fact which is both objectively and subjectively present. This is apostolic preaching.

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THE SACRAMENTS IN THE EARLY CHURCH

These monographs¹ are both suggested by the interesting treatises of Wilhelm Heitmüller, *Im Namen Jesu* and *Taufe und Abendmahl bei Paulus*. They both controvert the conclusions defended by Heitmüller, though from somewhat different historical and critical points of view. Andersen—as against the opinion of Heitmüller, that Paul's doctrine of the Lord's Supper

⁶ *Der zweite Brief Sankti Pauli an die Korinther*. Von Friedrich Langheinrich. Leipzig: Janas, 1905. 223 pages. M. 3.60.

¹ *Das Abendmahl in den zwei ersten Jahrhunderten nach Christus*. Von Axel Andersen. Zweite Ausgabe, Giessen: Töpelmann, 1906. 111 pages. M. 2.

Die Taufe im Urchristentum im Lichte der neueren Forschungen. Von F. M. Rendtorff. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 55 pages. M. 1.20.

is founded upon the ancient idea that eating the flesh and drinking the blood of a sacrifice united the partakers with the god and with one another—contends that the last meal which Jesus ate with his disciples was an ordinary supper, eaten, as the good tradition in the Fourth Gospel shows, on the evening which preceded the evening of the pascal supper. Jesus gave to this supper no memorial or sacramental interpretation, nor did he suggest that it was to be celebrated after his death, either as a memorial of him or as a symbol or a means of salvation through his death. These features, so far as they appear in the Synoptic Gospels, are due to additions to the earlier tradition, which must have been added as late as 165 A. D. They led also to the change of the date from the evening of the thirteenth of Nisan to the next evening, the time of the pascal supper. Paul knew this simple tradition, but was not satisfied with it. He believed that he had "received from the Lord" a revelation which preserved the form of the event more accurately and interpreted it more correctly. According to this revelation the Lord instituted a ceremony which was to be repeated frequently. It was, however, simply a memorial. The "body" was not the flesh of Christ, but his ideal or spiritual body, the church, into whose life the communicants more fully entered as they ate this supper together; the wine in the cup was not his blood which men were to drink; the cup was the new covenant in his blood; it was to remind the recipients that Jesus' blood had sealed a covenant, not to impart a mystical grace. This interpretation requires, as was the case with the Synoptics, some revision of the text of I Cor. 11:23-26.

Andersen finds no evidence of a sacramental interpretation of the Eucharist earlier than Justin Martyr, where it begins to suggest itself. Stages of its development appear from Tertullian to Cyprian, though Origen has not lost sight of the earlier and simpler view. The development of this doctrine led to the redacting of the Synoptic Gospels, and to some extent of the account in I Corinthians. Here is the weak point in Andersen's argument. It is difficult to believe that these four documents were consistently revised to incorporate into them, more or less fully, a doctrine of late appearance and slow growth, and that these revisions were promptly and universally adopted. It is a fair question whether the facts to which he has called attention do not suggest that the early Christians interpreted the language of the gospels more simply and more justly than the theologians of later generations. In some respects these Greek and Roman converts to Christianity were as ill-fitted to interpret the tropical, oriental language of Jesus and those who recorded his words, as are some German and English interpreters of later generations.

Heitmüller in his book, already referred to, upon Paul's views of baptism and the Lord's Supper, had suggested the idea that Paul had accepted a widely prevalent doctrine that the soul of a worshiper might be brought by a proper ritual act into a mystic union with the god worshiped—a union which involved a blending of substance, rather than an ethical assimilation. He understands Paul to teach, in the sixth chapter of Romans and elsewhere, that one who receives baptism dies and is raised in Christ not primarily in a moral experience, but in the renewal of the nature or substance of the soul, which renewal forms the basis of the moral experience. Rendtorff argues against this interpretation of Paul in an able and interesting treatise. He says, very justly, that such a writer as Paul cannot be interpreted simply by gathering from various sources and comparing sentences which resemble those which he uses. His own experience and point of view have more to do with his meaning than the history of terms and phrases which he adopts.

When these two books, by Heitmüller and Rendtorff, are read side by side, however, the reader can hardly escape the impression that the difference between the two authors is one of emphasis and proportion rather than of actual opposition. Each holds that the reception of baptism was, in Paul's mind, more than a confession or symbol of a voluntary change. It was an act which completed and established regeneration, and, in the consciousness of the recipient, transferred him from this world and its ruler to the kingdom of God and into union with Christ. Each holds also that Paul could have seen no value in such a rite unless attended with a living faith and a conscious purpose to live the life of the regenerate. The earlier author, perhaps, lays too much stress upon the early and wide-spread conception of the saving power of a formal act, as an influence upon the mind of the apostle, and renders himself liable to a criticism based upon an understanding of Paul's thought for which he too found place in his interpretation; and the critic does not seem to realize fully that the apostle may have adopted, not only terms, but ideas which prevailed among those for whom he labored, and infused them with new life and power, without rejecting or ignoring their earlier meaning.

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BOOKS ON THE HOLY SPIRIT

As the title indicates, this neat little volume¹ deals with only one section of the biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This limitation is necessitated

¹ *The Teaching of Jesus concerning the Holy Spirit.* By Louis Burton Crane. New York: American Tract Society. xiii+175 pages. \$0.75.

by the fact that the book is one of a series by different authors, on "the teachings of Jesus."

The volume is intended primarily as an aid to the devotional side of the Christian life, and as such ought to be judged. Regarded, however, from the standpoint of critical scholarship, it has several marked defects. Most significant among these is the fact that the author does not raise a single critical question concerning the sources of his scriptural material—in fact treats it all as "authoritative revelation." This leads him more than once to regard a late conception of the function of the Spirit as an early one—e. g., the Spirit as the power of God working in creation (Gen. 1:2), which is clearly a late conception.

Fortunately the author recognizes the element of progress in the biblical revelation. For example, he says that in the Old Testament "the Spirit was not revealed in his personal character, but always spoken of as the power or energy of God working in the world, and particularly in his chosen ones." It is only in the New Testament that the Spirit is clearly set forth as a person.

In the teachings of Jesus recorded in the synoptic gospels the author finds little advance over the Old Testament conceptions of the Holy Spirit. In the gospel of John, on the other hand, the advance is very marked. There it is that Jesus gives the Spirit a new name, "Paraclete," as well as attributes to it new functions. In the summary of his results the author says:

Jesus teaches that the Holy Spirit is a person distinct from the Father and from the Son. That, while for economic reasons he is represented as subordinate to the Father and to the Son, yet that he is to be regarded as co-equal with them in substance and in authority. That the Father sends the Spirit as he sends the Son, and yet the Spirit's work is peculiarly His own. That the Son prays the Father for the Spirit's descent, and yet that the Son's work must be carried on and applied by the Spirit.

The eleven distinct chapters comprising the body of the work are well co-ordinated, and the style is lucid and attractive. It is a book written especially for the laity, and for such will prove decidedly helpful. The critical scholar will find in it little material which can be used directly in his investigations. The interpretations of the scriptural material bearing on the subject contain little that is really new, and the results obtained are those usually set forth in works covering the subject.

Nösgen's elaborate volume² follows in the wake of the modern critical

² *Der Heilige Geist: Sein Wesen und die Art seines Wirkens.* Von K. F. Nösgen. Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1905. vii + 259 pages. M. 5.50.

movement as a defense of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Happily the spirit of the work is irenic throughout. In the introduction the author points out that present-day Christian thought subordinates the doctrine of the Holy Spirit—in fact, sets it in the background—compared to the doctrines of God and of Christ. One of the leading purposes of the author's study is to show that both in the Old and New Testaments the Spirit is regarded as a personal, conscious, life-giving power. The separate personality of the Spirit is his principal contention. So eager is he to establish this thesis that he maintains that the fundamental conception involved in the term "Spirit," whether applied to God or man, is personality. Had he studied the Hebrew term *ruach* in its development and in all its meanings, he would have seen how improbable was this generalization. Several times he interprets the term "Spirit" where the context clearly requires either "breath" or "wind" (e. g., Ps. 33:6).

Though the material used in establishing a conclusion is largely derived from the Scriptures, the method can hardly be called that of modern biblical theology. In fact, it approximates more nearly the proof-text method of the older school of theologians. For this reason the conclusions arrived at will not have a very large influence on modern thought.

In certain ecclesiastical circles the book will no doubt have its influence, especially in those parts where the author makes a direct application to the church and its life—e. g., when he suggests that the Spirit may work regeneration even in infants at the time of their baptism (an assumption that can hardly be said to have scriptural warrant). In most cases the author does not venture quite so far into the realm of conjecture, but is content to set forth the more general conceptions of the function of the Spirit derived from the Scriptures and Christian experience.

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EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

The Oxford Society of Historical Theology has, through a committee of six scholars, done a real service to all students of early Christian literature in the volume on *The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*.¹ The members of this committee—Vernon Bartlet, Kirsopp Lake, A. J. Carlyle, W. R. Inge, P. V. M. Benecke, and J. Drummond—divided the Apostolic Fathers among them, and undertook to determine what books of the New Testament, if any, each writer knew and used. The six authors

¹ *The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers*. By a Committee of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. v+144 pages. 6s.

followed a single plan in their study, and their conclusions, with the grounds for them, are thus at once readily seen. The conception of the task, the method pursued, and the presentation of results alike exhibit freedom from bias and a truly historical spirit. Not everyone, indeed, will agree with all the conclusions reached; perhaps the six authors were not in all cases convinced by one another; nor could it be otherwise in matters where the evidence is often so delicately balanced, and where the authors have striven as far as possible to state an explicit verdict. For this very effort at explicitness they are deserving of thanks. In their historical presuppositions, however, it is less easy to follow them. Their arrangement assumes that Barnabas and the Didache are earlier than I Clement, which is more than doubtful. Too much is perhaps credited to synoptic tradition, frequently at the expense of the gospel of Mark, and the statement that *αὐτοδομεῖν* "outside Polycarp . . . does not occur in the Apostolic Fathers" (p. 85) is hopelessly wrong; the word occurs scores of times, being especially frequent in Hermas.

Preuschen's useful collection of extra-canonical gospel material and tradition appears after four years in an enlarged form, duly supplemented, by the fragments recently found and published by Grenfell, Hunt, Schmidt, and others.² As before, the Greek and Latin texts are given, without introductions, but with German translations and indices. There is also a select list of literature on the various documents and writers.

More than fifty years have passed since Petermann published the first edition of *Pistis Sophia*, from the Askew manuscript which alone preserves that most important monument of Gnosticism. Schmidt's work³ does not include a revised Coptic text of the work, but such a revision is practically presupposed in his German translation, and his introductions show that he has worked over the manuscript with care. The Askew manuscript belongs probably to the fifth century, and the work was composed in Egypt, in the Greek language, in the third century. It appears now for the first time in a German translation.

From the Bruce papyrus Schmidt has already published the Coptic text of the Books of Jeu and other Gnostic fragments (*Texte und Unter-*

² *Antilegomena: Die Reste der ausserkanonischen Evangelien und urchristlichen Ueberlieferungen*. Herausgegeben und übersetzt von Erwin Preuschen. Zweite umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1905. vi+216 pages. M. 4.40.

³ *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*. Erster Band, "Die Pistis Sophia. Die Beiden Bücher des Jeu. Unbekanntes altgnostisches Werk." Herausgegeben von Carl Schmidt. ["Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte."] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. xxvii+410 pages. M. 13.50.

suchungen, Vol. VII, No. 2). This papyrus includes parts of two distinct manuscripts, written in the fifth or sixth century, while the works they partially preserve were composed in the first half of the third. The first of these works, *The Two Books of Jeû*, like *Pistis Sophia*, which refers to it explicitly, comes from the encratite Barbelo-Gnostics in Egypt, while the second work, for which no name can be given, emanates from the Sethite-archontic group of Gnostics. Schmidt gives German translations of these works, and a series of exhaustive indices concludes the volume.

"When thou findest a word of St. Athanasius," wrote Johannes Moschus, "and hast not paper, write it upon thy garments." Riedel holds that the *Canons of Athanasius*,⁴ preserved in Arabic and in part in Coptic, belong to the fourth or fifth century, and may well be an authentic work of Athanasius the Apostolic. After a critical introduction, comparing the *Canons* with various acknowledged writings of Athanasius, the editors publish the Arabic text, chiefly from a Berlin manuscript of the fourteenth century, in conjunction with four other manuscripts of less importance. An English translation follows, made by Mr. Crum from Riedel's German rendering of the Arabic. The Arabic version of the *Canons* seems to have been based on a Coptic version, and of this latter Mr. Crum has identified two fragmentary copies; one, on papyrus, of about 600 A. D.; the other, on parchment, of the tenth century. The Coptic (Sahidic) text of these fragments is published by Mr. Crum, with an English translation, and one facsimile. A series of indices conclude this worthy addition to the publications of the Text and Translation Society.

The Paris *Corpus* of oriental Christian writers is another of the great new agencies in the publication of Christian texts preserved in oriental tongues.⁵ It is suggestive of the international character of the undertaking that scholars of three different nations unite in this new part, which contains Latin translations of various minor Syriac chronicles, the longest being that of James of Edessa, the continuator of Eusebius. The fragments of this work bring the chronicle down to 631 A. D., but James is said to have carried it some years farther.

The famous *Chronicon* of Eusebius, lost in the original, is known to us chiefly through the Armenian version and through the Latin form into

⁴ *The Canons of Athanasius of Alexandria*. The Arabic and Coptic Versions, edited and translated, with Introductions, Notes, and Appendices, by Wilhelm Riedel and W. E. Crum. [Text and Translation Society.] London: Williams & Norgate, 1904. xxxv + 59 + 153 pages.

⁵ *Chronica Minora*. Pars Tertia. Interpretati sunt Brooks, Guidi, Chabot' [= "Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium: Scriptores Suri: Versio," Series Tertia, Tomus IV.] Paris: Carolus Poussielgue, 1905. 185 + 304 pages.

which Jerome, with more or less alteration, put it. Of Jerome's Latin, the Bodleian manuscript is the oldest witness, belonging to the fifth century, and the publication of this manuscript in photographic facsimile is thus an important contribution to the study of Eusebius' monumental work.⁶ Chronological tables such as these, more than any other form of composition, require the accurate reproduction which facsimiles give, and with this admirable edition the study and criticism of Jerome's Eusebius have been sensibly furthered. The introduction deals with this and the other manuscripts of the same work, and kindred topics are treated in a series of six appendices. To the plates of the Bodleian manuscript are appended facsimiles of a few pages of the Udine and Paris manuscripts, probable descendants of the Bodleian manuscript, which preserve passages now wanting in the Bodleian codex, from which thirty-three leaves have been lost.

Lietzmann's latest *Kleine Texte* are a group of Greek documents from Berlin, Fayûm, and Oxyrhynchus papyri, selected and annotated to serve New Testament students as examples of contemporary Greek in common use.⁷ The texts chosen belong mainly to the first century.

The fourth and fifth fasciculi of Rauschen's *Florilegium*⁸ contain various anti-heretical works of Tertullian, Irenaeus, Victor of Lerin, with textual and historical notes. This enterprise, which enjoys the encouragement of Cardinal Fischer, is designed to make the more important patristic writings accessible and intelligible to a wider circle of students and clergy.

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A NEW EDITION OF THE WORKS OF CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Volume XII of the Berlin edition of the Greek Fathers of the first three centuries contains the first volume of the works of Clement of Alexandria.¹ It is edited by Professor Otto Stählin, of Munich, whose work

⁶ *The Bodleian Manuscript of Jerome's Version of the Chronicle of Eusebius*. Reproduced in collotype, with an Introduction by John Knight Fotheringham. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. 72+242 collotype pages. 50s. net.

⁷ *Griechische Papyri*. Ausgewählt und erklärt von Hans Lietzmann. ["Kleine Texte für theologische Vorlesungen und Uebungen."] Bonn: Marcus & Weber, 1905. 16 pages. M. 0.40.

⁸ *Florilegium Patristicum*. Digessit vertit adnotavit Gerardus Rauschen. Fasciculus IV, Tertulliani Liber de Praescriptione Haereticorum; accedunt S. Irenaei Adversus Haereses, III, 3-4. 69 pages. M. 1. Fasciculus V, Vincentii Lerinensis Commonitoria. Bonn: Hanstein, 1906. 71 pages. M. 1.20.

¹ *Clemens Alexandrinus*. I: *Protrepticus und Paedagogus*. Herausgegeben im

preparatory to this splendid edition of the great church father was reviewed in this *Journal* some time ago.² On pp. ix-lxxxiii the editor prints the introductory material to the whole of Clement's works, of importance, thus, also for Vols. II and III, completing the works of this important Alexandrian theologian. This introduction is divided into six chapters, viz.: A. *Testimonia* (pp. ix-xv), concerning Clement and his writings drawn from the author's own statements as well as from those of Julius Africanus, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Cyril of Alexandria, Jerome, Photius, and others. B. Manuscripts (pp. xv-xlvi). The greater part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the manuscripts containing the two works edited in this volume, the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*. The archetype of all the manuscripts of these two writings is found in the codex Parisinus graecus, 451 (=P.), the manuscript owned by the great archbishop Arethas of Caesarea in Cappadocia. Stählin's description, characterization, and critical estimate of this manuscript are most excellent and complete. Next follows a list of the manuscripts, arranged in two groups, that were copied directly from, or depend indirectly on, this archetype. The two most important of these are the codex Mutinensis (=M.) III D 7 (tenth or eleventh century); a careful and good copy of P., which cannot be said of F. The Mutinensis, again, has been the exemplar for three later manuscripts, and was used by Victorinus in his edition of Clement. It contains the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*. Inferior to M. is the codex Laurentianus V 24 (=F.; twelfth century) containing the *Paedagogus* and used also by Victorinus. Mutinensis and Laurentianus are mutually independent.³ In addition to these three chief manuscripts, the editor mentions and describes the codex Genuensis Miss. Urb. 28, containing the *Protrepticus* and Books II and III of the *Paedagogus*; and Paris. Suppl. Graec. 254, containing the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, I, 96-103; II, and III independently; while *Paedagogus*, I, 1-96, is copied out of Laurent. V 24 either directly or at second hand. As an appendix to the editor's careful and minute description of the manuscripts is added a very learned and painstaking

Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der königl. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften von Otto Stählin. ["Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte," Vol. XII.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. lxxxiii + 352 pages. M. 13.50; bound, M. 16.

² *Journal of Theology*, Vol. VI, pp. 191, 192 (January, 1902).

³ Against the editor's explanation of the sometimes better text exhibited by F. in the first book of the *Paedagogus* as compared with that of M. (p. xxxi), see Koetschau in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1905, No. 20, col. 542.

discussion of the orthography of these manuscripts. Then follows a brief description of the manuscripts containing the text of the *Stromata*, the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, *Eclogae Propheticae*, *Quis dives salvetur* (two manuscripts), and the *Adumbrationes in Epistolas Canonicas* (in two manuscripts of the ninth and thirteenth centuries, respectively). C. "Indirect Witnesses" (pp. xlvii-lxiv). The editor takes up in four paragraphs: (1) The manuscripts containing excerpts from the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromata*; all of which are based on one and the same archetype; for the *Stromata*, the codex Laurentianus V, 3 (eleventh century), but of no critical value. Appended is a list of additional manuscripts of Clement mentioned in ancient catalogues. (2) The *Catenae*. Following some general remarks on the character and nature of the catenae, the editor prints ten catenae to the individual writings of Clement. This portion of his work is based to some extent on Zahn's excellent *Suppl. Clement.*, and on Karo and Lietzmann's *Catenarum Graecarum Catalogus* (1902). (3) The seven *Florilegia*, chief among which ranks the *Sacra Parallela* of John of Damascus. Added to this paragraph is a succinct list of the fragments of Clement's writings. (4) Quotations from Clement in the works of later authors—Eusebius, Arnobius, Firmicus Maternus, Cyril of Alexandria. D. Editions. The first edition of the complete works of Clement is that by Petrus Victorinus, published in Florence, 1550.⁴ It is followed by that of the careful and conscientious Friedrich Sylburg (1592), whose results, together with those of Le Nourry (1703), were used by John Potter (1715), who himself made valuable additions. Later editors, Reinhold Klotz (1831) and Dindorf,⁵ copied their predecessors most faultily and carelessly. Special editions of the *Stromata*, Book VII, the *Quis dives salvetur*, and other works are estimated on pp. lxiv-lxvii. E. Translations. Of translations Stählin mentions in two paragraphs (1) the Latin rendering by Gentianus Hervetus, 1551—a translation hastily made and often faulty; and (2) the translations into modern languages. F. On pp. lxxx-lxxxiii the editor briefly states the principles underlying his own work toward this new edition of the works of Clement. The twelve chapters of the *Προρρητικός πρὸς Ἕλληνας* are printed on pp. 1-86, on the basis of M. and P. and the daughter-manuscripts of P. Pp. 87-222 contain the three books of the *Παδαγωγός*, based on three manuscripts. The scholia to both works follow on pp. 295-340.

* ⁴ See Stählin in *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, N. F., V, 4; and Christie's notice in this *Journal*, Vol. VI, p. 147.

⁵ Oxford, 1869; four volumes; severely criticised by most scholars, especially Paul de Lagarde.

Copious indexes to these scholia consisting of lists of passages from the Old and New Testaments and profane Greek literature are added.

The texts edited by Stählin have been carefully collated and revised. They show on every page the philological acumen and scholarly thoroughness which have characterized his former publications. But few passages remain that have baffled all attempts at emendation. These are wisely indicated by a prefixed †, or by asterisks showing the omission of some word or words. The editor enjoyed the literary assistance of such men as Joseph B. Mayor, E. Schwartz, and U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf; but the real work was done by himself—and good work it is. Those who are interested mainly in the linguistic and textual work of the editor will find additional suggestions in the reviews by Koetschau in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1905, No. 20; and by Klostermann in the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, September, 1905, pp. 673-80. Most welcome to the student of Clement is the rich and carefully selected bibliography scattered throughout the introduction. We hope to see very soon the second and third volumes, completing this most excellent edition.

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AN EARLY WITNESS TO CHRISTIAN MONACHISM

This edition¹ of an interesting treatise is by Lic. Eduard von der Goltz, the fortunate discoverer of the Greek version of "the Prayer of Euthalius," a document that has settled a nice stichometrical question and will influence the whole Eutholian problem. The Benedictine edition (Migne, *Pat. Graec.*, XXVIII, 251-81), its nearest predecessor, was produced in days when of even the largest libraries in Europe there was no exhaustive knowledge; while of the treasures of Athos and the monasteries of the near, but dim, East there were no catalogues like those of Lambros or Sakkelion. The study under review is divided into three parts: (1) "Die Herstellung des Textes;" (2) "Ursprung und Charakter;" (3) "Die Bedeutung des Traktats für unsere Kenntnis der Geschichte des christlichen Lebens."

The notable features of the first division are a contribution to our knowledge of the genealogy of the Athanasian MSS, particularly those containing the *De Virginitate*, and the text edited anew from the manuscripts thus studied. Von der Goltz has carried forward this study from the con-

¹ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΝ (*De Virginitate*). Von Eduard Freiherr von der Goltz. Eine echte Schrift des Athanasius. [= Texte und Untersuchungen, N.F. XIV, 2.] Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 143 pages. M. 5.

clusions of Wallis and Loeschke and Lake. He has discovered the best textual representative as yet of *De Virginitate* in the Cloister Library of St. John, upon the island of Patmos. When a scholar attempts definitive study of Athanasian MSS on the same scale as that of Dr. Capo upon those of Isidore of Pelusium, he will do well to keep in mind this introductory study to the latest edition of *De Virginitate*. The text is produced with discrimination, and, so far as this notice is concerned, only in one particular will it be criticised.

The second division is a discussion of the general character of the contents of the treatise and of its literary relationships. Its affinities are, primarily, with the Canons of Hippolytus, the Testament of our Lord, and the Apostolic Constitutions; and, secondarily, with the Egyptian Church Order and the Canons of Basil. These latter relations appear to be indirect and through the first-mentioned group of writings. Von der Goltz arranges these writings in a different order of affinity, placing first the Canons of Hippolytus, the Egyptian Church Order, and the Testament; and then, in the second place, the Apostolic Constitutions, and the Canons of Basil and of Athanasius. A careful comparison might suggest rather the order given above, and that the parallels of the Canons of Hippolytus are even closer with the Testament than with *De Virginitate*. The one apparently direct parallel of the Canons with *De Virginitate*, *πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον κ. τ. λ.* (see below), is probably a reminiscence of the Mandates of Hermas (I, 1). A further reason for so arranging them will appear later. It is to be noted also that there are some parallels with the *Διδαχὴ* (as pointed out by Dr. Rendel Harris), and seemingly with the Syrian recension of it.

The third division concludes that *De Virginitate* displays a conception of life produced by the fusion of the ideals of the church of the first century and the rules and institutions of early Greek monachism. Indeed, the treatise presents three special features of interest. It is a valuable witness for the practice of virginity in a district yet to be determined; it illustrates early liturgical usage; and its author is still a problem. Its liturgiological value has already been fully recognized by Batiffol, who considers it a witness to the practice of the Syrian church in the fourth century. The value of its picture of the practice of virginity is bound up with the discovery of the author; and this again determines finally the provenance of the writing. Accordingly, the points made by von der Goltz in the section "Die Frage nach dem Verfasser" (pp. 114-22), and in others bearing upon authorship, will be dealt with one by one, though not in the order in which they occur in his book.

The treatise opens with a paragraph of the highest value for determining the authorship. It contains a statement of theological belief; and hence, if there are any expressions characteristic of a particular theological school, light is cast on both author and date. The passage runs as follows:

πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον εἰς ἓνα θεὸν πατέρα πα Ὑτοκράτορα, ὁρατῶν καὶ δοράτων ποιητήν· καὶ εἰς τὸν μονογενῆ αὐτοῦ υἱὸν Ἰησοῦν χριστὸν, τὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, κατὰ πάντα ἰσοδύναμον τῷ πατρί, τὸν πρὸ αἰώνων ὄντα· καὶ εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον τὸ ἐν πατρὶ καὶ ὑφ' ὃν, παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποστελλόμενον, καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ διδόμενον, πατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μία θεοτής, μία δύναμις, ἐν βάπτισμα (chap. 1).

1. No exposition is needed to show that the complexion of the passage is other than Nicene or at any rate Athanasian. But von der Goltz questions the genuineness of the more decisive phrases. He proposes to punctuate the passage differently from preceding editors, and the statements in question are to be considered as interpolated. After διδόμενον, and before πατὴρ underlined, he places a comma (p. 108), which destroys the grammatical concord. The older editors placed a full-stop after διδόμενον. A semicolon is the proper punctuation; and the new sentence fittingly closes the symbol. The MSS lend no support to von der Goltz's criticism. But with the admission of the sentence there enters into the problem an element that is not Athanasian. The doctrinal terminology is certainly Cappadocian, as Batiffol has shown. There are no real parallels in the writings of Athanasius to the distinctive expressions of the symbol.

2. The evidence for a *De Virginitate* written by Athanasius, and supposed evidence to the treatise we are discussing, is as follows (pp. 115-17):

a) Jerome in his *De Viris Illustribus* (c. 87) mentions among the writings of Athanasius a *De Virginitate* which Sophronius translates by *περὶ παρθενίας*.

b) Theodoret, in his *Ecclesiastical History* (II, c. xi) says that Athanasius wrote καὶ παραμυθητικούς δὲ λόγους ταῖς παρθένοις ἐκείναις.

c) In Photius (Cod. CCXXIX) we have the reference from Ephraim of Antioch (ca. 529-44 A. D.), Ἀθανάσιος ὁ Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὰς παρθένας ἐπιστολῇ (Migne, *P. l.*, 103, 996 C), in a list of church fathers who acknowledge δύο φύσεων ἔνωσιν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ πρόσωπον ἐν (*op. cit.*, 993 D).

d) Another witness is found in Hadrian's epistle *De Imaginibus*, in which he writes: "item ejusdem S. Athanasii de virginitate inter cetera: et in spiritum sanctum qui in patri et filio existens a patre emittitur et per filium datur" (Migne, *P. L.*, 98, c. 2, 1249).

e) An indirect witness (p. 116) may perhaps be seen in the oration

of Gregory of Nazianzus in praise of Athanasius (Orat. XXI), where he tells of the many pastoral interests of the great Alexandrine, *νεανίσκοι καὶ παρθένοι, πρεσβῦται μετὰ νεωτέρων, ἱερεῖς καὶ λαὸς*; and again, *προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ζῦγιον, καὶ παρθένιον, καὶ ἐρημηαῖον, καὶ διαλλακτήριον*, etc.

The statement of Jerome renders it probable that Athanasius wrote a *De Virginitate*. The character of that work is probably defined with accuracy by the historian Theodoret, as being an epistle of encouragement written to some virgins in a time of persecution. Indeed, the chapter of his *History* from which the reference is taken gives us the actual historical circumstances. The allusion in Gregory of Nazianzus to Athanasius as a *νυμφαγωγός* for *παρθένοι*, is quite inconclusive. The reference made by Ephraim of Antioch can be used only to support the fact that Athanasius did write an epistle *πρὸς τὰς παρθένους*. In Hadrian's epistle four quotations are made as from writings by Athanasius. The first of them is given above. The others are as follows: "Interrogatio Antiochi ad sanctum Athanasium" (*Quaestiones ad Antiochum Ducem*, Quaes. 39; Migne, P. b., 28, 622); "Sancti Athanasii de interpretatione psalmorum" (*Expositio Psalmorum*, 72:20; Migne, P. b., 27, 332); "Item ex epistola sancti Athanasii ad Epictetum" (Migne, P. b., 26, 1052). Of these three citations only one, that from the epistle *Ad Epictetum*, comes from the authentic writings of Athanasius. That is sufficient to impugn the worth of this epistle as a witness to the Athanasian authorship of *De Virginitate*. Accordingly, the only conclusions to be drawn from the references to a *De Virginitate* in the name of Athanasius are, that he probably did write an epistle to some virgins, and that the nature of the epistle may be as defined by Theodoret.

3. The argument from terminology, both ascetical and doctrinal, is another factor in the case. An examination of the many descriptive phrases applied either to virgins or to the practice of virginity cannot be entered upon here.² Throughout von der Goltz's book, however, emphasis is laid upon the Egyptian characteristics of both classes of expression. Now, parallel for parallel, these same expressions can be traced in the ascetical writings belonging to the Cappadocia of the fourth century. It is true that von der Goltz (pp. 120, 121) supports their Egyptian character by a *catena* of references to the *Vita Antonii*, *Vita S. Syncleticae*, *Expositio Psalmorum*, Fragment on Matt. 7:6, the *περὶ ὑπομονῆς*, epistle *Ad Amum*, and *De sententia Dionysii*. But of these the second, the third, and the fourth, at least, are not Athanasian.

4. The literary relationships of *De Virginitate* have already been

² I have collected the evidence in another study which may soon appear.

touched upon. Two of the writings in which parallels occur offer further support to the argument that it was produced in a district other than Egypt. First, as regards the Testament of our Lord, there is general agreement among scholars that the redaction was made somewhere in Asia Minor. There seems also some special reason to look to the province of Cilicia as answering most exactly to the geographical data of the book. The parallels between the Testament and our *De Virginitate*, and the fact that the writings were written about the same period, give support to the view that they were produced in the same region—the Testament in Cilicia and *De Virginitate* in the adjacent Cappadocia. Further, von der Goltz (p. 74) produces several parallels between *De Virginitate* and the *Sententiae ad Virgines* of Evagrius Ponticus. That Evagrius had been closely connected with the Cappadocians before he went into the Nitrian desert (385-400 A. D.) we have upon the authority of Palladius (*Hist. Laus.*, c.; 86). It was under the influence of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa that he was taught the doctrine embodied in his *Sententiae*, in which there are no characteristics distinctively Egyptian. Hence the parallels with *De Virginitate* give their quota of support to the Cappadocian origin of our *De Virginitate*.

5. The language of the doxologies also point to a district other than Egypt. In it we have four doxologies, occurring respectively in chaps. 12, 13, 14, and 25; the first three as doxologies to prayers, the last closing the treatise. The prayer of chap. 12 with its doxology is found in the Apostolic Constitutions (VII, 49), which is of Syrian origin. The other doxologies, where not based on the Didache, vary in some degree from this one, but their Syrian character is equally demonstrable. They read thus; c. 14, τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, μεθ' οὗ σοι δόξα, τιμή, κράτος εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶναίωνων, ἀμήν; c. 25, διὰ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας κ. τ. λ. These doxologies find their parallels in the Apostolic Constitutions, and its basis, the Syrian *Didaskalia*. (Compare the Verona Latin fragments, "a domino et doctore nostro Jesu Christo, cui est gloria in saecula; amen," ed. Haler p. 2.; Apost. Const., I, 1). The forms of all four are not Athanasian. He uses almost invariably a full trinitarian expression; an exception being that which closes the *Vita Antonii*. Further, in three different places they have the phrase found also in Serapion, ἐν ἀγίῳ πνεύματι (Wobbermin, *Texte und Unter.*, N. F., II, 3b, 96 f).

6. In conclusion, attention may be drawn to two lesser features of *De Virginitate*. The first is a piece of poetical description, ποταμοὶ μελίβρυνται καὶ πηγαὶ δάναοι (chap. 1). Such a description may have one of two sources

of inspiration—an earlier writer, or the influence of an author's country upon his imagination. In Plato's *Ion* the poets are said to claim to derive their strains ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι (p. 534, ed. Hermann). It is just possible that the juxtaposition of the two words, a little before Plato uses the phrase ἐκ τῶν ποταμῶν μέλι, may have suggested our author's phrases. If, however, he was influenced rather by the beauties of the country about him, it could not be a country such as Egypt. On the other hand, the phrases would suit a hilly country, abounding in streams and springs, such as Cappadocia.³ In chap. 14 the words of the grace after meals are: ἐλεήμων καὶ οἰκτίρμων ὁ κύριος, τροφήν ἔδωκε τοῖς φοβονμένοις αὐτόν. δόξα πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι. This finds its parallel in the ancient liturgical form preserved in the Apostolic Constitutions, VII. 33, ὁ ἐλεήμων καὶ οἰκτίρμων. Such a relationship suggests *De Virginitate's* knowledge of some Syrian or Palestinian liturgy, which would be natural in a work produced on the borders of Syria or Asia Minor.

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RECENT LITERATURE CONCERNING MEDIAEVAL MONASTICISM

This book¹ is part of the unfinished labors of the late Arthur Giry, the eminent mediaevalist whose death a few years ago was a grievous loss to the cause of historical research. One of Giry's pupils, M. René Poupardin, who already has made a distinguished name for himself as an archivist, has completed the task from the notes of his master, and added an introduction.

There are really three manuscripts here edited: (1) the *Vita Filiberti*—the life of a Merovingian saint of the seventh century, "écrite peu de temps après sa mort, mais dans un style barbare qui choqua même les contemporains;" (2) the *Miracula* of St. Philbert; (3) the *Chronicon Trenorchiensis*, (being the chronicle of the monastery of Tournus, where the saint's bones found final sepulcher), which was written in the eleventh century. The latter texts particularly permit us to follow the wanderings of a group of monks

³ Nonnus' Paraphrase of St. John's Gospel, on 6: 68 (ed. Scheindler p. 75), ἀμφιέπεις γὰρ ζῶντι ἀνάνδιω μελιρρύτω χεῖματα μύθων, yields an illustration of the sense of μελιρρύτος from a date somewhat later than the *De Virg.* and from an Egyptian writer.

¹ *Monuments de l'histoire des Abbayes de Saint-Philbert (Noirmoutier, Grandlieu, Tournus)*. Publié d'après les notes d'ARTHUR GIRY. Par RENÉ POUPARDIN. Paris: Picard, 1905. lii+137 pages. Fr. 4.50.

during a space of forty years, who were driven from point to point by the Norman invasions of the ninth century, and who finally found lodgment in 875.

The historical value of hagiographical literature is not so out of proportion to the enormous number of the lives of the saints as might be supposed. An accomplished scholar has recently expressed its value thus:

In the fortunate democracy of the Roman church, saints might spring from any walk in life and play their part on a humble as well as a conspicuous stage. Therefore their pious biographers, relating human life with a degree of detail which historians never thought of bestowing on any but kings, give us, quite without intending it, invaluable glimpses into the actual existence of classes in mediaeval society, of whose obscure and inarticulate mode of life we should otherwise learn nothing at all.

In the *Monuments de l'histoire des Abbayes de Saint Philibert* we get glimpses of culture history which are worth having: the function of the monastery as a place of asylum in an age of blood and iron; odds and ends of mediaeval psychological and social phenomena, and not a little light on the economic life of the time. We have very little knowledge of the trade relations of France, Flanders, and England before the year 1000, and the information in the *Vita*, chap. xxix, and in the *Miracula*, chap. 81, concerning Breton and Irish trade is very valuable. Incidentally the contention of a recent thesis, that the Scottish kings who had dealings with Charlemagne were really Irish chieftains, finds some substantiation. Light is also thrown, as intimated already, upon the ravages of the Northmen.

Since the book has appeared, a controversy has taken place between M. Poupardin and M. Léon Levillain in the *Moyen-Age*, March-April, 1906, regarding certain features of the editing to which the interested reader is referred. The latter disagrees with M. Poupardin as to the place where the first book of the *Miracula* was written; as to the "immediatization" of the saint, and as to the identity of the person to whom the latter work is dedicated.

Within the past seven years, a remarkable series of investigations in the field of mediaeval church history has been appearing under the direction of the theological faculty of Munich University. Each one of them is a product of seminar work there. The present book² is the last, and not the least important, of this series. The author is a monk of the order of St. Benedict. It is a critical comparative study of the regulations govern-

² *Untersuchungen zu den ältesten Mönchsgewohnheiten: Ein Beitrag zur Benediktinerordensgeschichte des X.-XII. Jahrhunderts.* Von BRUNO ALBERS. München: Lentner, 1905. xii + 132 pages M. 3.20.

ing the Cluniac group of monasteries during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries, as they are preserved in various codices, with a view to ascertaining the antiquity and origin of each manuscript and their historical relation to one another. It is intended as an introduction to an edition of the *Consuetudines Cluniacenses antiquiores*, which has just been issued under the supervision of the writer of this book from the press of the order at Monte Cassino.

In its nature, this study is a sequel to the earlier work of Traube upon the genesis of the Benedictine Rule.³ In that work, after comparing the discrepant passages in the earliest manuscripts of the Rule, Traube showed that these fell into two classes, pure and interpolated, and that the author of the latter was the abbot Sulpicius (died about 560), whose careless and incorrect version was the one most adopted by western monasticism. These changes, however, were due to ignorance and misunderstanding, and not to wilful intention. The Rule remained in this imperfect form until 787, when Charlemagne undertook its revision as part of his great plan of ecclesiastical reorganization, and requested the abbot Theodore to send him the correct version. It was then that the original first came into circulation. Traube's study concluded with a consideration of the work of the commentators, as Paul the Deacon, Chrodogang, Theodulf, and Benedict of Aniane.

Since the appearance of Sackur's *Die Cluniacenser* in 1895 there is no room to doubt the connection between the monastic reform movement led by Fleury and Cluny in the tenth century and the Carolingian reform movement. In chaps. i and ii Albers of necessity goes over a part of the ground covered by Sackur; but the fact that this is a study in textual criticism, and not an institutional history, brings him really more into alignment with the famous names of D'Achery and Mabillon.

There are six manuscripts in particular which are examined and compared. The Codex Casanat (called B'); the Codex Barberiniana XI, 120 (called B); another Barberini codex (Vat. Lat. 477, called C); the *Consuetudines Farfenses* (called F); the *Consuetudines* of Ulrich of Zell (called U); the *Concordia Regularis* of Dunstan (called D); Besides these, less important constitutions, as the *Consuetudines* of Gorze, Fructaria Dijon and of Bernard of Marseilles, are introduced.

It is not necessary to go into the process of critical analysis to which the author has subjected these texts. Suffice to say it seems to have been exhaustive. The result may be summarized thus: B is a reflection and amplification of B'. There are identical false readings in each. C is

³ See *Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften*, München, Vol. XXI, 1898.

proved to be derived from one of the other two, and the conjecture is hazarded that B is the connecting link. The demonstration goes on to show that the compiler of F knew and used B and B'. But did he use C? The answer largely depends upon the time of its composition, and this Albers has been able to fix satisfactorily, so that all these hang together. And yet, although the body of it is younger than B and B', C shows older traces not in the others, thus pointing to an unknown earlier text (*Urtext*), which is designated by the symbol X. Dunstan's *Concordia* also has vestiges of primitive influence, but in the main is derived from the others. The writer is certain the Benedict of Aniane knew B' and the unknown text X, which are the sources of his *Consuetudines*.

The whole work is of so critical a nature, and the demonstration proceeds so much after the manner of a series of mathematical formulae, that it is difficult to present the argument in any other way than to state the propositions as they are made. Yet the work is far from being baldly technical, for the notes contain a wealth of historical information. It is an almost impossible hope that the tantalizing *Urtext* will ever be found, and yet, when one recalls Pertz's wonderful discovery of the lost manuscript of Richer and Wattenbach's later achievement in a similar line, one ventures to hope.

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A BIOGRAPHY OF HÜBMAIER

Dr. Vedder's biography of one who is coming to be regarded as the ablest of the earlier Anabaptist leaders¹ supplies a long-felt want. Hitherto our latest and most accurate treatment of Hübmaier has been Loserth's monograph, published in 1893, but as valuable today as when it was first issued, by reason of the many facts concerning Hübmaier's life which have been brought together in this volume. But this book has never been translated into English, and in reading it one seems to feel its one grave defect, that the author cannot warm up to his subject, even when the excellent material that had been furnished him by the scholarly Austrian jurist, Dr. Joseph R. von Beck, died 1890, demanded more sympathetic consideration. Dr. Vedder's treatment in the book under review is sympathetic, but with conscientious regard for the facts, which are stated with clearness, candor, and accuracy. He makes the subject of his book to have been a man of great ability and generous attainments, a conscientious and successful

¹ *Balthasar Hübmaier*. By Henry C. Vedder. [Heroes of the Reformation Series.] New York: Putnam, 1905. xxiv+333 pages. \$1.50.

student of the Scriptures, but not a man who could endure privations for his convictions, as could other Anabaptist leaders.

The strongest chapter in the book is the one on the "Teachings of Hübmaier." For this he was obliged to study carefully Hübmaier's tracts, of which happily a number have come down to us. In intelligent interpretations of the Scriptures, Dr. Vedder says, Hübmaier "was the peer of the best scholars of his age" (p. 155). Of his ability as a writer he says: "His power of expression, his sense of literary form, his art of putting things . . . sets him alongside of Erasmus." Of his Christian spirit he correctly notes: "To read the average pamphlets of Luther written to confute some adversary . . . and then to turn to any writing of Hübmaier is like escaping from the mephitic odors of a slum into a garden of spices" (p. 158).

The readers will find in Dr. Vedder's volume a tabulated list of all the known writings of Hübmaier and the titles of some of the most important books bearing on the life of the man and the movement he represented in those early years of the sixteenth century. To the latter list, in the judgment of the reviewer, two more books of Loserth's might be added: *Georg Blaurock und die Anfänge des Anabaptismus* and *Der Anabaptismus in Tirol von seinen Anfängen bis zu seinem Erlöschen*.

Dr. Vedder is probably right in his contention that the first syllable of Hübmaier's name should have the umlaut, but we fear that Beck's and Loserth's spelling of the name without the umlaut, together with the difficulty many non-Germans will have with the umlaut, will keep the older form of the name in use.

We hail with satisfaction the announcement in the Preface that an English translation of all the writings of Hübmaier may soon be undertaken. Hübmaier's peculiar usage of words will be the one special difficulty which will have to be reckoned with in such an undertaking.

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RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT

The interest of Professor Stevens' book¹ centers in the atonement of Jesus Christ. "Salvation" is viewed particularly with reference to the method of its accomplishment, and in a lesser degree with reference to its spiritual content. The doctrine is based on the actual teachings of the

¹ *The Christian Doctrine of Salvation*. By George Barker Stevens. New York: Scribner, 1905. xi + 546 pages. \$2.50.

Scriptures rather than on religious experience. The treatment is in three parts—the biblical material, the principal forms of the doctrine as held by Christian theologians, and the author's own constructive statement. The first two constitute a historical survey of the doctrine, though the author disclaims the intention of writing its history. The value of the work would be heightened, however, by a generous allotment of space to this very thing; for it would furnish, even if the treatment were brief, a view of the conditions of the times when the principal types of theory came forward, and would prepare the way for a juster estimate of their worth than could follow from a test of them by present-day ideas alone.

Of the biblical material the priestly, sacrificial system is first taken up. The author finds that "neither its original nor intended and prevailing meaning was penal or substitutionary," and it only became so in later Judaism by the application of "those physical and mechanical categories with which was built up the pharisaic system of satisfactions, imputations, and merit-treasures." The prophets "ethicized" the early Israelitish idea of salvation as deliverance from perils and misfortune, and showed the inseparability of national safety and moral righteousness. God's righteousness is his absolutely equitable dealings with men, his self-consistency, and, so far from being contrasted with his mercy, is one with it.

In the New Testament four types appear: Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels, Paul, the Hebrews, and John.

1. In the mind of Jesus salvation is the life of sonship or moral likeness to God, but he neither presented an analysis of the process of salvation nor described its steps. He came to save men from selfishness, which must be replaced by love. To his own mind his teaching, his example, his life, his death were all one; together they were saving. After a careful examination of the saying of Jesus about giving "his life a ransom for many" and his words at the institutions of the Supper, the author finds that the supposed sacrificial reference in the former depends on a very doubtful connection with Septuagint usage, and the substitutionary idea in it depends on a literal construction of a figure of speech. As to the latter passage, the phrase "remission of sins" is of doubtful origin, and in any case does not bear explicitly on the question of penal satisfaction. Only by isolating these passages and separating them from Jesus' view of the import of his whole life can they be made to yield the doctrine of penal substitution.

2. In Paul, our author holds that, although there are passages (e. g., Rom. 5:10; 11:28; 8:7; 3:25; II. Cor. 5; 18, 19) which reflect the idea that

God's righteousness is "self-affirming governmental justice," "the principle of penalty," that Christ is "substituted for the sinner in his death," "so enduring the penalty of sin or the equivalent of that penalty that its infliction may be withheld from those who accept the benefits of this substitutionary experience;" yet these ideas do not belong to the main current of Paul's thought and are quite subordinate to his more mystical and ethical view of salvation by a life-union, a moral identity, with Christ. The specifically Christian is to be distinguished from the characteristically Jewish or rabbinic in Paul. Unfortunately, traditional dogmatics has attached itself to the former and minor element and has almost lost sight of the more important.

3. In Hebrews Christ's death is sacrificial, but not substitutionary or a satisfaction of justice; it is necessary because foreshadowed in the ceremonial law, but not because of the demands of retributive justice. How his death atones for sin is never indicated in the epistle.

4. In John salvation is eternal life which, again, is the knowledge of God and fellowship with him. It comes by illumination. Men obtain it from Christ because his work on earth is the historical manifestation of a perpetual spiritual activity by which he has been seeking to impart a revelation of God to every individual man. The death of Christ, while necessary and of saving value, is not generically distinct from Christian self-giving in mutual love and service. Thus the New Testament writers substantially agree as to what salvation is; the method of God in effecting it may be variously apprehended.

I must confess to some surprise at Stevens' statement that Paul taught the doctrine of penal substitution. The author comes to that view rather reluctantly and with hesitation (see p. 71) and seems to feel a lack of satisfaction with it, for he recanvasses Paul's doctrine several times (*vide* pp. 60, 68, 128, 274, 347, 451). But I can scarcely believe that one who had renounced the attitude of the Pharisees in religion should have followed them rather than the prophets on this point, and I think that by keeping the prophetic conception in mind a different conclusion may be reached. That two inharmonious conceptions of the method of salvation stand side by side, and that too in a single letter, in Paul's writings, seems incredible. The question at stake for Paul was not whether God would prove himself righteous by inflicting without fail the punishment of sin, but whether he would do this by overthrowing the dominancy of sin in the world (cf. Acts 17:30, 31). In the death of Christ was "set forth" that purpose and the method and source of its accomplishment. This harmonizes the Pauline view with the prophetic.

Turning now to Christian speculation on the subject, and omitting any consideration of the patristic theory that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to the devil, Dr. Stevens clearly expounds the five important types of doctrine which have played an influential part in the formation of Christian doctrine. These five types are: (1) Anselm's doctrine of substitutionary satisfaction; (2) the Reformation and post-Reformation doctrine of penal substitution; (3) the governmental theory of Grotius; (4) modern penal satisfaction theories, based upon the fundamental antithesis between the attributes of justice and mercy in God; (5) modern "ethical satisfaction" or "moral influence" theories. For purposes of criticism the author elsewhere reduces these theories to three—the theory of strict substitution and penal suffering of Christ; the governmental theory which is a half-way house, the resultant of two forces—religious sympathy with the underlying assumptions of the penal theory, and ethical revulsion against the inevitable consequences of that theory; and the view which interprets Christ's work in terms of personal relationship. But near the end of the book he says that choice must lie between the penal satisfaction and the moral theory. We will here sum up his arguments against the former.

It is *unscriptural*, for it is not found in any of the biblical writers except Paul, and even he entirely transcends the forensic conception in his specifically Christian teachings, nor is it required by their principles. It is only a *provincial* orthodoxy, for historically the great mass of Christian thinkers have not accepted it. The elements of the theory are *derived from opposite sources* and are contradictory. It is based on the *view of punishment as vengeful and vindictive* and not as remedial, and it leaves *no proper place for forgiveness*. It is *immoral*, for it impugns the justice of God. It has *no real place for Christ's life* in the redemption work and presents an artificial view of his death. Lastly, *it misrepresents the ethical character* of God. The best illustration of this Deity is Shakespeare's Shylock" (p. 410), and the Father in heaven of whom Jesus spoke, is forgotten. These arguments are delivered with a keenness and conviction which seem fairly irresistible.

Stevens begins his own constructive statement with the Christian conception—that is, Christ's own conception—of God. This he holds to be the foundation of the true theory of the atonement and the touch-stone of all theories of it. But one might object: Granted the right idea of God is the highest of all considerations and the supreme test of all doctrine, it does not follow that it is the first to be presented. Is it not true that it is the last and highest attainment of human thought, a product of many

factors of which the nature and the work of salvation are themselves among the most important? In this Stevens has followed the traditional method; but it seems to settle everything in advance. Christ's own personal teachings are treated as the source of our knowledge of God's character: "I find the gospel, and the whole gospel, in Jesus himself [he means Jesus' preaching], presented with a clarity, a simplicity, a transcendent beauty and matchless power nowhere equaled." These are noble words. But later it is added: "The revelation of God through Christ is primarily seen in Christ's own life and character." But this, one might interject, each of us must discover, partly, at least, through the impression it makes on our hearts; that is, out of our religious experience. God is "Father." Mercy, and not punitive justice, is his primary characteristic. Forgiveness comes from God himself without the removal of obstacles in himself. The righteousness of God, as in the Old Testament, is *saving*. The ground of forgiveness is the character of God. So teach Jesus and all the New Testament writers. Righteousness and holiness are synonyms of love.

The key to the personality of Jesus is found in his own self-consciousness. His conviction of personal sinless holiness, of himself as the heaven-sent friend of man, his call to repentance and acceptance of free forgiveness—here is his claim to saviorhood. God was to him "my Father"—in a unique sense. "Out of this grew his sense of his unique mission." Query: Might not the order be the reverse?

In primitive Christian thought we find everywhere sentiments harmonious with those of Jesus. If in describing him they made use of current philosophic language, it was "to express their sense of the unique character and revealing, saving significance of Christ, and not with the intention of proposing a speculative theory of his person." To them Christ was the realization of moral union with God, the interpreter of God to us, the revealer of the enormity of sin and God's compassion for sinners. All was conceived from the practical standpoint. Sin is voluntary, a state of the will; there is nothing of the historic orthodox doctrine of original sin, total or hereditary depravity, of the distinction between natural and spiritual goodness, "nor of that series of covenants (mostly made in Holland) by which one school of seventeenth century Calvinists explained God's dealings with the human race."

The orthodox distinction between punishment and chastisement, essential to the penal theory of atonement, is invalid. But if Jesus' representation of God's relation to mankind as that of parenthood is correct, then punishment can never be with sole regard to retribution. "Christ poured out his life for men, not to meet the ends of punitive justice, but

to save them from the sin which makes justice punitive" (p. 339). Forgiveness is not payment of a debt—commercial figure, nor acquittal of a culprit—legal figure, but a fatherly act; not a preliminary to salvation, but a part of salvation. "It is the transition from a guilty past to a holy future."

Hence the relation of Christ to man is not contingent on sin. His is the perfect life, holiness incarnate, *saving* in the whole extent of it and not by an isolated act. That perfect life of sonship constitutes him Savior and Lord—he is divine. "We must possess ourselves of his secret, repeat in ourselves his experience, live over again his life." In this all the New Testament writers are agreed. Christ's death was indeed necessary, but not in order to the forgiveness of sins, for that would make the forgiveness of sins prior to his death impossible or inexplicable. The true ground of forgiveness is the divine grace which Christ exhibited perfectly in his life and death. Did Christ then, bear our sin? Yes, in the sense that he entered into the perfect realization of the misery and guilt of our sin, suffering these with and for us. His mission was to reveal the eternal love in the bosom of God. His death was necessary because it lay in the path of the end he sought. The history of the events of his life sets all other theories at naught.

God was satisfied *ab intra*. He expressed himself in Christ. Salvation, therefore, is not referable solely to a single historic transaction. Atonement is a process, not merely an event; it is perpetual, eternal. Stevens thinks that this corresponds with the New Testament idea of the cosmic and eternal Christ. "There is an activity of God in all history of which Christ's earthly work is a historical expression. His saving mission is a transactional expression of eternal atonement." God in his very nature is a sin-bearer. Similarly, the attainment of righteousness is a never-ending process. Faith is the beginning of it and implicitly involves the whole. God accepts our faith, not instead of righteousness, but *as* righteousness.

It is evident that we have before us much more than a doctrine of salvation; it is virtually a whole body of divinity. It is an attempt to meet the needs of thinking men who feel that, the world-view upon which traditional dogmatics is built having been abandoned, there is imperative need of theological reconstruction. This magnificent piece of work is entitled to a hearty reception, for it not only abounds in rich and suggestive ideas, but it is also full of religious inspiration.

The pamphlet of Ménégoz² is a vigorous presentation of a view to which

² *La mort de Jésus et le dogme de l'expiation*. Par E. Ménégoz. Paris: Fischbacher, 1905. 43 pages.

the author says he has come through severe inward struggles. The general position is the same as that of Stevens. Some points may be specially noted:

The word of Jesus is the word of God; that is, in things moral and religious. In answer to the question whether we actually possess his teaching the author says that historical criticism has put that beyond all reasonable doubt. But the reviewer is tempted to ask whether religious faith can repose on scientific investigation or the sensible facts which such investigation is supposed to establish. Is not the foundation too slight for so great a superstructure? At this rate would not Christianity be still a religion of authority? Ménégos holds that the only expiation for sin, known to either Testament is by suffering—but, if we except Paul, never by a substitute. He says that Jesus did not believe that his own death was in itself a necessary condition of the forgiveness of human sin, inasmuch as, according to the synoptists, he was not certain until the very last that he was to die. Those exclamations of Jesus in reference to his death at the time of its imminence are evidently taken at their full face value as normal expressions of fact, but not so those distinct statements of the writers to the effect that Jesus plainly foretold his death. Such passages of the Synoptic Gospels which speak of the necessity of Christ's death are supposed to reflect the influence of Pauline ideas on the tradition. As for Paul himself, Ménégos thinks that he obtained his idea that Jesus really suffered the curse of sin from Deut. 21:23 by placing it alongside of the fact that Jesus suffered as if a malefactor, though in reality the Son of God—a rather fanciful explanation. While the author holds that suffering for sins yet uncommitted is absurd, he yet approaches the doctrine of substitutionary suffering for sin in his view that the solidarity of the human race made possible the suffering of Christ for past human sins and like suffering on our part.

Abbé Révière's book³ is an attempt to justify from the Roman Catholic standpoint the Anselmic doctrine of the atonement. More particularly it is an attempt to meet the polemic delivered by such "rationalists" as Ritschl, Harnack, and Sabatier against the Catholic dogmatic system, and especially to meet their attack on the doctrine of redemption by vicarious satisfaction, which seems an integral part of that system. The author is frankly an advocate, not a judge. To him the dogma of redemption was promulgated by divine authority, but the why and the how are taught by theology—itsself, however, reposing ultimately on authority.

³ *Le dogme de la rédemption*. Par l'Abbé J. Révière. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. xii + 519 pages.

The method followed is the historical; only, the outcome of the investigation is settled in advance. The teachings of the Old Testament and later Judaism on the sufferings of Messiah, the doctrine of Paul who lays the foundation of the dogma, the other biblical writers, and then the speculations of the Greek and Latin Fathers are traced in their order, with the aim of showing that the idea of substitutionary satisfaction was not a new thing in Anselm's time, but a stronger and more scientific expression of the ancient conceptions. Anselm's doctrine, therefore, is the issue of a normal development, and the later mediaeval theologians have given it a symmetrical elaboration. The author thinks that history makes clear the permanence and identity, during this development, of the one fundamental idea which constitutes the mystery of redemption. He declares that "the serene audacity of the affirmations" of Protestant historians need cause the Catholic no alarm. He has been unable to deprive himself of the pleasure of uncovering their errors. His pebble has "broken in pieces the colossus with the feet of clay." This defense of dogma by attempting to show its inner law of development bears a striking resemblance to the method of Orr's *Development of Dogma*. Abbé Révière has given us a lucid and interesting presentation of the Catholic view. But why should it be necessary for a Catholic theologian to justify the authoritative dogmas of his church!

Our examination of the works under review will perhaps justify the following remarks:

1. The desire of Stevens and Ménégos to base their theology on the direct teaching of Jesus has the ring of genuineness, and must be very reassuring to many minds. Yet we are not to forget that those very teachings have come to us through the medium of the early Christian consciousness, and the most natural explanation of the selection of Jesus' words made by the synoptists is that these were the teachings most meaningful to the early Christian community and most adequately representative of their religious and moral life. But could we if we would, and do we ever in reality, take over those teachings bodily into our consciousness and accept the sufficiency of their account of Jesus' thoughts? Can we import the primitive Christian consciousness into our minds? There is really a need of clearing the atmosphere on the question of what is meant by the authority of the Bible.

2. Professor Stevens attempts to give us a biblical, rational, and non-speculative body of doctrine. It is doubtless true, as he thinks, that one result of speculation has been the mixing of pagan and Christian elements in traditional dogmatic. But Stevens himself does not escape the specu-

lative impulse. His interpretation of the life and death of Christ as the manifestation of the sin-bearing and suffering of God—which seems the grandest conception of the atonement—is nevertheless a speculation. And this is indeed inevitable. The realities of religion must have a place in our world-view. If in explaining the relation of sin and atonement to the nature of the universe earlier thinkers have failed, we do not remedy the matter by eschewing speculation, but by doing it better.

3. The progressive explanation of the atonement by reference first to feudal relations, next by universal and inflexible law, then by the attributes constitutive of Godhead, and lastly, as in Stevens, through personal relations, probably represents true progress. But we cannot help asking whether the last-mentioned can provide a place for the idea of penalty, a very indispensable, though awful, idea to the masses of men. Can it, in the next place, afford some account of the relation between sin and death! The conviction of a connection between sin and suffering seems ineradicably fixed in the human mind. Death, whatever else it may mean, is viewed by men in the light of a defeat, as witness the millennial fight against it. Sin is also a defeat—a moral defeat. The two must be connected. It seems to me that Stevens has not allowed full weight to these considerations.

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MODERN THEOLOGY IN GERMANY, SCOTLAND, AND FRANCE

One of the most interesting publications from Germany in recent years is a volume of investigations and discussions on various allied subjects¹—viz., the essence and origin of religion; its roots and their unfolding; the Old Testament in the light of modern research; the gospel and primitive Christianity; saving faith and dogma; morality and religion; Christianity and the Germans; science and religion; religion and school; the church-forming power of religion; the essence of Christianity. Any adequate review would require a statement and appreciation of the main content of each of these essays—an onerous task for which we may not claim the needed space. Suffice to say at the outset that all have as their

¹ *Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung der christlichen Religion*. Herausgegeben von A. Deissmann, A. Dooner, R. Eucken, U. Gumbil, W. Hermann, F. Meyer, W. Rein, L. v. Schroeder, G. Traub, G. Wobbermin. München: Lehmann, 1904. 386 pages.

common purpose the exposition and advancement of religion in the life of the present. Hence, too, their form is not technically scientific, but popular. As the title indicates, we have here contributions to the further development of the Christian religion. The writers, themselves Christian from principle, are convinced that eternal truth wells up in Christianity, that a kind of life is unfolded therein to which spiritual supremacy and dominion of rights permanently belong. But these writers are also convinced—here is the crux of the matter—that the present state of the Christian religion does not correspond to the requirements of the world-historical situation; that the eternal truth of the religion has coalesced with much which very many feel today to be temporal and human, and to which therefore they find it impossible to accord the veneration due the eternal and divine alone. Grievous complications have arisen which have come to be well-nigh insufferable. During the modern period the picture of nature, the picture of history, the picture of man, have profoundly changed. Life itself, in its innermost web, with its goals and its forces, has become different from what it was. Shall, now, the entire historical life, scientific, political, economic, industrial, moral, change radically, and religion change not? In that case the result would be an inner dualism or breach in the life of the human spirit, injuring both the religious and the scientific, repressing and crippling the whole. In the end the outcome of culture without religion will be seen to be stale, flat and unprofitable; for culture cannot push aside the old eternal questions with which religion has to do. But religion, too, will be betrayed into rigidity and impotence if it resist progress and sunders itself from all the rest of life. Suppose, now, as is the case to a good degree on the continent of Europe, that the authority of state, church, and of society is summoned to maintain that inner dualism, to command men to believe what they can no longer conscientiously believe, then a moral crisis arises, which can be treated lightly only by those who have no sense for the veraciousness of life. The mere artificial and conventional maintenance in *statu quo* of that which has inwardly lost its validity jeopardizes veraciousness. The spirit becomes bewildered, and the conscience vexed and oppressed. Hence a great change must take place—is already going on—in the religious world; and it would seem that, in the providence of God, leadership in this revolution has been assigned to the people of the great Reformation.

In Germany these questions were formerly limited to academic circles. But that policy seems now to have been abandoned; and the problems are carried forth into all circles. Hence this book treats them in a way that is intelligible to all. The conclusions of specialists in many fields are

popularized. To be at once reliable and accessible to the people—that is the aim of the book. Each writer gives an independent expression of a great movement, but the movement itself is not the creation of the caprice of the individual; it is rather immanent and universal, the manifestation of the elemental and irrepressible forces of ultimate reality itself. A book of depth and of freedom, which says yes as well as no, it should contribute to the inner truthfulness, which is so painfully missed in the modern cultural world, of all those who, sick and sore from the confusions of the times, still care most of all for the things of the spirit.

It is interesting to compare with the volume above described a volume from Scotland,² containing eight popular lectures: "What Is God?" "Is Christ the Son of God?" "Did Christ Rise from the Dead?" "What Do We Mean by the Holy Spirit?" "What Is the Catholic Church?" "Can Sin Be Forgiven?" "Is there Life after Death?" They are published both by previous intention and by request. "They are meant to be primarily apologetic in character . . . also frankly religious." A comparison of the topics with those of the German *Beiträge* above will itself indicate interesting differences of standpoints. In general, it may be said that the Scotchmen in question cling to the traditional forms of belief, which they refuse to criticize and try to exempt from criticism, while the Germans feel somewhat more keenly that one of the most vital of all causes is the cause of truth and intellectual honesty, and are therefore prepared to accept the results of free inquiry, even if it should tear away from them everything they would wish to believe. If the Germans ask: "How much of traditional Christianity may we retain consistently with scientific integrity?" the Scotchmen are rather inclined to turn the question around. As an aside, it may be pointed out that this is a division which everyone who is open to the intellectual influences of the times must feel in himself, as a conflict, or apparent conflict, between two claims, both of which arise out of his own nature. As for the Germans and Scotchmen, neither party thinks that there is peace in the policy of a science without faith, or of a faith without science; but while the Scotchmen do not clearly distinguish faith from science, and while they are inclined to gloss over and conceal the incompatibility between modern science, historical and psychological especially, and the old forms of faith, the Germans sharply make the distinction and recognize the impossi-

² *Questions of Faith: A Series of Lectures on the Creed.* By James Denney, Marcus Dods, John Laidlaw, T. M. Lindsay, H. U. Mackintosh, James Orr, P. Carnegie Simson. New York: Armstrong; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1904. viii+212 pages.

bility in question; and, on this account, seek to overcome the conflict by the *Weiserentwicklung* of religion. To be sure, now and then today a young German, like Lipsius, concludes that the division of science ("reason," he would say) and faith is incurable, and supposes that we must choose the one and reject the other. But the Germans in general do not so conclude, but trust two things: the criticism of the forms of faith and the idea of development. The Scotchmen seem to be more afraid than the Germans that this criticism and this idea will be ultimately destructive and merely negative in its effects. It seems to me that the future is with those who believe that the searching fires may burn up much of the wood, hay, stubble—the perishable adjuncts that attach themselves to the edifice of human faith—but that they cannot touch the stones of the building, still less the eternal foundation on which it is built. Yet, on the other hand, I will not conceal my conviction that the dissolving power of these fires must be more fatal to more things which men have thought and still think to be bound up with their religious life, than the ordinary theological science of the English-speaking countries has come to appreciate.

Briefly to illustrate the difference alluded to above, reference may be made to the treatment of the subject of the Trinity by Professor Orr in the lecture, "What Is God?" God is tri-personal, he says. He finds this taught in the Old Testament (p. 25). The revelation of this truth "naturally culminates" in the New Testament. The trinitarian dogma is thus essentially biblical, and inalienable to the Christian religion. Here we have an illustration of the incorporation of a specific doctrinal formation, historically conditioned, into the pale of the faith that saves. If we turn now to the *Beiträge*—to Deissmann's discussion, say—we find that he exhibits the gospel and primitive Christianity without mention of the Trinity. In the very next lecture, however, Dorner, expounding *Heilsglaube und Dogma*, sets forth the subsequent ecclesiastical formation of the trinitarian dogma, and denies to the dogma any causal efficiency in the production of faith. The Scotchman would cling to the historic creed of the church, as a sum of fixed ideas, as constitutive of the gospel that saves; the German recognizes those ideas as temporal and transitory, and, what is of more importance by far, sees that the gospel does not consist in ideas of any kind.

Thus it is clear that, if the German is striving rather to readapt the gospel to the new situation of the modern world, the Scotschman is seeking rather to conserve the old, to keep the former statement of the gospel intact. Both know *what* the gospel is, but they would differ widely as to *which* it is. For the Scotchman it is a set of unchangeable and authori-

tative ideas—cause of which life is effect; for the German it is a kind of life and spirit—cause of which the ideas are effects, or rather experience in which ideas are instrumental and auxiliary, therefore capable of changing to fit new experiences in new situations. They differ—and to clear this matter up is the pressing task of theology—as to the origin, nature, and function of religious faith. The reviewer believes that the distinguished Scotchmen in their book do not occupy, with full power and boldness, the position of the Reformation. They seek to exhibit, not religious faith, but the gospel as spread before them in the Sacred Scriptures. Thus, in their case again, the old hereditary evil of Protestant dogmatics is not overcome: they set forth the thoughts, in which faith lives, as *normative doctrine*. The content of the gospel is held to be a *set of ideas*. Since these ideas are claimed to be borrowed from the Sacred Scripture, they become a fetter upon the interpretation of the biblical books, as soon as normative validity is accorded to these ideas in a definite form. As soon as we make Christian faith or the content of the gospel to be a sum of ideas, a doctrine of universal validity, no matter what those ideas or doctrines are or where they come from, we have left the soil of Protestantism and become Catholics. Ideas may be the expression, but not the norm, of faith. Besides, doctrines which claim universal validity are something quite different from a reality which can be experienced by many and become revelation of God to many. Indeed, by the “historical person of Jesus” is often meant among theologians today the “tradition” which is specially to be found in the Synoptic Gospels, without mythical features, but with the resurrection. But the content of such tradition is without doubt not a reality which we ourselves experience. The tradition with this content is itself “doctrine.” It is therefore not difficult for the theologian to bind it up in a bundle with other doctrines. But if we understand this expression, “the historical person of Jesus,” in this manner, we have no right then to call it the reality which redeems us. For it then no longer has the power and dominion over us of a reality which we ourselves experience. The proposition which still needs to be fought is that Christian faith has its beginning in the willing acceptance of a doctrine, of a set of ideas, of any such formally defined content of the gospel.

Loisy's book¹ of six chapters, treating of the sources of the gospels, the kingdom of heaven, the Son of God, the church, the Christian dogma, and the Catholic worship, is a liberal Catholic's reply to the famous lectures of Harnack on the essence of Christianity which have made such stir in the

¹ *The Gospel and the Church*. By Alfred Loisy. Translated by Christopher Howe. New York: Scribner's, 1904. 277 pages. \$1 net.

Protestant world; incidentally also to Sabatier's *Esquisse d' une philosophie de la religion*—a book strongly resembling Harnack's book in point of view and conclusions.

Loisy's book is not an essay in apologetics, as some have supposed. He himself disclaims any purpose to write an *apologia* for Catholicism or traditional dogma. Even his own church failed to understand him here, and because his work was defective and incomplete apologetically, especially as concerns the divinity of Christ and the authority of the church, repudiated the book. Still, Loisy was plain as to this matter: "The aim of the work is just to catch the point of view of history" (p. 2). Harnack had set forth a religion, or rather *the* religion, in the sole and unchangeable principle which he deemed to constitute it. He extracted or enucleated this principle from the gospels, and used it as a touch-stone to test the whole Christian development. The degree of the worth of that development is to be determined by the degree in which the previous essence of the Christian religion has been preserved therein. Harnack's whole contention is based on this fundamental point. Because from this principle Harnack arrives at a damnatory judgment upon the evolution of the Catholic church, her dogmas and her worship, Loisy calls in question both the principle and method of the distinguished Berlin professor. Can a movement as far-reaching as Christianity be based on a single idea or a solitary sentiment? Could a religion with such a career have its origin and value in a single thought, such as faith in God the Father as revealed by Jesus Christ? Is Harnack's definition of Christianity that of a historian, or merely that of a theologian who takes from history as much as suits his theology? Is his theory deduced from history, or is the history interpreted by the light of the theory?

So Loisy queries. Hence his brilliant book.

If Harnack finds the essence of Christianity in a sentiment in the soul of the Jesus of history, and the continuity of the religion in the identity of this sentiment in Jesus and in all Christians, Loisy's contention does not fall much short of saying that essential Christianity and empirical Christianity are coincident extensively and intensively; that, in short, the essence is the actual history itself. Loisy goes so far as to say that the essence of the gospel according to Harnack was only that which was secondary according to Jesus. To Jesus this essence was not in the new, but, for the most part, in that which was common to him and Judaism. In the face of the fact that nowhere does history show anything that is unchangeable, the essence of Christianity is not an unchangeable stability—the effect of that simple, new idea which Jesus was supposed to hold. The gospel is simply the root of the church; the church the living and inexhaustible fruitage of the gospel. The essence is the actual history itself.

The reviewer does not know what Harnack would say to his critic. But his own mind is full of thoughts on the great subject. He wonders why Loisy does not see the inconsistency of recognizing the development itself as the essence, on the one hand, and the static fixation of a specific stage and form of that development as final and infallible, on the other hand. The gulf between the spirit of modern science and even liberal Catholicism, still of structural necessity clinging to the principle of an absolute doctrinal authority, is greater than Loisy seems to think—quite as great as that between Harnack's "isolated sentiment" and evolution.

Again, it is difficult to see why, from Loisy's standpoint, Protestantism itself does not have its justification in his own principle, is not a legitimate, and indeed necessary, expression of the essence of Christianity. But in that case Catholic polemic and persecution should be condemned by Loisy as fighting against God—or does his evolutionary hypothesis include even that in the essence? Why do Catholics look upon Protestantism as a fundamental breach with true Christianity? If the process itself is the reality, how can any stage of that process be erected into a criterion by which to criticise and correct other stages?

A further consideration to which Loisy does not give due weight is the invasion of the historical with moral evil. Instead of essential Christianity having radical error and evil as inalienable constituents, it must rather be the critical touch-stone by which to distinguish those phenomena due to the pure impulse of the essence from those other phenomena which issue from error and sin.

But it must be admitted, I think, that so far the discussion is a drawn battle. The Harnack side holds rather to the individualistic explanation of the origin and worth of Christianity; the Loisy side, to the socialistic. Even in Germany today the religio-historical people are finding the source of our religion to be so social and complex that the "individual withers and the race becomes more and more" once again in human thought. While the scale of individualism and socialism will tip probably ever now this side now that, yet at the present time a new fight needs to be made for the personal, as the sole home of absolute values, as therefore having an autonomous and inviolable right to exist on its own account. Today it is precisely the dignity and right of personality which suffers abridgment from the doctrine of evolution. Personality has always so suffered from Catholic institutional absolutism, and Loisy is in danger of making matters worse by adding to this his new evolutionistic absolutism.

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CAIRD'S GIFFORD LECTURES

We have in these volumes¹ twenty-seven lectures from the pen of one of the most learned and most able and influential philosophers of our time. He reconstructs and elaborates the Hegelian dialectic with such independence that we sometimes wonder whether he would not have developed much the same general system of thought and belief, had Hegel never been born. Certainly the crystalline clearness and flawless beauty of his style, together with the earnestness and nobility of his thought, have contributed much to the popularity of logical idealism among many English-speaking scholars. And while it is often said today that the influence of the system is on the wane—a statement which is apparently true—still this may be due to the absorption of its ideas by the collective educated consciousness of our time, even more than to refutation and rejection of the system as a whole. It must be admitted, however, that a great change is going on in the philosophical world. Thought is directed, not to the morphology, but to the physiology, of reality, so to speak. The criterion of the “truth” of ideas is not their correspondence to objects, is not even their cognitive efficiency for getting at the “outside” world, but their workability and self-consistency. As in the last analysis we do not know what the eye in essence is, but only know its function, so of ideas. The biological function of ideas and beliefs as of organs of the body is in high favor with men of science today, thus gaining their adhesion to the new philosophy. All this ontological agnosticism is a far cry from the Hegelian gnosticism of which for so long Caird has been our foremost English interpreter. Upon the subject-matter expounded in these lectures he once yet again superposes the old dialectic schematism of his master.

Caird tells us that after he delivered these lectures he rewrote most of them, and added three lectures upon parts of the subject, which he was not able to discuss with sufficient fulness. His aim was, on the basis of the philosophic thought indicated above, to give an account of those ideas of Greek philosophy which have most powerfully affected the subsequent development of theological thought. This purpose naturally led him to confine himself chiefly to Plato and Aristotle, to the chief representatives of the Stoic philosophy, and to Philo and Plotinus among the Neoplatonists. Secondary variations of opinion, especially among the less important writers, he leaves to one side. He has also dealt with many aspects

¹ *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in Sessions 1900-1901 and 1901-2 by Edward Caird. 2 vols. Glasgow: MacLehose; New York: Macmillan, 1904. Vol. I, xviii + 382 pages; Vol. II, xii + 377 pages, 14s. net.

of the thought of the leading philosophers which do not appear to bear directly upon theology—the development of the logical and ethical elements of the Platonic philosophy, for example; or, of the theoretical and practical philosophy of Aristotle and the Stoics. But he did this because of the difficulty he would otherwise experience in showing the real meaning of the theological speculations of these writers without tracing out their connection with the other aspects of their philosophy. When he came to Plotinus, the case was different. Theology was the center of all his thought, and everything else was to be viewed in relation to it. In this connection what Caird says concerning religion is so important that it may as well be quoted in full: “A man’s religion, if it is genuine, contains the summed-up and concentrated meaning of his whole life; and, indeed, it can have no value except in so far as it does so.” Hence, too, it is obvious, according to Caird, that the theology of a philosopher is the ultimate outcome of his whole view of the universe, and particularly of his conception of the nature of man. This is a further explanation for his having linked very closely together the theology and the philosophy of the men under review.

While there are, of course, an intellectual, an emotional and a volitional element in the religious consciousness, as in every other, Hegel put the emphasis on the first, Schleiermacher on the second, Kant on the third. Here, too, Caird follows Hegel, although conditioned somewhat by the application, since Darwin, of biological, rather than logical evolution to the organic world and to the various departments and interests of human life. Hence Caird insists that “every man’s religion is on the way to become a theology” (p. 8); while Schleiermacher, e. g., and, following him, the Ritschlians, declared that religion is not theology and theology is not religion. “It is essential to faith that it should develop into reason,” says Caird (p. 21). “Philosophy must show itself as the purest form of its [religion’s] consciousness of itself” (p. 24). “Theology is religion brought to self-consciousness” (p. 31). Hence Caird turns to Greek philosophy and gives primary importance to its contribution to theology. It was the thought of Greece which gave to the philosophical inquiries of Christendom a definite method and a definite aim. It was from Greece that the fathers of the church borrowed the forms of thought, the fundamental conceptions of nature and of human life, all the general presuppositions, in fact, which they brought to the interpretation of the Christian faith. Hence the necessity of a knowledge of the Greek theology to “trace with intelligence the evolution of doctrines either in the early or mediaeval or modern times.” True enough. But what light is then thrown upon the religion of the Sermon on the Mount, and of the parables of Jesus—

upon the religion of the good Samaritan, whom Jesus praised despite his ignorance of the theology of the Greek philosophers, and its trinitarian and christological fruition in later reflection; and upon the religion of the prodigal son who needed repentance and a father's forgiveness even more than the philosophic exploration of the consciousness of a Hegelian Absolute, "the reflective analysis of the consciousness of God in its distinctive form" (p. 31)?

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PRESENT-DAY CONCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL PROBLEM

In the pronounced metamorphosis of the thought-world which has characterized the last two generations, no other phase has such significance for the theologian as the growing recognition of the reality, authority, and rationality of the moral. The ethical is coming to its own. Many false prophets have predicted an eclipse, total or partial, of the moral interests. Many other faint hearts have hoped against hope that the glory of the moral world might gain scientific recognition. Meanwhile the natural-science method has been disposed, not without signs of exultation, to annex everything in sight, and to proclaim no "truth" or "method" valid but that of laboratory analysis and historical research. Naturalism has aspired to become a universal theory of reality; and the effect has been confusion and hesitation in the ethical camp, with some evidences of dismay and even some desertions.

The truth is that the whole field of morals has been largely in the hands of its traditional defenders. Dogmatism of varying types has led the defense. While natural science has collected an arsenal of magnificently effective modern weapons defensive and offensive, the moral army is still equipped, in many of its divisions at least, with blunderbusses and flintlocks. The long-range artillery of the enemy has revealed the weakness of our traditional weapons.

But the enemies' searchlight has brought a revelation. We have been firing upon our friends. The militant spirit has been disastrously directed upon all sides, and scientific method must be credited with the discovery of the facts. Dropping the metaphor, let us say that a better theory of knowledge is exposing the fallacy of a false naturalism, and establishing meanwhile the reality of the facts, at least, which ethics have sought to defend. The moral facts have not been shaken. They are native to personal life. Religion and morality have never really been in jeopardy. *We have simply identified facts with explanations.* When

our old explanations were challenged by the insight of modern science, we thought the facts were threatened. Hence the false shibboleth of "ethics against science," and hence the lamentable campaign against science. But in these latter days men of insight, imbued with the scientific spirit have been teaching luminously upon the moral problem. Men of conviction, with reverent regard for the facts of the moral life, have discovered that these facts do not dissolve away under scientific scrutiny, but only appeal more authoritatively. New conceptions, new theories, new explanations, are being advanced, but the glory and inspiration of the moral realm of truth are being established, while it is sharing in the mental adjustment by which it, like other realms, will gradually find a more stable place in our theory of reality. The contributors to this end are chiefly living writers and teachers who are offering, each in his own way, a point of view that will be recognized in the final result. Men like Professor Herrmann in Germany and President King in America are sowing good seed in the wonderfully fruitful soil of the present, and already some of the seed is germinating.

In his Lyman Beecher lectures¹ Professor Peabody employs the grace and charm of treatment and the exceptional spiritual insight which characterize all his work. The lectures constitute an inspiring and informing study of the ethics which take Jesus as the norm, and personal character as the end of moral achievement.

Recognizing that "this is the age of the social question," the author gives a fresh interpretation of the significance of Jesus from the changed center of gravity. Leaving out, so far as possible, the religious content of the gospels which has been the object of study of other generations, he confines himself to the study of the significance of Jesus for the character of the individual in society.

Each period in history goes with its question to the simple record, and finds an answer which seems written to meet the special problem of the time. In an age of theology the gospels were a source of theological doctrine; in an age of ecclesiasticism they fortified the church; in an age of emotionalism they kindled the flame of piety. The same adaptability is discovered once more by the age of the social question (p. 4). Other paths open before the thought of other generations; but straight before the age of the social question lies the social teaching of Jesus Christ (p. 8).

This is the point of view of the book, and in a brief preliminary discussion Professor Peabody shows that, consistently with his purpose to establish

¹ *Jesus Christ and the Christian Character*. By Francis G. Peabody. New York: Macmillan, 1905. 304 pages. \$1.50.

a social kingdom of God, Jesus "has what has been called a passion for personality." *Character* is the keynote to Jesus' method, from whatever point of view you regard his work.

If, then, the study of the social question opens as by an inner door into the interior problem of the Christian character, it becomes of peculiar interest to follow the teaching of Jesus as it thus enters the region of personal morality. What are the traits which he is most concerned to inculcate? By what kind of persons is the service of the world to be effectively undertaken? What is the way of growth, and what are the consequences of the Christian character? Is the character trained in the way of Jesus Christ fit to meet the demands of the present age?" (P. 18.)

He invites us to quit the theological, and to confine ourselves for the time to the ethical interpretation of Jesus Christ. But it is a merit of the book that it recognizes the exclusive ethical emphasis as a *method*, rather than as a finality. Theology is in abeyance here, but theology is inevitable and will be drawn from the same sources. But

if it be the truth of history that the first disciples were led on from moral attachment to spiritual insight, from reverence for the character of Jesus to confession of the faith of Jesus, it may be reasonably believed that the same path of spiritual development may be followed to the same end by the mind of the present age. Other times have first been taught of the nature of God and then have turned to the service of man. It may be the distinction of the present age to reverse this order of religious experience and to rediscover the knowledge of God through the doing of duty. It may be that beyond the ethical renaissance of the present time there is waiting a revival of religion (p. 37). The Christian theology of the future may be a corollary from the character of Jesus Christ (p. 38).

Such are the problems and the method of the inquiry. The alluring and illuminating discussion of "The Character of Jesus Christ," "The Roots of the Christian Character," "The Growth of the Christian Character," and the other consecutive topics, cannot be characterized in a brief review. Many of the familiar problems concerning Jesus and the Christian character meet us here, but the discussions are so fresh and suggestive that the reader has constantly a sense of discovery as he sees the problems through Professor Peabody's eyes. The book articulates with the author's *The Social Teachings of Jesus*, but its problem and purpose are different. It is a most valuable addition to the literature of Christian ethics. It is an immensely fruitful book for all; but it has peculiar eye-opening value for the student afflicted with academic theological myopia.

Somewhat in contrast with the concrete treatment of ethics just noted

is the treatment by Emil Fuchs of *Gut und Böse*.² This work appears in the *Lebensfragen* series, some volumes of which have already been reviewed in these columns. "Good and Evil" here symbolize the whole circumference of the ethical problem; and the real subject of the book is given in the subtitle, "The Being and Becoming of Morality." With a good deal of skill and directness the author approaches the chief problems of ethics, and wrestles with them. The treatment is theoretical, but not academic. With a fair degree of originality the book exhibits the thoroughfares of ethics and the principles of ethical engineering by which we may hope to find a way over the hard places.

The book falls into two parts. In the first is considered morality in general, or in mankind; in the second, the specific form of the moral life in the individual. With scientific directness the treatment begins with a recognition of the positive and instinctive utterance of moral judgments, and at the same time our attitude of indefiniteness toward the standards by which we proceed. The author notes the impossibility of any systematic treatment of ethics until we agree on some sort of standard of measurement. In a scientific spirit he inquires what "scale" or "yardstick" of moral values can at least tentatively serve as a basis for discussion. What these moral standards are, the fact of their manifoldness, their classification, their unqualified nature—these topics precede a somewhat full and very suggestive discussion of the source and justification of our moral measurements. With copious historical citation and comparison, he traces the rise or "becoming" of the ethical life, and notes its many-sidedness. Consonant with the modern psychological emphasis, he finds that unitary creative personality is the last word as to the source of our complicated ideals and measurements in the moral realm. Personality brings its own authority; and development is the law of the spirit. The mystery of unity and development in ethical judgments is simply one aspect of the mystery of the unity and development of the conscious agent. Meanwhile we must weigh moral quantities in terms of principles and ideal values which grow in meaning; and not in terms of fixed units eternally valid and unchangeable.

Of special interest is the chapter in which Christian ethics are exhibited as articulate in principle with the structure of ethical theory which he has outlined. The relation of morality to religion, as well as the significance for science of the moral world-view, receives consideration. In discussing the individual moral life, the exigencies of duty in society, and the conflict

² *Gut und Böse: Wesen und Werden der Sittlichkeit*. Emil Fuchs. Tübingen: Mohr, 1906. 308 pages. M. 3.

of the laws of the spiritual with the laws of the natural world, we have the reflection of a current ethical emphasis in German thought. Whether the philosophical implications that underlie certain phases of the discussion are sound will receive varying degrees of assent according to the reader's presuppositions. That the book is a vital discussion of vital issues is above question.

An interesting discussion is that of Wilhelm Schmidt³ in *Der Kampf um die sittliche Welt*. The nature of the book renders impossible an adequate characterization in a few words, except to say that it is a literary study of various writers, with the moral problem as the directive principle of the study. After a brief chapter on "Human Freedom" and also one on "Conscience," as the underlying facts in the ethical consciousness, Dr. Schmidt traces these and correlated ethical conceptions through the works of Shakespeare (whom he designates the poet of the conscience), Herbert Spencer, Buddha, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoi, and Lombroso. A great variety of interesting view-points are disclosed and contrasted. Suggestiveness is perhaps the chief merit of the treatment. While offering nothing profoundly original, it may serve to disturb and broaden complacent dogmatism which recognizes only one point of view. For the authors with whom Schmidt deals are all real forces in the moral world, and their convictions, though having a common ethical root, are almost grotesquely contrasted at times in their practical and theoretical outworking.

The practical spirit of the treatment and the underlying conception of method is well expressed by such sentences as the following: "The final goal of ethics is not knowing, but doing;" "We undertake ethical investigations, not merely to know what virtue is, but in order to become virtuous. That should be the leading motive of our treatment." The book has a practical as well as a theoretical purpose. It closes with a chapter on the goal of human freedom, in which the outcome or ultimate meaning of moral life is discussed.

Herrmann's *Faith and Morals*⁴ is really the English form of two small brochures which are already familiar to the readers of German. *Der Evangelische Glaube und die Theologie Albrecht Ritschl's* constitutes the first part, on faith; while the second part, or "The Moral Law," is Herr-

³ *Der Kampf um die sittliche Welt*. Von Wilhelm Schmidt. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1906. 338 pages. M. 6.

⁴ *Faith and Morals*. I. "Faith as Ritschl Defined It;" II. "The Moral Law as Understood in Romanism and Protestantism." By Wilhelm Herrmann. New York: Putnam, 1904. 415 pages. \$1.25.

mann's *Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit*. If we mistake not, both pamphlets have been reviewed in these pages; but the present form will make Herrmann's notably keen treatment available for many new readers. The wide influence of Herrmann's work as thinker and teacher claims our attention to the position he defines here.

In the first part he asks the question: "What is faith?" And in giving us Ritschl's conception he is giving his own reply. With incisiveness and with evident conviction he discriminates, and inveighs against, the traditional conception of faith as credulity, or assent to a Bible. This is in general the Roman Catholic conception, and, alas, a current conception of Protestantism. Faith is a more vital act of a personal soul, and can have no relation to the form of assent to what we do not perceive to be true. "Every religious thought which does not become intelligible to us remains foreign to us, though we may give it out ever so defiantly as the expression of our own convictions and excite our imaginations ever so strongly with it." Then he pleads for the reality of a faith which is nothing less than a personal experience of the reality of the living God. With inimitable vividness he discusses this conception as the only root of a moral faith, and considers the relationship of Christ to Christian faith.

The second part, on morals, is likewise a contrast of Roman Catholic morality with the essential morality which makes the individual autonomous in his own moral world. He demolishes the etiquette conception of morality, and declares for the independence of the sovereign soul which can find its way without paths or rules. The moral ideal is a growing ideal, and duty and virtue grow as consciousness grows. Personality finds its guiding principle and authority in its own unfolding nature. This is, of course, closely related to the previous conception of faith as a personal relationship. With a frank recognition of the elements of the moral problem, with intellectual keenness, and with passionate conviction, he outlines a daring conception of the essentially moral, and scouts the position of formalism and legalism. Naturalism, too, as an account of the moral life is by implication shown to be utterly inadequate and misleading. His argument carries the weight of conviction, and makes the reader feel that we are conducted to the very heart of the problem. Herrmann is a great prophet in this "greatest sphere" of life, and his teaching will come as a tonic to other eager seekers.

President King shares with a very few other thinkers the distinction of being spokesman and leader, in our generation, of the most fruitful positive movement in philosophy and theology. His constructive insight and

practical helpfulness have found eager recognition on the part of many who have listened to his frequent platform utterances, or have read his published writings. This most recent volume contains characteristic emphases of his thought expressed with characteristic clearness. *Rational Living: Some Practical Inferences from Modern Psychology*⁵ exactly expresses the purpose of the book and suggests its method. It is an endeavor to gather up some of the chief results of modern psychological study, and show their relationship to character-building. Increasing comprehension of the laws of mind ought to bring increasing facility in achieving one's best self. This latter is "rational living," and it is essentially the problem of ethics.

The discussion aims to give in the field of practical living something of that sense of unity and sureness that the investigator in natural science has, and that can come only from a knowledge of the laws involved. In this aim it joins hands with all those writings—much more numerous of late—that have sought to give to both ethics and religion a true psychological basis (p.ix).

For the purpose of this brief review the scope, method, and purpose of President King's attempt in this book can be most adequately and accurately expressed in the author's own compact preliminary statements. He first notes the enormous amount of consideration given to psychological study in the present generation.

No other department of study directly connected with philosophy has had anything like equal attention, or made anything like equal growth (p. 1). Such extended and thoroughgoing study of the nature of man ought certainly to have some meaning for practical living. It concerns, therefore, every intelligent man to ask what the significance of this movement is (p. 2). Using the term "modern psychology" to cover the trend of all later psychological investigations, what are the most important inferences from modern psychology? What does it mean? The answer can be given very compactly. There seem to the writer to be four great inferences from modern psychology, and each with suggestions for life and character—that is, with direct suggestion of the conditions of growth, of character, of happiness, and of influence. These four inferences are: life is complex; man is a unit; will and action are of central importance; and the real is concrete. In other words, modern psychology has four great emphases; for it may be said to urge upon us the recognition of the multiplicity and intricacy of the relations everywhere confronting us; of the essential unity of the relations involved in our own nature; of the fact that this unity demands action and is best expressed in action; and that we are, thus, everywhere shut out from resting in abstractions and must find reality only in the concrete. Mani-

⁵ *Rational Living: Some Practical Inferences from Modern Psychology*. By Henry Churchill King. New York: Macmillan, 1906. 271 pages. \$1.25.

festly these contentions are all closely interwoven, and they may be even regarded as all summed up in the last—as asserting the interrelatedness of all. . . . It is these four propositions which form the subjects of the main divisions of our entire inquiry (pp. 3, 4).

With scientific dialectic and patience, but with a living regard for practical issues, this fourfold theme is shown to yield directive principles for life, which must have immense significance. President King's book forms a valuable addition to the literature of our age which is studying the problems of education, of religion, and of ethics from the standpoint of the nature of the mind itself. As a contribution to the science of ethics its value is twofold. First it makes clear certain practical corollaries and conclusions for the direction of conduct. But second, and chiefly, it emphasizes a *method* in ethical study—the method which reasons from the nature of mind to the practical principles that ought to govern life. This is surely a rational method, and it ought to justify the hope of approaching the goal suggested by the title of the volume, *Rational Living*.

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A STUDY OF HERRMANN

A careful study of the perhaps most influential theologian of Germany today¹ has been prepared for the purpose of acquainting French students of theology with the issues which center in Herrmann's work. The first part of the book is devoted to a careful objective presentation of the historical development of Herrmann's literary activity, including a brief résumé of the discussions and controversies occasioned by his writings. The second part discusses critically topic by topic the main aspects of Herrmann's theology, giving both the estimates of the prominent critics of Herrmann and the author's own conclusions in regard to him. Among the many suggestive interpretations we can name only a few. Goguel shows that Herrmann was largely responsible for giving to the somewhat crude dualism of Ritschl a well-reasoned basis, and he gives an admirably clear and compact survey of the warfare which has been waged in Germany concerning this dualistic theory of knowledge. He also sets forth with penetrating insight the difficult question as to Herrmann's conception of faith and its relation to conclusions based upon scientific demonstration. In this particular field he thinks that Herrmann

¹ *Wilhelm Herrmann et le problème religieux actuel*. Par Maurice Goguel. Paris: Fischbacher, 1905. 267 pages.

has been over-influenced by a materialistic conception of natural science. Herrmann will not admit that natural science can in any way disclose spiritual reality. He accordingly proclaims his conception of faith as the sole avenue of escape from scientific agnosticism. One advantage of Herrmann's religious opposition to natural science, however, is seen in the refusal to entertain the thought of any of the humiliating "harmonizations" between religion and science which have done so much to bring discredit upon theologians in the opinion of men of scientific spirit. Herrmann is criticised by Goguel for not setting forth a theory of religious knowledge. While repeatedly asserting that the laws which govern the conclusions of faith are different from the laws which govern scientific conclusion, he nevertheless fails to show how such faith-conclusions are results of an orderly process of knowledge rather than arbitrary assertions of the individual person. Again, Herrmann does not allow sufficiently for the pedagogic value of historic doctrine. As a matter of fact, a person usually becomes a Christian by first accepting, on the authority of trusted parents or teachers, a certain body of doctrine as the basis of action. Religious development consists in a progressive criticism of this naively accepted doctrine, rather than in a repudiation of it for the purpose of learning purely and simply from the personal life of Jesus. Perhaps the most valuable portion of the book consists in Goguel's admirable review of the famous controversy as to whether the "biblical Christ" or the "Christ of history" is to be the basis of religious faith. In answering this question, Herrmann has attempted to employ the method of approach which would be approved by inductive science; i.e., to discard all conceptions of the supernatural Christ or of the ideal Christ, and to begin by coming into contact with what historically can be ascertained concerning Jesus of Nazareth. But our religious convictions concerning Christ are not found by using historic data as natural science does—viz., to draw certain inferences from them—but rather by the personal contact with the overmastering spiritual power of the inner life portrayed in the gospel picture of Jesus. Herrmann holds that, no matter what one's historical conclusions may be, the transforming effect of Jesus religiously upon men will be always the same. Goguel, however, thinks that one's conclusions based upon historical criticism have much to do with the spiritual effect wrought upon one by the personality of Christ.

The work as a whole is marked by a careful and accurate investigation, combined with a sympathetic appreciation and criticism.

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